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Abstract 
The i\ustrallan Broadcasting Corporation. creatGd In t 932 and 
reconstructed in 1983. is a pub/ic-fundod national f)roadcasting 
organisation. It was 0st:;bilshed to provide a oomprehensivG. 
Innovative and impartial radio and television service for all 
Australians. 
The ABC is a statutory corporation. intended to be accountable 
to Parliament for it:s actions, but independent of the government of 
the day. Controvorsy about ABC news and current affairs 
sorv1ces, about whether Corporation programs arG obfGot/ve, 
Impartial, baiancod and free from polft/cal interference, is a hardy 
per;;;nn1,11 of Ausrn:i/ian public life. The ABC'c public credibility 
depenos on Its perceived ability to function without government 
intiu0nc0 over prograrn content. 
T!Jr: ABC does not operate In isolation. It must negotiate tor 
financo and resources wlt11 o federal burnaucracy 11nd conform to 
standarr.is of accountability sot by Parliament. Corporation claims 
to tndopendenco cannot be ossassed in absoiutG terms, but must 
be 'li~~ved wirhin its zettlng in a world of conrplox lnrGraction 
omween Parliament, the government and tho Corporation. 
\t\litl1in thi0 tramtawork, ABC independence rnusr be viewed in 
two arenas - thG! administrative independence of tho organi'1ation to 
control and aliocate Its resources, and function a/ Independence to 
make program iudgoments without outside lnterforencG. This 
dissertation examines both dimensions of t11e conrompornry ABC. 
Through institutionili analysis it seeks to determine whG!ther the ABC · 
in pracrice enjoys th;;i lndepondenco which in theory is guamnteod 
by its log/sliltlve form. 
The thesis opens with a discussion of tho thooretlcal 
assumptions 1inderlylng the ABC and a description of the 
organisation's environment: the origins of the ABC In tho idDology 
of pubiic sDrvic<? broadcasting, Its place in t!Jo Austm//an 
broadc:'!sting system and Its relationship with governments and the 
Public Service. It is argued that the prec/sa objectives and alms 
of tile ABC have never been clear. tflat a lack of agre,;;d goa/3 
makes it difficult for tho organisation to win public aupport against 
governmental intervontlon In /\BC administration. and that rho 
structure of tl1e Australian broadcasting system em1b!os commercial 
3 
media rival.~ to lobby governments to re3trict tho ABC to m.~rginal 
acrivitios. 
ABC decision-making is then examined: the influence of the 
ABC':; legislative basis, structure, tho role of the Board of 
Directors, 1\BC management, the internal allocation of resources 
and the work environment. The focus is on the relative 
involvemont of dirootors and man,9gers on ABC output; it is argued 
that structural impediments limit thCJ intfuenoe Directors can 
exercise over Corporation policy, while confu:1ed lines of 
responsibility. the structure of the organisation and the production 
process make it difficult for ABC managers to tightly control 
program output. 
With the external and internal context established, the 
production of ABC news and current affairs programs and the 
political control of ABC resources are examinea. The study 
concludes with an assessment of whether the rhetoric of an 
independent but accountable ABC is realised, or whether the 
Corporation is part of the general machinery of government, with 
its independonco a convenient fiction. 
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Australian Association of !.:rational Advertisers 
Z\.clrnini.:~trative Appeals Tribunal 
Australian B:toadcasting CommJ.ssion from July 1932, 
Australian Broadcasting corporation from July 1983 
Australian Broaclca:iting Control Board (abolished 1977) 
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (created 1977) 
Australian Council of T~ade Unions 
Automatic Data Processing 
Australian Journalists Association 
Australian Labor Party 
Alnplitude Modulation radio signals 
Australian :National Cpinicn Polls 
P-.. ustralian National University 
Australian con'JflUnica.ti.ons satellite zx~ste:n 
Brl.sb;).11e. Adelaide,. Perl11 and I1obarL ( .r..nc e:-::pression 
for th.e srnaller corporation branches) 
Br1tish Bro::ttl:icasting corpo:ration 
l'.llC Board of JV'.anagement 
PetJ.er~1.tion of Aust:rali<:l.n Comroe:r.cial Televizion Stat.ions 
Federation 0£ Australian Radio IlroadcasterD 
Prequency ?1odulation ~ zte:reo radio and television 
Independent Television ( llritish} 
Liberal/National Countr:y ParL~l coalition 
LWl' 
Ml? 
OTC 
l?MG 
PNG 
.!?SE 
RSL 
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London \1eekend Tele:v-is:io:r1 
~·!e1nber of the House of Representati.ves 
~1ational B::::oadcasting Se:t.vic0 Planning Cornnlittee 
Australian oversea.D Telecomrnunic<l.t.ians Comn1ission 
Office and Department of the Postroaster-Generul 
Pa_pua New Guinea 
Public Servic~ Board 
Kadio Active Movement - .internal ABC faction of the 
early l970a 
Returned Sailors', Soldiers' and Ai.:r:mens • Imperial 
League of Australia 
SpecJ.al Broadcasting Service (established l97B) 
United l\uiiOtralia ParLy { 1931-1944) 
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Introduction 
Tim ABC resembles Culliver lo Ll!llpu1. iled to the ground by 
innumerable threads manulactured by his well-meaning but 
watchful hosts. The ABC is. however, not likely to be called 
upon to put out ,1 palacQ fire: It is more likely to bG suspected of 
stc1rting one. 
(Professor Leonie Kramer 19830: 128l 
Ccn1ro'(ersy J':J.out the nev;s and current affairs programs of tlia f>.ustrn!L1n 
3roadcasting Corpora1ion <ABC) is an Australian trndition. No eioctlon 
c::1n be hold v1ithout both government and opposition accusing th(3 ABC of 
btas. Every !IG'vv progrJm earns the Corporation a furious rtJsponso from a 
section oi tho population, ,l\!I important ABC a-dministrative decisions incitG 
condemnntion frorn :~ome politici<:1.n or interest group. 
no1es : 
Tho content of most of the disputes ~bout tho f.\BC was thin. 
Tho way they were conducted was overwhelmingly appalling 
par11san on al! sides without even a vagueiy thought·~out ldea ns 
to what the it\BC might aim at: :..t.nle c!ichos sorved indeod. 
When the history of broadcasting in f\ustrnlia i~ vJ:itton. one of 
tho most dG:prosslng th£?rnos obout it will bo 1hat. ln :;10 tnr ns 
'principles' over got discussed, it v-1nn in this 3nH~in\el!ectual, 
higl1!y distortGd and basically ignorant way in vvhich ut ioast son1e 
of those principles were ralsGd in thG fairly constant 
pre-occupation with the ABC. ( 1980: 551 l 
Th!s the~ls tnKcs a cr\tlcal look ot the ARC. an orgardswtion whlch 
producos radio nnd television prcgrurriS, The ABC is a statutory 
corporation, dosiqned to bo accountabl0 to Parliamcmt but ind0pendent of 
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government. The Corporaiion ic funded by Parliament and charged with 
responsibility to provide comprGhenstvo information, oducation <2nd 
ontertainrnent for a!! /\ustral!ans. Discu0slons wbout the independence of 
the !18C, about whether Corporation programs are objective. impartial and 
balanced are a hardy perennial of 1\ustralian public life. 
Numerour; fundamental problems plague the simple proposition that an 
agency of the state should be respon5ible to Parliament but !me from 
gcvt1rnment directive, ~-lovv can an orgunisation be both accountable n.nd 
indepondent? What does 'indepcmdent' mean - what are the nature and 
distinct characteristics of institutional independence? These questions need 
to be asked of all statutory corporations, and are partlculariy important for 
the ABC. which owes 115 public credibiiity to its percoived independence. 
This ~;tudy alms to clarify tho concept of institutional indopendonce for u 
statutory corporation -· that is, lhG degrne to which a statutory corpor;:inon 
i:J or ls net controlled or directed by governments. T!1e thesis 0xolore0 
the pnt0ntitil for t\8C indepc:ndenco by as$e:;sing whether tho organisation 
c:::in produc8 n.Bws and currc;nt affairs progrnms vvithout governmGnt 
inierferenct?. 
FtJnct\nnn! nnd l\dminlstrativc lndoc('.\ncioncc 
The ABC does not op~srah;; in isolation, It must negotiate for finance 
and resources \Vith a federal bureaucracy and r:ontorm to stand.n:rds oi 
accountability demanded by PariiarnfJnt. 1::orporation cl3irns to 
independence c3nnot be aS::>i:JSs0d tn absolute te-rrn::, but must be viewed 
wlthin the frarne\vork of the parliamnn;ary sy'.::,tern \vh!ch created ths, ;\BC 
and the form and ::;;tructure \Vhlch sust,-:;in;) the organis.atior·L 
!n 1932 Parliament created an institution \Vhich \Vas designed by 
convention and legi~.lation - to be independent. The l\BC was intended to 
select. prepare and broadcast political news and analysis •.vithout 
government involvement. Tl1e 1\BC would have oo editorial voice but be 
g 
inr.tcpendc;r1t and reliabie, .. , 
opinion' (ABC Hl82a: 3) . 
a dislnterested forum for differing shades of 
\iVhon the ABC \VCJ.s reconstituted as a 
Corporation in 1983 thG requirement that its programs should remain 
independent and ob1eoilvo was included in Corpor,'Jtion legislation. 
The politicians who established the ABC sought an institutional form \Nhlch 
would ensure the vlabillty oi 
chose tho legislative device 
impartiality and independence. 
of the statutory corporation 
Parliament 
to balance 
Though 
practice 
autonomy v,i!th the concept of ministerial responslbiii1y. 
independence and accountability appear incompatible. in 
gnvernments view the ABC as comprising tvvo different sectors the 
administrative ,1nd the functional. The administrative side of the srntutory 
corporation deans 1,v\th ihe requisition. ailocation and use of resources 
v1hil0 the functional dimension generates output. iviini:~terial responsibility 
requires monitoring the ndrninistratlve sector or a statutory corpora1ion while 
not bncorn!ng involved in functional affairs, 
keeping control over the sector of ;;t~.ttutory 
cnrpora1ions, rrdnister$ are ablEJ to regulate v:ages nnd cono!tlons oi statf, 
c:H1suro cornpiianco v1ith ::;tandard buronucr;;;t!c auditing pr::ictlccs and 
generally perforrn the same rnonitorlng ro!o thoy koop over their own 
dopariments, \deztlly, hov-1ever, ministers 'zvin not influence the 
organlsnt\on's us0 of its resources. This should, in theory, prevent n 
corporation exp!cltl:;g its indnpendonce to become corrupt or inofflcient, 
Though an arbitrnry division. tfif? adm\ni;:;~ru1ive/functionul dichotomy 
enables politicians to w.rgue that statutorv corpcr;ition;:; nrc t!nunc\a!iy 
accountable to Parnament but frc:e to pur;;;ut: their ov.in policy choices. 
r~obody seriously claims that 
The f.\BC's lega1 status as a 
institutlonnl saiegu2rri::; against 
:he f,Bc is adminisiraiively indepondent. 
stotutory corpor&tion gives it iow if any 
pciitlcal or buroaucratic intrusion Into 
internrJI f\BC administration. The Corn-oration rolios on governmento for 
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fun-els and must continually justify its expenditure to Parliament, The 
admlnistrat!vo /\BC is enmeshed in the federal burr~aucrlJcy, 
Government control over availnble resources sets boundaries of operation 
for the functional :::.~ctor. V>Jithin thf.3$e parameter::,, hov1ever, there is no 
llfJil~n:ry nexus be1i.veen administration ancl functional independence. One 
could irnag1n;:r a government irnposing strtfi- ceilings on the 1\BC, rr.aking it 
riillicult to acqu!rn new equipmenL cutting tho ABC's budget and restricting 
the n1nbHitv of 1!,BC statf but stiH having no direct influence over the 
content of specific ABC programs, Government intervc~ntion in ABC 
administration cannot be equated with government censorship of output. 
Cortain!y there ''" a risk oi political directives being tied to an offer of 
more re~:ources or the:~ threat of a budget squeeze. but there remain~;; a 
quaiitative dlffcm:mce between using \he ABC's budget ailocation to limit the 
boundarie~1 ct f\BC acHvit;1 and atternpt~ng to Influence prograrn decision::>, 
;\n organisatlon with lh~le admlrl.!stra1ive autonomy can remain functiont1\!y 
independent. Political lnvolv0rnenl in distribuiing and ntonitoring resources 
f11G2ln poli:icai lnput to decisions about functional 
rnattor~l-, 
\t is not :Jssorted th::rt /\8<.~ administratlon con be co S8parated 
trom iunction - one exists to support 1he other, f:..s the Report ct the Dix 
Commi1~ee noted. in n creative orgnnisr.nion $UCh we; the ;\8C, functional' 
and 'administrzitive' responsibilities iend ,~ !ose thoir separate moaning 
because '<people actually producing H10 programs (tho;,,><) performing the 
function} must engage in the adminisrrative activi1:y r:r?eded to produce 
them" 1VoL 2:721). Rather. the;: di5tinction is Introduced bec:ause it is u 
vlev-1 of insti1utionn! arrangcmen1s used by /\BC \)!rectors, manager:; nnd 
governmonts to define their ov1n roles and reso!ve th<? tens.ion inherent in 
the conflicting demandti ot n1ini~:tGria! r;,;sponslbi!lty and institutional 
indopondenco, Tho adminstrat\on/functlon dlchotcmy ls not 2 rigid 
objective distinction but a uso1ul 1malytic0i cmegory with its basis in 
11 
politlca! ::ind bureaucratic prnctice. This 0:xarnines ABC 
;,dm!nistrative and functional independence, questions VJh{'.3ther 21dmlrdsirative 
issuos might influence tunctiona.! program deciJions a~d nssosSdwheth0r tho 
insiitutional independence vvhich is guDrantocd to the statutory 
corpora1!0n in theory ~ occurs in practic.cL 
This the~.is fo!iov¥s the trtlditlon of f\ustr3Han public policy process 
Hte-rature-, 1 empirical appro3ch, It identiiies and 
defines a public organisation. examines its political and iegal basis. 
surveys the bureaucratic and social setting. details the iormuiation of 
policy within \he organisation and finally asks questions about the !unctions 
being performed. 
Johr. VVarhur::;t'::, ~Jobo Or Dog1na? illustrates thi::; Gmplrlcnl tr2dition, 
'l'Jnrhurst, studied the funcHon oi the lndustries /\ssistance Commission 
( if-'.\C), a statutory corporation \Nhich produces indcpondont reviev1s of tnriff 
levels and industry sub'.:>ldi0s, IAC reports frequently upset lntero::t groups 
nnd con1r;::idic1 govornrnent poiicy: VVarhurst was 1-~een to examine v..-hethor 
the original statutory independence had survived "21lr11ost continuous public 
tBnsiOfl$ betv1een the governrnent and tho it\C" { l 082: 3) . 
\tVarhurst begins his study v;ith u sketch of the po1lticui, his;torlc<.Jl. legal 
and theoretical basis of Th8 iAC;, t-!e describes th0 social nnd 
bureaucra1ic environment in which tho iAC operates. including th8 op11ons 
for 'discipllning' the organisation available to governmonts, Fron1 poiltic;J! 
and buroaucratic set~ing0 he turns to internal l/\t.-:: decision·~in<Jking, 
1txamp!er.: include Corbett's work on Pcl1Ucs G.nd the A1rline.s l 1~C5), Pere.::' tmporttAnt ;:,rticle 
on "'The Resurrection of Avtonon1y IJrganisationa.1 Theory nnd tt»e ~,tatutory Corporation" 
(1975), Mawl-;er. Sm1tr, and V'!Q!!er's Potit1c3 and Policy In _A.u<;tr~Jia (197n}, V'lt:!!er & Grattan':; 
CGn !·,1lnicte:ro Gore? ( 1'38i 1 anct V1ettenha1!'s :report on statutory corporations, included a.c ,,;i,n 
appendl)(. to the Report 0f tl:e Ccrnrn:lteB 'Jn _,i;_u~tr::illan Government b.dm1n1~,tration ( 1'J7Gl . For 
fuH d~tallo. ~ee bibliogr:'.\p!--;y. 
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Fin-ally, through a series of case studies, V\Jarhurst is able to draw 
together the focus of his anr:dysis and ask specific questions about the 
independence of the IAC In formulating its report5 without government 
direction, 
The t\BC is also a coni.inuanv controversial organisation, frequently 
upsetting individuuls, interost groups and government$. Like lf\C reports, 
/\BC programs nre constantly :;crutinisod for evidence of bias. The 
credibility of both organi:..::1tlons rest~ -,r;\th their independence. roiiticL::ins 
may have a vosted ~nterest in influencing the functions of the lAC and 
ABC, but each organisation wouid cease to be of real influence, or serve 
u useiu\ function, if to be nothing but a government mouthpiece. 
The r;pproach used so succ~ssfuily by Warhurst guides the s1ructure of 
this ~n$1it1.:t1onai study at tP.e /\BC. In ctttempt!ng to lHuminate the 
bursz1ucr2tlc con1ext ,':'.jnd the pol!tica! pressures upon nn organisrJt\on. tho 
:.tudy moves tovvard a narrow and l!mited goal : to nssess the potentizd of 
the? institution to perform the function for which ., !~ was e::ttabllshed. Thi:.;. 
goal dernnnds v1ide-rang}ng research. 
noted in 1 :)53, nny of tho actual of tho J\BC; 
'\vou!d need tc lncluda nn inquiry into the det<:uled operntlon o1 the 
Co1Tim!sJion DIJd lts roL:~1tion0 \Nlth ministers. governmnnt depurtml!!nts, other 
public bodies otc," ( 1 Q53d: 115), 
The pub!!c poliCV proce:ss rnor.iel is based on cn1piricn! m~;thods. But it 
does not crnbroco on1pirici0rn - the be Hot th;::it fa Ct$ ure obioctive, noutrul 
or value-free, Facts do not exist !ndependent!y of the v1rly v.;e 
conce-ptualisB a matter. /\ iviarxlst account of the J1i.8C, for 
example. V<'OUid lock for fi:icts v;h\ch iden1ify the media as a hegemonic 
force supporting capit::iil:.m; thus i-lumphrey tvlct.-:iueen 
assumption that tho fA6C is "ju::;t another lnoological appnrntu;, ct tho 
capitalist state" ( 1D77'. 04), i\~c(~ocen, 3.rid thoso \r'Vf'\o follow !\~orxist or 
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JtrDcturaltst approachos to media studiGs. arc interested in systems rnther 
than the relationship between a specific ins1itmion and the state. The 
1-\BC'~; role i~ seen in 0uch mod~!s as servile and unchanging or, at best. 
;s;s a !imlted drena for conflicting ideologies, 
r\ public policy process vinw cngnges a different perspective snd so a 
dlfierent ~.et of facts, a assumes that the relatlonsh:p t.:-.et'.veon the state 
and an institution such as the ABC i::> rarely mechanistic or static, 
!nstitutlons are perceived us hoving the!r ovvn !nterestr; to fonow. v1ith 
behaviour mediated by the legnl basis of the organisation, its location 
within the stnte and its ability to moboiise public support for a concept 
such as 'independence'. Hence this ::;tudy focuses on uncovering facts 
ubout the day-to~-day structural and theoretica1 rela!ionshipr> betvvaen the 
st;:He. governmr:nts and tho ABC;, 
Tho pubiic pcficy proce;;s Jppronch r:.uggests it::; own mothodology. Tho 
matoriai from 0econdary sources .::ind on 
fntcrvicws vvith 2 participarns. /\ question ha.s been 
hFJve functional indepor:donce? 
ttna!ysis !:., by 
of the focus. 
governrnonts. hovvev0r, ru!os out o deiinitive u.nswor. 
doos the ABC 
if vve rt"1ject the 
absolute ffJrmu1uHons asserted by obstract sys1em~~~based rnotiel~" tf1on an 
that viii! be posslble ar0 qualified conclusions, 
Chapter 1 of tho thesis sets out th0 theoretic0! ;:::s;;urnptions underlying 
the 1\BC and descrlbcs the orgnn!~ntion's environrnont : the origins of the 
2A word on footnotin::s. T'.'.((\.\Jghout tt:i::> the::is the H:;,rvard r0ferent0 !:y0tem is uced. ~o t!:;.t 
a cpJote trom page 314 of l'\Bn ln91is1 book This !:-; T"'"' ,.\8C (Univ<Jr:}1ty of l·,ielbourne Press, 
1983) - which i~ ~r.e fir'.:t 0f cever0I relevant works- pvbti;)h€d by lngli:i in ti;;:;_t year - 1..y:~!! appear 
in t~e text J.') {!ag!t.s 1'383::1:3~!'.l), \¥Ith U·;o full tlt!E> ot t":e book lf\('.!l!ded in 17'*3 bibl!ograpfiY. f':. 
name appears To!loweQ only by :?, d.1te, svcll as (l'\rame-r 1084), i0.d:catE>s ,1 qvotzi.tion from 0.n 
int.erv1ew conducted for t'i:'.J. the~~1c. Details of interviB\VS :1\'.)0 appoar :n the hihiioqraphy. 
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ABC !n the ideology of public nervlcr:: bro.:idcustlng. its place !n the 
/~ustrailan broadcasting sys.tern and It$ rcdationshtp vvith governments nnd 
buroaucracios. It is argued that the precise ob.ieclivos and aims of the 
ABC'.: have never boen clear, that o lack of agrcacd gon!s makes it ditfir;uit 
for the orgnni'.';ation to win public support against govemmentai 
Jdm\nistrative intervention and that the structure of the Australian 
broadcasting ::.ystem enables commerclai media r1vaJs to lobby governments 
to rcstric1 the f"BC to marginal activities. 
Chapter 2 of the thesi::; exnmines decision-making within the J\BC : it$ 
lcgi:;lative bBsis, structure, tho rolo of the Board of Directors, ABC 
management. internal allocation o·f resources and the work environmGnt, 
This ::tJctlor. iocuses on the r0lat!ve influence of Directors and managers 
en ;\BC output, urgufng thv.t r.tructur21i in1pcdirnants Hmit the influence 
Dlrac1or:, can oxercise over Corporation policy, while confused lines of 
rospons1billty. the structuro of the organisation nnd the produ0Hon proces::; 
rn0ko it difficult for 1:...8(~ mo_nagors to tightly cor:trol program output. 
tho production of ;\SC: ncvvs und curront aifJir;:::. prograrr.,s and tho pohtical 
control ot ,o..ac: ro001ircnr .. ll complete:::, rhe study 
th".: exteni to '>Vhich \ho d0vic0 of thf': statutory corporation providos the t\BC 
with administrative ana/or functional independenco. 
Limits of this Studv 
The ABC is a highly visible organisaiion, 2n insi!tutlon about v1h!ch ct!! 
,i'.\u-straiians have wn opinion. academic and pruc11tioner with \Vhorr1 
thts project has been discu::.z,cd offered a dif~oront vision of hovv to 
understand tho J\BC;. ~.r!nny i!lurninat!ng '.::>1Jgqestlon0 have been 
incorporated; it is not their fault if ! have not ~:nwDys li;:;toncd to good 
advice. i\Jeveriheless. it quickly bocamo cl oar th;qt tho ;-.\BC iG a complex 
organisation open to endless intorprot0tion; no sing lo study could hope to 
tackle the lull range and potential of ABC activity. 
15 
I·- hnvr:i choson an institu1lonf31 approach, belioving thi:; provides a bnsis 
for future work from many different perspectives, Thls thGsis ,is Hrn!ted ta 
studyiing the effectiveness of the device of a statutory corporation in 
protecting the l1BC from 011ts1de ooliticcil involvement in internal 
docls!cn -m«lking. [')y CtiOOSing CllO 2fJfJfOUCh ii becornes ilE.:cessary i:o 
drav·t boundaries which !nevitnbly exclude other fascinating and perhaps 
equally rewarding perspectivos. TfH~ ABC is a rich enough topic io inspire 
myriad ::;peciallsed researchGs - ,:1n institution;:Ii study hopofu\ly v;ill provoke 
much needed alrernnttve reading::; of the Corporation and its output, 
This work concentrates on the ABC as an organisation - the messenger 
rather than tho rnessago. !\1ost public interest in the ABC. howBver. 
\!Vhl\e ~ ussume thwt 1'.\BC 
progr,;im,-rn:-1kers rnproduce their socialisation by broadcusiing 1he dominAnt 
0 
nnrms .::1nd belief~> of our ~ocicty."' and believe that un institutional analvnis 
win bo directly rolHvont to explaining any persistGnt bias. this ~tudy does 
Definitive answers to que~hons 
about bias in individual progr.Jms v~i!I involvo diftorent theorGt1cai constructs 
o rcscnrcn.nr able to conljuct -:.urveys of product\on ::,ta.ff and 
:3uch .'.1 study ~::> n0odod, but must 
Thero is u!JO important work to bo done on tho rolG oi the !>.BC ln 
\i\lhcn the former Commi-s:;ion turned 50 in Ju!y 
1982. there \Vas rnucn c-i:=;cuJ::::ion of its cu1turtli signiflcnnco. 
that "!ifu in 
George 
3
,t.Jqn ,A,shbolt .:trguec ~~.~t the /;GC, ~\;) :; GtHte autf'only, "•:: exp(:;:ch:;d to di:::.~eminate i::ter.G, 
op;nio-n8t values ;;,nd ~ttit\Jl1Bs \vhich -:>.c:::urnc; or i11 ~orr;B W(~y 1n0::.tr::ite t~:e b~1:::1c tienevo!en\:e of 
our .::.ccisJ !;;tructures, cur p0\1ti<.:al proe-e~',:;es., otJr foreli]n ,:t[1:..;ncB3i .,our e<;onorn1r. prionU,::s ~n<.t 
our cvitura! a:::.p1r~t1on:::" ( l0BO: 153):. 
16 
Fr.:rwoH, looklng b;;ck on the 19:30s in i\ustraHa, feit "but for tho /\BC vie 
v1ould h;:;;ve inhabited <i land of pcrpotuoi drought" ( lng!ls 1983a: 77). Yot 
th1~re has been !iitle ::;ericus ztudy of the /\BC's culturai influence, /\gain. 
although nn instl1utiona\ study v1lH throw light on hovv the ornanisdtion 
determines its cultural offering;:;, it v1Hl requirG a very dlfierent sort of 
stu(jy to do just!co to the ABC's contribution ta its nn.tlon. 
f;,n origlnul intention \Vr:ts to compare the .t\BC with its inspiration, tho 
British Broadc::isting Corporation {BBC), While visiting Rritriin and delving 
into the British literature. however. significant d!f1erences become apparent 
in tho hit.tcry, ;:nructure and purpo5es of those two public broadcasting 
organ\s;.Jt!ons. /;;.,s lvlark /\rmstrong notes 
Dlscusr.ion of the /\B(:; has been heavily inttuenced by llter:tture 
concorr•ing tho British Broadcasting Corpormion. Many ABC sta!f 
~2e rhelr omployor ns an Australian BBC. This has produced 
:-)crr:n distortion$, becauso the .£\BC hBs nover !n fact enJoyed the 
1he pros11g::: or the mystique of tho sac. 
( 1 ()iJ2: 'Jtf) 
On returning t:) 1\u~:;1r;::i!ia ! dolotod the corr1parative material and chose :o 
concentra1e en tho loc<Ji ;ns'titu1lon, ;·lov1Gver. even ii ciroct comparisons 
to d\r0ct rose arch· by 
providing a dlffGrent mooed. it b2ct:1n10 to ldontify those p<:irts of 
th0 /\BC that diverged from 8r\t;::;h pruc1ico L:tnd 1horeby dornandoc 
explanatlon, The 8rit1sh experience theretore u th ls study, The 
British literaturo nnd discussions '.'-Jith Grit!sh ucc:idorrdc~~ and broadc;1cit0rs 
were crucla: in understanding public nroudcas1ing. Tr,e origin~~ of tho /\BC 
unquet>tionab!y He in an Plttempt by r.1rllomont to croato an antipodean 
BBC, But u!tirnate!y this i~ not d compLJrnHvo stuc~y b8cnus0 tho 
d\fferc:nccs h.-:1ve becorne so grout: comparh:;on::; confuso rather thnn 
onngrrton' 
is no longor an entlroiy :::ipproprinte rnodel fer tho Af3C. 
Finally there are internal lirnit~: to :-1 ;::;tudy of the org0nisntion 'Nh!ch niust 
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be - noteo. !~;:, this thesis is primarily interested ln the Llbii!ty of the ABC 
to produce indcpenrlr:;nt ne-.,vs nnd current affairs progrnm~, little attention 
is gi'.1 en to l\BC invoivoment in orches1ras, merchandising or uduc0:tlon, 
Siml!ar!y. Radio 1\u~traiin is given no ::.;peel al omphe_sis. Rz:dio Austr:J.lia i::; 
part of the 1:\BC. 1ncluded in its Charter: decisions about its programming 
arB rn::tdG by thG same processes described in this v1ork, lio\VBVer, the 
:speciai role of F1,adio Austrn!ia in prornoting abroad .f.\ustralia's foreign 
po!icy interG!',;ts. nnd its ro!aticn5h!p v1ith the Q(!)pr:1rtmont oi Fornign f\ffair~, 
raise co~nplex is.sues which demand sopnr:Jt('?- anatysis. 
/.1ny comemporary study is eventually overtakeo by history. tt is always 
tempting lo i:1c1ude dotui!s of just one more event or controversy but one 
must drav1 tho line somewhere. so the substantive part of this study 
concludes with the federal oiection of 1 Docembor "<984, By th;:it date 
/\EJC::: onAh\ing i8gislaHon wut; in operation, the Corporation established. its 
S;;;:ird ::tppointed, o ivlonaging C1irector in oHice. the outline 01 major 
structured reform-s. announcr:-id .:Jnd $Overal political cri:::os and nn elcc1ion 
::-,urv1vGd, Though dot.:JHs \Nlll c;iange. am confident that the ba::;lc 
ano cor.ctusions '<Vill r0rnain valid • .. vh\le the 1\BC ls u statutory 
corporation. 
/\ study in the ptJbHc policy process tradition naturally boglns vvith th0 
body of literature vvhich nurtured tho uppro21ch. Hence- tho numerous 
references to the 1::.;xtcns\ve 1\ustrallan literature on ;::.twtutory corporr:nion;;. 
and pubiic policy, 
ln Britain a large. dotaHed and divor'.:".e borly of 1iter2turo is avai!21b!G 
about organisational aspect!:> of the BBC. lJnfortunoto!y, sln1ilur literature 
en the ABC hns been slow to emorgo, Though Ken l~glis' 1983 history of 
th(:) Con1rnission is essentla1 rending anc tills un ln1pcrt21nt gnp, the ;\BC 
hns been significantly restructurod 0ince his book 1Nns completed. ,'\ 
lS 
s~'stomatic of tho contemporary /\BC has yet to be published, 
Anyone interested in the currr:nt /\BC 0ffnlrs remains dependent on 
personal contacts and mr:din reports for information. 
T\-',e ABC 5o.:ird dces not re!eo::;e minutes or vvork\ng pzipers from lts 
meetings. and Di recto re; ore rnquirnd to respect the confidonti::iliiy of their 
occu::.ionally found th0lr way to th!s researcher, though their supply is 
unsure and their impcrtonce difficult to asse~s. Some documents are 
quo1ed in this thesis. as zire ::;tatsments irom .£\BC Directors. managers 
cmd staff. information from ABC annual report::, speeches by i'.BC 
Chairnon. etrticlcs from Sc<:1n (the ,4.8C': tn-house journai), ABC press 
r0iGasos. tho no;v~\cttcr of the f\BC Staff 1\ssoclation and press c!ipplngs 
from .:;croG::: th8 nation thoughtfuily comoi!ed und circuluted each w0ek by 
th~ ;\BC':;, ~niormation [i;vi~»lon, 
This v1021tth of printed 1nat0rial has benn given Hfe by numerous 
lntcrviov:s v1:th tho00 in and nround ihe orguniswtlon. In three years of 
n very junior ABC; administrativo c!nrk from 
roiusc~d to .:1n0v,;er "irnper1inent q_uor,tions", E\0owhore 
to intore;:;.ted obsorvi:.:rs \vas no problem. From Brir;bnne to fviG\bourne to 
London I v1ns ::1b!n to 0it in ABC offices und studios, chatting v1itr1 tllo~e 
who wor~\od !here. v121tct1ing hov-; decisions 'Nere made and sometimes 
dlpping into the tor:-vnt of puper Villich floods through tho orgi:lnlsntlon:, 
Throughout these in1orvlov1s ono v1aG :;truck by tho genuine concern for the 
future o1 the 1\BC. the comrnltrnent to 1he idoals ct public servicG 
broadcasting, .1nd by the <:lffection !n which ',l\unty' is hc!d by ovfJn it~) 
harshest critic~ .. 
"Though ihF: par.seG into history on :30 Junr"' 1083, !ts 
cxperlr.Jnce rernains relevant for the contornporn.ry Gorporution. ThiG thesis 
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ha;J dr.:tv1n on vvrit\ngs about the t:ornn1ission. inclualng Richard l-larding's 
Ovt:Jtd~1 intarfgron(~o ( 1979). c:~0ment S{,1rr;rr::!or's ·rr10 /\13C - 1\unt Si1ily l1nd 
Sacred Cov1 1: 1:381), numerous B:rtic\00 by /_i,,lan ;\;:;hboH, and variou::; 
government rnports '.Vhich touch upon aspects of the ABC';:; operations, 
The rnott !n1portunt of those public documents ls The f-tBC In Revieiiv 
;\Jationol Brcadca::;ting Jn the 1 :780:::; - the 1 ~i81 Report of the Committee of 
Review of the l\ustrnliun Broadcasting Commission (usually known as the 
'Dix Report', after Committee Cha!rrnun /\it)X Dix). Thl~. lnctependont 
inqu\ry Vlas onnnunced in Parliament on 23 May 1 !)79 and its report 
delivered !o the Minister for Communic;;t!ions in May 1981. The Committee 
and its secretariot studied the /.1;8C, quesUonBd ;ts staff, and received 
more than 2 200 \-vritton ::.ubrr1is5ions frorn interested peop!o and group;:» 
The Dix R0port was highly critic;:il of many 01spects o1 th'" !18C, 
atirl;Jut!ng rriuch of iht? blurne fer wh:_tt it 
dlrec':!y on ;\BC rnan;:;gernc:n1, '!ho rr;port urged tha: tho ;\BC be 
re--:-:;tructurGo ,::ind given a charter sirniivr to thut ci tho 85(~. h: nt:t\'.:!d 1hat 
ciltnough 1her3 v-;as no evldonco of t'.ie "use of the 0dminisar;:::nive 
relr2tlonship batw.;;on the ,L\GC ::ind govornrnont bcoios to bring ini!uenco to 
bear upon f\BC c-ditoriiJl und pro9r.:1m m~1ttcrs", c;13n9or; to the 
urr-angerr10nts v1ero roquired to iirnit ";J,ny such 
future" <Vo!, 2: 79). 1·he Dix rGccrnrnendauons bocarrio tr:o b,;i_sis ior 
internal f-1,BC chnn.gcs and for t:-ie 1 G82 and 1 D83 ioglslwtion v1hich 
abollshod the Commission and rep!acod it ;,vi th a Corporutlon, 
The tive volumes of thG Dix Report continue to provid8 u u::ei'u! 0ourc0 of 
information and opinions about the ,A.BC, though much of the~ nnulysis is 
no lonqer directly applicable. Thls thesis dr-i'".PHS on f)ix m:1tor\al vvhcn lt 
pr<Yvidos usoful historicni insight~ or can be checked 11ga1nst current 
prncticc. 
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Pin;Jlly, \hore is }\on Inglis' long-awaitnd history of ih8 Comm1ssion, Thi~ 
!::; The /\BC ( l 983aJ. 'Nith o.ccost. 10 /'.\fl,(':; ar;,;hivBs and the active wupoort 
cf tho C:otT1n1ission. Inglis hos produc-:-3d a :.chol;;,trly, detniled c:ind thorough 
history of tho organisation. He ::;rovidc~; ;:'.l wer:dth of information .:;ig21inst 
v1hich to :s;:;t hypotheses, assr::ss 0rgurnen1~; i1nd trnce continuity of 
drc~veloprnent, Thi;; thnsis examines ti1n co;;tr:rnpor;1ry ;\BC and has been 
carBful to avoid roproc!ucing the 'Nork of lrig\is, but must ncknovvledge itG 
rr1;-Jps out thCT tBrritcry 0ny orgnni$ntionul ot the f\SC \NOU!d have 
litiln authority. 
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Chapter 1 
THE ABC'S ENVIRONMENT 
l: l PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING 
'Independence' must be a judgement about behaviour in a particular 
context. This thesis poses the question of whether the administrative and 
functional independence of the ABC are guaranteed by the legislative 
device oi the statutory corporation. To inquire whether the ABC is 
independent it is necessary first lo explore the theoretical basis !or 
statutory authorities working in the broadcasting industry. 
The British Parliament o1 the l 920s nurtured a set of ideas about the 
relationship between broadcasting and the state. Through rhetoric and 
practice, these tentative notions developed into a coherent ideology of 
'public service broadcasting'. This ideology was imported by Australia in 
the 1930s, where it gave to rm to the Australian Broadcasting Commission. 
In this tradition 'public service broadcasting' implies an organisation 
supporting the broad consensus of social. moral and cultural values 
represented in Par!iainent. Public service broadcasting organisations aro 
committed to normative and politically impartial programming, supporied by 
a le9al form which balances responsibility to Parliament with independence 
from government control. Redefined and clarified through practice. this 
set of ideas continues to shape the form and activities of the ABC. 
The Origins of Public SfJrvice Broadcasting 
The development of radio was extraordinarily rapid, Only three decades 
separate Marconi's tentative experiments in 1895 from the British Parliament 
legislating tor a state monopoly over this new and potentialiy powerful 
medium. Rapid technological change required quick policy decisions on 
complex technical issues; governments had neither the time nor information 
to think through fully the implications of broadcasting. The 1926 general 
strike in Britain taught politicians the propaganda ootential o! radio. The 
British Parliament had tolerated private ownership of newspapers, but many 
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politicians now perceived radio as a much more poweriul medium. able to 
profoundly influence the entire community. 1 Control over radio. argued 
The slate would. of course. some. "must lie in the hands of \he state. 
see to it that it was used as an instrument for the public's good' (Burns 
1977: 35). 
Rather than licence commercial radio stations. British politicians decided 
to create a public monopoiy. The franchise was awarded to the British 
Broadcasting Company, which in 1927 was nationalised as the British 
Broadcasting Corporation ( BBCl. The BBC. funded by compulsory 
licence lees. was a new type of organisation. 11 was founded by Royal 
Charter. an organisational novelty proceeded in Britain only by the Port of 
London Authority ( 1908)' the Forestry Commission (1919) and 
accompanied in 1926 by !he Central Electricity Board <Inglis 1983a: 17l. 
Unlike newspapers or publishing. broadcasting institutions did not evolve 
over a long period o! lime. Parliament created the BBC "fully fledged as 
a public corporat1on" which "reflected both the ideological novelties and 
orthodoxies prevai<ing in the twenties and thirties" ( Windlesham 1980: Hll. 
The device of a corporation enabled Parliament to establish 1he form. 
goals and struclure oi broadcasting without being seen to dictate the 
content of programs. It gave the BBC independence within oounds fixed 
by a Charter. 
The ·organisational novelties" o! 1927. embodied in the BBC, remain the 
basis for public broadcasting services. The assumptions of pubiic service 
broadcasting developed by the BBC were imported into Australia and built 
into the ABC in 1932. 
ABC legislation of 1983. 
These assumptions survive. unchallenged. in the 
1soma ex.pe-ctations of the power of radio ware very high indeed. In Australia the Anglican 
Reverend R.B.S. Hammond wrote : "Christ may qolte likely return within the next twenty years 
- moyt>e ten - and when He does He Wiil probably tell the world by rMw ... One of the bodily 
dlftlcu1t1es t~.al surrounded the return ct Our Lord Ms been removed with the discovery of 
wireless" (quoted m Thomas 1980: 10). 
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The Political Basis o! Ppblic Service Broadcasting 
When the estab!ishmem and financing of the BBC were first raised in the 
House of Commons. on 15 November 1926. Pos1master-General Sir William 
Mitchell-Thomson told the House : 
While I am prepared to take the responsibility for broad issues 
of policy. on minor issues and measures of domestic policy and 
matters of day-to-day control. I want to leave things to the lree 
judgement of the Corporation. (Burns 1977: 12) 
The Postmaster-General enunciated the founding principle of the BBC : a 
Corpora1ion with independence in day-to-day management but ultimately 
responsible to Parliament. The British Parliament would establish and fund 
the Corporation. giving it a Charter and licence which sei out du1ies and 
responsibilities. Parliament would monitor the BBC's performance and 
periodically renew the arrangement. Parliameniary power. however. must 
not become government prerogative. The BBC would be part of the state 
but different from the traditional ministerial department: the Corporation 
would be responsible but not subject lo a minister. 
The Charter required that the Corporation be neutral. reporting on 
politics and current affairs without editorial comment. Although not 
favouring any political party. the BBC would be partisan in ils support ot 
the system ol Parliamentary government 
The underlying assumption of the BBC is that of liberal 
democracy. The BBC as an institution is the child of 
parliamentary democracy. And the whole concept of its 
establishment assumes its support of that system. (Curran 
1979: 106) 
The 1935 Ullswater Committee in Britain reviewed and endorsed the 
arrangements which required the BBC to balance responsibility to 
Parliament with independence of programming from government : "we find 
that this line of demarcation has been observed in practice. and we are 
convinced that no better can be found" concluded the Committee Report 
(Burns 1977: 12). 
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Historians have not been so kind, pointing out that the line between 
support for Parliament and support for government is sometimes rather 
fine, Burns quotes an unfortunate le11er sent by BBC Director-General 
John Reith to the British Prime Minister during the 1926 General Strike. 
Stanley Baldwin was assured of BBC support through an ingenuous 
argument. "Assuming that the BBC is for the people" wrote Reith "and 
that the government is tor the people, it follows that the BBC must be for 
the government in this crisis too· Ubid 16-17), 
R<iith's private admission is curious, for the BBC relies on support from 
all sides of politics for independent broadcasting. Competing political 
parties have a vested interest in creating a non-ministerially controlled 
BBC. As a Corporation o!flcial explained : 
What chiefly protects the independence ol the BBC ... is the 
two-party system. and the tear that something disagreeable done 
by one party when it's in power would lead to the Opposition. 
when it was in power, doing something even more disagreeable, 
It's as though the independence ol the BBC was maintained by 
mutual agreement between the two, because of the common 
interest they have in the kind of neutrality, objectivity or 
impartiality of the BBC. <ibid: 188) 
The independence of a public broadcasting organisation in the British 
tradition is therefore a function of parliamentary government. Parliament 
gives the BBC a Charter which establishes the framework of professional 
neutrality, The BBC can reflect the range of views represented in 
Parliament but in doing so "it has to speak in ways acceptable. ultimately. 
to the political Establishment" <ibid: 189). The BBC could not consistently 
act as an opposition to the prevailing political. social and moral norms of 
the nation without the risk oi uniting Parliament against it. The 
Corporation must not only support the system of parliamentary democracy; 
it must also implicitly support the consensus values of Parliament. As !he 
BBC Handbook states 
Impartiality does not imply an Olympian neutrality or 
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detachment from those basic moral and constitutional beliefs on 
which the nation's life is founded. The BBC does not feel 
obliged tor example to appear neutral as between truth and 
untrnth. justice and injustice, freedom and slavery. compassion 
and cruelty. tolerance and intolerance (including racial 
intolerance). This is an important reservation, but not one which 
detracts from tha BBC's ovarall determination to be impartial in its 
presentation of controversial issues. ( 1984: 1571 
The BBC's statement of impartiality resembles the traditional notion of a 
'neutral' public service: the BBC claims it does not chose between political 
parties or interests but carries out the policy enunciated in its Charter. 
As long as BBC reporting is perceived to be non-partisan. within the 
prevailing social. moral and constitutional beliefs. !he Corporation will 
enjoy the support of Parliameni. 
The political basis of public service broadcasting is thus a corporation 
independent of government directives but responsible to, reflecting and 
contained by, the broad consensus of values and ideas evident in 
Parliament. 
The Normative Basis of Public Service Broadcasting 
Fearing the ability of radio to influence public opinion, British politicians 
established a Corporation which believed in a "normative role in !he 
cu!turaL moral and political life of the country" \Burns 1977: 43). The 
values of British democracy and the British way ol life would be projected 
by radio. The British listener would be ollered a cultured choice o1 
programs by a Corporation dedicated lo broadcasting 'in the public 
interest', 
Normative broadcasting has a moral dimension: it implies that the people 
are not necessarily the best judges of what they should see or haar. 
Throughout the papers dealing with the establishment of the BBC runs a 
common thread an abhorrence of letting the market dictate broadcasting 
content: the fear that, if allowed, commercial radio would pander to the 
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Lowest Common Denominator wilh material that was trite. frivolous and 
debasing. Working within the aristocratic tradition of a paternalistic state. 
British politicians preferred a BBC monopoly with a normative function to 
enlighten. educate and entertain. John Reith. the first Director-General ot 
the BBC. wrote in 1924 of his belief that radio could be a Good Thing if 
crude commercial values were kept out : 
I think it will be admilled by all that to have exploited so great 
a scientlHc invention tor the purpose and pursuit of entertainment 
alone would have been a prostitution of its powers and an insult 
to the character and Intelligence of the people. <quoted In 
Windlesham 1980: 19) 
The Reithian ethos required broadcasting to be a public service with 
"high standards and a strong sense of responsibility" (BBC Handbook 
1983:139). Although BBC programming has changed since the 
introduction oi commercial compelitors. some Reithian ideals survive. The 
current BBC Director-General. Alasdair Miine. echoed his illustrious 
predecessor when he told The Guardian that the role of the BBC is to 
"entertain. educate and inform people properly" C 12 April 1984: 17 - his 
emphasisl. One Australian commentator wrote approvingly of the results 
of the Reithian code : 
Reith and his equally high-minded colleagues. as well as the 
Governors o! the Corporation. were unashamedly paternalistic in 
salting the standards of !he BBC in the 1930s and entertained no 
such irresponsible notion as giving the public what it wanted or 
what it thought It wanted. Rather. it would get what people o! 
fearless intellectual and moral integrity decided was good for it. 
<Semmler 1981: 2l 
While the BBC retained its monopoly. a small group of people - the 
Governors and staff of the Corporation - chose the programs to be offered 
to the British public. Critics claimed that the BBC was imposing one set 
of moral values on the nation. Lindsay and Harrington note that. in 
effect. a small minority of the nalion had decided that the values 
expressed in broadcasting "should be congenial to themselves. that they 
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alone knew what was 'good' for the rest of the public. who could like it or 
lump it" (Wiener 1981: 109l. Paul Johnson describes this paternalistic 
approach to broadcasting as "about as far removed from a democratic 
model as it is possible to get" (1983: 21>. 
ihe BBC lost its monopoly in 1955 when Britain acquired commercial 
radio and television, As Asa Briggs argues, however, it was not the 
introduction of commercial television and radio services but a breakup of 
consensus in national goals which inevitably changed the traditional 
Reithian BBC. The Board of Governors could no longer agree on an 
interpretation of the 'national interest'. especially after 1945, "when to 
economic and political differences were added differences in approaches to 
'traditional morality'" ( 1979b: 18). 
While Reithian practices have subsided over time. the notion of essential 
'standards' remains part of the package of Ideas known as public service 
broadcasting, lo its role as defender and reflection of Parliament. the 
BBC added a commitment to embody and propagate Britain's cultural 
heritage and essential social and moral values. ihe formallly of many 
BBC programs impressed upon the public and Parliament how solemnly the 
Corporation regarded Its onerous responsibilities. The ideology of public 
service broadcasting required more than reporting of news and providing 
entertainment: it demanded a normative role in \he national life. 
Australian Publjc Service Broadcasting 
Mr. W. M, Hughes : Broadcasting will be more potent in reaching out 
to the distant parts of this great country, and in 
exerting an influence for good or !or evil. than 
any other agency. including our educational system 
and our universities. 
Mr. Archdale Parkhill Nonsense! 
(CPD Vol. 133: 959 March 1932) 
When Australian politicians prepared legislation for a national 
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broadcasling organisation. they adopted the ready-made Brilish ideology of 
public service broadcasting. Local politicians admired the BBC because it 
was "already famously good" and "it was British" (Inglis 1983a: 17l, 
Parliament "betieved that the qualities they admired in the BBC were 
transferable to an Australian setting" (Thomas 1980: 19), In the extreme 
Angiophile atmosphere of the early 1930s. the notion that what was good 
for Britain woutd be good for Australia was propagated by Prime Minister 
Lyons. who told the first ABC audience that the new organisation should 
·walk in the footsteps of the BBC and fall in behind Britain" <ibid: 19). As 
Inglis notes 
Like the Parliament that established it. the Australian 
Broadcasting Commission was a thoroughly imperiat artefact: the 
government had decided. as the Postmaster-General told the 
House, "to follow the British system as closely as Australian 
conditions will permit". (19B3a: 19l 
The Australian Broadcasting Commission. created in 1932. Incorporated 
the form and ideals of public service broadcasting developed in Britain In 
the 1920s, When transmission began from studios in Sydney ABC 
announcers. like their BBC counterparts. , wore dinner suits when behind 
the microphone. Numerous ABC staff were ax-BBC personnel, There 
were, however, problems transplanting the BBC to Australia. While the 
BBC enjoyed the undivided loyalty of British listeners, in Australia the ABC 
had to share the airwaves with a thriving commercial radio sector. 
Furthermore the independent BBC was based on a Royal Charter, a 
constitutional device not available to an Australian Parliameni. The ABC 
borrowed the form and programs of the BBC but it did not flourish in the 
way Parliament might have expected. Ellis Blain, an ABC announcer from 
1936. felt that in copying ihe BBC. which had been designed for a 
community without choice. "the ABC perpetuated its own Isolation" (Inglis 
1983a: 76), In 1983 the former Commissioner for Community Relations. Al 
Grassby, in explaining why Australian audiences felt alienated from their 
national broadcasting organisation, could still say of the ABC ·1hey're 
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almost a second channel of the BBC' <Sydney Morning Herald 25 
June: 12l. The Australian public have not been enthusiastic about 
culturally uplifting and educating programs. BBC goals did not translate 
well to Australian conditions. and the ABC was often left without an 
audience or purpose. 
Commercial CompetiHon 
In Britain a BBC monopoly could set standards without fear of 
competition: ii could exclude the 'trivial. the irresponsible. the 
meretricious and the debasing from broadcasting programmes" without 
effect on ratings (Semmler 1981: 1), With a monopoly until 1955. the 
BBC shaped the tastes of a generation and ensured that eventual 
competitors played the game by the same rules. The programs of 
independent commercial television (ITV) reflect the continuing strength of 
the public service broadcasting ideal in Britain, where the state continues 
to set content standards for both the public and private sectors. 
When Australian politicians embraced 
broadcasting by establishing the ABC, 
the ideology of public service 
they expected the same high 
standard of program. The ABC, however. did not have exclusive access 
to the airwaves. From 1932 commercial operators sought to limit its role 
and audience. Commercial broadcasting, free of statutory requirements to 
provide "adequate and comprehensive" programs, aimed for large 
audiences lo sell to advertisers. Despite their pious tones at licence 
renewal hearings. Australian commercial broadcasters did not follow British 
practice by taking on the responsibilities of public service broadcasting. 
The commercial media resisted attempts by the state to enforce content 
rules or minimum standards, 
The popularity of commercial broadcasting in Australia has lei\ the ABC 
in a perpetual dilemma. If it conlines itself to cultural and educational 
programs, the ABC can be certain of low ratings. accusations of elitism 
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and questions abou1 why Australians should support. through compulsory 
taxa1ion. a privileged minority of regular ABC viewers and listeners. IL on 
the other hand. the ABC seeks legitimacy through popularity then it simply 
repeats the programming of commercial operators. 
Because Australian commercial stations are not bound by the same rules 
of enlightenment and education. the broadcasting system divides into two 
Incompatible sectors : one maximises the audience for pro!ii. the other 
seeks standards which restrict it to only a small audience. The ideology 
of public service broadcasting imported from Britain has imposed on the 
ABC a commitment to normative programming which does not rest 
comfortably in Australia's competitive broadcasting system. 
The Legislative Basis of the ABQ 
Though Incorporated only in 1927. the BBC adopted the image of an 
ancient and venerable institution part of the very framework of 
democracy. The BBC provided the model for Dominion governmems who 
established the ABC in Australia. the CBC in Canada and the NZBC in New 
Zealand. These public service broadcasters were empowered to provide a 
total range oi services to the community; they were to be 'above poiitics'. 
Governments might come and go but the public broadcastlng organisations 
would remain. 
The BBC has a unique legislative basis. It was established by a Royal 
Charter which derives its authority not from Parliament but from the 
The Charter requires the BBC to acquire a licence from 
of State for the Home Department (BBC Handbook 
King-In-Council. 
the Secretary 
1984: 155)' This licence lists the interpretation of the Charter agreed 
between the Corporation and Parliament. By setting out the BBC's 
obligations and freedoms. these docum.ents deline the relationship between 
Parliament and its broadcasting organisation. While a Charter and licence 
are in operation there is no BBC Act for Parliament to amend. only the 
Charier and licence to be renewed every 7-10 years. 
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The Charter gives the Corporation its legal existence and sets out a 
constitution and objectives. This archaic legal form was chosen to put the 
broadcasters at a distance from Parliament. The instrument was not 
available to Australia : "A Dominion government could no more create a 
Corporation in the name of the Governor-General than it could have his 
jewellery protected by Beefeatars" Clnglis 1983a: 201, Australian politicians 
sought to create a similar distance between government and institution 
through the device of a statutory corporation. This type of organisation 
enables Parliament to monitor the activities of the public broadcaster and 
intervene if necessary, while providing the appearance of distance from 
government necessary to ensure public credibility in the independence of 
the service. ABC publications often quote Prime Minister John Curtin, who 
in 1945 affirmed Parliament's intention to give special independence of 
judgement and action to the national broadcasting instrumentality : 
This is inevllably the case because of its highly delicate 
function in broadcasting at public expense. news statements and 
discussions which are potent influences on public opinion and 
attitudes. , . this particular function calls for an undoubted measure 
ol independence for the controlling body of the national 
broadcasting instrumentality which cannot be measured by the 
constitution of other other semi-governmental boards or agencies 
which do not impinge on the tender and dangerous realms ol 
moral. religious. aesthetic and political values. ( Duckmanton 
1975: 5-6) 
While still a novelty in Britain in the 1920s, statutory corporations had 
been used in Australia since the 1880s. when Victoria and NSW wanted lo 
establish public ownership but not ministerial control over !he railways 
<Goldring and Wettenhall 1980: 136). Statutory corporations are supposed 
to "keep politics out of public enterprises and public enterprises out of 
politics" (Corbeil 1965: 188l. When seeking a model for an antipodean 
broadcasting organisation. Australian politicians saw in the statutory 
corporation, and its embodiment in the BBC, an organisational form which 
was "familiar and congenial" <Inglis 1980a: 2l. 
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Oespi!e a wide lllerature, there is no agreed definition oi a "statutory 
corporation" beyond being an organisation created by Act of Parliament. 
This is because statutory corporations are created by governments on an 
ad hoc basis. Each is tailored, in form and accountability, to a specific 
function, In !he broadest sense, a statutory corporation is a public owned 
instrumenlality enjoying freedom from the restraints on policy and the 
administrative structure usually imposed on ministerial departments. Z 
Without an agreed definition. ii is difficult to identify indicators which 
specify when a given statutory authority has ceased to be independent. In 
his work on aviation statutory corporations, David Corbett examined the 
question of whether decisions by statutory corporations are made by 
lull-time managers or politicians. Corbett found that. in practice, a public 
enterprise ied by a powerful personality may be immune to government 
Interference (1965: 186l. Seeking a mode of analysis which could Identify 
patterns rather U1an concentrate on individuals, Corbett suggested a model 
of a statutory corporation with an Ideal level of autonomy. His definition 
attempts lo isolate essential features which must be present if a particular 
statutory corporation is to be considered Independent. In Corbett's model 
an autonomous public corporation 
... is a body corporate, created by statute. having perpetual 
succession. It can sue or be sued, and can buy, own or sell 
property in its name. It is directed by a board appointed by a 
minister or by the CabineL Board members have security of 
tenure. either for a fixed period of several years or during good 
behaviour, until a fixed retirement date. Members of the board 
of a truly autonomous public corporation are drawn from outside 
the ranks of Parliament. Cabinet or the civil service. The 
autonomous public corporation derives its revenue from the sales 
of its products or services. It administers its funds for ilsel!. 
without supervision from the Treasury, and ii does not require 
approval from the Treasury or Parliament before making current or 
2Go!dring and Wettenhall make the point that there has not been a direct legal test of the 
validity of federal statutory authorities; s.64 of the federal constitution only mentions that 
governments must ~<}"'"'"'"" through 'departments' of state neaded by ministers (1980: 140), 
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capital expenditures. Capital funds may come to it by 
parliamentary appropriation or by the sale of bonds. usually 
guaranteed by the government. It keeps it owns accounis and 
has them audited by independent business auditors. The board 
of the autonomous public corporation can hire or fire its own 
employees. from the General Manager down to the lowest-paid 
worker. without seeking approval from the Civil Service 
Commission or from anyone in administrative or political authority. 
An autonomous public corporation reports periodically to a minister 
and reports annually to Parliament. However. the minister is not 
empowered, under the incorporating statute, to give any specific 
directives to the board of the corporation, nor is he required to 
answer any questions in Parliament about the day-lo-day running 
of the corporation or its internal affairs. Parliament discusses the 
affairs of the corporation when the annual report is tabled or 
when amendments to its statute are introduced, but Parliament 
abstains from intervention in its internal affairs. and from detailed 
continuous scrutiny of its administration. ( 1965: 187-188) 
Although this ideal autonomous statutory corporation is never realised in 
practice, Corbett clearly sets out the abstract concept of a statutory 
corporation. The model expresses the minimum requirements for autonomy 
within the inevitable limitations of law, resources and activity - such 
criteria ·remain important as a frame of reference for an assessment of 
the degree of operational independence in particular cases" <van Munster 
1974: 275)' 
Though a statutory corporation is intended to have the same 
independence in policy matters from government direction as a Royal 
Charter bestows. the ABC has a quite different legal basis the BBC. 
Politicians can alter the mandate of the ABC by amending the Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation Act ( 1983) . Bi-partisan support for an 
independent ABC remains essential. for Parliament retains the legal power 
to abandon at any time the convention of non-intereference by polilicians. 
When the ABC was re-constituted as a Corporation in 1983. the changes 
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were primarily structural. 3 Goals were not re-defined nor made explicit 
through legislation. Though the ABC was given a Charter. this document 
expressed familiar vague principles. The 1983 Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation Act affirmed the device oi the statutory corporation as the 
legislative basis of the ABC. The ideals of public service broadcasting -
independent. normative programming - were embodied in a Charter which 
requires the organisation to provide 'innovative and comprehensive 
programs' which 'contribute to a sense oi national identity and inform and 
entertain' Cs. 6. ll. 
The requirement that programs be 'comprehensive· a word which 
appears in all ABC legislation since l 932 - reflects the origins of public 
service broadcasting in a monopoly. Because the original BBC had to 
cater for the tastes of the entire population. it needed a broad spectrum 
of programs. In 1932 this provision was imposed on the ABC. despite the 
Commission operating within a competitive broadcasting system. and is 
required once again by the 1903 legislation. 
Any demand lo be 'comprehensive' inevitably produces a series of 
contradictory goals. The ABC's Charter requires it to 'contribute to a 
sense of national identity' but also to ·reflect the cultural diversity of the 
Australian community': the ABC is required to broadcast programs of 'wide 
appeal' but also to include 'specialised' programs. The ideology of public 
service broadcasting forces upon the ABC a wide constituency which it 
cannot hope to serve fully with a limited number of outlets. 
3History does repeat! In 1931 \he Scullin Labor government introduced an ABC Bill but fell 
before the legislation reached the Senate, With minor revisions the Bill was reintroduced and 
pas•oo by the subsequent Lyons UAP government in 1932. In 1982 the Fraser L/NCP 
government introduced a new ABC Bill, Agam \he government tell l>etore the legislation reached 
the Senate and again a subsequent government. the Hawke Labor government, re•ntroduced and 
passoo the Bill wlth only minor modification. 
36 
While Government and Opposition politicians argued over details of an 
ABC complaints procedure and certain industrial relations practices in 1982 
and 1983, the Parliamentary debates over restructuring the ABC suggested 
agreement among polihcal parties on the substantive basis of the national 
broadcasting organisation, Speakers such as Peter Milton, Labor MP for 
La Trobe, spoke approvingly of Lord Reith's notion that broadcasting should 
be "an instrument of public good, not a means of handling people or 
pandering to their wants": Milton warned the ABC that ". , , giving the public 
what it apparently wants in the form of trivial pop music or comedy shows 
is prostituting public broadcasting" CCPD Vol. 133 11 May 1983: 469}. 
Other MPs complained of reception problems in their electorates or 
criticised minor aspects of ABC programming. There were no voices 
questioning the basis of the ABC In a statutory corporation or asking 
whether public service broadcasting ideals developed in Britain are 
appropriate for Australian conditions. There was no debate about 
fundamentals: Australian politicians implicitly agreed on the form and role 
tor the ABC. 
The 1983 legislation once again committed the ABC to a specific type of 
national, cultural broadcasting. 
an Ideology derived from a 
Parliament's expectations were based on 
different cultural setting. Australia has 
imported an institution without giving it the monopoly which would juslily its 
paternalistic blend of comprehensive and uplifling programming, 
Defining Goals 
When politicians created the Australian Broadcasting Commission in 1932, 
they did not write Into enabling legislation the precise meaning or aims of 
'public service broadcasting', The expectation of quality programs, 
services for special interest groups, culture and re-inforcement of 
community values were conventions. not statutory requirements. 
Parliament vested responsibility for interpreting its ideals in a Board of 
part-time Commissioners, drawn from the great and good in society, to 
act as trustees for the 'national interest'. 
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The first Commissioners and their many successors found little 
community agreement about appropriate goals for an Australian 
pubiic-iunded broadcasting organisation. In a pluralist society there is not 
one but many 'national Interests' making demands on the limited resources 
oi the ABC. Except in wartime there are few uncontested 'national goals' 
to guide the Board. Unable to articulate and defend precise community 
accepted goals, the ABC simply assumed a consensus about what it should 
do. The lirst Commissioners iell back on a normative role for the 
organisation and viewed the ABC as a public institution with a moral 
obligation to "realise the taste and improve the culture oi the community. 
to spread knowledge, encourage education, and foster the best Ideals of 
our Christian civilisation" (Thomas 1980: 18), 
The ABC does not use market criteria to determine its program choices, 
and so lacks an overriding principle to guide resource allocation, 
Decisions about which services will be offered ultimately rest on value 
judgements made by the Board or. should it flounder, by ABC 
management. This has proved an inherently conservative approach to 
determining priorities. Once a service is provided and allracts an 
audience it cannot easily be removed. for the ABC finds It difficult to 
admit that ils allocations of taxpayers' money are quite arbitrary. Because 
it is required to provide a public service but has no guidelines on how to 
best serve a diverse community, the ABC remains prone lo pressure from 
organised special interest groups. Such groups often provide the only 
feedback to ABC activities. leading to complaints orientated programming. 
The problem of allocating resources without being able to refer to a 
priori principles is the perpetual dilemma for ABC decision-makers. The 
difficulties were neatly illustrated during a controversy over the future or 
ABC FM radio, The ABC runs a national network of FM stations providing 
stereo classical and opera music lor a loyal audience oi about 200 000 
listeners. A meeting of ABC managers in July 1904 recommended that the 
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ABC give more emphasis to attracting a new. younger audience by 
changing the FM network into a stereo rock music service. based on ABC 
radio station 2JJJ-FM in Sydney. The Board had to decide between two 
specialised audiences. neither of which had an over-riding claim on ABC 
resources. Both classical and rock music devotees argued that the ABC 
should cater for their interest. each claiming to be inadequately served by 
existing commercial operators. Each group mobilised community support 
to lobby Directors and managers, The rhetoric of public service 
broadcasting was no help for a Board seeking a principle on which to 
decide between two groups with essentially equal claims. Eventually. altar 
noting the volume of protests from loyal FM classical iisteners. the Board 
decided to retain the classical music service and to seek 'in principle' to 
establish a separate youth-orientated FM network <The Austraiian 
September l 984l, 
ABC Director Richard Boyer strongly argues that only a statutory authority 
which has articulated In meaningful terms Its aims and objectives and 
Indicated the means to achieve them will have any prospect of maintaining 
autonomy. ABC aims and obiectives need to be subject to public debate 
so they can develop a significant measure of public support. The 
advantage oi achieving a public consensus about the organisation's goals 
is that "while they are a discipline on the lunctionanis oi that authority, 
they are also a discipline on the body politic" (Boyer 1984) . 
Boyer suggests that ABC goals formulated through public debate would 
coalesce community opinion about what is expec!ed from the Corporation. 
"In the absence of a clear philosophy which is public and which enjoys a 
measure of community consensus the organisation is very much at the 
mercy of management. public opinion and the body politic" Ubid 1984). 
He Is critical of past ABC managers and Commissioners who waited for 
governments to provide the ABC with a set of goals or hid behind the 
'adequate and comprehensive' formulation to avoid having to justify 
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priorities or enunciate the principles on which decisions were made. 
Boyer points out that governments possess neither the ambition nor 
expertise to interpret Parliament's mandate for the ABC. If governments 
knew exactly what they wanted from the ABC they could dispense with the 
Board and write precise instructions. in the form of organisational 
objectives. into the ABC's legislation. Boyer believes !he responsibility 
rests with the ABC to formulate objectives. report them to Parliament and 
so stimulate public discussion on the ABC's role. Once Parliament 
approved such objectives "they would become a discipline on any 
government denying the ABC adequate resources" Cibid 1984). 
Without long-term aims and objectives. short-term goals have become 
more important for the organisation. Annual reports point out haw well the 
ABC performs certain tasks rather than justify the priorities chosen by the 
organisation. Professionalism becomes an end in itself. This lack of a 
larger goal. Boyer suggests. weakens the credibility of the ABC with the 
community and with governmen\s at budget time - "in the absence o! such 
a philosophy the claim on public funds is so much weaker" Ubid 1984). 
From his experience as a member of the ABC's Board of Directors, 
Boyer has pointed to the problems of decision-making without an agreed 
set of priorities. However. it may be difficult to provide an uncontested 
set of aims and objectives ior an organisation as complex and diffuse as 
the ABC. Because the ABC Charter requires the Corporation to be 
'comprehensive' and sets out contradictory requirements. it is lil1eiy that 
only 'parenthood' goals can be agreed. and presented in terms not much 
less vague than those of the Charter itself. This is evident in the Board's 
first attempt to write coherent goals for 
released to the media on 31 August 1984. 
the organisation. which were 
The Board announced that as 
Australia's national broadcaster and major cuiturai organisation. "the 
central objective of the ABC is to extend the range of ideas and 
experiences available to Australians and contribute to the development of 
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values within the community and a sense of national purpose and identity" 
( ABC 1984b: l l . The Board plans in 1985 to write a more detailed 
'philosophy' for the organisation. 4 Without a statement o! purpose from 
which it can derive goals and policies. there is a risk of ABC goal 
displacement and continuing uncertainty about role and identity. The 
advantages oi a prepared statement of ABC philosophy. however. must be 
balanced against the trade-off -· a vague Charter provides scope for 
flexibility and unobtrusive escape from unsuccessful policies. 
In practice. when organisations set down absolute priorities these quickly 
become weapons for use in internal disputes. The announcement of goals 
can often set ofi a "complicated power play involving various individuals 
and groups within and without the organisation" <Etzioni 1964: 7-8). Most 
decision-making in a large institution is about marginal change between 
activities which compete for resources, In a multi-function organisation no 
one activity can be given absolute priority for fear it will consume all 
resources at the expense of other activities. In the eternal battle over 
allocation. each claimarit will appeal to an interpretation of goals which 
supports its case: if such an interpretation is not possible. a competitor 
may dispute the legitimacy of the rules. 
The reduction of objectives to an emphasis on ·independence' as the 
sole aim of the ABC is not 'goal displacemenr but. rather. the minimum 
goal to which all participants can agree. 'Independence' is a principle 
with support from the community: it provides a discipline on the body 
politic. 'Independence' may not be a principle from which one can derive 
specific resource decisions. but in the absence of more thorough aims 
and objectives it at least provides a lower order agreement on a goal Jor 
the organisation. 
~for further details, see Appendix 1. 
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Boyer's critique of the lack of a 'rationalist' approach to decision-making 
points to the difficulty of defining 'political interference' in the absence of 
agreed minimum services required to fulfill ABC obligations. Since the 
ABC has not been able to demonstrate that bureaucratic restrictions affect 
essential public service broadcasting activities. it has not been able to 
convince the community that administrative impositions are just as much 
infringements on ABC independence as the occasional and more 
spectacular attempts by individual politicians to lean on the organisation, 
The independence of the ABC derives from its basis in a statutory 
corporation built upon the notions of public service broadcasting. The 
Corporaiion Is "predicated on the existence of the present political system 
and its underlying social and economic order which the ABC is required to 
sustain" <Semmler 1981: 95). Because the ABC is an institution based on 
conditions developed in a different context. it continues to find it difficuit to 
de1ine its role or justify normative programming In a competitive market. 
The ABC Is thus an institution built on ambiguous foundations. its 
activities have been de!lned through use. historical accident and 
government intervention rather than derived a priori from principles 
established by Parliament or placed on the political agenda by the board. 
The ABC Is pursuing the BBC's objective of 'comprehensive' public service 
broadcasting within a very different legislative and competitive environment. 
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1 .'2 BROADCASTING IN AUSTRALIA 
The ABC does not operate in isolation. It is part of an industry 
comprising a commercial component funded by advertising revenue and a 
public sector funded by taxation. These sectors compete for audiences 
and for government favours. To maintain its position and to press its 
case for new resources and stations. the ABC must join the fray and 
become an actor In the political system. 
Australian commercial radio and television stations are largely owned by 
media conglomerates. These companies lobby governments to restrict the 
role of the public sector and so limit competition. As Windschuttle notes, 
in their editorials the Australian commercial media defend the concepts of 
'free enterprise' and the 'free market' yet "the great virtues that are 
claimed for !his system - the sovereign of the consumer. the efficiencies 
of competition. the market opened to talented new entrants - are nowhere 
more lacking than in the structure of the media business itself" ( 1984: 84). 
Australia has one of the world's most highly concentrated patterns of media 
ownership and a licencing system which restricts the opportunities for new 
competitors. 
The public service broadcasting tradition requires the ABC to produce a 
comprehensive service which informs. educates and entertains. This 
mandate is challenged by commercial broadcasting operators. who argue 
that the ABC should "complement rather than compete• by catering for 
minority interests and leaving mass appeal programming to the private 
sector. Holroyde has argued : 
... Australian broadcasting seems to have reflected the 
inherent dichotomy in the national identity, The Australian 
Broadcasting Commission, which was founded very much along 
the national public service lines that had been developed by Lord 
Reith in Britain. inevitably echoes its United Kingdom origin and 
43 
inspiration. On the other hand, the commercial channels have 
tended to follow the precedents and the examples set by 
commercial television in the United States. All the major 
networks therefore have largely continued to depend upon 
philosophies of program-making derived from outside Australia. 
(1980: 32) 
broadcasting sys1em - one advocating broadcasting for profit. the other as 
a public service. 
The Structure oi the Broadcasting System 
The Minister for Communications has the power to licence radio and 
television stations. This right flows from s. 51 Cvl of the Australian 
Constitution, which gives the Commonwealth government jurisdiction over 
'. .. postal. telephonic. telegraphic and other like services". Since the 
Wireless Telegraphy Act oi 1905. Federal governments have regulated the 
Australian electronic media. 
The original Australian broadcasting system developed during the early 
days of radio. A dual system. it comprised an independent national ABC 
reporting to Parliament and commercial stations operated privately by 
licencees for profit ABC programming was determined by its 
Commissioners. Commercial stations were free to chose their own 
programs within requirements relating to ownership. technical. Australian 
content. advertising and network matters contained in the Broadcasting and 
Television Act ( 1942 and amendments) . 
In 1975 a third broadcasting sector joined the system public 
broadcasting. These are radio stations operated by non-profit 
organisations and licenced to serve a specific community or special 
interest group. Most are run by volunteers and rely on public subscription 
for income. Whatever its value to the community. public radio has tailed 
to attract large audiences. It has not proved the drain on commercial 
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revenue or ABC audience feared by some before the introduction of the 
public sector, 
In January 1978 the Liberal/National Country Party ( L/NCPl government 
established a fourth sector. the Special Broadcasting Service ( SBSJ . to 
provide multi-cultural radio and television services. The SBS was an 
election promise to the ethnic communities which had complained bitterly 
about the 'anglo-saxon' bias of ABC programming. To avoid duplication. 
s. 26 of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act <1983) requires the 
ABC to 'have regard' to services provided by SBS. though the same Act 
also requires the Corporation to take account of the 'multicultural character 
of the Australian community'. 
Despite considerable financial support from Federal governments the SBS 
has yet to attract a large audience for its radio or television services. In 
mid-1982 Australian Labor Party <ALPl Senator John Button. as Opposition 
Spokesman on Communications. attacked 
! Mf multi-cultural television was catering for 
the SBS. claiming that 
ethnic communities bui for 
"middle class trendies too lazy to go to art cinemas". Once in 
government Labor announced an inquiry into the future of the SBS. chaired 
by F. X. Connor. to report in early 1985. There has been widespread 
speculation that the service will be merged with the ABC. 
In 1984 the Australian broadcasting system comprised 
No. stations Commercial Public SBS 
------------
Radio 126 137 50 2 
Television 84 50 
<ABT Annual Report 1983/84: 25} 
Although the ABC has 84 television stations. the same basic schedule is 
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seen simultaneously across Australia. with small inserts of local news. 
current affairs and weather information. There are 126 ABC radio 
stations. but only 4 basic services. 
networking of commercial programs. 
stations are Individually programmed. 
needs. 
In contrast. though there Is some 
commercial television and radio 
allowing greater flexibility for local 
There are no available accurate figures on the breakdown of audiences 
between the four broadcasting sectors which make up the Australian 
broadcasting system. Few people use one service exclusively; most 
change stations and medium regularly. Industry audience ratings scores. 
though often quoted. are not particularly useful because they only show the 
audience at any given time. not the intensity of preference. patterns of 
use or cumulative audience figures <Dix Vol. 1: 3) . 
Australia is still considering the introduction oi pay. subscription and 
cable television. When the Australian communications satellite, AUSSAT. 
is launched in 1985. it will give commercial radio and television access to 
many remote areas which are currently the preserve of the ABC. This 
new technology will dramatically change the Australian broadcasting system 
and make Australian ownership and control of local broadcasting services 
more difficult to define or enforce. 
State Agencies Supervising Broadca§ting 
Federal parliamentary control over the broadcasting system Is expressed 
through legislation and administered by government agencies. Some 
Infringements ot broadcasting law can be dealt with directly by these 
agencies: others must be referred to the Minister for Communications for 
action. 
The Department of Communications monitors and reports to the Minister 
on the performance of the ABC. SBS and ABT. In particular. the 
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Department assesses !he financial performance of each organisation and 
makes recommendations lo the Minister about budgets and new policy 
proposals. The Department. however. has no direct jurisdiction over the 
activities of statutory corporations in the Communications portfolio. 
Responsibility for regulating the commercial sector is largely delegated to 
the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal CABTJ. The ABT is an independent 
statutory authority which distributes and renews licences !or commercial 
radio. television and public broadcasting and advises governments on 
policy. Members of !he Tribunal are appointed by the government. 
Figure 1: 2: 1 outlines the relationship between the various agencies. 
institutions and legislation involved in the broadcasting system. As the 
diagram indicates. the ABT has no control over ABC licences or 
programs. 
In 1976 the Fraser L/NCP government announced an 
broadcasting system (known as 'The Green Report'. 
F. Green from the Department oi Communications) . 
inquiry into the 
after its author 
Since 1948 the 
commercial sector had been subject to program standards set up by the 
Australian Broadcasting Control Board <ABC Bl . but the ABC had not. The 
principle of ABC independence had always been cited as the reason for 
not allowing ABC programs to be regulated by another government agency. 
The commercial sector urged the 1976 inquiry to make the ABC adhere to 
the same program standards. On the recommendation of the Green 
Report. the government amended the Broadcasting and Television Act 
<1942l to abolish the ABCB and replace it with the ABT. The government 
announced that the ABT would be a 'supra-authority' with responsibility for 
regulating the whole broadcasting system. including !he ABC. It would 
have the power to grant. renew or revoke licences and to set technical 
and program requirements for all broadcasters. 
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There was no mention. however. of the ABC in the preamble to the 
amendments. and a dratting error failed to alter s. 18. 2 of the 
Broadcasting and Television Act to give the ABT specific statutory power 
over the ABC. Richard Harding. an ABC Commissioner and professor of 
law. noticed the mistake while the amendments were still before Parliament 
but "did not in the circumstances feel it was incumbent upon me to alert 
the government to the botched manner in which it was carrying out its 
rushed task. nor did I alert anyone ... who might have felt tempted to pass 
on the warning" ( 1979: 93) 
Whether in fact the ABT was ever intended to have jurisdiction over the 
ABC remains a controversial point and will remain so until Parliament or a 
court rules on the question. Some ABT lawyers argue that the Tribunal 
could claim jurisdiction over ABC programs. though they acknowledge that 
it is 'almost inconceivable that the Tribunal would use its power" (Ghee 
1984). The Dix Committee noted 
It is now accepted as a convention, Irrespective ol any 
legislative provisions remaining on statute books. that the 
Commission should not share responsibility with any other body for 
the content and composition of its programs. In news and current 
attairs or in any other program sector <Vol. 2: 76). 
Had the ABT been successfully established as a 'supra-authority' for the 
whole broadcasting industry. significant powers of decision over ABC 
program mailers would have been vested in a regulatory organisation which 
is directly and professionally lobbied by commercial organisations keen to 
advance their own interests. In her final letter to the Minister as ABC 
chairman. Dame Leonie Kramer noted the Tribunal's interest in gaining "a 
discretionary power over the ABC" and warned of the dangers to "the 
ABC's absolute Independence In ma!ters of programming" which had been 
"upheld for over 50 years by successive governments" { 1983d: 2-31 . 
As Armstrong notes. the ABC has largely - but not entirely - stayed 
outside the orbit of the ABT 
48 
... On occasions. ABC spokesmen have said that the ABC 
voluntarily complies with the Broadcasting Tribunal program 
standards ... Legally. national programs are not governed by the 
program standards system. . . However. the Film Censorship 
Board applies the Television Program Standards of the Tribunal. 
including classifications. to all material imported for 
television ... The ABC originally objected to this application of 
standards designed for commercial television and to any imposition 
of censorship by another statutory body. but its objections were 
not heeded. Cl982: 113) 
The 1983 ABC legislation requires only that the Corporation "shall take 
account of" program and technical standards set by the ABT ( s. 6. 2iil . 
The Tribunal has not forced the issue of its jurisdiction. 
Broadcasting Industry Interest Groups 
Legislation which regulates Australian broadcasting does not and 
arguably could not - set out precise overall objectives for the system. 
Instead the law establishes a framework for the competing ideologies of 
public and private broadcasting. 
The tension between the public and private sectors is a clash of 
objectives. Established in the tradition of public service broadcasting. the 
ABC expects to provide national. comprehensive and impartial news. 
information. culture. education and entertainment. The commercial 
sector, on the other hand. is a business. When 1he ABC successfully 
attracts audiences away irom commercial radio and television advertising 
rates. and hence profitability. are affected. ABC Managing Director 
Geoffrey Whitehead noted the efforts of commercial stations to prevent the 
ABC's news program. The National. going to air in March 1985 
, .. television companies from the private sector have tried to 
shoulder-tackle most of our team to prevent it going beyond the 
pilot stage. , . Clearly those private sector interests know it wiH 
affect lhe cost per thousand rate they charge advertisers if their 
audience drops only one or two per cent. They're very nervous. 
They'd be much happier if we were in a tiny ghetto of people 
clutching their brows and being extremely intellectual and not 
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broadcasting to the broad mass. 
1984: 6) 
(National Times 19 October 
Commercial radio stations have a capable professional lobby organisation 
in the Federation of Australian Radio Broadcasters ( FARBl. F'ARB keenly 
advocates restricting the number of licences available to commercial 
operators. and so limiting competition for existing operators. FARB Is also 
a vocal champion of limiting the role of the ABC. ft argues that the ABC 
should provide only 'specialist' and 'minority interest' programs: a FARB 
submission told the 1976 Green inquiry that "ratings seeking by 
non-commercial broadcasters Is strongly opposed" (Svensson 1976: 133l. 
FARB has not been I· about its economic sell-Interest. FARB 
opposes 
, blatant government competition at enormous public 
expense. , . the question is .. , whether the ABC could make 
sufficient inroads ta undermine the advertising rate structures and 
thus the viability of the independent broadcasters. This could 
only be a significant step toward the day when there would be 
only one voice in the land, the voice of authority, (Faster 
1976: 157) 
The lnteres1s al commercial television are represented by the Federation 
of Australian Commercial Telecasters <or FACTS. an interesting acronym 
for an industry which derives its income entirely from advertising), Like 
FARB. FACTS members have a direct interest in keeping the ABC out of 
popular programming, FACTS. however. prefers economic arguments to 
emotional appeals to the doctrine of freedom of the press, FACTS told 
the 1976 Green inquiry that "since the community ultimately bears the cost 
of the system. it also has the right to expect it ta be structured in an 
efficient. economic manner" (Svensson 1976: 126l. FACTS used this 
position to argue for a high degree of program specialisation within the 
system. with the ABC and special interest group broadcasters to ·1111 the 
gaps· left by commercial broadcasters, 
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Economic arguments for 'efficient' allocation of resources across the 
industry may seem reasonable at a glance but do not stand up to closer 
inspection. particularly with television. 
In a market with direct competition. the technical and allocative efficiency 
oi an industry can be assessed. The performance. for example. of 
publicly owned Trans Australian Airlines <TAAl against privately owned 
Ansell Airlines is revealed each year by . information about passengers 
numbers and the profitability of each operator. In broadcasting. however, 
no one pays directly for the service. The ABC is supported through 
taxation not sales, the commercial stations through a loading on consumer 
goods. Thus the ABC's Income - unlike that of TAA - is not directly 
related to its audience share. Commercial broadcasters could never drive 
the ABC out of business through normal competition. If the ABC attracts 
audiences from commercial stations it potentially costs the commercial 
operators advertising revenue: but if the reverse happens the ABC may 
lose prestige and confidence but theoretically it should not suffer 
financially. 
Because the broadcasting sectors do not directiy compete for income. 
'market failure· occurs in the Australian broadcasting system (Withers 
1982:225). Market principles will not operate when there is no direct 
competition to ensure optimal technical or allocative efficiency, In an 
industry which is structured by legislation and not subject to market forces 
between sectors, the only way commercial interests can limit the activities 
oi the ABC is through government intervention. 
Commercial television advertises mass consumption goods, 10 out of the 
top 15 biggest spending television advertising categories are products sold 
mainly in supermarkets and department stores. As promoters of high 
consumption goods. commercial television stations can rarely afford to 
appeal only to minority interest audiences. Commercial television is "in 
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the business of creating very large audiences who can be exposed to the 
message of the advertisers• (Windschuttle 1984: 63). Because entry to the 
market is limited - with only two or three commercial television stations In 
each major city - the tendency Is toward parallel programming. like ice 
cream vendors on a beach. commercial stations tend to bunch in the most 
popular segment of the market. With so few stations It is more profitable 
for each to take a share of the largest single market than to dominate 
smaller individual markets. Economist Martin Cave looked at the 
experience of broadcasting systems with a limited number of stations and 
concluded "competitive channels will broadcast similar programt 
designed to appeal to the same mass audience and neglect minority 
tastes" ( 1984: 7l , 
From the consumers' point of view. there is no 'e!ficient' allocation of 
resources across the broadcasting industry. Commercial stations are not 
providing a range of program choices. The ABC, with only one station. 
can not possibly cater for all minority tastes. let alone also fulfill its 
obligations to produce 'comprehensive' programming. The reason tor the 
lack of choice for consumers is not the failure of the ABC to provide an 
alternative. but the restricted number of commercial operators. 
The efficiency sought by FACTS would not occur in television 
broadcasting even if the role of the ABC were restricted by government 
intervention. Market forces can produce industry resource efficiency and 
diversity only when entry to the market is open - a condition not met by 
the Australian broadcasting system. While there are so few commercial 
television licences there is no economic incentive tor any operator to 
forsake large markets for small. 
The ABC 
Unlike its commercial competitors. the ABC must provide a 
comprehensive service. The Charter requires that the ABC : 
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Q provide within Australia innovative and comprehensive radio and 
television services of a high standard, 
Q provide programs that contribute to a sense of national Identity. 
inform and entertain, and reflect the cul1ural diversity of the 
Australian community. 
o provide radio and television programs of an educational nature. 
o promote Australia's music. drama1ic and other performing arts. 
o transmit to other countries radio and television programs of 
news. current affairs. entertainment and cultural enrichment. 
<Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act s. 6. ll 
In the 1983/84 financial year the ABC employed 6 596 staff and received 
$292 417 000 from Parliament. These resources were used to provide : 
o three networks of medium wave <AM) radio stations, 
broadcasting across Australia through 95 stations. 
o a 24 hours a day FM stereo classical music network. 
o a shortwave radio service for inland Australia via six 
transmitters. 
o 2JJJ-FM Sydney, broadcasting in stereo 24 hours a day with 
relays on ABC AM stations from midnight to dawn in Canberra. 
Newcastle and Wollongong. 
Radio Australia 
., an overseas shortwave service broadcasting 48 hours a day -
24 hours in Engllsh and 24 hours in other languages, 
Television 
Q a colour television service for one national network through 276 
transmitters and translator stations, including programs by 
Intelsat satellite to communities in outback Australia. 
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News and Current Affairs 
o a nationwide independent news service staffed by ABC 
journalists In 38 cities and towns across Australia, and covering 
the world from 12 overseas bases. 
o public affairs programs in radio and television attracting national 
prime-time audiences for analysis of Australian and overseas 
events and issues. 
o direct broadcasts from Federal Parliament of proceedings in the 
House of Representatives and the Senate, 
Music and Concerts 
o six symphony orchestras one in every state capital 
employing 428 musicians full-time. 
o the ABC Sinfonia of 42 young post-graduate musicians. 
o a concert management handling more than 750 orchestral and 
recital activities a year, with more than 1 000 000 seat 
attendances. 
Education 
" educational programs for students - about 40 new program 
series a year in radio and 275 new educational episodes in 
television. 
o 62 educational books. booklets. cassettes. records and poster 
sets. 
o educational programs for adults and !or pre-school children. 
o a merchandising division, ABC Enterprises. marketing 
recordings. cassettes and books. 
" a program sales section marketing ABC-TV programs within 
Australia and overseas. 
54 
<> magazines - 24 Hours for the FM service. a fortnightly Radio 
Guide and general ABC magazines See and Hear and 
Countdown. 
(ABC Annual Report 1982/83: 2. 1983/84: 3) 
An ANOP survey conducted for the Committee of Review found that 93% 
of Australians use the ABC each week c Dix Vol. 3: 198l. Scan. the ABC 
In-house journal. welcomed the ANOP Report which it said "torpedoes the 
myth that the ABC is an elitist service which few bother to watch or listen 
to• (ABC 198lb: ll. The survey found a diverse and fluid ABC audience. 
The ABC's value to the community. concluded the Committee's Report. "Is 
dominated by its importance as a provider of news and information. 
People who want to know more about the world and want authoritative 
interpretations of major events turn to the ABC" ( Oix Vol. 1: 3l. 
The ABC is sensitive to commercial criticism of its range of programs. 
It noted In a submission to the Committee of Inquiry : 
If It does not attract a large share of the audience It becomes 
vulnerable to the charge that the taxpayers are paying for an 
organisation whose service they do not use. If it seeks to attract 
a large audience. by emphasis on entertainment in prime listening 
or viewing hours. It is criticised for competing too actively with 
the commercial stations and merely duplicating the type of service 
they provide. CABC 1980: 25l 
Richard Harding has succinctly described the ABC's dilemma as "showbiz 
or public service?" < 1979: 123) . In its submission to the 1980 Committee 
of Inquiry. ABC management attempted to justify the existence of a 
government-funded public service broadcasting organisation with its 
distinctive normative programming 
" a parliamentary democracy must have a diversity of viewpoints 
expressed In its media. This must Include a trusted and 
Impartial source of news and Information for the community. 
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" the ABC must serve a vast country with a scattered population. 
It is required to help foster a 'national identity'. The ABC is 
currently the only national information service. 
" the ABC must maintain balance between town and country. 
between local and national allegiances. "The ABC has a 
specially important role in conveying information about internal 
and foreign affairs to all parts of the country·. 
" though broadcasting for larger audiences. the ABC cannot 
·sacrifice minority interests to mass appeal". 
" there is a need to spread good-will and information abroad 
through Radio Australia. 
" the ABC sees Itself as having a duty to support and spread the 
arts in Australia: it sees Itself as a vital cultural Institution. 
With such a small population in Australia the ABC helps keep 
the arts alive by employing orchestras. writers and producers. 
" the ABC has an educational role to schools and rural 
communities, 
" the ABC trains young Australians for the broadcasting industry. 
(ABC 1960: v-vil 
The submission notes that the broadcasts by commercial stations are not 
Interrupted by parliamentary sessions: nor are commercial operators 
required to carry the financial burden of maintaining specialist services and 
an independent news service. The ABC defends itself as a public service 
of benefit to all Australians which should not be restricted by the economic 
interests of others. 
Defining A Role for the ABC 
In 1960 and 1981 the Committee of Review considered arguments from 
broadcasting interest groups about the role of the ABC. 
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In rejecting the FACTS and FARB submissions calling for a limited role 
for the ABC. the Committee of Review drew on evidence from an ANOP 
survey. the ABC National Population Study. This survey found that 78% of 
Australians believe "the ABC should provide programs for the general 
community rather than for those sections of the community the commercial 
stations don't cater for". Only 15% of listeners and viewers surveyed 
called for more 'specialisation'. with little agreement on what sort of 
specialisation was required (Dix Vol. 2: 45) . 
The Committee noted the complications of providing 'specialised' 
programs on a single ABC national television network. Programming which 
'fills the gaps' in a capital city. where there are up to 4 other channels to 
chose from. might also be the only service available to a rural community. 
Because only one television signal is broadcast across Australia, the ABC 
must keep in mind its total audience. To avoid direct competition in the 
cities. the ABC would need to subdivide its television network. which would 
require considerable resources and might compromise the ABC's standing 
as a national information service. 
The Dix Committee concluded its examination of the place of the ABC in 
the Australian broadcasting system with an essen1ially traditional view. 
advocating continuing public service broadcasting, It recommended that 
The ABC should provide a national service for all Australians. 
balancing as best it can the need to provide quality mass appeal 
programming with the demand for a wide range of special or 
minority interest broadcasts. It cannot escape from the former on 
the grounds that the commercial sector sees itself as fulfilling 
popular demands nor on the latter because the public 
broadcasters and the SBS have occupied some of its traditional 
territory. The ABC can. and should. take account of the 
capacity of other sectors to assume part of the burden. but it 
cannot relinquish its broader function, It should continue to 
develop an emphasis on its news and information service. It 
should continue to develop a concern for appropriate services to 
people in country localities and isolated areas where choice of 
programs is severely limited. It should be sensitive to the need 
for innovation and enrichment of Australia's cultural life. through 
the reflection of minority cultural interests as well as general 
artistic achievement (Vol. 2: 52), 
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. 
Commercial organisations expressed dissatisfaction with the Dix definition 
of the ABC's role. They re-iterated arguments about the need for the 
broadcas1ing sector to be considered as an entity. FARB's comment on 
the Dix report was to claim that "a most relevant and important question is 
unanswered - what is to be the role of the ABC?" ( 1981a: 3). FARB also 
attacked the methodology of the ANOP survey which led the Committee to 
reject the conclusions of the FARB and FACTS submissions. FARB's 
'independent evaluation' of the ANOP survey concluded that "some of the 
errors ... are so blatant and so basic that they must cast serious doubts on 
the validity of the entire study" ( 1981b: 2). 
The specific issue which most disturbed the commercial operators was 
the Committee's recommendation that the ABC be allowed to accept 
corporate sponsorship of programs to ease its financial difficulties. The 
corporate sponsorship case is worth examining in some detail for the 
insight ii gives into structural pressures within the broadcasting system. 
The case suggests that commercial media organisations lobbied the federal 
government. in public and private. to reshape the ABC to serve their own 
interests. 
Corporate Sponsorship 
During the 1920s British newspaper proprietors righteously applauded 
public ownership of broadcasting - not least because a state monopoly 
eliminated a potential competitor for advertising revenue. When Australia 
came to establish its public service broadcasting organisation in 1932, 
local newspaper owners with radio interests had a vested interest in seeing 
that Australia did not follow the British example and give the ABC a 
monopoly over broadcasting, Though the nation was in depression. 
commercial radio was proving financially lucrative and owners were not 
inclined to surrender their stations to a state monopoly. 
The original Labor government legislation of 1931 to establish the ABC 
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did not propose eliminating the Australian commercial broadcasting sector: 
·a measure proposing complete nationalisation would have had no chance 
of being passed by a Senate in which Labor lacked a majority• (Inglis 
1983a: 17J. The legislation instead created a dual system of broadcasting 
: a national ABC funded by primarily by licence lees. though with some 
sponsored programs, and a commercial broadcasting sector supported 
entirely by advertisers, When the government fell the Bill was revised and 
reintroduced by the incoming conservative administration, Newspaper 
proprietors successfully lobbied the new government for an amendment 
removing the right of the ABC to accept sponsorship of programs: the 
clause eventually accepted by the government "conformed almost word for 
word with one suggested by the Australian Associated Press and the 
Brisbane Newspaper Company Ltd" <Thomas 1980: 15). When the ABC 
began broadcasting on the evening of Friday. 1 July 1932. it was 
expressly prohibited from broadcasting paid announcements. 
The issue lay dormant until !he 1981 Report of the Committee of Inquiry 
Into the ABC recommended commercial sponsorship of some ABC television 
programs. The Committee hoped that business corporations would 
underwrite the production costs of prestigious and expensive events such 
as opera broadcasts and major sports coverage. No advertisements would 
interrupt ABC programs: the name of the sponsor would appear only at the 
beginning and end of a program. News and current affairs programs were 
to be excluded (Dix Vol. 1: 15l . 
Corporate advertising for the ABC was advocated by the Australian 
Association of National Advertisers ( AANAl and vigorously opposed by 
FACTS and FARB. The members of the AANA wanted access to ABC 
audiences. which it believed "are in the upper socio-economic group which 
are themselves significant consumers of goods and services and ideas but 
more importantly take decisions on behalf of major companies. 
organisations. associations and governments" (Windschuttle 1984: 62J. 
59 
The AANA argued that corporate sponsorship would give the ABC a greater 
diversity of income sources and so more Independence. Within guidelines 
to "safeguard editorial independence and program judgements• the Dix 
Committee accepted the AANA argument. though noting the risk that 
sponsors might attempt to influence ABC programming. The Commitlee 
supported its decision by pointing to the advantages of !he ABC having 
diverse sources of funding and by quoting its ANOP survey which suggested 
that half those interviewed favoured sponsorship of ABC programs. 
The notion of corporate sponsorship was guardedly accepted by ABC 
Commissioners as a way of gaining some financial independence during a 
time of severely restricted funding. ABC Chairman Professor Leonie 
Kramer rejected the opinion that external sponsorship would endanger the 
ABC's independence. calling this a "rather dismal" view of corporate 
intentions (The Australian 11 June 1982: 3). 
The notion of corporate sponsorship was opposed by FARB. FACTS. 
Aunty's Nieces and Nephews (a whimsical pressure group of ABC 
supporters) . and the ALP. which saw corporate underwriting of ABC 
programs as "the thin edge of the wedge" ! Button 1982: 30). 
While the government considered its options. FACTS and FARB lobbied 
strongly against corporate underwriting being permitted for ABC television 
programs. A FARB report. Sponsorship and the ABC. ques1loned the 
ability of any 'strict guidelines' to preserve the independence of the ABC. 
The FARB report concluded that by promoting its own merchandise "the 
ABC has already crossed the threshold of commercialism. and should now 
return to its proper position" (198la: 16). FARB warned that the Dix 
report "has not given due regard to the insidious effect of Introducing a 
government-subsidised competitor Into the adverllsing marketplace" 
(1981a: 14l. 
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Commercial operators found allies in newspapers which were often part of 
the same media conglomerate. The Age editorial of 20 April l 980 
discussed the dilemma posed by the acceptance of corporate underwriting 
and argued that the ABC would be compromised by such a decision. The 
Sydney Morning Herald editorial of l May 1980 also opposed corporate 
sponsorship. It began with references to the ABC's "independence and 
integrity" and ended with a coy warning that "the size of the corporate 
cake is by no means unlimited". 
The Sydney Morning Herald became more emphatic in its epicurean 
metaphors in an editorial on 7 July 1980 : •The size of the corporate cake 
is not limitless, and such organisations as the Australian Opera and the 
Adelaide Festival depend on it. They must not suffer because the ABC 
may want a slice of the cake". The editorial did not mention the extensive 
media holdings of the Fairfax company. the owners of the Sydney Morning 
Herald. which also rely on advertising from corporations for revenue 
<Ashbolt 1980: 155). 
The controversy ended on 4 July 1982 when the LINCP government 
announced that it would not allow corporate underwriting of ABC programs. 
The Minister for Communications cited the "possible threat to the ABC's 
independence· as the reason for the decision (Brown 1982: 6-7) . The 
announcement was applauded by the ALP: section 25( 3) of the ABC 
legislation subsequently passed by a Labor government prohibits the 
Corporation from accepting ·any payment or other consideralion for the 
broadcasting or televising of any announcement. program or other 
matter.· 1 
1 tt ts by no means certain that the current Board ac<;epts the ban on corporate sponsorship. 
Media reports suggest that Chairman Ken Myer ts keen to acqutre corporate funds and has urged 
the government to amend the ABC's leg•slation to allow this. 
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The corporate sponsorship controversy suggests that. as in 1931-32. 
commercial media owners successfully pursued their economic interest in 
restricting the role of the ABC. The decision of 4 July 1982 illustrates 
how government decisions. rather than market forces. determine the 
boundaries of ABC participation in the Australian broadcasting system. 
Summary 
Because there Is market failure in the broadcasting Industry, government 
intervention defines the roles of the various broadcasting sectors. Hence 
there wiil be constant pressure on governments from commercial 
broadcasters who are keen to keep the ABC out of popular programming. 
Ashbolt suggests : 
It is when the ABC steps out of character and out of line. 
either by drawing audiences away from the commercials (as on 
rock s1a1ion 2JJ) or by disturbing the populace with dangerous 
thoughts and raffish language. that the lobbyists of FACTS and 
FARB begin to agitate in Canberra for restraints on the 
ill-considered expenditure of taxpayers' money and for 
programming guideHnes to which all broadcasting bodies should 
conform. < 1977: 256-257) 
The ABC refuses to accept the 'minority interest' role ascribed to it by 
organisations representing commercial radio and television. The 
Corporation argues that its Charter gives It a mandate to provide a 
comprehensive service with a balance between wide appeal and specialised 
programs. 
Thus the structure of Australia's broadcasting system has institutionalised 
a strong conflict of interests between a commercial and a public service 
broadcasting sector, Both sides appeal to governments for support and 
favours. The system forces ABC to be a political actor. Commercials are 
lobbying the government - the ABC must do likewise to maintain its 
position. Because it is part of a system of competing interests. the ABC 
cannot afford to stand above the fray. 
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1. 3 PARLIAMENT AND THE ABC 
The ABC was created by the Australian Commonwealth Parliament. The 
Corporation owes its continuing existence to a mandate from Parliament 
and is accountable for the way it exercises that delegated responsibility. 
Though supporters of the ABC assess the ABC's position by absolute 
standards. "Parliaments are the only sovereign entities in our society• (Dix 
Vol. 2: 72). 
In practice the relationship between the ABC and Parliament is mediated 
by the conventions of statutory corporations; Parliament se\s \he 
boundaries of ABC activity. finances the organisation and moni\ors 
compliance with the Act but does not become involved in day-to-day 
management or determine policy for the ABC's Board of Directors. The 
ABC is accountable to Parliament directly through annual reports. 
parliamentary commi1tees and independent reviews and indireclly through a 
minister. who can be questioned by members and senators and censured 
if ministerial performance is found lacking. 
Traditionally a minister is responsible for all actions taken by 
departmental o!ficials. although "in practice the doctrine has probably 
never been literally true" (Weller and Grattan 1980: 13l. The relationship 
between a minister and a statutory corporation is more problematic. 
Statutory corporations are created precisely because Parliament wants a 
function kept at a distance from political directive. So ministers whose 
portfolio includes a statutory corporation must perform a delicate balancing 
act in keeping the statutory corporation accountable while not interfering in 
policy. 
F. A. Bland has argued that •the statutory government corporation is out 
of harmony. if not quite inconsistent. with the old theory of parliamentary 
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government and of ministerial responsibility" Cl 937: 41) , Certainly 
independence and responsibility are not easily reconciled. In practice an 
implicil distinction is made by responsible ministers between a statutory 
corporation's administrative and functional independence, Ministers monitor 
the administrative performance of a corporation to check for compliance 
with Parliament's legislation without becoming involved in functional issues. 
Minister for Communications Michael Duffy acknowledged the restriction of 
his responsibility for the ABC to adminis!rative concerns when he told the 
Media Councii of Australia that "in my period as Minister for 
Communications I have consistently stated that programming is a matter for 
the ABC. not the government. 
the government" (April 1984: l l , 
I continue to hold this view and so does 
Accountability Through A Minister 
The tension between ministerial responsibility and statutory autonomy is 
an irresolvable and probably inexhaustible subject. 
Commission On Australian Government Administration noted 
As the Royal 
... !hat a statutory body has been brought into being frequently 
signifies that a deliberate decision has been taken to place the 
performance of a particular function outside the political sphere of 
influence or to relieve a minister and his department of immediate 
responsibility for it. But the fact that certain powers are reserved 
to the minister means that it Is the Parliament's intention that the 
abdication of ministerial authority should not be complete and 
sometimes also that Parliament desires that the a.ctivities of the 
body should be subordinated to broad policies enunciated from 
time to time by the government .. , 
It has not been easy to devise statutory formulae which 
adequately express the desired balance of ministerial and agency 
powers and responsibilities. and there have. no doubt. been 
occasions when this difficulty has been compounded by the 
absence of any clear conception of what the minister's role 
should be ( 1976: 86l . 
To reconcile the independence of a public service broadcasting 
corporation with the requirements of responsible government. Lord Reith of 
the BBC argued for limited ministerial responsibility (Hull 1959: 37). He 
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accepted ministerial powers of appointment to the BBC Board. directives in 
national emergencies and a right to explanations from the Corporation 
about Its activities. He did not. however. want ministerial Involvement in 
Corporation policy. For Reith the minlster·s role should be to ensure !hat 
the Corporation fulfills Its statutory requirements. Ministerial power should 
be explicit and restricted. with its exercise accounted for in Parliament. 
In return Parliament should not hold a minister responsible for program 
policy decisions made by the Corporation. 
Reith's notion of explicit and limited ministerial involvement in !he affairs 
of public broadcasting statutory authorities Is reflected in the legislation 
establishing the ABC. The Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act ( 1983) 
clearly lays out the duties and defines the powers of the Minister of 
Communications in relation to the Corporation : 
" Directors of the Board are appointed by the Governor-General 
on Iha Minister's advice and may only be dismissed for 
non-attendance at Board meetings. failure to disclose pecuniary 
interests. bankruptcy. misbehaviour or physical or mental 
Incapacity ( s. 18l 
" the ABC can only spend money in accordance with estimates of 
expenditure approved by the Minister ( s. 69l 
" the ABC cannot spend more than $500 000 on a non-program 
matter or sign a lease without ministerial approval ( s. 70l. it 
cannot provide satellite earth stations without the consent of the 
Minister ( s. 76l. 
" the Minister has the power to give directives to the Corporation 
"in the national interest": such directives and explanations must 
be tabled in Parliament within 7 days Cs. 78l . 
o an annual report from the Corporation must be submitted to the 
Minister and Parliament. It must include details of all 
ministerial directives issued in that year Cs. 80l. 
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These provisions require the Minister to oversee the ABC's financial 
affairs and to approve new projects, but exclude a Minister from 
involvement in ABC program decisions except in exceptional circumstances 
when 'the national interest' is at issue, The power of directive enables 
the Minister to order or ban the broadcasting of a particular program or 
matter by the ABC, but has been little used since the power was 
introduced in 1942 legislation : 
• in 1943 the Postmaster-General prohibited the broadcasting of 
certain information about barrier positions in horse races. 
o also in 1943 the Postmaster-General required the announcement 
of new closing times for Post Offices. 
o in 1946 the Postmaster-General prohibited talks on sex and 
venereal disease. 
" In 1963 the Postmaster-General directed that an Interview with 
M. BidaulL former Prime Minister of France. not be televised. 
The direction was withdrawn alter four days and the material 
subsequently transmitted (Dix Vol. 2: 76l. 
Critics of this limiied notion of responsibility argue that ABC legislation 
does not face the problem of informal pressure from Ministers who "refuse 
to answer at the despatch box for influence they exercise over the dinner 
table". In particular. ii is argued that Ministers avoid the formal exercise 
of their power of directive by using "informal pressures, the brief telephone 
call, the off-hand suggestion over lunch or the hint dropped through a 
third party" <Hull 1959: 45, 54). 
Although no legislation could guarantee the ABC immunity from informal 
pressure by ministers, accountability to Parliament provides some check, 
If opposition politicians discovered. from whatever source. that a minister 
was attempting to informally coerce the ABC. then the forum of Parliament 
could be used to expose and embarrass the government. The political 
costs of being caught trying to interfere with ABC independence are high. 
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There are. however. considerable difiiculties which arise when writing 
limited ministerial responsibility into the enabling act for a statutory 
corporation. No legislation can guarantee the ABC immunity from informal 
pressure. Ministers must have sufficient powers to intervene to check 
failings. They require accurate and frequent information about the ABC's 
activities. As Hull notes. if ministers use their powers too frequently they 
defeat the purpose of the corporation device. but if they are not 
sufficiently aware they abdicate their responsibility to Parliament ( 1959: 53l. 
Section 8. 2 of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act ( 1983} 
requires the Board of Directors 
referred to it by the Minister. 
"ministerial representations are 
to 'consider' any government policy 
In Lord Windlesham's experience. 
invariably listened to and urgently 
considered at a senior level within any broadcasting organisation. It would 
be foolish. as well as short-sighted. to do otherwise. " A request lo 
'consider' policy is. legally speaking. not a directive and Windlesham is 
quick to point out that the final decision must rest with the Directors oi the 
Corporation < 1980: 30). No government policy has yet been referred to 
the ABC for consideration. 
A Minister who believed the ABC Board was not acting in 'the national 
interest' about a specific program matter could issue a directive. though 
this would then have to be explained to Parliament. A Board which felt 
that the government was becoming involved in Corporation matters beyond 
the Minister's jurisdiction could complain in its annual report in the hope 
that Parliament wiil restrain the executive. Should this fail the Board's 
greatest weapon is resignation to draw public attention to the plight of the 
Corporation. 
The Relationship Between the Minister and the ABC 
The Minister for Communications represents the ABC in Parliament. but 
the relationship between the Minister and the ABC Board has not always 
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been amicable. When Country Party MP A.G. Cameron was appointed 
Postmaster-General In 1939 and given jurisdiction over the ABC. he told 
the ABC Chairman 
I know nothing about broadcasting. and I am not interested In 
it. If I had my way I would stop all broadcasting. No time for 
these mechanical things. Don't know anything about music. As 
for people who give talks and documentaries over the air. if I had 
my way I would ... bring them under the Vermin Act. Unglis 
1983a:69l 
When the Chairman replied that the ABC was only performing its statutory 
duties. Cameron reputedly responded 
believe in boards or commissions 
<Armstrong 1962: 10ll. 
·Forget your Charier. I don't 
believe in ministerial control" 
Not all Ministers have been like Cameron. Former ABC Chairman Sir 
James Darling found most Ministers keen to keep their distance in a very 
difficult job, in which they were "inhibited by law from any direct control. 
but continually harassed by Opposition and colleagues alike. and watched 
like a lynx by the. press" <Inglis 1980a: 13) . Darling's predecessor, Sir 
Richard Boyer. believed the Minister should act as a "kind of parliamen1ary 
liaison officer. He or she will not be held accountable but will undertake 
to make inquiries on Parliament's behalf" C 1983: 95). For Chairman 
Boyer the basic principle governing the operation of statutory authorities "is 
that they are responsible. not to their ministers like departments. but 
through their ministers to Parliament• <WettenhaH 1983: 20). 
The relationship between the ABC Board and the Minister responsible for 
administration of its Act is thus "a sensitive one. Generalisation about the 
degree of any interference by the Minister is impossible. since it depends 
on the personalities involved" {Armstrong 1982: 103). 
Each new Minister for Communications must informally negotiate with the 
Board of Directors an understanding about the limits of ministerial 
68 
responsibility, While Acting ABC Chairman in the difficult time of transition 
from the Whitlam to Fraser governments. Earle Hackett found ·no Minister 
ever tried to Influence news bulletins or anything while I was Chairman" 
( 1982). Professor Leonie Kramer dealt with five Ministers while a 
Commissioner and found a •general consensus" amongst Ministers about an 
appropriate level of involvement in ABC affairs. She "never had any sense 
that any of these wanted to exercise any influence on major things or on 
minor things" ( l 984J . As Chairman of the ABC. Kramer believed that she 
and the Minister should have an understanding of each other's views. She 
felt that Ministers should be kept Informed by the Chairman about major 
policy decisions before the Board; any ministerial comment would then be 
relayed to the Board by the time the item in question came up for 
consideration ( 1984) . This practice is continued by Chairman Ken Myer. 
who informs the Minister on important Board deliberations ; "He should 
understand and be informed by the Board of what our current policies are. 
II he doesn't like them well that's unfortunate; he doesn't have any power 
over policy" (City Extra ABC Radio 23 June 1983J . Long-standing ABC 
practice is to invite occasionally the Minister and other politicians to an 
exchange of views and lunch with the Board. Through such informal 
contacts are understandings about a relationship forged. 
The evidence from the 1980s suggests that Ministers are keen to keep 
their distance from ABC policy-making. Minister for Communications 
Michael Duffy told !he National Times : "I always feel that you may be 
perceived as interfering if you have a close sort of relationship. So I just 
don't have a lot lo do with the ABC. It's better that way" C 1 June 
1984: Bl. ABC Chairman Myer described the relationship between himself 
and the Minister : "I get to see him occasionally. I telephone him to 
inform him of things he should know about. He lakes the view that he 
should be seen to be at arm's length from the ABC, think very properly. 
I think the Prime Minister has taken a similar stance. He doesn't want to 
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be seen standing over the ABC Board with a big stick" ('Good Weekend". 
Sydney Morning Herald 24 November 1984: lOl. 
Most routine contact with the government actually occurs through officials 
of the ABC and the Department of Communications. Budget bids and 
policy proposals from the ABC are evaluated by the Broadcasting Division. 
the unit within the Department of Communications responsible for 
overseeing the ABC. SBS and ABT. The Broadcasting Division does not 
exist to "think up ABC policy" but to ensure that 'policies and estimates 
presented by the ABC and approved by the Minister are carried out 
according to those terms" (Smith March 1983). Department officers 
regularly discuss policy and administrative matters with their counterparts in 
the ABC bureaucracy. 
In her last letter to the Minister as Chairman of the ABC. Professor 
Leonie Kramer expressed concern about "the increasing inability of the ABC 
to make its views known direct to the minister of the day. without first 
having them monitored. refined or interpreted by the Department of 
Communications· ( 1983d: 1l. Professor Kramer feared that technical 
advice being sent to the Minister by the ABC was "filtering through the 
Department oi Communications but coming out a different colour· < 1984) , 
Kramer's own experience. however. suggests that the Minister does hear 
directly from the ABC and is not obliged to accept the advice of the 
Department of Communications. The invoivemenl of the Department of 
Communications in ABC affairs is not interventionist but reflects the 
responsibility of the Minister to remain informed about Corporation 
activities. Department of Communications monitoring ls a further form of 
accountability, though one often resented by ABC officials. who worry 
about "the implications for the ABC's independence of the trend toward its 
increasing administrative involvement with other parts of the government 
system" (Dix Vol. 2: 77l . ABC reports complain about the resources 
70 
diverted to comply with constant requests for information; they argue that. 
even without government bureaucracies becoming involved. "the work of no 
other public service body is so visible and open to such sustained public 
scrutiny" <ABC 1980: 28l, 
Accountability to Parliament 
As well as the responsibility vested in the Minister for Communications. 
Parliament directly maintains a "close overview of the performance ot the 
ABC" <ibid: 28l. Parliament can discuss the Corporation's activities 
through debates and committees, It can alter or abolish the ABC through 
legislalion. It receives petitions from the public about ABC activities. 
Members of Parliament. like other citizens. can directly complain to the 
Corporation about its policies. 
Parliament requires from the ABC an annual report which includes an 
audit. details of expenditure. particulars of any ministerial directive or 
request made to the Board. details of any gifts or bequest accepted by the 
Corporation and information about the activities of ABC Community Affairs 
Officers. ABC officials can be directed to give evidence to Parliamentary 
committees or to independent inquiries established by Parliament. The 
ABC can be opened up to intensive scrutiny from its creator. It can be 
made to account for its actions. 
U> Accountability Through Legislation 
The ABC derives its mandate from the Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
Act < 1983) . drafted by lawyers from the Department of Communications on 
policies laid down by Cabinet. The legislation establishes the form, 
overall structure and boundaries of activities of the ABC. and can be 
amended at any time by Parliament. With the exception of the Charter 
setting out ABC responsibilities. the legislation can be Interpreted and 
enforced by the courts. 
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Other legislation passed by Parliament affects the ABC. The 
Parliamentary Procedures Act. for example. requires the Corporation to 
broadcast 'live' on radio the proceedings of parliamentary sittings, A joint 
parliamentary committee determines whether the ABC will broadcast the 
proceedings of the House of Representatives or the Senate on any given 
day. Parliamentary broadcasts began on 10 July 1946, The first Member 
to catch the Speaker's eye during airtime was W. M. Hughes: •the ABC 
transmitted that night not only his voice but squeaks from his hearing aid" 
Ungiis 1983a: 129). 
Since 1951 the ABC has sought ways to avoid the disruption to its radio 
schedules caused by sittings of Parliament. Thus far Parliament has 
refused to give the ABC a separate radio network exclusively for 
parliamentary broadcasts or allow the ABC to adopt the BBC practice of 
broadcasting edited highlights and commentary at the end of each sitting 
day. 
The ABC is also subject to general law, including defamation. contempt 
of court and copyright law. Parliamentary broadcasts. however. are 
protected by Parliamentary privilege. 
The potential for legislative amendment to dramatically alter the ABC was 
exhibited on 18 November 1976 when the L/NCP government introduced 
legislation to create the ABT and expand the number of ABC 
Commissioners. All serving Labor-appointed Commissioners were to be 
removed from office so that the new ABC Chairman, Sir Henry Bland, 
could •start again with more complaisant Commissioners" (Harding 
1979: 81). Inglis notes that "no government had ever behaved so radically 
toward the ABC as Fraser's now did when ii set about re-writing the law to 
make a clean sweep of the Commissioners appointed by its predecessor" 
( 1983a: 402l. 
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The removal clause provoked considerable public hostility. A public 
meeting in Melbourne Town Hail protested against government policies 
toward the ABC. A meeting of ABC staff in Sydney expressed no 
confidence in Bland and threatened strike action if the government removed 
any of the Commissioners before their terms expired. The ABC Slaff 
Association and 'Aunty's Nieces and Nephews' lobbied Cabinet members 
and government backbenchers. On 3 December 1976. under pressure 
from the L!NCP backbench. Cabinet dropped the amendment removing the 
Commissioners. As a compromise Fraser increased the number of 
Commissioners from 9 to 11, "thus putting the rump of Whit!am-appointed 
Commissioners well and truly in the minority" (Harding 1979: 84), Bland 
resigned. claiming that the failure to carry out the amendments "abrogated 
the assurances by the Prime Minister that had persuaded him to accept 
the position" (Inglis 1983a: 404), 
Though Fraser failed to remove Labor appointed Commissioners. the 
evenls of late 1976 suggest that a government could remake the 
Corporation through amendments to its legislation. Fraser's failure. 
however. also demonstrates the depth of bi-partisan support for the ABC 
within Parliament. Government backbenchers believed that whatever the 
perceived failings of the ABC they could not condone a move they saw as 
political interference in Australia's public broadcasting organisation. A 
consensus among politicians about permissible behaviour by Parliament 
toward the ABC acted as a check on the executive using this legislation for 
political ends. 
Governments do not need legislation. however. to indicate their 
displeasure to the ABC. Through implication. via 'of! the record' 
discussions with journalists or by out-and-out attack. politicians attempt to 
intimidate or persuade the ABC to change its ways. Prime Minister 
Hawke. for example. made known his irritation with the organisation in the 
early months of 1984. Hawke had clashed with the ABC during the 1983 
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election campaign but since then the Labor government had restructured 
the Commission as a Corporation and appointed a new Board of Directors. 
In April 1984 Bob Hawke told a meeting of ALP parliamentarians that the 
ABC was "running a consistent line against the government". His 
comments were supported by Foreign Minister Bill Hayden but opposed by 
Michael Duffy. the Minister for Communications <Melbourne Harald 2 May). 
Alarmed by press reports of the criticism. ABC Managing Director 
Geoffrey Whitehead sought an urgent meeting with the Prime Minister. The 
three weeks between request and meeting saw public clashes between 
Hawke and the ABC. The Prime Minister objected to a segment on the 
current afiairs television program Nationwide. which featured a puppet 
resembling Hawke reading the ABC news in the manner he thought it 
should be presented. In an interview on the ABC radio program Morning 
Extra. the Prime Minister accused Corporation journalists of taking a 
"particular line on the uranium issue" (The Age 28 April 1984) . The ABC 
was defended by Deputy Opposition Leader John Howard. who felt that the 
Corporation • ... has shown courage. it has shown independence and, 
frankly. that is what the Prima Minister cannot really abide' <Scan 14 May 
1984: 10). 
On Friday 27 April, ABC Managing Director Geoffrey Whitehead met 
Prime Minister Hawke. senior advisor Peter Barron and the Minister for 
Communications. Hawke spelt out his grievances. which the National 
Times claimed were largely prompted by Peter Barron, "who makes no 
secret of his low regard for the ABC", The National Times reported that 
Whitehead anticipated Barron's attack and "let Barron know, in no 
uncertain terms. that he would not be stood over· <4 May 1984J. Laurie 
Oakes. writing in The Age. reported that Whitehead and Hawke had 
discussed "proposals for special procedures to allow politicians lo make 
complaints to the Corporation". 
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According to Oakes, the 75 minute meeting considered the establishment 
of a direct line of communication between the Prime Minister's press 
secretary and the Deputy Managing Director of the ABC (2 May 1984). 
This prompted the Leader of the Opposition, Andrew Peacock. to ask in 
Parliament whether such a 'hot line' for complaints by the Prime Minister 
would be established, Mr. Hawke labelled the report "absolute nonsense" 
and assured the House that there were "no arrangements for such a form 
ol censorship and nor would there be in the future". The Prime Minister 
then described his meeting with the ABC Managing Director "Mr 
Whitehead set out in extensive form the future plans financial, 
administrative and conceptual - for the ABC" (Canberra Times 3 May 
1984). 
Though Hawke made public his anger with the ABC. there is no evidence 
that he sought to influence ABC program decisions or use administrative 
constraints to 'punish' the organisation. The Melbourne Herald reported 
that the Prime Minister's. dissatisfaction "lies more with the present Board 
and competence of the organisation than with any conscious attempts at 
bias" c 2 May 1984) . Some months later Hawke told Parliament : "!here 
seems to be increasing and widespread view that the performance of the 
ABC is less than excellent in all its aspects. That is a view (with) which 
t as a private citizen agree. but I emphasise that I believe without question 
there is an irreplaceable rote for the ABC" (Canberra Times 14 September 
1984: ll. The Prime Minister may have been speaking as a ·private 
citizen' but the message was clear: the ABC can only ignore his 
continuing displeasure at its peril. 
Iii) Parliamentary Questions and Debates 
In Britain the Speaker of the House of Commons usually refuses to allow 
questions about BBC programs. If the question deals with administration 
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or technical matters, Home Secretaries preface their answer with "the 
broadcasting authorities tell me that ... ·, The Home Secretary may 
promise to inform the Corporation of the MP's question, but will usually 
remind the House that responsibility for decisions on the content of 
broadcasting properly belongs with the BBC (Windlesham 1980: 24-25). 
In New Zealand the Speaker has refused to allow questions on the 
day-lo-day policy of the New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation C NZBCl 
because "the matters which are the subject of this question are not the 
responsibility of the Minister, They have nothing to do with him. They 
are solely the responsibility of the Corporation" C Gregory 1978: 429l . 
in Australia there are no parliamentary standing orders particular to 
questions about the ABC: the Speaker must rule whether a question on the 
ABC can be directed to a minister as a ·matter of administration for which 
he is responsible" (House of Representatives Standing Order no. 142) . 
AustraHan parliamentary practice is to allow questions on ABC policy. with 
ministers responding by responsibility for the particuiar decision 
then reading a statement prepared by the Corporation. 
Inglis describes Parliamentary questions about !he ABC during the 1940s 
and 1950s : 
Chitlcy and Menzies were both disposed to leave the ABC 
alone, Each made It a practice to answer questions in 
Parliament by reminding members that the ABC was an 
Independent body, Chiiley saying so with his usual Inscrutable 
flatness, Menzies sometimes with an air of cool disdain towards 
the organisation and Indeed towards the whole business of 
broadcasting, But neither could curb his followers. and had the 
ABC been required to report Informal attempts at browbeating by 
ministers and other members. they would have taken up a fair 
amount of space In annual reports. ( 1983a: 188-189) 
The pattern has not significantly changed. Members still use questions 
as a chance to criticise the Corporation rather than from interest In the 
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answer. Ministers and Prime Ministers still respond by re-iterating the 
formula of ABC independence. In 1983, for example. 9 questions about 
the ABC and its Chairman were asked and answered in the House of 
Representatives and 7 questions In the Senate, 
the ABC were disallowed. 
No questions referring to 
The Minister !or Communications and the Prime Minister both answered 
questions about personal conversations with ABC Chairman Professor Leonie 
Kramer over matters of ABC programming. On 15 September 1983 Mr, 
Dully refused to comment on ABC expenditure on news services. saying 
"the matter of what services will be employed by the Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation ... is one for the ABC" <CPD Vol. 132: 890J. On 
18 October 1983 Mr.. Duffy denied charges that he had directed the ABC 
to give more prominence to the ALP in its reports of a Queensland state 
election. Mr. Duffy asserted that "there has been no interference by this 
government in the Board's decisions" and then relayed informaiion from the 
Corporation abou1 the ABC election coverage. 
ln the Senate John Button. as the Minister representing the Minister for 
Communications, used a question on 4 May 1983 to criticise the Chairman 
of the ABC. Professor Leonie Kramer. for not always acting ·without !ear 
or favour· (CPO Vol. s98: 149). Such strong criticism of the Chairman of 
a statutory corporation by a senior government minister is rare indeed and 
Senator Button earned much adverse public comment for his attack. His 
comments were ( inconciusiveiyl debated by the Senate on i 0 May 1963. 
when Bullen claimed that his remarks had been a personal observation 
from a member of a government "committed to the independence of the 
ABC and to procedures which will ensure greater independence than it 
ever had in the past• (Vol s98: 311-312). 
A subsequent exchange of letters revealed that Senator Button and the 
then Leader of the Opposition. Bob Hawke, had complained to Professor 
77 
Kramer several times during !he 1983 election campaign about 'biased 
items' on the morning radio program AM, Kramer had investigated !he 
complaints and found them not justified. This, apparently. was the cause 
of the Senator's outburst. Inglis observed that Hawke and Button 
... argue that there's nothing wrong or Improper about this, 
They argue that they're simply exercising rights which anyone can 
legitimately exercise in complaining of what seemed to them 
misrepresentation. Clearly such complaints come with a special 
force when they come from people who are actually. or 
potentially, in charge of the ABC's budget. ( Doubfetalrn ABC 
Radio 1983d) 
The dispute between Button and the ABC Chairman did the new Labor 
government little credit. Media reaction was critical of Button's personal 
attacks on Professor Kramer; On 7 May The Australian asserted in ils 
editorial 
Senator Button's accusation that the Commission's Chairman. 
Professor Dame Leonie Kramer has not performed her duties 
without showing fear or favour is a clear allegation of political 
bias .. , ( yetl the instance he cites scarcely justifies the magnitude 
of his charge that she has failed to act "without fear or favour". 
Senator Button has said she is conducting her private 
Falklands War. Apparently he finds her position analogous to that 
of Mrs. Thatcher. In one sense. he is right. Britain. li\<e 
Dame Leonie, was the victim of an unexpected attack. II she is 
the Mrs. Thatcher in this exchange. one may wonder whether 
Senator Button casts himself in the role of General Galtieri. 
Several of Button's colleagues, including his protege Michael Duffy. 
distanced themselves from Button's comments. 
criticism. the government moved to end the row. 
Embarrassed by media 
Button claimed to have 
been "misunderstood" and denied he had been attempting to pressure the 
ABC. Professor Kramer. he explained. was "a most diligent Chairman of 
the ABC in a most difficult time for that organisation" (The Canberra Times 
7 May 1983: 1), though he also expressed regret that a "conservative 
radical" such as Kramer had ever been appointed Chairman of the ABC 
(The Australian 9 May 1983: 2l , 
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At the time of the controversy the Australian Broadcasting Corporation Bill 
( 19831 was before Parliament. Its passage on 26 May dissolved the 
Commission and required the appointment of a new Board of Directors. 
Newspaper editorials urged the government to reappoint Kramer as a public 
gesture of its commitment to the independence and integrity of the ABC. 
The government would only say that all present Commissioners were to be 
considered. When the first ABC Board was announced on 9 June 1983. 
no serving Commissioner was retained. 
In 1983. as in other years. the Minister for Communications answered 
questions about his own dealings with the ABC but avoiding taking 
responsibility for policy decisions taken by the Board of Directors of the 
ABC. Government and Opposition members and senators used 
parliamentary 
administrative 
questions 
policy. 
to criticise aspects of ABC program and 
Some ot these complaints originated outside 
Parliament: Doug Anthony's question in the House of Representatives of 19 
October. for exam pie. put forward the opinions of the state government of 
Queensland. 
If members or senators want to discuss the ABC they can move a motion 
that Parliament consider the issue as a 'matter of national importance'. 
Such debates are infrequent. rarely occuring more than once in a year. 
Nevertheless, when they do occur. these debates give parliamentarians 
scope to express wide-ranging opinions about the performance and policies 
of the Corporation. At the very least parliamentary queslions and 
discussion enable ihe ABC to gauge the feelings of its creator and 
paymaster. 
om Parliamentary Committees 
ABC compliance with the financial and legislative wishes of Parliament is 
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reviewed by parliamenlary committees. including at times the Public 
Accounts Committee. 1 the House of Representatives Standing Committee On 
Expenditure. the Public Works Committee. the Legislative and General 
Purpose Committees of the Senate and ad hoc committees to investigate 
specific issues. 
Around May each year senior ABC managers travel to Canberra from 
Head Office in Sydney to appear as witnesses before a Senate Estimates 
Committee. Although Estimates Committees tend to be unsystematic in their 
approach, the ABC still has to account in some detail for the way it has 
spent the taxpayers' money. In April 1982, for example. Senate Estimates 
Committee B asked ABC managers questions about staffing levels. 
transmitter equipment. co-productions with the BBC. reductions in 
production of local drama and documentaries. salary levels, the cost of 
orchestras, ABC cars. Internal mail. legal expenses. accommodation. 
transport and capital works (Record of Proceedings 19 April 1982). 
The ABC takes such Committees very seriously. usually sending its 
Managing Director. Director of Finance, Corporate Controller of Finance. 
Controller of Radio Distribution and Services, Federal Director of Television 
Transmissions and Controller of Engineering to Canberra so that the ABC 
delegation can field the wide range of Senators' questions. Senators use 
Estimates Committees to delve Into policy as we!! as administrative 
concerns: it ls one of the few opportunities senators have to directly 
question ABC officials about their activities : 
Senator Cook Mr Chairman. this Is a fascinating. maybe even 
1Tue Public Accounts Comm~ttee was about to begin examining ABC finances in 1979 -
01because we'd heard they were ln a mess0 said Committee member Senator George Georges -
but dropped the Intended inquiry when the Dix Committee of Review was announce<l {Talberg 
1963). 
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riveting line of questioning. but is it relevant 
to the Estimates? Is there not some responsibility 
upon senators asking questions to relate them to the 
estimates? 
Chairman (Senator Robert Rayl : The difficulty that we lace with 
Estimates committees. or any committees in this 
Parliament. Is that if we operate simply under the 
Standing Orders and do not take into account the 
traditions of a committee we may be ruled out of order. 
There is an extra problem with the ABC in the way its 
Estimates are laid out ... they seem to be in an 
overwhelming mass ... I thought Mr Whitehead was 
answering questions very competently. 
Senator Cook I did not question that. I just asked about the line 
of questioning. 
Chairman I am as concerned as you are that at times we are 
drifting ofL But. nevertheless. we are talking about 
government expenditure of over $300m. If we do not 
explore these matters here there is really no 01her 
place to do so. 
(Senate Estimates Committee A. 4 September 1984: 156,) 
Press reports of a 30 May 1984 hearing of the Senate Estimates 
Committee described the ABC Managing Director being "carpeted" by angry 
senators. The Committee complained that an earlier failure by ABC 
executives lo explain structural changes to the Committee showed that "the 
Corporation had neglected its accountability to Parliament" (Sydney Morning 
Herald 31 May 1984: 1 l . 
Committees educate politicians about the ABC and its activities. though 
detailed knowledge is usually absent from parliamentary debates on ABC 
matters. Despite the so committees. there are few if any recognised 
experts on the ABC within the Commonwealth Parliament. This contrasts 
with the House of Commons. were backbenchers can make their reputation 
by becoming highly knowledgeable about specific areas of state activity. 
such as the BBC. Forrest has argued that most Australian 
parliamentarians have neither the time nor competence to understand the 
operations of statutory authorities : 
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... nothwithstanding executive-imposed limits on the time and 
resources available for scrutiny of statutory authorities. few 
parliamentarians have shown themselves to be particularly 
interested in the topic anyway. Explanations of this abound but I 
favour an adaptation of what R.H. Tawney called the 'Tadpole 
Theory'. which suggests that most backbenchers are like tadpoles 
- reasonably content to remain largely uncritical of their murky 
pond on the grounds that eventually at least some of them will 
become frogs. In other words the 'professional backbencher' is a 
rare commodity indeed, Consequently interest in the authorities's 
affairs has been at best sporadic with occasional enthusiasms 
tired by the potential for party political gain and followed by a 
hasty dropping of the topic as other issues crop up. ( 1983: 86), 
Parliament's committee structure is important, even if most commitlee 
deliberations on the ABC are less than expert. Committees give 
parliamentarians a reason. method and resources to investigate the 
activities of the ABC. Corporation accountability to Parliament can be 
extended through new committees if the normal channels appear 
Insufficient. The work of parliamentary committees - or the threat of their 
establishment - remain a continuous if unsystematic monitor of the ABC's 
performance. 
Uv! Independent Reviews 
As well as committees, Parliament can establish independent reviews. 
with terms of reference to include any or all aspects of the ABC. 
Parliament can supply an independent inquiry, such as the Dix Committee 
of Review established In 1979, with a large secretariat and substantial 
resources and require the ABC to make available any documents or 
personnel. 
Chairman Professor Kramer complained of the large number of such 
reviews - 32 public inquiries into aspects of the ABC since 1972 - saying. 
•accountability could hardly be taken further than that" <l 983c: 127) . 
Frequent inquiries, she complained, are unsettling for the organisation and 
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make unreasonable demands on limited ABC resources. The Dix 
Committee. however. did not feel that such reviews might compromise the 
ABC's independence. The Committee recommended that "there be a 
public inquiry into the policies. practices and performance of the ABC at 
regular in1ervals of seven years' <Vol. 2: 9). 
The findings of the Dix Report contributed to the restructuring of the ABC 
as a Corporation in 1983. While compiling the Report. Committee 
Chairman Alex Dix made ii clear that he Intended to produce a document 
which would be accepted and implemented by the then L/NCP government. 
He told the National Times in March 1980 : 
We have to be practical about this. There is no point us 
coming up with a copious and well-argued report ii t\ is politically 
unacceptable in either a public or government sense. We'd be 
wasting our time if we said the ABC should be carved up on the 
one hand, or that its budget should be tripled on the other, I'm 
noi anxious to produce a report that has no chance oi being 
Implemented. (Edgar l 9B l: 11 l 
Patricia Edgar has pointed to the danger of an independent review being 
structured to justify government interference in the ABC. Noting with 
disquiet the comments of Alex Dix. Edgar argues that the purpose of an 
inquiry should not be to produce a "politically acceptable" roport but to 
"produce a document which examines all the issues with integrity and 
makes recommendations consistent with the roles and needs it has 
explored without consideration of the current political climate. Repor\s 
remain on the record. governments change" <ibid: 11) . Noting speculation 
that Dix hoped to be made Managing Director of the new ABC. The 
Bulletin commented "Any one reading the first two volumes of his 
report ... could be forgiven for viewing it as a million-dollar 1ob application" 
( 23 June l 9B 1: 21 l . Morgan in the New Journalist also concluded that Dix 
had produced a "politically acceptable" rather than an objective report. 
Morgan claimed that the Report ignored the damage done to the ABC by 
the financial restrictions of the Fraser years: "the government excluded 
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consideration of the impacts of Its policies from the Inquiry's terms of 
reference and Dix obliged by dutifully conducting proceedings in a vacuum 
which ensured that there would be no embarrassment for his political 
masters" ( 1982: 39). 
Reviews such as the Committee of Inquiry supply Parliament with detailed 
Information about the performance of the ABC. Inquiries force the 
Corporation to justify its activities and usually provide governments with 
options for altering the ABC through legislation. Independent Inquiries are 
a powerful Instrument of parliamentary accountability; it would be disturbing 
ii their integrity were uncertain. 
Summary 
ABC independence derives from a mandate from Parliament. That 
mandate can be altered or withdrawn at any time. Through its Minister. 
through direct checks by committees and inquiries and through monitoring 
by the Department of Communications, the ABC remains accountable to 
Parliament for its actions. It is accountability mediatea by the tradition of 
the statutory corporation, which defends the ABC's right to some autonomy 
in policy-making by distinguishing between administrative irwolvement and 
functional independence. 
The evidence of recent years suggests that Ministers and the ;\BC Board 
have reached accommodation about an acceptable level ol ministerial 
involvement in the affairs of the organisation. Such accords are essential: 
as Windlesham point out, if ministers frequently intervene they not only 
erode "the responsibility of the people appointed on their own 
recommendation to represent and interpret the public interest". !hey 
"destroy the basis upon which that responsibility rests" ( 1980: 26). The 
Dix Committee of Inquiry asked Commissioners if they had been subject to 
political pressure. ABC Vice-Chairman Laurie Short replied : "from time 
to time parties do complain but as to government direction or government 
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pressure, in my time on the Commission I have no evidence of ii". 
Commissioner Ken Tribe responded that "ii there was any leaning, it was 
not done on me". Chairman Professor Leonie Kramer observed ihat "the 
pressures that come on individual Commissioners are rather from interest 
groups in the public than from politicians" (Scan S December 1980: 7l. 
Nevertheless the ABC has complained about the high level of monitoring 
which makes it difficult for the organisation to operate freely and flexibly 
while 
.. , its accountability to the Parliament has been extended so 
as to require it to provide detailed information to various 
government departments and agencies on a range of 
administrative questions which have little relevance lo 
broadcasling, This requires the diversion of staff from more 
urgent administrative and operational duties associated with the 
provision of program services to the pubiic. (Dix Vol. 2: 78) 
Beyond the statutory requirements of iegislation, much of the relationship 
between Parliament and the ABC is based not on law but on the 
conventions of limited ministerial responsibility. As Mark Armstrong noted. 
the effectiveness of a statutory corporation in maintaining its independence 
while remaining accountabie to Parliament relies on "the quality of the 
people ... you can't legislate about that" (September Hl82l. R. Gregory 
has also argued that the onus is on public broadcasting organisations to 
define and protect their responsibilities. To maintain functional 
independence a corporation cannot rely on "having friends in Parliament" 
but must defend its right to make program policy without ministerial 
involvement ( 1978: 431, 435). 
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1. 4 FUNDING THE ABC 
"Such inefficiencies as do exis1 in national broadcasting have 
as !heir major cause the mercurial na1ure of fonding 
arrangements" 
ABC Annual Report 1975/76 
Speaking to the National Press Club on 12 May 1983. Professor Leonie 
Kramer argued that independence for the ABC remained a "pious hope" 
while the ABC was dependent on "government handouts for Its operations" 
<Canberra Times 13 May 1983:3). The Minister for Communications. 
however. defended the ABC's Independence within current financial 
arrangements. Michael Duffy assured the Corporation that lhe ALP 
government did not have "the slightest intention of exerting pressure on the 
ABC by threatening \o reduce its funds ii It does not treat the government 
favourably in news and current affairs programs" ( 1984: ll. 
Both Kramer and Dufty were addressing the relationship between funding 
and independence. The ABC is financed directly from Commonwealth 
consolidated revenue. with the amount determined each year by Cabinet. 
Duffy's comments acknowledged a concern that government control o! the 
purse might alfect the ABC's capacity for autonomous action. Kramer was 
making the point that the current funding system leaves the ABC vulnerable 
to financial pressure from governments and makes long-term planning 
difflcult for an organisation whose Income can lluctuate according to its 
political fortunes. While the ABC remains dependent on governments for 
funds it is placed in an invidious situation; as a broadcaster the 
Corporation is expected to be neutral and 'above politics'. but as an 
organisation the ABC must lobby governments to guarantee its financial 
stability. 
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The Development of ABC Funding Arrangements 
In David Corbett's model. 1he ideal statutory corporation raises its own 
income and remains independent of Treasury ( 1965: 187) . The original 
Australian Broadcasting Commission Act of 1932 provided the organisation 
with a source of funds outside direct government patronage. This was a 
licence fee levied on al! owners of radio receivers. with the level set by 
government. The Australian Post Office collected the fee on behalf of the 
ABC. 
The licence fee system. however. did not prove a stable or independent 
income because governments used their power to alter the ABC's share of 
licence fee revenue. In 1940. for example. following a campaign by Sir 
Keith Murdoch's newspapers. the Menzies government reduced the cost of 
a radio licence and the ABC suddenly found itself in serious financial 
difficulties (Inglis l 983a: 62). 
In 1947 the ABC's financial problems prompted the Parliamentary 
Standing Committee On Broadcasting to begin an investiga1ion of f~BC 
funding. The Commi11ee noted the unsatisfactory history ol the licence 
system with governments able to vary the ABC's income by altenng the 
licence iee. Committee members were not keen for the ABC to become 
part of the annual system of grants used to finance government 
departmen1s. They feared political interference if Cabinet directly allocated 
money to the Commission. Though the Commitlee eventually recommended 
that the ABC move from a licence to funding from consolidated revenue. it 
argued that grants should be for a three year period. This would 
minimise the risk of governments using the purse-strings to discipline the 
ABC. The Committee rejected suggestions that the ABC be funded partly 
by sponsorship or advertising (Semmler 1981: 66-67). 
The Chifley Labor government accepted the notion of direct funding but 
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insisted that the ABC participate in the normal budget cycle. The 
Australian Broadcasting Act of 1948 decreed that the ABC henceforth be 
funded by annual grants from consolidated revenue. "There was no 
evidence that the Labor government introduced the new system in order 10 
hobble the Commission. Probably it had no other motive than 
anxiety ... that an increase in the licence lee would be electorally 
unpopular" (Inglis 1983a: 187). Curiously. the licence continued to be 
collected until 1973. with the receipts paid directly Into consolidated 
revenue and bearing no relation to the ABC's income. 
As the 1947 parliamentary committee report anticipated, the system of 
annual grants enabled governments to exert financial pressure on the ABC. 
In the Hl50-51 budget. for example, the Menzies L/NCP government 
unexpectedly reduced the ABC's estimates by 125 000 Australian pounds. 
In 1953, having realised its vulnerability without a guaranteed source of 
income, the ABC requested a return to the original licence fee 
apportionment system. The government declined. 
The fluctuations in funding by direct parliamer1tary appropriation have 
continued, though the ABC has not always been the loser. In 1970 the 
Postmaster-General informed the Treasurer that the ABC's estimate of 
expenditure for the following year would be reduced by $500 000. with half 
that reduction to be applied to ABC television current affairs programs. At 
that time the government had no legislative power to order cuts to a 
specific ABC ac1ivity: i1 could only reduce the overall level of funds 
available for the organisation. Determined opposition from the 
Commissioners and a public outcry eventually forced the L/NCP government 
to abandon this heavy-handed attempt at censorship. ABC General 
Manager Talbot Duckmanton called the Postmaster-General's capitulation a 
·precedent of the right kind and of enduring value for the future· 
(ibid: 328), Explaining to a BBC audience some years later the 
implications of the government's failure to restrict the ABC's foray into 
current affairs television, Ouckmanton asserted : 
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It is argued. of course. that the ABC cannot be Independent 
In its program policies if ii has to go to the government each 
year - 'cap in hand' as the popular phrase has it - for the next 
year's money; that if the government of the day holds the purse 
strings it must be tempted to use that power to influence the 
Commission's program policies. I must brace myself at this point 
and tell you. no doubt in the face of pitying disbelief. that. In 
practice. it Is not so. ( 1975: 10) 
In Hl71 the L/NCP government amended ABC legislation to introduce 
estimates clauses. The provisions, which are standard in Australian 
statutory corporation legislation. require the ABC to submit estimates of ils 
expenditure in the coming financial year. for consideration by the Minister 
far Communications. Estimates project ABC spending in five broad 
headings - Radio Australia. radio-domestic. television. other activities and 
administration. Each heading is broken down into figures far salaries. 
expenses and capita! equipment CDix Vol. 2: 539. Lindsay 1984. Blunden 
1984). The current format of ABC estimates was proposed by the ABC. 
though the Minister has the right to stipulate the form in which the 
estimates will be presented. Once approved. the ABC can only spend 
money according lo these estimates. The estimates clauses were 
in1rcduced as a "housekeeping measure. part and parcel of a modern set 
oi standards far banking (and) keeping audits" (Harding 1979: 111). 
The danger to the ABC from this 'housekeeping measure' only became 
apparent in 1977. In that year the Fraser L/NCP government decided to 
close dawn ABC radio station 3ZZ. Because Melbourne ethnic/ access 
station 3ZZ was officially designated 'experimental'. rather than part of the 
ABC domestic radio service. its running costs app<'lared as a separate item 
in ABC estimates submitted to the government. Cabinet declined to 
approve the estimate funding 3ZZ and the station could not continue. 1 
There is no evidence that the estimates clauses were originally designed to 
1The 3zz case is described in detail in chapter 3:2 
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be used in this way, but they proved an effective control over ABC 
ac1ivitles. If ABC legislation had contained estimates clauses in 1970, 
Postmaster-General Hulme could have required the ABC to list the costs of 
program categories and then legally reduced the estimate for current 
affairs television by $250 000. This would have required a complete 
restructuring of the ABC's accounting procedures, away from capital and 
salary listing in favour of identifying specific output costs for programs. 
Though no government has used the estimates procedures to attack 
established individual programs (as opposed lo an experimental ABC 
service) , the estimates clauses nevertheless do more than allow 
governments to closely monitor ABC spending; they give governments a 
potential point of entry into ABC decision-making. 
Following the 1975 election. the ABC faced its most dramatic financial 
contraction. The Board was informed that it would have $8. 4m less than 
anticipated to see it through the remaining financial year ( lngiis 
1983a: 389). The Fraser L/NCP government reduced the ABC's income in 
constant dollars every year for the rest of the decade. Only in 1982/83 
did the organisation regain the level of funding it had en1oyed in 1975/76 
<ABC Annual Report 1982/83: 35). As Edgar notes 
... several members oi the newly instailed LINCP government 
in November 1975 believed that their lime out of office had been 
made much more difficult by the ABC. and that the ABC was 
biased toward the Labor government . 
. . . the ABC had to fight off crippling financial 
cutbacks ... Ostensibly the government's intention was to achieve 
greater efficiency within the ABC. but it was widely believed that 
the government's targets were polilicaL ( 1981: 10) 
The instruments used during the Fraser years to reduce the size and 
scope of the ABC were not restricted to financial measures. Stall 
ceilings. manpower plans, the appointment of Sir Henry Bland as 
Chairman. inquiries. limitations on new transmitters and revisions to tho 
Broadcasting and Television Act 
MacDonald noted in the Sydney 
"watching a well-loved Auntie 
1983a: 437), 
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were also employed. 
Morning Herald, the 
starving to death by 
As Marion 
effect was like 
inches" (Inglis 
The ABC's financial contractions of the later 1970s were generally met by 
reducing capital expenditure. thus diminishing the future effectiveness of 
the organisation. ABC Director Richard Boyer notes that the ABC 
"absorbed the reductions in real income it experienced between '74-75 and 
'79-80 (roughly 28%1 by disproportionately cutting capital 
expenditure ... this is seen in Canberra as reflecting poor management" 
( 1983: 2l. In fact the options for cutting costs in an organisation such as 
the ABC are limited because most capital is already tied up in expensive 
equipment and facilities. Because broadcasting is both capital and labour 
intensive, requiring elaborate electronic equipment and numerous skilled 
personnel, considerable long-term planning is needed to get programs to 
air. A broadcasting organisation must think ahead and build studios. 
acquire equipment and train personnel. A large broadcasting institution. 
then, is not very flexible. I! it is to operate efficiently it must commit 
resources in advance and work to iong~term plans. This makes an 
organisation such as the ABC particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in 
funding. Even a slight shortfall in expected income can wreck years of 
planning, with disproportionate effects on current and future operations. 
In 1979 the government signalled the end of the period of 'negative 
priorities' for the ABC. Tony Staley. Minister for Posts and 
Telecommunications, announced the offer of three year funding for the 
ABC, with a promise that the 1979/80 allocation would be indexed against 
inflation. The following exchange was reported on the ABC national 
television news of 24 July 1979 : 
Duncan Fairweather Is this an admission by the government 
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that it's been too hard on the ABC for the past three 
years? 
Tony Staley : In effect it is. 
CWilliams 1982b: 6l 
When Staley resigned as Minister. the offer was modified and later 
lapsed. Since then the Corporation has relied. once more. on annual 
appropriations. and must live with the risk that governments will attempt to 
use their financial control to pursue political ends. 
The Budget Process 
Australian governments use a system of annual appropriation. with 
Cabinet framing a budget which is then considered by Parliament, The 
budget process is more than an exercise in raising and spending money. 
It is a statement of government policy in every area affected by fiscal 
measures. The budget is an economic strategy to achieve political ends. 
The difficulty for governments preparing budgets is finding a 'rational' 
level of funding for an organisation such as the ABC : 
Both outsiders and many insiders find it hard to judge fairly 
the eiiiciency or creativity of the ABC. , . ABC funding is a 
permanent 'problem'. Given its very broad aims. given in the 
Act and arrived at by convention. given that priorities are not 
clear nor could they be without offending important interests. 
given no easily available criteria for ABC 'waste' or 'efficiency'. ii 
is not easy to see how much money the ABC 'really' needs and 
how much 'fat' there is. Basically, it is.,. a question of taking a 
past figure and extrapolating it. .. Endless disputes over funding 
and the use of funds are built into the system. C Mayer 
1980: 551) 
The Australian Broadcasting Corporation must participate in the annual 
budgeting process. It negotiates with the Department of Communications 
for Ministerial approval of its estimates. Once this ls given the ABC 
becomes part of the Department of Communications' bid for approval by 
Cabinet. Thus the ABC must each year present detailed financial records 
to its supervising Minister and ultimately to the government for approval. 
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The annual ABC appropriation represents a political decision about the 
worth of the organisation. 
Cabinet's decision on the level of ABC funding is included in the annual 
Appropriation Bills. The Corporation is given grants for ABC operations. 
capital and Radio Australia. A three line appropriation does not mean the 
ABC can spend this money al wilL Section 62 of the Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation Act ( 1983l , passed by a Labor government, 
reproduces the 1971 L/NCP amendments which require the ABC to submit 
detailed estimates oi expenditure to the Minister and adhere to whatever 
estimates the Minister approves. Governments can thus keep fairly strict 
control over ABC finances - both the overall level and the way the 
organisation uses this money. 
The ABC's annual budget cycle : 
o October the ABC begins preparing three year forward 
estimates of the cost of existing and approved projects. 
Q December the ABC's forward estimates. approved by the 
Board o! Directors. are sent to the Department of 
Communications. 
o March : the ABC prepares its estimate 
coming year. This is sent to 
Communications. where i\ is analysed 
Department of Finance by March 31. 
of expenditure 1or the 
the Department of 
and forwarded to the 
" May based on 
proposals the ABC 
initial Cabinet responses to expenditure 
must provide a 'first bid' for total funds 
required in the coming financial year. These are processed by 
the Department of Finance and returned to Cabinet. 
" J1Jly : Cabinet makes its budget decisions . 
., August : the annual budget is brought down. including \he 
ABC's funding for the financial year. 
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• November : Parliament passes the Appropriation Acts. 
o January : ABC submits "additional estimates" to cover rises in 
costs before the next budget process. 
The ABC's three year forward estimates. first bid estimate and additional 
estimate are prepared by the Corporation's internal Finance Department 
and approved by the Board of Directors before being submitted to the 
Department of Communications. The Australian government budgaling 
process is largely incremental. so most of the estimates documents deal 
with comparisons for the figures from the current year. Estimate 
documents lnciude descriptions of changes in activities and programs which 
will result in movements in revenue and expenditure. The budget process 
is the ABC's opportunity to ouiiine for the government the operational and 
capital requirements of Australia's national broadcasting organisation. 
There are inevitable but unpredictable increases in costs. especially in 
salaries. during a financial year. To these, an additional 
estimates process. in January. supplements the main budget following the 
passing of the Appropriarion Acts. Additional estimates ensure continued 
funding of projects until the next budget. They normally do not include 
capital items or the funding of new projects. Additional estimates require 
further negotiations between the ABC and the Departments of 
Communications and Finance. In December 1983. for example. the ABC 
requested an additional $20m to enable it to cope with extra costs until 30 
June. The Department of Finance found this bid too high and - on three 
occasions - pressured the ABC to reduce its requirements. In January 
1984 the ABC reluctantly resubmitted a request for $ l 2. 5m only to have 
Finance offer a maximum of $ l 1 m. Finally Cabinet decided that the ABC 
would have to accept $12. 25m. of which $10m was already commi1ted lo 
covering salary increases following a national wage case (Sydney Morning 
Herald 3 March 19B4: 7). In January 1976 the refusal of the new Fraser 
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government to grant additional estimates was the first indication of the 
coming 'squeeze' on the ABC, 
The ABC and the Budget Bureaucracy 
The Communications portfolio examines the estimates documents of the 
agencies under Its jurisdiction, including those from the ABC, and advises 
the Minister on trade-offs available within the portfolio to keep within 
budget guidelines decided by Cabinet, The Department of Communications 
"is not. and can not be. a disinterested advisor its primary 
responsibility Is to the Minister, not to the ABC" (Dix Vol. 2: 528) , If the 
ABC disagrees with the assessment of the Department of Communications, 
then it must put Its case to the Minister and await a decision, When 
budget negotiations are completed, the Department of Communications 
returns to its role of ensuring compliance with approved financial and 
policy guidelines. 
Once the Minister for Communications has approved the combined 
est\mates ol the portfolio, these are forwarded to the Min;ster !or Finance, 
The Transport and Industry Division of the Departmenl of Finance deals 
wilh !he ABC, treating Its estimates in the same manner as those from 
government departments. The Department of Finance is considered by the 
ABC to be a tenacious negotiator, Former General Manager Charles 
Moses claimed that an ABC which lacked a skilled and experienced 
Controller of Finance would have "an almost impossible lime in squeezing 
the requisite funds from that tough department" (Weekend Australian 2 July 
1983: 6) , II negotiations or explanations are required. there may be direct 
contact between officials from the Department of Finance and executives 
from the ABC, A representative from the Department of Communications 
joins any conferences and advises the Minister of its outcome, 
Any dispute between the Departments of Finance and Communications 
over the ABC's appropriation is first considered intormally by the Ministers, 
95 
If they cannot reach settlement. the mailer becomes a 'disagreed bid' and 
goes to Cabinet for a decision. Such disputes are rare because the ABC 
and the Minister are working to budget guidelines issued by Cabinet in 
May, and so can anticipate the level of bid the government will find 
acceptable. ln the case of a disagreed bid, Cabinet receives a report 
from the Department of Finance and listens to the arguments put forward 
by the Minister for Communications. Cabinet's decision Is final. 
has only been two disagreed ABC bids. the most recent in 1980/81, 
There 
On 
that occasion the view of the Department of Finance prevailed (Coulter 
1983)' 
Once a budget is passed by Parliament. funds are transmitted to the 
ABC by the issue of warrants. These come from the Department of 
Finance and are sent to the Department of Communications. which in turn 
remits the funds to the Corporation's account with the Reserve Bank in 
Sydney. The transmission of funds !allows a timetable prepared by the 
ABC. The ABC draws from lls Reserve Bank account Ill on a monthly or 
'as needed' basis. It is paid no interest on the deposit. The ABC may 
not borrow funds, nor raise loans on its assets. 
Monitoring ABC Expenditure 
Financial checks on the ABC are part of a wider set of constraints on 
autonomous action by the Corporation. which aim "to provide accountability 
to the public or the Parliament as a whole without subjecting the ABC to 
political manipulation" (Armstrong 1982: 101\. This is the standard 
dilemma of statutory corporations balancing independence with 
responsibility. For the ABC this requires remaining accountable to 
Parliament for its expenditure while retaining the right to decide its internal 
allocation of resources, within broad headings approved by the Minister. 
The Department of Communications keeps an expenditure report on the 
ABC and provides detailed records to the Department of Finance. Other 
external reviews oi ABC expenditure include 
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<> an annual investigation and report by the Commonwealth 
Auditor-General of accounts under the Audit Act. 
<> the ABC provides an annual report to Parliament which includes 
financial statements independently audited. Ministers are 
expected to defend the financial administration of statutory 
corporations under their responsibility or to take action where 
financial statements are not satisfactory. 
• review by parliamentary committees and independent inquiries. 
such as the Dix Committee of Inquiry. 
• Senate Estimates Committees examine claims for additional 
estimates and review the performance of the ABC over the 
previous year. 
• the decisions of the law courts if particular expenditure is 
challenged as being illegal. 
The Dix Report noted that "by and large the ABC has complied 
reasonably well with the statutory and administrative requirements of the 
government and Parliament over the years". On only ihree occasions 
since the iirst report in 1933/34 has the Auditor-General's report to 
Parliament about the ABC been adversely qualified <VoL 2: 515). The 
ABC. hmvever. has complained of the totality of government procedures 
and controls as a major inhibiting factor in its capacity to get on with its 
primary function - that of producing and broadcasting radio and television 
programs. The ABC has argued that it alone should determine "how the 
overall appropriation is apportioned to meet current requirements and future 
developments" (quoted in Dix Vol. 4: 40) . The Dix Committee did not 
accept ABC complaints about its bureaucratic environment: it concluded 
that each set of procedures had a rationale and produced in aggregate 
financial constraints and controls over the ABC which were "strict and 
detailed" (Dix Vol. 2: 514-515). 
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Triennial Budgets and Planning 
After listening to years of protests from the ABC that its funding was 
inadequate to fulfill statutory obligations, the Fraser government decided 
that "for a trial period of three years the ABC's appropriation for ordinary 
operations and capital expenditure would not be less than its appropriation 
for 1979/80 plus adjustment for subsequent increased costs" (Dix Vol. 
2: 517l, The ABC considered it was being offered a guaranteed long-term 
minimum income. Announcing this 'triennial funding' for the ABC on 24 
July 1979, the Minister for Posts and Telecommunications. Tony Staley 
said 
Now this is a remarkable breakthrough and the ABC admittedly 
has had a ditficult time in the past few years. And 
that this will give them new heart and hope. They'll 
pi an, they'll be able to give jobs lo Australian 
directors. actors, actresses and people like that and I 
great deal for Australian culture. (Williams 1982b: 6l 
we believe 
be able to 
producers. 
think do a 
The admission by the Minister that planning was difficult under the 
current annual funding arrangements, then in their 30th year. was 
important for the ABC. Since 1949 the ABC had argued for some form of 
triennial funding. stating that it needed to be able to plan for three year 
periods to accomodate the long project lead times of the technological 
broadcasting industry. 
Unfortunately for the ABC. the Minister's statement did not include a 
guarantee of full adjustment. In its estimates for 1980/81 the ABC 
requested an adjustment of :1>3m to cover "extraordinary increases in the 
cost of raw film. purchase of films and sporting rights". Cabinet rejected 
the ABC's claim. which Department of Finance o!ficials cited as an 
example of the inability of the ABC to adjust to the realities of a tight 
budgeting situation <Dix Vol. 2: 525-5261. The failure to recover what it 
saw as a clear case o! rising costs needing adjustment convinced the ABC 
that the government did not intend to adhere to its commitment. The 
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Chairman of the ABC. J. D. Norgard. told ABC staff : "The Commission 
is deeply concerned that the triennial funding promised by the government 
in 1979 has not been maintained. If we don't receive substantially more 
than is now being proposed. the Commission will have no option but to 
cut programs and services in both radio and television and certainly will 
have no funds for development" <Scan 22 June 1981: ll. 
The government and the ABC had disagreed about the definition of 
'triennial funding'. The government intended to guarantee a minimum 
parliamentary appropriation for three years at the 1979/80 base level, but 
retained the right to decide what costs were 'justified' and thus to be 
included in annual adjustments. The ABC had a wider vision of the 
implications of lriennial funding. It envisaged a rolling three year base 
indexed to maintain its value in real terms; furthermore. the ABC expected 
to have immediate access to the entire three year grant at the beginning 
of the triennium and not to have to go through the usual budgeting 
process in the second or third years (Coulter 1983). None of these ABC 
expectations were satisfied by Staley's triennial funding. 
has not been repeated. Triennial funding remains an 
expectation. 
The experiment 
unfulillled ABC 
From 1982/83 the ABC's financial situation began to improve. The 
organisation was able to cease the practice of weathering financial 
contraction by transferring money from the capital projects to finance 
continuing operations. This was partly helped by a one-off capital 
appropriation for new ABC equipment to cover the 1982 Commonwealth 
Games. Transferring capital appropriations to cover operational costs 
arose as a desperate move to keep programs on air during the difficult 
financial period of 1976-81. Some within the ABC have suggested that the 
transfers were only an extension of the problem of effective planning 
imposed by an annual appropriation system. ABC Commissioners told the 
Dix inquiry, with particular reference to housing. that 
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it is not possible to make rational decisions for the future 
development of accommodation with a system o! annual 
appropriations ... the Commission takes the view that really 
eHective long-term planning and economic management can be 
developed only when there is a level of assurance regarding its 
funding. (Dix Vol. 2: 518) 
Governments and Treasury have consistently opposed long-term 
commitment of funds to the ABC. They have stated that advance 
agreements for expensive operations reduce political and economic options 
for governments because such commi!ments 0 assume that the relative 
claims on governments will remain in the same sort of relationship for the 
next three years' C Boyer 1984l. 
Many critics of the ABC's management of its resources argue that the 
plea for guaranteed long-term funding exaggerates the difficulties of the 
current system. Most businesses operate successfully with similar 
uncertain future incomes. The report of financial consultants who 
examined f-\BC management practices for the Dix Committee noted that 
many /'BC capital and plannng problems were self-imposed because the 
ABC's "budget aliocation process has not always coped systematically with 
the adjustments required" (Dix Vol. 4: 4-5l. By overspending in its 
operational division and compensating from the capital appropriation. the 
ABC has created uncertainty about having enough remaining capital !or 
long-term projects. partlcularly ior financing buildings. 
Dix concluded that "!he ABC should be able to undertake longer term 
planning under the present funding process" <Vol. 2: 524). To stop the 
practice of transferring capital to operations. Dix suggested that 
governments be even more strict in enforcing precise adherence to 
estimates by apportioning funds to specific operations such as Radio 
Australia. orchestras. and education <ibid: 540). This recommendation 
was opposed by the ABC Commissioners. who argued that "the process of 
limiting or with-holding funds for particular program categories could have 
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unfortunate effects. with the government of the day exerting too great a 
direct influence on programming" <ABC 1981a: 12-13). The system of a 
three line ABC appropriation has thus far not been altered. but 
governments retain the polential. through the estimates process. to follow 
the Dix recommendation and impose more strict external control on the 
ABC's lnternai allocation of resources. 
Funding and Independence 
To the extent that governments control the amount of funds 
provided through the Parliament to statutory bodies. it could be 
argued that the independence of those bodies is limited. <Dix 
Vol. 4: 13) 
The BBC Is funded by a radio/television licence. supplemented by a 
grant from Parliament. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation is funded 
by a licence supplemented by advertising. as is its New Zealand 
equivalen1. The ABC. however. remains solely dependent on the 
government for funds. In many ways the switch from licence fee to direct 
grant for the ABC was inevitable. The high cost of providing adequate 
services for a small population spread over a continent meant that revenue 
from licences would be inadequate unless the licences were extremely 
expensive, The high cost. the difficulties of collection. the problems oi 
enforcement and the political unpopularity of new taxes all against 
any Australian government reintroducing a radio/television licence to fund 
the ABC. 
Many commentators have proposed alternative methods of financing the 
ABC which seek to guarantee the ABC's independence while keeping the 
Corporation accountable to the taxpayers through Pariiament. Clement 
Semmler suggested a combination of a liconce fee to cover the cost of 
producing entertainment programs and a direct government grant for 
minorily broadcasting services such as Radio Australia. education and rural 
programs <1981: 69) . Professor Kramer pointed to universities as a 
possible model far ABC funding. arguing that the three year formula 
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iunding of universities placed tertiary institutions "a little further from direct 
financial dependence than the ABC" < 1983c: 128>. 2. The university 
precedent of a triennial recurrent grant, with the ABC applying for new 
capital requirements at \he end of each triennium. would save the 
"dreadful annual trek to Canberra" to lobby !or funds. and avoid the 
problem of coping with rises in non-discretionary costs which are not 
included in additional estimates. At the same time Kramer supported 
corporate sponsorship because she believed the ABC should have more 
than one source of funds ( 1984l. She failed. however. to convince 
either the out-going L/NCP government or the incoming ALP administration 
of the need to find new methods of funding the ABC. 
The annual budget round forces the ABC to become involved in poiitical 
and bureaucratic manoeuvring. The ABC's estimates must be approved by 
the Minister for Communications before they can go to the Department of 
Finance. f\lew policy proposals, requests for capital allocation and 
disputed bids are all taken to Cabinet by the Minister for Communications. 
Consequently, cordial relations with the Minister, an ability to present good 
cases lo the Departments of Finance and Communications and some 
political discretion about when to request more resources and when to 
keep quiet. are necessary if the ABC is to get maximum benefit irom the 
budget process. Even when money has been promised, there is the risk 
that the government may renege on its commitment. as the Fraser 
government did in 1976 by cutting $ l. 1 m from the ABC budget and in 
1980/81 by abandoning triennial funding. 
2Tt:e parallel with onivers~ties is interesting. Both claim special mandates tor their 
lndependence - the ABC from its position as a statutory corporation. unlverslties trcm the 
tradition of academic freedom. In the ANU Reporter (27 August 1982) the Chairman of the 
Au.stra!icy_n Vice-Chancellor's Committee~ Professor David Caro, is quoted as urgu1ng that 
"autonomy {is} the big qu~stion" and then goes on to discuss autonomy purely in terms of an 
economic retatlonshlp - the right of universities: to a guaranteed and stable income frorn the 
tederal government. 
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The ABC's financial position is often contrasted with with that of the 
BBC. When the BBC Charter is renewed or a new licence negotiated. the 
BBC and government reach a long-term agreement about the Corporation's 
parliamentary supplement and income from the licence lee. The BBC thus 
has a guaranteed minimum long-term income. Many British writers insist 
that BBC independence rests on its source of fonds : 
Without the licence fee it would not be the same institution; it 
would either be subject to the advertisers and market analysts (if 
it should decide to take advertising) or become the vassal of the 
civil servants (if it were to accept direct government funding) . 
Both directions are heartily to be deplored. <Smith, Times 
Higher Education Supplement 14 June 1982: 1 ll 
In 1977 the British government broke with tradition by announcing the 
licence fee settlement for the next financial year only. The 
Director-General of the BBC, Sir Michael Swann, replied that a one year 
agreement was dangerously close lo an annual grant-in-aid system of the 
sort "repeatedly rejected by government committees of inquiry as being 
bound, sooner or later, to undermine the BBC's vital constitutional 
independence" <BBC Handbook 1978: foreword), 
This issue was taken up in considerable detail by the Annan committee 
in its 1977 review oi the BBC. That Committee, alter a spectacularly 
inaccurate description of the operation of funding for the ABC, concluded 
that the Australian method of 'direct taxation'. if used in Britain 
. , . would entail detailed supervision by the Home Office and 
the Treasury of BBC current expenditure. where now only the level 
of capital expenditure is fixed. This means the BBC would have 
to justify all its expenditure each year and the Home Office would 
be entitled to examine in detail, the BBC's plans and any 
proposals for new expenditure. Governments would be expected 
to have views and even take decisions about program costs, 
content and quality. Stations and services which the government 
thought redundant would be shut down. Inevitably the government 
would become responsible for the BBC services.. . (quoted in Dix 
Vol. 4: 14}. 
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Yet the BBC suffers from the same problem which plagued the ABC when 
it too was funded by licence fees. if lhe government sets the level of the 
fee then the organisation can find Itself very short of money. Licence 
Increases are electorally unpopular; the BBC finds It difficult to persuade 
governments that it needs more funds. So the BBC must lobby. must 
argue its case to politicians, must play politics to ensure its income keeps 
up with costs. The long-term agreement about licence levels certainly 
removes the pressure of annual appropriations. but it does not take the 
BBC entirely outside the political arena. 
The Annan committee rejected direct funding as incompatible with the 
continuing independence of the BBC. The Dix Committee. on the other 
hand, was unimpressed by claims that current funding arrangements 
threaten the independence of the ABC. Their Report was generally 
unsympathetic to ABC requests for a lessening of financial and other 
supervision by Commonwealth departments; the Committee "did not 
consider that the ABC had a unique constitulional or democratic role which 
required special freedom" (Arms1rong 1982: 105). The Dix Report argued 
that the ABC placed too much emphasis on its status as an u111que 
organisation" which "merits spec1al treatment" and should ins1ead 
concentrate on becoming "more ellective in its dealings with the 
bureaucracy" 
(The ABC) pointed out that its statutory respons1bliities as 
defined in the Broadcasting and Television Act were illegally 
encroached on by procedures and decisions applied 
administratively by the government. .. such polemics are in our 
view counter-productive. and divert the energies of the 
organisation from a realistic appraisal of its roiaiionship with the 
government and effective handling of the system of management of 
public resources that the government has imposed. (Dix Vol. 
2: 559) 
Dix Commillee members examined and rejected various alternative 
methods of funding the ABC. such as the reintroduction of licence fees. 
advertising. a tax on the revenue of commercial operators. loans. bonds 
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and even lotteries to support the Corporation. Though recommending 
some corporate underwriting the Committee concluded that funding through 
parliamentary appropriation is a "major safeguard" which protects the 
"editorial independence and integrity of the ABC" (Vol. 2:471). 
Consequently Dix recommended that parliamentary appropriation should 
continue as the main source of ABC revenue. wilh more detailed estimates 
!or certain specific functions. 
The assertion that direct funding does not threaten ABC independence 
can only be tested by an appeal to history. Here the evidence is 
inconclusive - sometimes, as in 1970. a government failed when it tried to 
exert financial pressure to stop an activity of which it disapproved. On 
other occasions, as in 1977, a government was able to use the budget 
process to shut down an ABC service. What can be asserted from 
historical evidence is the potential for political interference inherent in the 
budget process. The annual budgeting system makes the ABC an actor in 
the political system. It must participate in bureaucratic politics to protect 
its resources. The ABC must continually justify its activities to government 
agencies and to Ministers. Under the current system. "if the government 
pays the bills. it is readily arguable that nothing is outside its competence" 
rsemmler 1981: 70). 
The ABC's main complaint against the current system has been the 
problem of planning within a fluctuating annual income. In Professor 
Kramer's words. 
We at present waste financial and human resources in tho 
annual pilgrimages to Canberra to argue !or our sail-evident 
needs. This system •s administratively inefficient. and prohibits 
confident long-term planning, ( 1983d: 4) 
The Corporation's planning problems. however. are not substantially 
different from those of any large organisation. One suspects that few 
other organisations would so endanger their future viability by maintaining 
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most or all current operations at the cost of capital expenditure, The ABC 
has sometimes allowed the complexity and problems of the current system 
to justify short-term responses to financial crises: Its difficulties might 
originate with political decisions and be exacerbated by the annual 
appropriations system. but they have not been helped by the ABC's 
management of Its resources, 
ABC Director Richard Boyer believes the organisation has been wrong to 
campaign for triennial funding rather than seek to work within the existing 
system 
If there is a genuine need !or the services of the authority and 
if It is meeting that need with tolerable efficiency and if it does 
enough to make sure it is perceived to be doing that then it can 
be as reasonably assured as possible that its relative funding in 
real terms is at least going to continue in the future, ( 1984) 
This view was supported in Parliament during 1982 debate on ABC 
legislation. Senator Peter Baume defended the current funding system. 
saying that he had "never seen the reality of the argument that government 
funding of the ABC implies subservience to the government's wilL Any 
government that tried to crippie :he ABC by needlessly withholding funds 
would quickly lose community support" ( 1982: 6l. Boyer argues that the 
ABC has failed to convince the government that it is being efficient and 
therefore governments have felt justified keeping a close watch on ABC 
activities: ii the "lack of public performance goes far enough for long 
enough constraints will become embodied in legislation" ( 1984l, 
Since 1949 the ABC has been almost entirely dependent on Parliamentary 
appropriation for financial support. The distinction between administrative 
and functional independence suggests that governments will normally use 
financial controls to draw the boundaries of ABC activity rather than to 
censor particular programs. There Is no guarantee. however. that a 
government will not eventually decide to use the estimates process against 
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a particular ABC program, The Fraser government forced the closure of 
ABC radio station 3ZZ with little political consequence: a future 
administration might decide that the political damage resulting from the 
removal of some current affairs programs would be less than the likely 
damage of allowing them to continue, Alternatively, the ABC may perceive 
that it will suffer financially if ii offends the government and accordingly 
protect its interests by politic decisions about program content. The 
current direct funding system. with its adherence to approved estimates. 
does not necessarily mean that governments can dictate ABC programming 
- but it does raise the potential for administrative procedures to influence 
judgements about functional issues. 
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1. 5 THE ABC'S BUREAUCRATIC ENVIRONMENT 
Media lawyer Mark Armstrong has argued 
... ii constitutional theory reflected current political needs. the 
ABC might be given similar legal independence to the courts. 
Legal texts cite the ABC as a prime example of the need for 
independence in a statutory authority ( 1982: 100-101). 
Yet while courts are given one-line budgets and control of their own 
administration. the ABC Is subject to a large number of bureaucratic and 
political checks. The ABC must not only account for lts use of resources 
to ParliamenL its Minister. the Departments of Communications and 
Finance and the Auditor-General; the Corporation must also deal with a 
large range o! government departments over staff levels. planning, 
transmitters. administrative arrangements and accommodation. 
ABC executives resent the need !or constant dealings with the federal 
bureaucracy. The Commission's submission to the Dix Committee 
complained of "too great a degree ot control exerteo by other branches ol 
the public sector upon the ABC's day-to-day operations" ( 1980: 28). 
Professor Leonie Kramer. as Chairman of the ABC. criticised the 
protracted fights and delays with the federal bureaucracy as a "waste of 
public money" ( 1984) . In response. the Dix Committee was surprised at 
the "extent of controls on the ABC as a result ol its relationship with other 
government bodies", though it noted that "there does not appear to be any 
widespread public concern about the statutory controls on the ABC" (Vol. 
1:11l. The ABC remains well integrated into the Commonwealth public 
service. with restrictions and checks that are unlikely to disappear. 
The Department of Communications 
The ABC's first point of contact with its bureaucratic environment is 
through the Department of Communications. Becauso the ABC needs 
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ministerial approval for its estimates. for non-program purchases over $500 
000 and 10 sign leases. there are constant dealings between the 
Corporation and the Department. For routine decisions the ABC must 
negotiate with the Department; as Hull notes. ·only matters primarily of a 
high policy nature reach the Minister" < 1959: 246} . While ABC Director of 
Corporate Affairs. John Hartley. complained about the attitude this 
bureaucracy took toward the ABC : 
There's an enormous amount of this dealing with Parliament. 
with politicians, with people who are trying to lean on the ABC -
often government departments. You're forever at loggerheads with 
the Department of Communications because everyone is trying to 
exert power. Government departments all the time are also trying 
to retain control over the ABC even when they've got no right to. 
( 1983) 
As ABC Chairman, Professor Leonie Kramer protested about administrative 
delays caused by the Department. She cited the case of such a delay 
preventing the ABC purchasing a new helicopter. The ABC had requested 
the Minister's approval to spend the money. but this was not immediately 
granted because the Department of Communications. without the ABC's 
knowledge or consent. referred correspondence between the Commission 
and the Minister to the Attorney-General's Department. While accepting a 
role for the Department of Communications in monitoring. but net 
controlling, statutory corporations. Kramer called for "more direct access 
between the authorities and the Minister without the Department's 
involvement" ( 1983d: 2l. 
Problems between the 11-BC and the Department of Communications were 
discussed with the Secretary of the Departmenl. Robert Lansdown, at an 
early Corporation Board meeting. Lansdown defended the role of the 
Department in closely monitoring ABC activities. pointing out that 
... no statutory authority - as an arm of the Commonwealth -
can exist in a state ol total independence. The central element 
was the use of public money and the final decision as to the 
commitment of funds had to be made at the political level. 
(Scan 5 September 1983: 5l 
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The restrictions and delays fer the ABC resulting from dealings with the 
Department of Communications are unlikely to diminish. While the Minister 
retains responsibility for decisions about estimates. purchases and leases. 
the Department must ensure that the Minister Is fully informed about ABC 
administration and can defend his or her stewardship of this statutory 
corporation to Parliament. Beyond protesting loudly, there is little the 
ABC can do if the Department of Communications interprets this 
responsibllity in a manner the ABC finds unnecessarily intrusive. 
Staifing : The Public Service Connectjon 
In 1960 the federal Parliament passed an amendment. requested by ABC 
Commissioners. which gave the Public Service Board <PSBJ power to 
determine wages. positions and conditions of employment within the ABC. 
Final authority over the ABC's structure and personnel was handed by the 
Commission to an external body - the ABC surrendered much of its 
administrative freedom to become part at the Commonwealth public service. 
The move was advocated by senior managers and a maiorlty of 
Commissioners. who hoped that transfer of powers over wages and 
conditions rnight ease the serious industrial relations problems then 
plaguing the organisation. The decision distressed ABC Chairman Boyer, 
who believed that "involvement with public service conditions made it far 
more diilicult to discern where the statutory authority arid independence of 
the ABC ended" (Inglis 1983a: 246), 
For two decades the Public Service Board ( PSBl had to be consulteti 
about any change to the structure of the organisation which might affect 
employees. Posts could not be created. altered or abolisr,ed without 
permission from Canberra. Wages within the ABC were not set by t!1e 
standards o! the broadcasting Industry but by PSB rulings on 'comparable 
work' performed elsewhere in the Commonwealth bureaucracy. !n many 
key respects the ABC became "like a branch of the ptiblic service ... 
developing and entrenching its own .. internal rigidities" (Dix Vol. 1: 12). 
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From 1976 through to 1983 the Fraser government used the statutory 
authority of the PSB to enforce staff ceilings on the ABC and to require 
that official international travel by ABC staff be first approved by the 
Overseas Visits Committee. As ABC Chairman J. D. Norgard complained 
These constraints. and often they are very serious constraints. 
severely hamper the independence of the ABC. Some. such as 
the limit on the number of people the ABC can employ. are 
contrary to the spirit and even to the wording of the Broadcasting 
and Television Act. The Act roquires that the Commission shall 
appoint such staff as It thinks necessary. But In fact 
governments now determine staff ceilings - and usually without 
consulting the ABC - and funds are provided accordingly. 
A group of public servants also decides who in the ABC shall 
travel outside Australia. irrespective of fluctuating needs arising 
from world events. Restraints are imposed in the industrial field. 
when dealing with staff. terms and conditions of employment and 
disputes. (1981; lOl 
Norgard concluded ; 
1\1! this means that administratively the ABC is required virtually 
to function as a government depar1ment with all the slow-moving 
procedures and bureaucratic delays inherent in such a system 
(1981; 11)' 
When the Whitlam government introduced staff ceilings in 1974. the 
ABC's quota was set at 7 600 people - more than the Commission then 
employed. The Fraser government. however. "quickly transformed this 
elastic girdle into an iron -jacket" <Harding 1979: 132J. I\ ceiling 
cl 7 100 staff was set during 1976. The following year this was lowered 
to 6 800 and then to 6 238 by June 1979. Tom Molomby calculates that 
in the period from 1976 to 1982 the ABC lost 15% of its stall, compared 
with an overall reduction of 5% In Commonwealth public service staff 
( 1982: 3l. 
As Norgard noted. it is doubtful whether governments l1ad a legal right 
to tell the ABC how many people it could employ: PSB jurisdiction to 
establish positions and set wages and conditions did not extend formally to 
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de1ermining overall staff levels. Harding called the use of PSB power 10 
impose staff ceilings an "illegitimate intrusion into the statutory 
independence of the ABC" (Harding 1979: 132). Nevertheless. had the 
ABC refused to co-operate. the government could have us7 the estimates 
process to hold the ABC to a specific allocation for salaries the 
Commission could not hope to maintain staff levels "beyond a certain point 
in the face of ever diminishing real levels of funding" Ubld: 133). 
The dislocation to the ABC caused by imposed staff ceilings was 
immense, The government ordered that the reduction be achieved by 
"natural wastage". that is through "filling only the most essential positions 
when they iel! vacant as the result cl resignations and retirements" (ABC 
Annuai Report 1976/1977:6), Reduction in 
random and hence difficult to anticipate er 
staffing levels was therefore 
plan (ABC 1980: 29l. 1 The 
ABC lost many cf its talented announcers and producers to better paid 
jobs in the commercial sector. It also lest much of its highly-trained 
production staff. The resulting shortage of Broadcasting Engineers 
contributed to the technical failings and on-air breakdowns which came to 
characterise ABC programs in the later 1970s. 
Following this experience cf staff ceilings and funding cuts, the ABC 
asked to be removed from the statutory controls of the PSB. This was 
endorsed by the Dix Committee. which hoped that ABC control over 
stalling, wages and ccndit!ons wouid enable the organisation to avoid a 
repetition ot the gross inefficiencies generated by the eflect oi sudden 
contractions on a rigid. inflexible ABC structure (Dix Vol. 1: 13) . 
1R:. Horne recalls staff r~action to the ABC staff ceilings process : "'\ remember one offlct.;r 
threatening to end one of his rnore drastic submlssions for expenditure cuts with •item, 10 
cents, tor one bunet to shoot myself\ to be remtnded by a lugubrlovs colleague that his epitaph 
would be written next day by the Staff Review Committee 'Posltlon x. vacant. natural 
wastage, no replacement recommended"' (1979: 53), 
112 
The recommendation to break the nexus with the PSB was accepted by 
the Liberal and Labor parties and incorporated in the Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation Act ( 1983). This legislation gives the ABC's 
Managing Director the right to "appoint such officers. and engage such 
temporary employees as he thinks necessary" on "terms and conditions" he 
determines ( s. 33). The ABC Board is given the right to create or abolish 
any position within the Corporation. Introducing the legislation the Minister 
for Communications. Michael Dully. told the House of Representatives : 
The Bill extensively updates provisions relating to the 
administration of the ABC. Part V of the Bill deals with staffing 
matters. A key change to the current provisions in the 
Broadcasting and Television Act Is the severance of all statutory 
links with the Public Service Board. The ABC will be free to set 
salary levels and terms and conditions of employment for all ABC 
officers and temporary employees. It will. however. continue to 
participate in existing arrangements administered by thG 
Deoartment of Employment and Industrial Relations for the 
co-ordi11ation of industrial relations policy and practice in 
Australian government employment (CPO Vol. 131 4 May 
1983: 1891 . 
These ·existing arrangements' require the ABC to consult about proposed 
changes to wages and conditions with the Co-ordination Committee On 
industrial Relaiions. chaired by the Department of Employment and 
mdustrial Relations. The Committee. through the Industrial Relations 
(Commonwealth Employment) Division of the Departmeni of industrial 
Relations. keeps the ABC informed on government wages policy and the 
decisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Commission: the /1BC in turn 
keeps tho Department advised on staffing developments within the 
Corporation. Though there are "day-lo-day consul1ations" between o11icials 
of the ABC and the Department there is. at presenL "no statutory basis to 
the relationship" (Neville 1984). While the ABC is not curren11y subject to 
staif ceilings and is not required to submit a manpower plan, it still has to 
submit an estimate of the number and cost of employees at budget lime. 
This proceoure is "etfectively a manpower bid" because the government 
"could re-impose stall ceilings through the estimates process" (Berry 
1984) . 
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The severance of the link with !he PSS has given the ABC administrative 
independence to restructure its senior management without external 
reference. The lifting of staff ceilings and an end to the jurisdiction of 
the Overseas Visits Committee enables the ABC to decide on personnel 
resources without having to fit into an imposed and arbitrary framework. 
The ABC. however. has not been given total control over staffing 
arrangements. II is required by its Act to redeploy redundant staff. Uke 
other government agencies. the ABC is subject to the full range of 
administrative law. including the decisions of the Arbitration and 
Conciliation Commission and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AA Tl. 
The Department of Employment and Industrial Relations Co-ordination 
Committee monitors the ABC industrial issues and keeps the government 
informed of developments within the Corporation. 
Transmitters 
The f'<BC has been ma'~ing, packaging and distributing programs which 
are transmitted by Commonwealth owned national transmitter stations since 
1932. These transmitter malions are provided by \he Minister for 
Communications and are mostly mu!tl-purpose. oftGn simultaneously 
broadcasting signals lor the ABC. SBS and commercial stations. 
Transmitting stations am operated and serviced by Telecom on bcihalf of 
the Department of Communications. Any new ABC service requires 
Ministerial permission lo use broadcast facilities. The ABC cannot extend 
or change an existing service (such as deciding to relay Sydney radio 
station 2JJ to Canberra alter midnightl without prtor consultations between 
the Department oi Communications. Telecom and the Minister. 
The involvement of Telecom and the Department oJ Communications in 
providing transmitting facilities for the 1\BC requires the Corporation to 
consult with these agents. The ABC must also negotiate with the Overseas 
Telecommunications Commission ( OTCl from whom it hires "the overseas 
program links and the international satellite relays through which some of 
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the domestic programs aro distributed through space circuits" (Dix. Vol. 
2: 675). The statutory responsibility of the Minister to provide transmitting 
facilities gives the government and federal bureaucracy direct involvement 
in determining the overall range, hours and medium (but not contentl of 
ABC services; in extreme circumstances it provides the Minister with a 
means to silence the ABC by directing Telecom to withdraw ABC access to 
a transmitting station. Z 
Planning New Services 
Section 111. c. 1 of the Broadcasting and Television Act gives the Minister 
for Communications sole responsibility for planning the development of the 
Australian broadcasting system. The provision of a new ABC radio or 
television channel is therefore a political decision. The ABC must seek 
permission from the government and its agencies to establish any new 
service, 
Planning tho public sector of the Australian broadcasting system is 
initially the responsibility of the National Broadcasting Service Planning 
Committee ( NBSPCl . which comprises representatives from the Department 
of Communications. Telecom and the ABC. The NBSPC, whicn is chaired 
and serviced by the ABC. discusses proposals tor future oeveioprnents and 
draws up a 5 year plan. This rs then put to the tYHnister for 
Communications. If the Minister approves then each stage of the plan is 
included by the Department of Communications in overall budget 
considerations. If Cabinet approves an individual project when it appears 
in budgei papers. !hen a f\JBSPC drafting subcommittee. cha•red by the 
Department of Communications. deals with the oetails of individual capilal 
works and new stations (Watson. Blazow 1984). Mark Armstrong notos 
2vvtien the tltatt of P..BC nl.dio station 3ZZ threatened lo continue tr~nsmission atter their 
station was ordered to close by the federal government in 1977, Telecom technicians 
disconnected the 3ZZ trans.mltter to prevtant ilte9a.1 broaocasts, 
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The ABC has often fared badly in past planning 
decisions. , . There were said to be occasions when the f-1BC first 
learned it was to operate new stations through newspaper reports. 
These planning matters are often politically sensitive, because 
existing stations in an area may oppose the opening of a new 
station, and because a new station is often used as an electoral 
lure. (1982:108) 
Thus ABC long-term pianning is contingent on external decisions. The 
ABC, for example. has argued for some years that it needs a second AM 
national radio network to serve rural communities and remote areas which 
currently only receive ABC radio 3. That proposal was considered by the 
NBSPC. approved by the Minister for Communications and approved in 
principle by Cabinet. In a press release the Minismr, Michael Dully, said 
"Introduction of the network was an election promise by the ALP and I 
am glad that in these stringent financial times we are able 10 honour this 
promise" ( 1983c: 2l. The 1983/84 federal budget included a specilic 
grant oi $200 000 for the ABC tc begin work on the second network, The 
radio r>etwork, which will rely on the AUSSAT satellite to reach remote 
areas. will begin transmission in 1986. The ABC has failed. however, to 
convince tne NBSPC or the Minister of its case for a second national 
te!evlsion network. it has put up several proposals over tne years, so far 
with no success - "we have nothing in principle and nothing in money" 
(Phillips 1984) . There is no point in diverting significant rnsoucces Into 
planning a second television network while tho government remains 
indifferent to the proposal. New service proposals must vvalt tor the 
federal government to make a specific decision to supply the funds and the 
transmitter before the ABC can be gm serious preparation. 
Accommodation 
Planning difficulties are further complicated by the requirement of the 
Lands Acquisition Act ( 19551 that the Department of Administrative Services 
negotiate property leases and purchases on behalf oi all government 
agencies. including the ABC. The Lands Acquisition Act requires the 
Department of Administrative Services to : 
116 
a onsure ihal proposed property acquisitions by Commonwealth 
land users represent the best economic proposition available. 
" continually review the economics of the use and retention of 
individual properties by Commonwealth users. 
a assess the short and long term accommodation needs of 
Commonwealth organisations. (Dix Vol. 2: 659) 
The Act makes the Department of Administrative Services the "central 
authority for the allocation, use and review of Commonwealth oflice 
accommodation· Ubid: 6591 . When the ABC proposes to buy or rent 
accommodation. a submission must be lodged with the Department of 
Administrative Services. If approved. the issue must then be referred to 
the Minister for Communications if the deal will cost more than $500 000 
or require the signing of a lease. 
The ABC has argued that the need to obtain the approval oi ministers 
and "the necessity to acquire the properties in the name oi 1he 
Commonwealth under the Land Acquisitions Act and then 10 havo 1hem 
assigned to the ABC could be expected to lead to confusion and delay" 
<Dix Vol. 2:662). Its arguments failed to convince the Dix Commiilee. 
which endorsed a continuing role for the Department of Administrative 
Services in assessing and arranging ABC property (ibid: 666}, 
The Dix Committee also endorsed the continuing requirement that only tho 
Department of Housing and Construction should provide architects and 
builders for Commonwealth statutory authorities Ubid: 668-669l, The ABC 
had complained that the involvement of the Department ol Housing and 
Construction in accommodation development was "slow. inilexible, and 
<does) not ... provide the kind of buildings that were required for a rapidly 
expanding activity (i.e. Television) subject to short-notice and largely 
unforseeable changes of direction" Ubid: 667), The Dix Committee. 
however, supported the efforts ol the Department ol Housing and 
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Construction to achieve "better value for money and consistency in the 
Commonwealth's overall public works activities". The Commiltee endorsed 
the role of the Department of Housing and Construction as "yet another 
means of bringing under formal parliamentary and governmental scrutiny 
the administrative activities ol the ABC" Ubid: 668J . 
The requirement that the ABC work through the Department of 
Administrative Services in leasing new property and through the Department 
of Housing and Construction tor new buildings and extensions remains in 
force. The provision that the Ministers of Administrative Services and 
Communications must approve accommodation contracts gives these 
government agencies a chance to dispute the ABC's judgement and so 
requires the ABC to consult before a proposal goes to the Ministers. 
These accommodation arrangements force the ABC lo justify relevant 
decisions to external monitors and are a significant drain on the ABC's 
administrative resources. 
The Commonwealth Ombudsman 
The office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman was established in 1976 to 
investigate complaints about Commonwealth 
The .!\BC understood this to include a 
administrative decisions but not the power 
programming decisions (Armstrong 1982: l 02l . 
departments and 
right to review 
to investigate 
authorities, 
the ABC's 
editorial or 
In 1981 a Perth man complained to the f18C, alleging misrepresentation 
on the current affairs television program Nationwide. Unhappy with the 
ABC's response, the man complained to the Commonwealth Ombudsman. 
Professor Jack Richardson. The Ombudsman's office iound grounds for an 
investigation and requested the ABC to supply copies of all relevant files 
and make ABC staff available for interview if required. 
ABC Chairman Leonie Kramer declined to co-operate, citing ABC legal 
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advice which suggested the matter to be outside the Ombudsman's 
jurisdiction; the ABC felt that "programming decisions are its solo 
responsibility and that any attempt to usurp !hat ro!e threatens the 
Independence of the ABC" (National Times 20 June 1982:5)' The 
Ombudsman's Fifth Annual Report reported the ABC's refusal to participate 
but argued that the ABC's position was not 
supported with objeclive legal opinions from a responsible 
source. , , the Interest displayed in excluding the Ombudsman 
from making enquiry into the subject of complaint was not 
matched by any acknowledgement that the complainant may have 
had a genuine grievance in writing to the Ombudsman. 
Independent legal advice confirmed the views about jurisdiction 
which I hold, .. (1982: 14l 
When the ABC threatened a legal challenge in the Federal Court, Prime 
Minister Fraser intervened by instructing the Minister for Communications to 
discuss the matter urgently with the ABC; Fraser was reported to be 
"extremely angry at the prospect of two government bodies wasting 
taxpayers' money in court to resolve a dispute between them" (National 
Times 20 June 1982: 5). The Issue. however. was not settled by ihe time 
the Commission was dissolved, In her last letter to the Minister ior 
Communications as Chairman. Professor Kramer warned of the possible 
implications of tho Ombudsman's claim : "At the heart ol the question is 
how to maintain the ABC's traditional (and statutory) programming 
independence. while still recognising that the ABC should be accountable 
to citizens through bodies such as the Commonwealth Ombudsman" 
(]983d: 2)' 
The Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act ( 1983) establish0d ABC 
Corporation Community Affairs Officers, in each state and territory, to 
investigate complaints about ABC programs. !I a complaint is upheld. the 
Corporation is required to broadcast or televise a "prompt retraction or 
apology in appropriate terms": details of the activities of the Community 
Allain; Officers are to be included in the ABC's annual report to Parliament 
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(S. 82), Despite \he creation of these posts, the 1983 legislation did not 
explicitly remove the ABC from the Ombudsman's jurisdiction: nor did 1983 
amendments to the Ombudsman Act ( 1976) exclude the Corporation's 
programs from investigation, An Administrative Review Council report did 
not recommend restricting the Ombudsman's jurisdiction. Hence the 
question of whether the Ombudsman has the right to investigate ABC 
programs remains "a matter of dispute" which may eventually only be 
settled by a court of law ( McCloud 1984), 
Administrative investigations by the Ombudsman are no! challenged by the 
ABC. The Ombudsman can investigate a complaint about a decision of a 
statutory corporation and provide a ruling with recommendations for 
action. 3 If the statutory corporation's response is not satisfactory, the 
Ombudsman may report the matter to the Prime Minister and Parliament. 
The Ombudsman would argue that this role does not threaten the functional 
independence oi the ABC: rather it is another means of ensunng ABC 
compliance with its enabling legislation and protecting ABC employees from 
arbitrary administrative decisions. 
The ABC argues that a right to investigate program decisions may nave 
implications lor the ABC's functional independence. ABC protests imply 
that referring specific program decisions to Parliament !l1rough the 
Ombudsman's report could detract from the ABC's indeponoenco. Tho 
Corporation fears that program-makers might seek to avoid possible 
proceedings. by exercising self-censorship when dealing with matters which 
might end up before the Ombudsman. At the very least ll wou Id be an 
3The Sydnev ~-Aornlng Herald', en 27 june 1984, noted tnat the Comrnon»vBalth Ombudsman 
had begun investigations into the legality of the appointment ct Geoffrey V'lhiteh-ead as hianagtng 
Director ot the ABC. The Herald alleged that unsuccessful appltcants for t~.e post of Managing 
Director had complained that not ('l.\l short-listed candidates were interviewed and that a Board 
subcornrnittee - and not \he full Board, as required by the Act - made the final decision. T~e 
comptaint was eventually dismissed by the Ombudsman, 
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infringement of the ABC's right to produce its programs without external 
reference. As there has yet to be a ruling on a program matter such 
fears remain hypothetical. The ABC's concern. however. seems out of 
proportion to the likely consequences of the Ombudsman investigating 
program decisions. At the most 1he Ombudsman could conclude that an 
individual was unreasonably treated and request an apology or 
compensation. In this case the Ombudsman's role would be analogous to 
that oi libel and defamation laws to which the ABC is already subject. 
The Ombudsman could only investigate a program already made and 
screened (assuming broadcasting is not prevented by court Injunction) : 
there is no question of the Ombudsman acting as a censor. Until the 
issue is resolved by one of 1he parties changing its position or a court 
ruling settling the dispute. the Ombudsman's role in ABC matters will 
remain uncertain. 
The ABC's Bureaucratic Environment 
The ABC does not have complete administrative independence. Not only 
are its activities under scrutiny from the legislature but it has a 'continuing 
invoivement" with a "considerable number of government departments. 
authorities.. statutory corporations and instrumentalities" (ABC 19BO: 28). 
The constant demands for information from these government agencies 
have "placed an unreasonable strain upon the depleted ABC staff whose 
ultimate objective is. or should be.. the provision of programs" 
(ibid: 32-33) .. 
The Dix Report argued that the f:18C made too much of the di11icul11es of 
its bureaucratic environment; the ABC was wrong 1o "emphasise con1inually 
in dealings with government o!ficials that it regards itself as a 
organisation and therefore merits special treatment" (Vol. 2: 528l , 
unique 
Instead 
the ABC must learn lo stand on its own two feet in competing with other 
bodies for resources and in its dealings with the various elements of the 
Commonwealth administrative system: nevertheless. the Commitiee 
concluded with a warning that 
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the administrative controls which were originally devised 
essentially to facilitate resource allocation and priorities setting in 
the Commonwealth government sector generally may also be used 
to attenuate the editorial independence of the ABC if adequate 
checks and balances do not exist in the system, <Vol. :2: 79) 
Despite this warning, the Dix Comm!llee seemed rather sanguine about 
the functional implications of bureaucratic checks, The Committee did not 
share the feeling within the ABC that external impositions create an 
atmosphere of an organisation besieged: even if bureaucratic requirements 
were not being used to apply editorial pressure, ABC personnel could see 
the inherent potential. The following summary sets cut in schematic form 
the issues and agencies involved in the ABC's macro setting. with 
comments on how bureaucratic procedures might have functional 
implications 
U) Accountability 
/"<gencies involved : Parliament, Minister !or Communications, 
Department of Communications, Department of Finance, 
Administrative Arrangements : ABC must present 
anr.ual reports. budget estimates and accounts for 
scrutiny, ABC subject to parliamentary review through 
committees or independent inquiries, ;\ dissatisfied 
Parliament may alter the ABC's legislation or use 
the estimates process lo change the boundaries oi ABC 
actlvity. 
implications : Theoretically the ABC accounts to Parliament for 
Its administration but makes Independent program decisions, 
WJ Finance 
Agencies Involved : Parliament. Minister for Communications. 
Department oi Communications. Department of F'inance. 
Auditor-GeneraL 
Administrative Arrangements : 1\nnual budget, 
ABC puts a case to thG Minister through the Department 
of Communications to be considered by the Department of 
Finance and then Cabinet, Parliament approves and 
monitors the budget allocalion. 
Implications : Budget process sets the boundaries of ABC activity; 
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estimates process has been used to close down a particular 
service ( 3ZZl . but not (at present) to cut out a particular 
program or individual. 
UiO Staff 
Agencies Involved : Department of Employment and Industrial Relations 
(formerly the PSB>. Department of Finance. 
Administrative Arrangements : ABC is now free of the PSB but 
governments can use the budget estimates process to set 
ceiiing on resources available for personnel. 
Implications : Government cannot dictate who can be hired but 
can set overall limits on staff numbers. 
(iv) Industrial Relations 
Agencies Involved : Minister and Department of Employment and 
Industrial Relations. Arbitration and Conciliation 
Ccmmission. 
Administrative .l\rrangements : ABC 'consuits' with Department of 
Employment and Industrial Relations. though there is no 
statutory requirement to do so. ABC is subject to 
national wage case decisions of the Arbitration and 
Conci!lation Commission. 
Implications : Ministers are advised about Industrial relations 
b11t have no power to intervene. 
(v) Transmitters 
Agencies Involved : Department of Communications. Telecom. 
Administrative Arrangements : ABC owns its transmitters but 
the common usage transmitting stations are owned by the 
Minister and operated by Telecom. ABC must consult about 
use of transmitting facilities. 
Implications : Government determines tho nature and hours (but not 
content) of services. ABC must have ministerial approval for 
varia1ions in use of transmitting stations. In extreme cases 
governments could 'pull the plug' on some ABC services. 
(vi) Planning New Services 
Agencies Involved : Minister and Department of Communications. 
Telecom. 
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Administrative Arrangements : Planning the broadcasting system is 
the responsibility of the Minister for Communications: 
ABC can make changes within its existing services but 
must receive ministerial approvai for any new channel. 
lmpiications : Sets boundaries: ABC must lobby the government tor 
approval and resources for any new service, Commercial 
operators will be lobbying governments to restrict the 
role of the ABC. 
(vii) Accommodation 
Agencies Involved : Departments of Administrative Services and 
Housing and Construction. Minister for Communications 
must approve non-program purchases over $500 000 and the 
signing of new leases. 
Administrative Arrangements : Department of Administrative Services. 
Department of Housing and Construction provides all new 
buildings, Need for consultation raises risk of lengthy 
delays. 
Implications : ABC resources diverted to meet bureaucratic demands. 
Ministerial control over sites of ABC facilities and purchase 
of ABC equipment. 
(viii) f\8C Purchases 
Agencies Involved : Minisrnr and Department ol Communications, 
,c\dmlnistrative Arrangen1en1s : ABC requires rninisteriat approval 
for non-program purchases over :>500 000. 
Implications : Need to lobby governments and retain favour of 
the Minister. 
Ux) Complaints Procoduro 
Agencies Involved : Commonweaith Ombudsman1s Office. 
,i\dminlstrative Arrangements : Jurisdiction to investigate 
admlnis1rative decisions conceded but jurisdiction on 
program matters disputed. 
implications : ABC claims potential threat lo independence oi 
its program-makers; ABC decisions referred by Ombudsman 
to Parliamem for consideration. 
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(x) Program Standards 
Agencies Involved : Australian Broadcasting Tribunal. 
Admlnis1rative Arrangements : ABT maintains that it has some 
jurisdiction to rule on program matters for the national 
sector as well as commercial radio and television. 
Implications : External challenge lo ABC's right to make its own 
program decisions, 
(xi) Public Service Procedures 
Agencies Involved : Auditor-Genera!. Administrative Appeal 
Tribunal. Department of Finance, 
Administrative Arrangements : ABC required to comply with standard 
public service auditing methods, to participate in Freedom 
oi Information procedures, to abide by AAT decisions. and 
to provide expenditure information to the Department of 
Finance. 
Implications '. Standard pub!ic service procedures based on government 
legislation: integrates ABC administrative arrangements with 
those of the wider Commonwealth public service. 
(xii) The Courts 
Agencies Involved : Australian federal and state courts, 
Administrative Arrangements : ABC has to comply with diiferent 
libel and defamation laws of six states and two 
territories. 
Implications : Restrictive Australian libel and defamation laws 
a problem for all f'ustralian media: limits scope of what 
can be reported by the Corporation, 
Administratively. the ABC clearly is integrated into !he Ccmmonweailh 
public service: "whethor it likes it or no!. .. in dGaling with public sGrvtce 
rules and regulations tho ABC is expected to perform as a public sNvice 
eniity" <Dix VoL 2: 558l , This creates problems for an organisation which 
must abide by elaborate procedures to ensure conlinuing acccuntabili1y 
while working within a broadcasting industry which fiercraly competos !or 
programs and talent. 
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The ABC continues to argue that it should be freed from many of these 
bureaucratic restrictions. Professor Leonie Kramer has warnod of the 
drain 1he ABC's bureaucratic environment places on the efficient running of 
the organisation. She has spoken of administrative procedures which 
develop a life of their own and stalk the land like Frankenstein. Professor 
Kramer argued that the ABC is capable of maintaining its own affairs within 
resource limits set by Parliament "In order lo achieve the high 
standards 1t sets itself, the ABC needs in practice the administrative 
autonomy which in principle Its position as a statutory authority guarantees" 
(Kramer 1983a, her emphasis), 
Nevertheless, there seems iittle likelihood of a decline In the aggregate 
number oi cl1ecks by government agencies on the ABC. Each individual 
check maKes sense for the agency Involved: few bureaucracies are likely 
to wiillngi-y surrender their jurisdiction over some aspect of ABC activity. 
The lacklustre performance of the ABC in the 1970s and a continuing 
reputation for poor management has maintained "unfocused suspicions on 
the part oi government officials and members of the government and 
Parliament aiike that whether from ignorance or design the ABC conceals 
more than 1t reveals about 1he co::;t and nature of its operations" (Dix Vol, 
2:559), 
At best these bureaucratic restrictions will set the boundaries of f1J3C 
activity. The danger is that external procedures wiii infringe on ABC 
functional independence, either through consuming scarce resourcGs, or 
more directly through impositions aimed at achieving editorial leverage. in 
the name ot accountability to Parliament, thG ABC has been left with littlG 
administrative independence: it must opera1e within n bureaucratic 
environment which threatens Independent. impartial programming. 
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Chapter 2 
THE ORGANISATION - ABC DECISION MAKING 
2: 1 THE AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION ACT ( 1983> 
Section 1 of this thesis examined the theoretical basis of public 
broadcasting statutory corporations. The Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation Act ( 1983) creates such a body. Through exploring the 
details ot the current ABC legislation. this chapter sets out the legal 
framework within which the ABC must operate. 
Control and regulation of broadcasting in Australia are a federal 
responsibility. Under its constitutional powers over 'postal. telephonic. 
telegraphic and other like services'. the Commonwealth Parliament created 
the Australian Broadcasting Commission in 1932 lo provide 'adequate and 
comprehensive' programs for all Australians. One piece o! Commonwealth 
legislation. the Broadcasting and Television Act ( 1942) • regulated almost 
the entire Au&lraiian broadcasting system. 
The 1980 Committee ol Inquiry recommended major changes to the ABC. 
The then L/NCP government decided not just lo amend the existing 
Broadcasting and Television Act. but to draf! an entirely new piece of 
legislation to deal specifically with the ABC. The subsequent Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation Bill ( 1982) was intended to replace the 
Commission with a Board of Directors and implement some of the Dix 
recommendations. The Bill was drafted by Iha Department of 
Communications. though many of its provisions were drawn directly from 
the existing Broadcasting and Television Act. 1 The legislation was still 
before Parliament when the Fraser government lost ol!ice. 
1 Alex Blunden from the legislative team within the Department of Communications which 
drafted the ABC Act believes it "essentially an update of the old Broadcas\lng and Television Act. 
It is not a radical departure at •II - but please <lon't tell the ABC tlla~" \ 1S63l 
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In Opposition the ALP had been critical of some aspects of the Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation Bill ( 1982). The legislation was withdrawn and 
returned to the Department o1 Communications for re-drafting following the 
ALP's electoral victory on 5 March 1983. 
Revised ABC legislation passed through Parliament on Thursday. 26 May 
1983, and was proclaimed on 1 July. On that date the new Board of 
Directors took control, the assets and functions of the old Commission 
were transferred to the new Corporation and the ABC began operating 
under its new enabling legislation. 
Despite some substantial changes2 the new legislation was "largely based 
on the Bills introduced last year by the former government• (Duffy CPD 
Vol. 131 4 May 1983: 187), The Minister's speech, and the debate during 
the passage of the Bill through Parliament, indicate a general consensus 
amongst Australian politicians about the goals. structure and legislative 
requirements of the national broadcasting system. 
£.Qrrn of the Legislation 
The Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act ( 1983) is divided into eight 
major sections. 
o The first defines the terms, interpretation and jurisdiction of the 
Act. 
o Part 11 deals with the establishment. functions and management 
of the Corporation. It includes the Charter of the Corporation 
and establishes the Board of Directors, the position of 
Managing Direclor and the committees which provide audience 
advice to the Board. 
2rhe 'Complaints Commissioner' pos~tion replaced by the new post of Principal Community 
Affairs Ottt<:er; provisions against corporate underwriting strengthened; the 'no work at directed -
no pay' provisions removed; changes to promcUon appeal provisions and a requirement included 
that the new Corporation take Into account the multi-cultural character of AUstralian s<><:iety, 
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" Part 111 spells out the duties and legal responsibilities of the 
Board and Managing Director. It provides for a disclosure of 
interests, the form the Board's meetings should take and the 
terms and conditions of appointment to the Board. 
<> In Part IV the powers and duties of the Corporation are 
established, with an emphasis on the responsibility of the ABC 
to provide 
accepting 
programs. 
an 'independent' news service and 
advertisements or the corporate 
a prohibition on 
underwriting of 
o Part V deals with staff 
promotion. redeployment, 
employees. 
matters tenure of employment. 
retirement and discipline lor ABC 
• Financial responsibilities and arrangements are the subject of 
Part VI. including the requirement for Ministerial approval for 
ABC estimates and the presentation to Parliament of an annual 
audit. 
" Part VII is concerned wilh technical services and hands over to 
the Corporation soma transmitters previously controlled by the 
Minister for Communications and Telecom. 
" Finally In Part VIII various miscellaneous duties and 
requirements are specified. The Minister is given power to 
issue directives to the Corporation In the national interest. an 
annual report to Parliament !s required and the offlce of 
Community Allain; Officer is established to deal with complaints 
against ABC programs. 
The Minister for Communications promised that this new legislation would 
create an ABC with "a clear Charter, a modern structure and an e!fecUve 
business-like management. The new ABC should be well tilted to carry 
out its tasks for the rest of this century and beyond" ( 1983a: 4). 
Legislative Aims ( 1 l Defining Goals for ihe ABC 
On May 4 1983 Iha Minister !or Communications, Michael Duffy, told the 
House of Representatives 
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Mr. Deputy Speaker, tor years the ABC has suffered from the 
lack of an adequate definition of !he role it should play in the 
Australian broadcasting system. Over the years. !his has .J.£1iiid to 
uncertainty in the organisation about which direction it stiould 
take .. ,. it is appropriate that Parliament should take this 
opportunity to provide that direction. (CPD Vol. 131 4 May 
1983: 187-lBBl 
The original Broadcasting and Television Act was ambiguous about the 
scope of ABC activities. specifying only that the Commission provide 
'adequate and comprehensive' programs. The new legislation gives the 
ABC a Charter. based on the BBC model. intended to set out the aims 
and !unctions of the Corporation. The ABC is established. according to 
!he Charter. to provide Australians with an "innovative and comprehensive· 
broadcasting service of a high standard. As well as education programs, 
the ABC should provide Its audience with programs "that contribute to a 
sense of national identity and Inform and entertain. and reflect the cultural 
diversity of the Australian community• (s, 6. 1a. l). 3 
The ABC is also required by the Charter to broadcast programs outside 
Australia <s. 6. lb) and to "encourage and promote the musical. dramatic 
and other performing arls in Australia" <s. 6. lcl. 
These important services are to be provided within the boundaries 
established by the Charter ( s. 6. 2}. The ABC is obliged to "take account" 
of services provided by commercial and public stations and program 
standards set by the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal. The ABC Is advised 
lo provide a balance between programs of mass appeal and those ol 
specialised interest. ABC programming should take into account the 
"multicultural character of the Australian community". 
3N:ombers indicate a section~ clause and sub-clause of the Avstraht\n Broadcasting: Corporation 
f1£! ( 1983), so that {s, 6. 2.li) refers to section 6, clause 2., subclause 2. of the Aet. 
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None of these functions, however, are legally enforceable by a court 
(s. 6. 4). The Charter is only intended to remove "uncertainties· and give 
the ABC "clear directions for its future development and progress" ( Dui!y 
1983a: 1l , in any case there is nothing in this vague Charier su!ficiently 
certain to allow a court to ruie on any breach. Nevertheless, FARB 
spokesman M. Hartcher, welcoming the inclusion ot 1he Charter, said that 
though its provisions are not legally enforceable, "FARB feels it will be 
able to bring infringements al the Charter to the Minister's attention now 
that the ABC's role has been explicitly defined" ( 1963), 
Legislated Goals < 2) Independence 
"This government is committed to maintaining a strong and independent 
ABC" the Minister told !he House when introducing the Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation Bill (1983) CCPO Vol. 131 4 May 1983: 187), 
One of his professed aims was to provide a legal basis for an ABC to iullil 
its program functions without political direction. Duffy argued that the ABC 
should be free from government interference. though it cannot be 
independent ol a Parliament which retains the right to alter its legislative 
base, There is, however. no guarantee of freedom !rom political 
interference written into the Act. It is the Board of Directors rather than 
the government which is charged with the responsibility to ·, . , maintain the 
independence and integrity of the Corporation' (s. 8. lbl. The same 
section obliges the Board to ensure that the ABC operates 'efficiently and 
with the maximum benefit to the people of Australia" (s, B. 1al and, more 
speciiically, to "ensure that the gathering and presentation by the 
Corporation of news and iniormation is accurate and impartial according to 
the recognized standards of objective journalism" (s. 8. le). Independence 
is here implicitly defined in the narrow sense of "freedom from bias" rather 
than "freedom from outside direction", 
There are, furthermore, two important sections of the Act which tend to 
diminish the right to independence given to the Board. These are 
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Parliament's financial powers over the ABC, which will be considered 
separately, and the power of Ministers to issue directives to the ABC "in 
the national interest" < s. 78l. 
That governments might take an interest in the activities cl the 
Corporation is acknowledged by a requirement that the Board "consider" 
any government policy referred to it by the Minister ( s. 8, 2), Having 
considered, the Board is free to decide that. taking into account its other 
duties and obligations. it cannot follow the letter of government policy. 
There is no compulsion on the Board, But as Stuart Revill told a 
Department of Communications conference. there would be considerable 
"political risks" for a Board which rejected a policy referred by the Minister 
07 November 1983). When the Dix Committee originally proposed this 
clause. the Opposition Spokesman on Communications, Senator John 
Button, found the suggestion "quite astonishing" and unacceptable 
(1982: 17-18). Yet this provision appears in ABC legislation passed by a 
Labor government. It has yet to be formally invoked. 
The power oi the Minister to give program directions to the ABC is 
largely based on section s. 116 of the Broadcasting and Television Act. it 
the Minister decides that a "particular matter" should or should not be 
broadcast "in the national interest", then the Minister has the power to 
direct the Corporation accordingly Cs. 78. 1-21. The directive must be sent 
in writing to the ABC's Managing Director Cs. 78. 41, and must be tabled in 
Parliament within seven sitting days (s, 78. 51, Any directive musl also be 
Included in the ABC's annual report to Parliament <s. BOa-el, 
The power to issue directives has not been used since 1963. ABC 
Chairman Ken Myer described this provision as "incompatible with a 
democratic socie1y": his comments were endorsed by the Minister for 
Communications. who told a media conference that the clause which gives 
the government power to direct what the ABC can or cannot broadcast in 
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the national interest is "a bit antiquated" <Sydney Morning Here.Id 14 June 
1983: 3) . The government. however. has not moved to amend the 
legislation. 
The independence of the ABC is thus vested in a Board of Directors 
appointed by the government and subject to certain financial, political and 
national emergency limitations. Except !or the power of Ministerial 
directive "the Corporation is not subject to direction by or on behalf of the 
Government of the Commonwealth" Cs. 78. 6l. No Act. however. could 
provide a legal guarantee of freedom from informal Ministerial pressures on 
the ABC. 
Financial Provisions 
Part VI of the Act outlines the financial powers of the Minister. The 
ABC's income is money appropriated by Parliament and paid to !he 
Corporation in amounts specified by the Minister ( s. 67. 1-2l. The 
standard Commonwealth financial controls on statutory corporations require 
the ABC to prepare detailed annual estimates for Ministerial approval 
( s. 69, 1l. 'The moneys of the Corporation shall not be expended 
otherwise than in accordance with the estimates o1 expenditure approved by 
the Minister" (s, 69. 2l. The praclice of ministerial approval of estimates 
removes the financial independence supposingly granted by the 'three line' 
appropria1ion in the annual Commonwealth budget, The Minister has a 
legal right through section s. 69 to shut down any part of the ABC's 
operations which appears as a separate item in the ABC's pre-budget 
estimates. 
The Minister must also approve any contract "under which the 
Corporation is to pay or receive an amount exceeding $500 000" Is. 70. lal 
and any contracts to hire or lease property. This provision, however, 
applies only to capital works: the Minister cannot veto the purchase or 
production of any program material. Opposing the requirement for 
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minislerial approval of purchases over $500 000. ABC Chairman Myer 
claimed 
He is also there to fight in the Cabinet for !he funds for the 
ABC. because we still work on an annual budget appropriation 
and even if we get a triennial one he'd still have to fight with his 
Cabinet colleagues for our iunds. 
What I don't think his role is. but what It has been in the 
past and is under the present Act. Is sltung down and having to 
authorise contracts of say $500 000 ... for items which have been 
included in the budget which has been approved by the ... Board. 
been through !he Department and gone through the Cabinet and 
the budget process, That. in my mind. is a total waste of the 
Minister's time and a total waste of my time and the Board's time 
and I don't intend to do ii personally. (City Extra ABC Radio 23 
Jllne 1983) 
Part IV of the Act. "Powers and Duties of the Corporallon" specifies that 
the ABC's ministerially approved funds may only be spent on the 
performance of ABC duties (s. 25. 1 l. The ABC may accepi gifts but not 
"where ii is likely that the independence or integrity of the Corporation 
would be affected" ( s. 25, 4). This prohibits !he ABC accepting corporate 
underwriiing or paid advertisements, though the ABC may advertise its own 
programs and merchandising activities (s. 31. 1-2). 
The ABC may raise capital from the sale of programs. records. literature 
and merchandising relevant to Its operations ( s. 29). It may charge 
admission lo "any public concert or other public entertainment" ( s. 28b). 
To the annoyance of Ken Myer, the first Corporation Chairman. the ABC is 
specifically prohibited from borrowing money ( s. 25. 2). The ban on 
borrowing against assets means !he ABC must rely on the goodwill of 
Parliament to provide adequate funding: there is no mechanism in the Act 
for appaal against Cabinet's decision on the ABC's annual budget 
appropriation and no formula is written into the legislation to guarantee a 
minimum level oi funding. 
Surveying the financial provision aifecling the ABC in the Broadcasting 
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and Television Act, which have been reproduced without substantial 
alteration In the new Austrelian Broadcasting Corporation Act. Mark 
Armstrong concluded 
The system of financial controls ... of the Act brings the 
Minister, his Department and the Department of Finance into 
frequent propinquity with the ABC. This tends to rob the ABC of 
the independence conferred by the program sections. The 
standard financial controls imposed on the ABC have lit11e regard 
for freedom of speech. { 1982: 104) 
ABC Chairman Myer has called for amendments to the financial provisions 
of the Act. He wants the government to give the Corporation " ... power to 
raise its own loans, invest money and set up subsidiary companies lo be 
conducted on a commercial basis" ("The Gulde· Sydney Morning Herald 15 
August 1983: 1). The government has promised to consider lnese 
requests. However, as a Department of Communications omcer noted. 
Myer is trying lo change specific government policy decisions; "Cabinet 
didn't want the ABC involved in these areas" (Blunden l983l . 
Accountability 
The ideal statutory corpornl!on is independent of the government of the 
day but accountable lo Parliament. 
There are a number of forms of accountability writlen into the Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation Act ( 1983l. The ABC Is accountable to 
Parliament through an annual audit and report, to the government through 
financial and direction provisions. to the public through Communiiy Affairs 
Officers and Advisory Boards, and to ABC employees through a staff 
elected Director. in all cases It is the Board of Directors, as the 
representative of the body corporate, which has the responsibility lo 
"ensure that the Corporation does not fail to comply" with the various 
provisions for accountability Cs. 8d). 
Parliament requires from the ABC, as part of its annual reporl. an alldit 
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conducted under section 63m of the Audit Act (1901). In addl1ion. !he 
report should include details of any Ministerial directives. particulars of any 
request from the Minister to consider government policy and notice of any 
action taken by the Board. particulars of any gifts to the Corporation and 
a summary of the activities of the Community Affairs officers ( s. 80). 
Financial accountability lo the Minister Is through the estimates process 
and the need for approval of certain contracts. ABC estimates must be 
presented to the Minister in whatever form the Minister directs ( s. 59. 1) . 
The Minister can thus demand details of the cost of individual programs. 
though at present estimates are only required to give financial details 
under live broad categories of ABC activity. 
The ABC is also held partly accountable to those whose Interests may be 
allected by Corporation programs. Through section 82. the Act 
establishes Community Affairs Officers In each state and territory of 
Australia. These oificers consider written complaints to the Corporation 
alleging errors of tact or invasion of privacy by ABC programs. I! the 
officer deems a complaint justified, then the Managing Director has a duty 
to "ensure that the Corporation broadcasts or televises. as the case 
requires. a prompt retraction or apology in appropriata terms' ( s. 82. 5). 
The activities of the ofiioers must be listed in the annual report. There 
has yet to be an upheld complaint. 
The ABC is. of course. also accountable in the courts through the iaws 
of libel and defamation. The original l/NCP Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation Bill ( 1982) created a statutory Compla;nts Commissioner 
outside the ABC with power to obtain information and documents, enter 
premises. examine witnesses and require the Board to publish findings in 
the form the Commissioner thought most appropriate. These provisions 
aroused considerable opposition; "The establishment of such a statutory 
position outside the ABC with broad powers to investigate a wide range of 
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complaints". said Michael Duffy. "smacks of political censorship" (CPD 
Vol. 131 4 May 1983: 189l. The Complaints Commissioner provisions were 
removed when the Act was redrafted. and replaced by the establishment of 
Community Affairs positions. 
'Public accounliability' is vested not only in the Community Affairs Officers 
but wilh a series of committees to advise the Board on ABC programming 
{ s. 11 , 4l , The Act suggests. but does not require. I hat an Advisory 
Commiltee be appointed from each state and territory, Although they allow 
some public input into Board decisions on programming. lhe committees 
and the co-ordinating Australian Broadcasting Corporation Advisory Council 
have no legal power lo override the Board on any matter, There are 100 
people on ABC Advisory Councils across Australia. chosen by !he ABC 
from public nominations. All participants work on a voluntary basis: some 
have complained lo the Board that they are not being sufiiciently consulted 
about major ABC decisions. 
Finally !he i\BC Board Is accountable to Its stall through a Joint 
Consultative Committee. containing representatives ol senior ABC officers. 
the ABC Staff Association and lull-lime ABC employees. The Consultative 
Committee 'considers' Board policy but again has no formal power. There 
Is also a staff elected Director. The staff representative posiilon was 
established In 1975. at which time Marius Webb from Sydney radio station 
2JJ was elected. When his term expired in 1978. the Fraser government 
declined to hold fresh elections and the position lapsed. It was revived in 
1983 when Du!!y announced that one of the eight part-time Directors would 
be elected by ABC staff. In November 1983 Tom Molomby. a legal 
reporter and executive member of the NSW Branch of the ABC Stall 
Association since 1964. was elected from a Held of six candidates, The 
staff-elected position. however, is not written into the Act. A future 
government may once again decline to continue the post. 
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Accounlability is an abstract concept difficult to translate into practice: 
the problem is legislating for 'accountability' to Parliament without 
introducing the risk of political interference. 
The ABC remains accountable to Parliament through its annual report a.nd 
Ministerial representation. Parliament retains the right to change or 
abolish the ABC's mandate should it decide that the the organisation has 
failed, Accountability lo the public is more problematic. While a citizen 
may complain to the Community /\ifairs officer or sue for libel. no citizen 
can sue the ABC for failing to 1ul!il its goals. Accountability io the public 
can therefore only be through Parliament, with the risk· that Parliament's 
legitimate interest could become an excuse for attempts to gain political 
advantage. 
The Board of Directors 
The Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act ( 1983) vests responsibility for 
the functioning, performance, independence and integrity of the ABC in a 
Board of Directors. The Board is to include the Managing Director. and 
not less than six nor more than eight other part-time Directors. 
The duties of the Board include < s. 8, 1 l 
o ensuring that the Corporation's functions are performed 
efficiently and to the maximum benefit of the Australian people: 
" maintaining the independence and integrity o1 the Corporation; 
o ensuring Iha\ the gathering and presentation of news and 
information is accurate and impartial according lo the 
recognized standards of objective journalism: and 
o ensuring the ABC's compliance with the Act and other relevant 
legislation, 
Non-executive Directors. including a Chairman and Deputy Chairman, are 
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appoinied on a part-time basis by the Governor-General for terms of up to 
five years. One historic criticism concerns the appointment of people to 
the ABC wilh lil!le or no relevant expertise. Section 12, 5 attempts 10 
alleviate this problem by specifying that non-executive Directors have 
experience in either radio, television, communications, management. a 
financial or technical field, or possess cultural or other interests relevant 
to the operation of a public organisation providing radio and television 
services. The requirement. however, is sufficiently vague !o exclude very 
few. Most people have some 'other interest' relevant to the vast array of 
activities undertaken by the ABC. 
The non-executive Directors are paid an honorarium determined by the 
Remuneration Tribunal (s. 14). In 1984 this was $26 257 ior the 
Chairman, 11>13 220 for the Deputy Chair and $8 823 for other Directors. 
All must disclose pecuniary interests ( s. 17) . While normally tenured. 
Directors can be dismissed 'by the Governor-General' !or misbehaviour, 
physical or mental incapacity, bankruptcy or neglect of ABC 
responsibilities. Directors could also be removed by amendment to the 
legislation, though Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser was unsuccessful in his 
attempt to dismiss the entire ABC Commission by legislation in November 
1976. 
Use of a part~time Board to supervise an organisation is standard 
practice for Australian statutory corporations. Other than the vague 
requirements of 'relevant interests'. (s. 12. 5), the ABC legislation does not 
specify any particular interest groups which must be represented. 4 Despite 
some discussion within the ALP about ways of easing the risk of political 
appointments. no mechanism for a diversity of backgrounds and experience 
4The BroadcasUng and Television Act, which shaped the organisation until 1983, required an 
ABC Cotnm1ssioner from each state and that at least one member of the Commission be a 
woman !s.31.2l. 
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amongst Directors has bean written into tha legislation. The ABC must 
depend on the goodwill of ihe government lo appoint a balanced and 
capable Board. 
The Managing Director 
While a part-time Chairman presides over !he Board. Iha day-to-day 
running of the ABC is entrusted to a full-time Managing Director. The 
Managing Director is chosen by the Board on a salary set by Urn 
Renumeration Tribunal. II outvoted the Managing Director must "act in 
accordance with any policies determined. and any directions given to him, 
by the Board" ( s. 10. 2}, 
The question oi whether !he chief executive officer should be a member 
of the Board has long been a contentious issue within the ABC. 
Previously the General Manager attended Commission meetings but was no! 
a voting member. The new arrangements. with Iha Managing Director a 
full member of the Board. may lend lo break down the traditional 
policy/ administration split between the executive and ABC management. 
The change reflects in part Dix's belief that the ABC should be run more 
like a commercial enterprise and less along the Minister/ public service 
model. 
A Managing Director is appointed for five years and eligible for 
re-appointment. with an equal vote on policy issues as well as 
responsibiiity for managing "the affairs of the Corporation" (s. 10, n. The 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act < i 903) does not itself restructure 
the ABC. but the important change from General Manager to Managing 
Director invites a different approach to running the organisation. The 
considerable powers of delegation provided in s. 24 enable the Managing 
Director to off-load much of the administrative burden in the interests of 
concentrating on policy matters. The Minister has spoken of the Managing 
Director being able to exercise "significant administrative powers in his own 
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right" <CPD Vol. 131 4 May 1983: 188). The clause allowing the Board to 
over-rule the Managing Director may prove significant in the light of 
previous clashes between Chairmen and General Managers over their 
undefined spheres of power. 
Slaff Matlers. 
The Act does not lay down the structure ot the ABC - that is for the 
Board to decide. But the Act does set out in considerable detail the 
terms and conditions of employment of ABC staff. 
significantly reduce the options for restructuring, 
These rnles may 
particularly the 
requirement to redeploy rather than retrench redundant staff. 
Armstrong has noted of previous ABC legislation : 
The extensive provisions of the Act and Regulations are more 
a part ol labour law than broadcasting law. They are similar to 
laws governing the slaff of olher Commonwealth statutory 
authorities like the Australian National Airlines Commission and the 
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation ... It has sometimes 
been said that the inflexibility of ... the Staff Regulations affect the 
quality of the national service by their rigidity (and) their 
unsuitability to a creative undertaking. ( 1982: 112) 
Mark 
The key aspect of Part V of the Act is the severance o! ail statutory links 
with the Public Service Board and. hopetully. therefore an end to the rigid 
structure. job categories and pay scales imposed by the Public Service 
Board since 1960-61. The Managing Director is now free lo set 
levels and job classiiications for all ABC officers and temporary employees. 
The ABC will. however. "continue to participate in existing arrangements 
administered by the Department of Employment and Industrial Relations !or 
the co-ordination of industrial relations policy and practice in Austraiian 
government employment" (Duffy CPD Vol. 181 4 May 1983: 189). 
The new Act also removes stall ceilings imposed on the ABC during Iha 
late 1970s. The Managing Director may "appoint such officers. and 
engage such temporary employees. as he thinks necessary· ( s. 33. 1). 
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However, 1he ABC's total wage bill is still part of the estimates requiring 
ministerial approval. and so could indirectly be used to enforce a s1a!t 
ceiling. This clumsy and imprecise mechanism for limiting recruitment 
would operate if the minister imposed a limit in the estimates on the 
amount aiiowed !o the ABC for salaries. Provision for staff ceilings is 
"never included in these statutory authority bills; ii is always understood 
that the Minister will use the estimates process to control staff numbers" 
(Blunden 1983l . 
Though now out of the jurisdiction of the Public Service Board, the ABC 
must slill adhere lo the complex and, arguably, rigid set of stail rules 
contained in the Act. A Promotions Appeal Board. a Tenure Appeal Board 
and a Disciplinary Appeal Board are ail established. Efficiency rather than 
seniority is lo be the sole criterion for promotion. The new regulations do 
not alter the inability of the ABC to off-load redundant staff during 
economic difficulties. Except ior proven cases of misconduct. ABC 
employees enjoy tenure of employment though not of any specific job wllhin 
the Corporation. "~' no longer able to perform useful duties in 
one area must be redeployed to other "duties !hat he can reasonably be 
expected to perform" ( s. 48). This clause goes against the 'business' 
approach suggested by the Dix Committee and must limit the ABC's options 
for restructuring in case of further economic contraction. 
In an a!lempt to improve the often unhappy industrial relations within the 
ABC. section 81 creates the joint Consultative Committee to bring together 
ABC management. employees and unions. Tho Act does not specify what 
the Committee will actually do: that w!ll be decided by the Board of 
Directors and decreed through regulation ( s. 83. 2). 
Program Rules 
In general the Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act ( 1983) does not 
specify the sort of programs the ABC should broadcast. It does note th at 
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the ABC should seek balance between mass appeal and minority interest 
programs <s. 6. 2a. iiil. should provide some multi-cultural content 
(s. 6. 2a. iv). and has special responsibilities in education programming 
( s. 6. 2a. vl. The Act. however. also requires the ABC to take into 
account the services supplied by the Special Broadcasting Service ( s. 26). 
Presumably the ABC is intended to supplement but not duplicate the SBS's 
ethnic language programs. 
There are. however, two services which the ABC is required by 
legislal!on to provide - current affairs and the broadcasting of Parliament. 
News and current alfalrs programs are an important ABC activity. Section 
27 of the Act requires daily radio and television broadcasting of "regular 
sessions of news and information relating lo current affairs within and 
outside Australia". From 1947 the ABC was prohibited from accepting 
local news irom other professional services; I his made the ABC "the only 
broadcasting organisation in the world to gather all its own domestic news" 
<Inglis 1983a: 130). The Dix Committee recommended change to a!low the 
ABC to use domestic wire services. This was opposed by the then 
Commission and by the ALP, wl'\ich noted that "there are enough pressures 
operating in the news media to roduce diversity as ii is. without 
encouraging the process" <Button 1982: 34). Nevertheless the Labor 
government's 1983 legislation allows the ABC. for the first lime. to take 
news from Australian Associated Press. the domestic wire service. ABC 
journalists opposed !he origmal drafting of this clause, arguing that the 
Corporation would use AAP material to reduce its stall of journalists as a 
cost cutting measure - hence the addition ol a provision that the ABC 
must ensure that it has "adequate" staff 10 collect and broadcast the news 
<s.27.2}. 
It is not the 1983 Act but the Parliamentary Proceedings Broadcast Act 
( 1946) which requires the ABC to transmit the proceedings of the 
Commonwealth Parliament. Several hundred AM radio transmission hours 
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are occupied each year by broadcasts from boih Houses of Parliament. 
The Joint Committee On The Broadcasting of Parliamentary Proceedings 
may also require television coverage of a joint sitting of both Houses. as it 
did in 1974. ABC personnel have been vocal in lamenting the disruption 
to normal programming caused by Parliamentary broadcasts. which 
normally attract lass than 1 % of the radio audience. 
With the exception of current affairs and Parliament. \he Act is 
concerned only to identify the audience the ABC must serve; ii is for the 
Board and management to chose or make the programs which fultil the 
ABC's charter. 
There is one restriction implicit in the program rules which affects ABC 
television. The Act requires a national television network: ii does not 
allow substantialiy different programming in each state. though the national 
network actually comprises separate state networks because of current 
terrestial transmission technology. The "national" requirement prevents 
sub-networking and so restricts \he ability of ABC-TV to cater !or local 
specialised needs. 
The Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act ( 1983) establishes the ABC 
as a body corporate, a legal entity which may sue and be sued 
(s.5.1-2). 
Part IV of the Act formally sets out the powers and duties oi the 
Corporation. The broad powers included are consistent those provided lo 
other statutory bodies. The ABC can enter into contracts, acquire and 
dispose of real estate and personal property. erect buildings and 
structures. appoint agorits and attorneys. act as an agent. and engage 
persons to perform services for the Corpora1ion ( s. 25) . In practice the 
ABC is required to consult with various government departments before ii 
can exercise many of these responsibilities. 
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Section 25. 6 gives the Corporation power lo provide radio and television 
studios only "at such places as the Minister approves". This means !hat 
the Minister and Department of Communications will be involved in ABC 
planning and policy decisions on buildings and equipment. 
Part IV of the Act allows the ABC to establish and maintain its orchestras 
< s. 28al and to generate supplementary income through merchandising 
< s. 29l. It does not. according lo Chairman Myer. go far enough in 
giving the ABC the ability to compete in the marketplace. 
Technical Services 
One consistent ABC complaint has been that the transmitters which 
broadcast its services are controlled by Telecom. In extreme 
circumstances a Minister could 'pull the plug' on the ABC by denying it 
access to broadcasting facilities. 
The 1983 Act contains a compromise on ABC requests for ownership. 
Ownership of ABC transmllters is transferred to the Corporation ( s. 75l . 
The agreement of the Minister. however, will still be required before the 
ABC can establish any new transmitter ( s. 77). Ministerial approval is also 
required for the ABC lo arrange permanent use o! a satellite system 
(s. 76l, The Minister for Communications thus remains the crucial figure 
In the planning and provision of ABC technical and studio facilities. 
When the Act was proclaimed, a dispute arose between the ABC and tho 
Department of Communications over the definition of the word 'transmitter'. 
The ABC discovered that even where it is the sole user of a station, 
ownership was not transferred. As the Department interpreted the AcL a 
'transmitter' "means only the 'little black box' which actually produces the 
signal. and not the 'buildings. land. aerial. wires or power source' by 
which is normally meant a 'transmitting station'" <Sibley 19B3l . The 
Department pointed out that the Act only requires transfer of ownership of 
146 
the transmitter: the Minister has the right. but not obligation. to transfer 
the whole station (land. buildings. aerial and am ii the Minister so 
chooses (s. 75. 1). The dispute has been decided in favour of the 
Department. The ABC has been given ownership of its transmillers but 
not o! the transmitting stations essential to operate them ( Blazow 1984} . 
The Department will retain control of these untll directed otherwise. As 
Alex Blunden notes. this limited definition "was intended when we drafted 
the Bill": it was a "policy decision" which technically removes control over 
ABC transmitters from the Minister. though with effects which are more 
symbolic than real ( 1983). 
Summary 
The aim of the 1983 Act Is to "provide the basis !or the development ci 
a sound and effective national broadcasting organisation" CDuffy 19B3a: 4). 
While giving the ABC a Charter with a set of goals is a significant 
advance. the 1988 Act has not seriously addressed the problem of the 
ABC's independence being compromised by the demands ol its bureaucratic 
environment. The Act changed the organisation of the ABC but did not 
substantially alter the existing institutional arrangements between the ABC 
and the federal government. The financial and administrative constraints 
imposed on the ABC remain in practice those applying to any government 
department. Cabinet still decides how much money the ABC receives 
annually. The ABC is not allowed to borrow against its assets or raise its 
own operating revenue. Continuing estimates procedures require the ABC 
to obtain Ministerial approval for how it spends its money. where ii builds 
its studios. what capital work contracts worth over $500 000 ii signs. 
which buildings it leases or hires and what new services it may establish, 
The government thus retains the power of the purse. The Act rejected 
legislative options for giving the ABC a permanent income. On the one 
hand the Minister expressed enthusiasm for his Act modernising the ABC 
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<CPD Vol. 131 4 May 1983: 190). but on the other denied it the certainty 
of funding useful for long-term planning. Without an assured minimum 
level of funds. the ABC has no legal guarantee that future governments 
will not repeat the !inancial cuts of the Fraser years. Without the option 
to off-load redundant staff ii ls difficult to see how the ABC could fulfil its 
requirement to be efficient in its use of resources should such cu1s occur. 
No piece of statutory corporatfon legislation can ensure autonomy -
especially not one which puts the responsibility for independence on the 
Board of Directors rather than on the likely source of difficulty. the 
government. The Australian Broadcasting Corporation Aci ( l 9S3l allows 
governments lo use subtle bureaucratic pressure or issue directions in the 
"national interest" to influence a recalcitrant ABC. The Act does not give 
the ABC in practice the administrative independence which in principle its 
position as a statutory authority should guarantee it. 
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2.'2 THE STRUCTURE OF THE ORGANISATION 
lhe stnndnrd critique of ~he !\BC is of an exces~ivoly bureaucratic and 
r 19id crganisation. /\n Internal document described the ABC as ". , . a 
typic2! bureaucracy concerned principally with its own internal procezses 
3nd tra:is.:Jctions doslgn0d to perpetuate its own existence" < f'lledia 
Management Report 1982: 3), 
Most ABC anecdotes are about ABC bureaucrats and their decisions. It 
!s tho peoplQ vvho occupy the offices and not the structure itself •,-Fdt 
usual Iv charged with goal displacement, infiexibiiity and stubborn resistance 
to change. 
ThG 1c:rm 'bureaucracy' has r.vvo dimensions, The first is ;:in 
r.:;rganlsation. its rules and procedures. Tho ~ocond refers to the 
ouroaucrats Strucrure 
r;iu::,t be distinguished frorn managemont. 
separa'!:e, A bureaucratic s1.ructur0 ~~; nn ordered sot of roles and offices 
\vith an agreed set of boundaries bctv1eon it:;1;;it and the outside world. 
The bureaucrats are the poop:e 'Nho occupy those oiflcec. and roles and 
maintain the boundarlos and cn3ractor of tt1ls negotiated order. An 
assessment of tho capnb!llt!os ot mnnagers cannot proc0d0 
una.Rrstanding of the structtire \vitr<in 'Nhich thoy 'Nork. 
Overview of the Struc1ur;:; 
In the broadest sense, the ABC is organised into three levels 
1. A Board of Directors, appointed by the government, who 
iormutate poHcy fer tho orgonisaHon. 
an 
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ABC management, the senior permanent ;\BC employees 
responsible tor implementing Board policy crnd admini:;tering 
the day-to-day running of the organisation, 
3. Production units, responsible to the managers. who make 
programs for ABC radio and television anrl Gperaie technica!, 
merchandising and management support services 
Tl"!is division of responsibilitios. as Corbett notes. reflects the origin$ of 
s.t;:itutory corporations in priv;ate companies: "the organisational chart of tho 
typical joint stock company, with its shareholders, diroctors, managers and 
employees, was the only practical pattern ior business success, public or 
prlvnte" (1965'. 189l 
As the ABC has expanded, however, this simple structuro has become 
more intricate and lines of authority have become ambiguous. in 
particular, the r;tructure has been complicated by the federal nature of !he 
ABC. f::..s woli as Head Office, located tn Sydney~ the Corporation hos ,_ 
or is developrng - branches In every stnte and territory, Most senior /1BC 
rnanng0rs v1orK in Head Office in Sydney whHe production stnff are 
:icaumed throughout tho branches and offices, The cornmon complaint 
from the branches. 1:> that "Sydney" (Le. Head Of!iceJ makes important 
declsion:::; about programming and resource aiiocation without sufflcient 
consultation about the needs of local branches and audiences. These are 
the familiar difficulties of <Jny federai organisation. 
The implications of toderal rosponsibl!lties for the structure aro 
signiflcant. The managemont hierarchy of Head Office is duplicated in 
rnlniature in each brunch. The lines of responsibility are often unclear, 
panicular!y about resource allocation at the local IGvel and about which 
matters mu!Jt be reierred to t-iead Of ti co, The Dix Committee Jou nd that 
under long-standing 1\BC duty statements, a particular program produced 
in a branch (in 0i1hor mediurn) could be the responsibility of any one of 7 
diHcrent managers, Dix called this : 
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, , a waste of resources. resulting in diffused accountabilily 
cind lines of responsibility, If it were widespread. it could leave 
the Impression with staff and outsiders alike that thG f\BC is an 
impersonal bureaucracy lacking any defined purposes. rathBr than 
a lively centre for the creation of quality programs. <Vol. 2: 720) 
Much of \he correspondence between branches and Head Office Is 
concerned v1ith defining jurlsd!ction. Olsgruntled staff in a branch may try 
to appeal over the heads ol local management. When personality has 
beon 1ho crucial factor in deciding the relative strength 01 an o1iice. the 
power bal;rnco be1ween branches and Head Otfice has fluctuated. Head 
Oifice. however. has final control ovGr resources and therefore it usually 
prevails. 
!n "ianuary Hl84 ABC Managing Director Geolfrey Whitehead announced 
that financial and program responsibilities are to be delegated to thG 
branches, This may reduce tho power o! Hoad Office and perhaps 
fundamonmily change the power balance between Branches and Head 
Otfice within tho organisation, The relationship between branchGs and the 
con1re, hov1ever, 1s only part of the wider structural problems for the 
t\BC. 
In its submisslon to the Comrnlttee of inquiry. the /.\BC included figure 
2: 2: l, This diagram makes the ABC structure look quite simple. by 
setting out three levels of activity production and s0rvlc0 units 
res;ponsib!e to a manngement 'Nhich in turn answer0 to the Board, 
The Dix Committee found tho reality behind the diagram anything but 
simple, Th9 l\BC's line d111gram. they concludGd, "does not t1escrlbo 
accuratciy the cornplex components of a large naUon13I org0ni.sation 
supplying highly var~od cnd~products", As the Comn1ittee vvry!y noted, 
discussions with ~taff "revealed that being an ABC 'insider' did not ::;eem to 
make the task of understanding thfs complox organisation ony easior than it 
was for uz" (Vol. 2: 709), 
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The Commi11GG cou!d not find i:l single ABC entity. Instead it identified 
;Jt least four cubstruciures each competing wlth. as we!! as supporting. the 
ethers, each v;ith \ts own sot of assumptions about purposes and 
priorities. The four substructures were 
1. l-\ fodsral f\8C -· t-iead Office and it~;; branches. 
2, A broadc;:isting or network ABC 
radio and television networks, 
programming the national 
3. A program specific /\BC - the departments which produce ABC 
programs, 
If. '\ technological ABC - the back-up organisation providing the 
equipmeni and technicians required lo produce and broadcast 
programz. (Vol. 2: 711-717) 
Dix felt thnt each sub-structure had lts own lines of authority, its ovvn 
admini:-;tr~tive othos and a management determined to preserve its 
autonomy from oncroachmont by the 'other' /\8Cs, \IVh!!e the Committee 
v1ns correct 1n !don~lfying tensions. oven its scherr10 of four ABCs is too 
neat and arbitrary nn identification of the division ot the necessary 
functions, tvtany 1\8('.'.'. administrators, for example, ore part of more thun 
one of thef;O cubstructurns ilnd operate uccordlng to their own prloritiEJs. 
Defending the Intricate structure of the ABC. forrr:er General Mr::a1;1ger 
Talbot Duckmanton expialned that the required precision of broadcasting 
could only bo 111et by a vteH-organi:.ed institution. The f:..BC. ho said, was 
subject to the 
'tyranny' of the clock and the caiendGr. Wo can't be la1e 
vJith our orders, Our programs right throughout the continent ln 
four diiferent time zones. must go to air on time. The /.\BC 
news, ior example, doesn't bogin tlve minutes !ate or one minuto 
early : each oulietin begins procisc;ly ;:it the scheduled time and 
this happens 365 days a year ano it doesn't happen may I point 
out. by accident. it happens because of inbuilt disciplino within 
the organisa1ion nnd bc:icauso the allocation of resources. tile 
staifing arrangements, are all goared to producing prcgrnms on 
the specified day at precisely the schoduied time. (1977: 18-l9J 
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·nm Dix Commiitee. however. was not so enthusiastic about the 
complexities which had grown up to meet the 'tyranny oi the clock'. it 
noted that many of the ABC's management problems stemmed from a 
confused and complex structure. Senator Button later interpreted !he 
Committee's comment::; on the structure of tho organisation as a ''darnn\ng 
indictment on those who have been responsible for the evolution of lhG 
present system" ( 1982: 21). In particular the Committee noted the !allure 
ol the ABC to adopt fully tho implications oi 'media management'. 
In 1973 the Commission invited McKinsey and Co. , an American firm of 
management consultants, to "undertake a general review oi the 
management of resources available to !he 1~BC" <Inglis 1983a: 330l. The 
Commission sought a morn rational way of organising the ABC. Mcl<insey 
traced the ABC's structural problems to 1956 and the introduction of 
television. The Commission had then decided against creating a sepcirate 
structure ior the new medium, preferrtng to absorb television into existing 
administrative nrrangements designed for radio, Tho integration proven 
incroastngiy cumbersome and unsatisfactory, it v,;as judged lnildequate by 
f\1r;:Kinsey, Br>sed on experience with the BBC. f,<~cKinsev recommended 
tha1 the P-.BC be offectiveiy split into t\'-/O separate organls2tions - one tor 
radio, the other for televt0ion. Head Office rnnnagornen1 vvouid 
co-ordinate, !eaving resource and program decislons to be m2ce ~¥ith\n 
each media structure. Each medium would become responc;;ble ior 
making. buying and transm1tting all its ov.Jn programs_ 
The shift to media rnanngement' ( i, G, each /\BC rned1un1 manuging 
itseli) was intended to break down centralised dec1s1on~·rn0King_ v·Jithin the 
ABC. Resource decisions would nov,; be made c!o;:;or to where resources 
were consumed. Ultimote!y rneaia management VilOU!d make /\BC senior 
management smaller and more eiticient. 
From 1974 the ABC be91rn implementing McK1nsoy's rncommendations. 
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Two departments, however, successfully resisted being divided between 
radio and telev\slon. News and Engineering, both crucii:ll to the ABC's 
performance, fought long and hard to stay intact. The result "lvns w. 
compromis8 which resembled media m;:inagement but oid not hilVe the 
advantagos v1hlch have followed full implementation of the McKinsoy 
Report rc~cornrnendationn, With News and Engineering separate lrorn the 
program~makers, the ABC required more senior bureaucrats to mediate 
and co~ordinate. The essential advantages oi media management ~ less 
burouucracy, n simple organisation structure and control of resources 
within each media structure - did not eventuate. 
The reluctance to introduce full media management resulted partiy irom a 
hesitant ~.~nior managemont and mainly frorn entrenched interests which 
reiused to co-operate, 
comes to matters ot 
One senior ABC manager suggested 
organisational structure the ABC 
!hat "when it 
r (S!~) is appailing 
Ulitora1e, . , the McKinsey Report baffled senior management and don't 
think they reaily understood what McKinsGy v1as driving at .. ,"( Nevvson1 
1983) ' -enc Dix Report noted , , . a lack of \Vhole~hearted espousa~ of the 
shift oi dlrE=JcHon on the part of influontlal personn0!; tha1 there oxist m;:1ny 
uncerrnini1ics about the direction of ch<:ingo: that tho changes have not 
oeen properly thought through'" <VoL 2: 719), The Report notod the lack 
of a timetable for the cornplete implementation of rnod!a 1 manC1gemont. 
One iormer Commissioner alleged that Genaral Manager Talbot Ouckmanton 
had not wanted to lmplernent the McKinsey Report, and so had introduced 
media mar;agement in "only a titular way .-it Hc:ad Office and in the 
states. The failure to implement the budgr:tting rneasures. - \Vh\ch !:>hould 
have followed the creation of media rnanagers in each branch. led to 
confusion about responsibilities throughout thB organisation, 
1 f,1uch of cr,apter 26 of t~:€ Gornm1t\8e of 1:-iqulry'::; RBport c:nti<:!sing ,t.,BC reh.Jctc1nCEJ t:> J.\;C0pt 
media rr1::.,n;S1gement v1as wntten by c. ~enior ,ABC m::;,11ager. John Mevtsom wus tr.en Din~cJor of 
R1;1dio Resource:» and tlie ABC's !i<1icon -':\ttlcer \Vlt..,_ the Committee. 
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/\ decade <ifler McKinsey. loilowing the criticism of the Dix Committee, 
the ABC renewed the atternpt to sort otrt its structure by completing the 
switch lo media management. A wor~ing group of 1\8C managers. staff 
and engineers was set up to advise on ways to achieve a media 
management structure, 
blueprint for pos!-·Dix 
Their September 1982 R0port was intended as a 
/.\BC': structural changes, but instead the Report 
raised doubts about the viabiiity of media management. It noted ' ... a 
view widely held in the organisation that media management. is a concept 
superiicially neat in appearance but in many ways oniy nominally life-like" 
<Media Management Report '1982: 4). The Report argued that "within an 
organisation as large. diverse and complex as the ABC, it is not possible 
to take this philosophy fu!iy to its logical conclusion" <ibid: 7l. 
Nevertheless the working group accepted the general thrust of McKinsey 
to1Nard sopnrnte radio and to!evlsion structures and recommended a long 
c.erins ot minor specific changes toward that end. Tho result vvt;is a 
part!at devolution oi prograrriming and financial po·.vors to medla m2nugers 
\vlihin each branch: cne such media n1anager felt these changes, 
creat(."Jd his post, !Gft him "under~paid. under-recognised and 
under-consulted" { f-lai\stone 1 G83), 
Following the ab.o!ition of tho Commission and its replacement by the 
Corporation in July 1083, the ne-..v Board of 
management' concept. In January 1984 
Whitehead announced plans to implomont 
Directors uifirmed H1e 'media 
Man;:iging Directer Geoffrey 
the original McKinsey Report 
recommondatlon by dividing departments and support service$ into radio 
and ielovlsion divisions. The result, hB hoped, vo1ould be rnoro efficient 
use ct resources and a loss contrci!ised organir,.Jtion, Tho Whitehead 
reforms, begun in 1984, envisage e three-year timetable. VJith tho ABC 
achieving its new structurA in the 1987 financlal yoar a delay of 14 
years since tho McKinsey recommendation:;. during which the /\BC'B partial 
transition from an Integrated structure to rr1ndia rnanagemont has ~nr;ronsed 
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tho administmtivG burdon, confused linos ot authoriiy botweon Hoad Office 
and the branches and failed 1o alleviate • ... the structural crisis which 
debiiit!'!tes tha organisation" (Aarons Scan 24 May 1983 original: 3). 
Structurai Problems For fv'lanaoers 
Mc Kinsey. Dix and tha Media Management wor!<ing group all argued that 
the ABC';:; structure required drastic change: they ::;tressed that the /\BC 
should become less like a government dt:partment ~1nd more a flexible 
broadcasting organ!0ation, This criticism recognized the posslbility thut 
caoabie ABC managers were being frustrated by an inappropriate structure. 
Many critics have charged that the 'public service' arrangements of tho 
/\BC have been a major imped1mont to developing an elficlent and flexible 
creat;ve organi"Sation. Semmler, for example, '1rgued that constant 
changes in lines oi nuthority produced a conservative and t>(3Crotive 
bureciucracy ( 1981: 184l. White dGscribed the ABC as i1 buremicracy. 
vvTih individl!Dl "empiro--building" departments constructod as though thny 
v1ere "ready to repel invnderc at ail times'' ( 1975: 79). Others drew 
atienHort to the 1960 decision by the Commission to request that the 
organisation be brough; under the the jurisdiction of the Public 
Board ( PSBJ, a;:; tt;e tirne 'Nnen thn ;\BC chose to identity itself ns part of 
tho fede-ral bureaucracy rather than as part o1 tt1e broadcasting industry, 
The nexu~ v1lth the PSB uccentuated tho tendency of 1he ;\BC to be run 
;.::dong the !ir,es of a traditicir1a1 governn10n1 department, As jobs became 
classlfiod ln puclic service terms it bnc2n-1e dfif!cult to make structural 
change to the ABC without protrcictoo negotiation$ with the PSB. When 
ne,,v positions were crea1ed to move an officer sldewLJys (such as creating 
Semmler) . these 
oiiicos became permanent parts oi on mcreasingly complex and rigid 
structure, As 1he former Director of 1\BC Corporate Affairs noted, tho 
result was the deveiopment of nn ', .. .JdminiGtrutive structure. The public 
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service system works on ndmin!stratlon. An organisation like \ho r,sc 
needs management and tl10y'ro very different things" (Hartley Hl83). The 
Dix Report suggested that \he ABC had created its own problems by taking 
an inflexible government department structure into broadcasting. an area of 
excopUonally rapid change in public taste. competition and especially 
technology. 
The f\tlC structure which emerged under the jurisdiction of the Pubiic 
Service: Board centred around divisions respon~ib!e for radio, television. 
Radio Australia. news services. engineering. management services and 
corporate aifairs. This centralisation of responslbiiity creaied a 
considerable work-load for senior managers; aH 22 senior dlvisional 
managers worked directly to !he General Manager. In ail. around 120 
senior rnanagers presided over ihVJ various activities ot the ABC, 
Ex~Depar1ment Head { ilshboit once deiighted colleagues with hi2, 
compuruson oi the ABC with a feudal state, where 
, the C~ommission is a coilege of cardinals issuing moru! 
ed!cts from rim0 to time but v.rhere tho General ~-~an ager is king. 
presiding over his chosen court and surrounded by wn 
agglomc,;ration ct baronios and fiefdoms. All these manorial lord:;, 
OWf:-; nomJnnl aHoglance to the Commission and the Genera! 
~;ianager. yet neqriy ul! pursue administrative and productton 
policies v1t1!ch Hovv from their Q\Nn fnher\1ed prerogatives, 
privi and prnct\ces rather than from lnstructlons passod down 
tho h1erurchlc~I pyramid by the titular rulers, This seignoriai 
aulonomy is maintained partly because the princelings. lords and 
barons are 'Nilling to bend the knee to the monarch when tho 
occasion cJemanrj::,, partly becausn they arG closer ih3n the 
Commis.sloners and t(Jp management to tho procedures of 
progrnm-maklng, But the limited autonomy of despots. ott0n 
warring amongst t11cmselves, hardly connotes f:eenorn for thG 
serfs, The r0sult !s that, despite breah:~outs here Lind ther;::; in 
the !ower ranks, n conservative and authoritarian ethos pervndes 
the organisation. Cl975' 192-193) 
Bulletin journaiist Bell carr!ed this analogy further when describing power 
changes within tho ABC 
Over 1hG yoars, certain /\BC depnrtmen1s llavo developed like 
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medieval !lefdoms. Their size, power, budget and influence have 
-.vaxed and v1anod. usually according to the strengths and authority 
o1 their rnanagors. f\iev;s ls a fiefdom that has lost power. 
Rura! is ono that has power. sizo and budget out of proportion to 
\ts prB-dorrdnantly urban audience. Education is another whose 
grov11h hcis boon untrammelled because it is sacrosancl. 
( 1983: 59-60i 
,John Hmtlev argues that this 'leudai' ABC structure which developed 
unher the jur!sd1ct1on oi the Public Service Board was inappreprialo. A 
quasi-.. government depnrtment could not succeed as an efticfent and 
creative broad castor. The influence of the PSB meant that " ... !he 
machine becomes more important than the product in so many ways 
because it is :;o in1ricate, It reaily does pay to play it safe in the P..BC or 
in any government department's operations" (Hartley 1983). The 
cemplexity of the structure enabled managers to avoid making decisions by 
ref0rring thr;;rn elsewhere; it produced a cautious management vthich in 
turn inh1bliod ~,tructu-ra! reform. 
Th8 complexity o1 ::Jtructuro created a hierarchy v1hich tock a !iie·-time to 
iJScond, in tho Rtlrly of the orgunisatlon Charles Nlosos became 
Gnnoral f'Aanager of tho fa,8C nged only :35, the l G70s n1any p0oplo 
reached senior managornent positions only VJhG:n •Niti1in a fow yoars ( uvon 
months \n 0.cme cases) of retirement. Such managers ;ookGd to a 
peaceft:! final iob nnd So tondod to play thing!:> by tho ruies. They found 
themselves, i1ov;ever, h0vtng to hur.dle a hoavy vvorkload bocauso ot the 
centrwtisation cf doclsion-making v1ithin 1he orgZlnisatiorL \AJhen a d~spute 
nrc:.e. o complex hiBrurchy c:::tfT'.t? into piu.y. !f o prcgrcim being rnade by 
thg A.BC's Department ot Sport for r;:idio l required lT"Oro resources. the 
program-makers \vou1d first approach their Departmont i--iead, if the Heatl 
approved. a request weuid bG piziccd with the Comroller ot fladio 1. The 
Controller v1ou!d have to consu!i 'Nith tho Director of Radio il0sources nna 
with other department hr:Cld0 d \t 0if0ctod buaget Llliocations, A 
controversial or difficult docfsion might gc to ihe J\sc;!stant i¥1anaging 
Director ( R~dfo) and even to the G2nera! fvlanager. 
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All this took time. Meanwhile the producers were trying to gel their 
program to ;iir. A decision made at a senior level, with all the citlendant 
delays, was handed down through this hierarchy. If the producers (or 
somebody elsel appealed against the decision. then the whole chain had 
to reconsider tru:i rnat!er. Managers. however. did not just have to make 
program decisions. Collectively they had to consider resource issues. 
what programs would be made. when they would be broadcast. ;md the 
iinancial. personnel, legal. publicity and technical implications of 
decisions, 
The ABC does no\ have a profit motive as a bottom line when deciding 
allocation of resources. In a commercial operation, if tha producers of 
dliferont divl::;ions v.rgue about who shou!d get exira staif, an execulive 
decision would be based on the relative contribution of those dcpanments 
to the organisation's profit, The t\BC. however. is a 'public service', 
f\ny decision affecting program departments is therefore arbitrary and open 
to dispute within and outside the organisation. Without a profit critGnon to 
dotermlnc re!nHvB importance. new resources tended to accrue 
d.epartrnent~; Jlroady controi!ir.g signiflcant ret;ources. Growth Yvas 
incroinentai, !novitahlV such n situation required a large management to 
arb-ltrntc the trequont dioputes between departments. ManagemBnt, 
ho~Never, had its ov1n interests and problems - hence disputes betv1een 
networks, ba1we0n rudio and television and batv-1een divisions us each 
argued tha1 its ov1n activity vvas essential and under-financed, 
This v1as the historic /\BC - a structure of shifting u!!iunces. constant 
power struggles and cl1anging relative strengths presided over by a General 
Manager with his own interests to protect. and a Commission lacl<ing 
sufficient iniormation to intervene In the constant Internal \.varfare, 
To try and reduce internal fighting. the ABC experimented with its 
structure and management practices. or blamed its problems on external 
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0vcents such as the staff ceilings and iunding cuts of tho Fraser years: it 
became "all too oasy for management and stall to use tho lack of money 
and lack of new equipment and facilities to jusiily glaring deficiencies" 
(Bell 1983: 58l, To stop the industrial disruption resulting from financial 
cuts, consensus management was attempted, In 197 5 the ABC structure 
was altered to introduce a Board of Management C BoMJ which would 
"enable senior management personnal to meet regularly on a formal basis 
to deal v.dth matters of overall concern to managernent which How across 
funct:onal responsibilities and have, therefore, become of concern to the 
organisation as a whole' COix VoL 2: 740), Predictably the BoM, the 
embodiment of consensus within the ABC, became part of the power 
strugglo, Staff argued that it was a "rubber stamp" for management 
docisions, while managers felt that staff did not understand the purpose of 
the Boi\~ or the realistic limlts of its influencG. 
The fa~!urc of consensus management was illustrated by tne seven year 
demarcation dispute V<Jlthtn the ABC over the introduction of electronic 
ne\vs·-gatherlng camerns { EJ\JGs), The ABC bought these new light-woignt 
cam0ras in 1976 but 'Ni71S unable to use thorn bocau~;e staii could not 
agree on \vhc :'.'.h0uid oporate the equipment, All management i1ntiatives to 
reso!vo th0 dispute faited and it finally took a strike by ABC journalists in 
November 1983 :o force the introduction of ENG cameras, Surveying the 
performance of f1BC management in this matter, two industric:il relations 
consultants concluded 
The introd1;ctlon of electronic news gathering equipment in the 
P..BC illustrates tho barriers to consensus-based consultation v1hen 
-the assoc~Zited demarcation dh~pute reilects management's pursuit 
of its 'territorial' i11torests, , , if the ABC is to such 
technological change, ii wou!d seern desirable for it to dove lop 
more llexible organisation,11 and job structures, It would =ilso 
seem necessary for it to improve its decision-making Llr.d 
consultative mechanisms, (Jackson & Yerbury 198 l: 59) 
in the later 1970s, -.vilh tho financiai constraints imposed by governmf~nts 
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arn:J tho difficulties of drastic organisational change resulting from tho 
Public Service Board nexus. the ABC structure did not promote effective or 
uiiicient management, Former Chairman Professor Leonie Kramer 
defended the quality of the ABC's senior managers. instead critcising the 
structure they had to work within as ". , , machinery inherited from the PSB 
arrangement which seems to have bred some bureaucracy of its 
own. , . with certain rigidities ond attitudes toward stalling" (City Extra ABC 
radio 23 June 1983) , The Corporotion's first Chairman, Ken Myer, 
shared Professor Vramer's concern nbout an appropriate structure. After 
first surveying his new domain, Myer found the ABC to be "suffering from 
the legacy of 50 years of bEJing associated with the public service, 
expected it to be bureaucratic and so far, , i havo found it that way" 
(ibid) ' 
Th9 1984 Structural Chgnqes 
The Austrnlian Broadcasting Corporntion Act ( 19831 removed the ABC 
from the jurisdiction of the Public Service Board. This follovved a 
recommendation from 1he Committee cf Inquiry and a request from the J'.1BC 
itself. Freedom from public servic0 rules and clnssifications gave th8 /'.\BC 
an opportunity to develop its structure and stuffing p:ol\ci0s along more 
adventurous lines. 
On 31 Jnnuary l 084 the 1\BC Board 2nnounccd dc-ta:ls o1 tho 
long~awaited restructuring of 1he 1\BC. The reforms aimed to rnduce the 
number of management posts, complete the move to media management 
and reducG the number o1 managers working dlrec!iy to the Manuging 
Director. Instead of on!y 9 position~ \fl Orf\ directly to the 
Manoging Director the nevi exGcutlvo director'.3 for Tetevislon. Radio, 
Radio f.' ... ustra!ia. New Businoss \)pportunitlcs, Information Services. ~1uman 
Resources. Finance and EDP, Engineering nnd Property and Concert 
Music. These executive directors h;:ive little line responsibility but 
concentrate on long~term planning and policy, They ure uppointed wilh 
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five year contrncts and largely recruited from outside tho organisation. 
Policy initiatives in the past have tended io come from management rather 
than the Board, and the appointment 01 these 9 executive directors may 
well increase the influence of senior managers over long-term ABC policy 
formulation. 
Below the executive directors the top 120 management positions have 
been restructured into separate radio and television divisions. Only a 
small number of managers remain in Head Office in general organisational 
suoport lu nctions. The long-term restructuring strategy is to delegate 
financial and program responsibility to these two media groups, thus 
decentralising ABC management. The initial reaction \Vithin the 
organisation to the restructuring, however, was lens than enthusiastic. 
The 120 sonior managers who lost their old iobs and had to compete for 
nfJW positions vvere understandably despondent. So too were journalists 
and eng1neern v:ho feared ios1ng th0ir status within the organisation when 
their depar1ments vvere divided into television and radio components; once 
the changes becnme pubiic "Whitehead faced hostility irom within the 
organisation, He \Vas, frankly. shocked by its vehemence·· { fVational 
Tim ea 19 Octoba:r ~ 884: 5) The ~/1anaging Director 1.ivas reported as 
saytng that "there aro some elements within the 1\f3C v1hlch didn't -.vant the 
re-organisation to v1crK, There '.vas an attempt to bounce me out of my 
job - l don't think that's puttitig it too strongly" (ibid: 6), 
Nevortheless, the Board intends to prevail in its three year plan to 
revitalise the ABC structure and implement full media managernent, "fhe 
ABC Annual Report notes the Board· s organisational decisions : 
, .. the Board adopted this now structure because, as far as 
possible, it wished to concentrate all the human, financial and 
equipment resources within the distinct radio and television 
divisions. As part of this process. tha Nawn Division \vill now 
exist separately in the radio and television directorates, while 
combining with the Public Alfairs, Rural and Sporting Depi'.lrtments 
to become part oi the Information Services group. The previously 
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in!ogratod departments of Educ;:ition and Music join Sporting and 
in'to radio and television groups. Rur;:il in being split 
(1983/84: 8) 
Stall hosiility to these changes resulted not only because tradition;:il 
power bases and privileged positions within the ABC were disi'lppearing. 
Some employees complained bitterly that Whitehead. born in Britain. was 
filling the ABC wiih his iel!ow countrymen. The Sydney Morning Herald 
noted the discontent. r.aying "A iew months ago leading J\ustralian 
broadcastors were saying it would be unthinkable if the ABC did not have 
an Australian as Manciging Director. But now the ABC has now not one, 
but three non-Australians in the top three jobs. .And two of them had not 
set ioot in th0 country before their appointment" < 28 July 1984: 35l, 
Thora is somo special pleading in these complaints. The 1C\BC has always 
re:-cru!ted irom Britain, f\i1any of its best known personnel are British-born, 
Th~?SO nevv managers had to comnete i.,vith local managers for jobs and 
v1Gre not selected by V\!h\tonoad a!ono but by tho Board ot Dlr0ctorn. 
Th-ere ls per:1ap::. more force in staff cCJmp!aints that the V\lhitehead reforms 
"substitute one bureuucracy for another more costly and bigger 
bureaucracy'' (ibid: 35), 
disturbnd by tbe- discontent \"ilth1n tne organisation over restructuring : 
Senator Peter Rao ... Can you comrnont ut cill as to hov1 long -you 
Mr. Whitohoad 
think it will ba betoro tho disiHusionment v-.ihich 
hus beon crGated 't:ilhin sectlo.-1s ct the ;\BC, , , will 
start to be overcorr10 hy the advantages cf the 
structuring which you h::Jvc und0rtwken? 
: l would say one to t\vo yoors before we get a. 
corporate !oynfty, ! do not think it '<vii! stop 
then by the w<Jy, but I thinl< the situation wil! 
become difieront. ! am prepared to be \udgod on 
what \VO have done at the end of the 1986-87 
financial ynar, 1 would stand on that record. 
(Senate Estimates Committee A. 4 September 1984: 159) 
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Whatever the quai\\y of those occupying ABC offices. the long-siandmg 
ABC structure has been a significant impediment to good management and 
to creative program-making. Managers were handicapped by a confused. 
fluid structure still in transition to media management. Entrenched 
interests prev<'.liled over McKinsey recommendations !or the separation of 
radio and television and ior an f-\BC management which co-ordinated rather 
than supervised, The compromised and incomplete media management 
system 
. contused the lines of authority, centralised power with Head 
Office and added more managerial positions to an already 
cun1bersome structurB. Ste:it claim media management has been 
superimposed on existing management rather than eliminating and 
substit.uting managenal roles. (Bell 1983: 63) 
The D!x Committee: found ;::in ,l\.BC which had become "slow moving, 
ovorgro',vn. cotnp\acont. and uncertain of 1he direction in which it is 
heading ocspite the o!lorts of many talented and dedicated people who 
worl< for n \Vol. 1: ll. The organisation, it said, "has come to prlzo iis 
c·nn comp-! :Jnd inffexlbi!ity" t ibid: 13), 
The chnnges annou need in January l 984 address many of the structuru! 
problems which have troubled the ABC. To pave the way tor long-term 
devolution of respom:.\bilities. the Board hus instituted ;:;hart-term 
centralisation This enabled Directors to implement change from ;:ibove 
and 'spill' its $-enior management, In the long run, structural changt:r 
should end the contused responsibiiities of managers by producing c1Gcir 
llnes of authority v;itf:in r:ach medium, The Board's decisions 21hould 
reduce the domlnan::o of !-lead OtficB. thus mn.king /\BC branches more 
responsive to local needs, There is, however, one significant impediment 
to the restructuring, .4.ny complex structure can only v1or'..\. effBctivety if 
incompetent people can be romovGd and ii stall and resources can be 
moved 1o areas of greatec;t need without intern;:i! obstruction from 
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departmental rivalries. The legisllltive requirement that redundant stall be 
redeployed. the dil!iculty of creming new posts to keep such sta!! busy. 
and the proven ability of 1\BC dopartments to hoard resources and obstruct 
change do not augur weil for the Board's structural reforms. The Sydney 
Morning Herald. surveying tho Managing Director's proposed changes. 
asked tho big question "Can Whitehead win or will the ABC 
bureaucracy's seemingly infinite capacity to survive defeat him and the 
Board?" (4 Fobruary 1984: 33l. 
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2.·3 CENTRE-PERIPHERY RELATIONS !M A FEDERAL ABC 
The ABC is a highly centralised organisation. its activities tighHy 
controlled by Head Office in Sydney. For decades ABC branches have 
complained that they lacked the resources, authority and flexibility to cater 
for local needs. particularly with television. In January 1984 the ABC 
Managing Director. Geoffrey Whitehead. announced significant devolution of 
financial and program responsibility to the branches and territories in each 
Australian state and territory, as part of an ambitious restructuring o! the 
ABC. Whitehead is attempting to reverse 50 years of power accumulating 
at Urn centre. 
Tho fJ..ustraltan Broadcasting Commission vvas created in 1932 as a 
national radio servica providtng "adequate and comprehensive" progr;:ims ior 
aH Auslrn!iaos, Radio technology in 1932. however, was not capatllG of 
broadcasling one service across the nation. Time differences and the 
of sending programs inter::;tate roquireo separate 
organisations each producing its O'Nn material and program schedules. 
In the original federal ABC, lndividuai state manilgers programed tho 
local ABC radio service in accordanco with general pollcy guidoHnes 
decided by the Commission. The Head Oif>ce oi the ii.BC, localed in 
" d 1 oy ney. could offer only limitod co··ordination. m211niy on adrninistrativc 
matters. 
By ihe mid~- 1930s Improved communications onab!od mn1erial to be sent 
1Head Off\ee r.ppev,r5 to t"!ave been c0t()_b!ished in Sydney for no better reason than the 
avaitab11ity of .studic!3 <UV'i t...,at 1t was the home town of Ct;ar!e3 Lloyd ,Jones, th1;1 first ASC 
Chairman. 
166 
interstate fer national use. oven H it could not yet bo broadcast 
0!mu!taneously. ABC Chairman Cleary and Gonera! Manager !\~oses used 
th8 new technology as the basis tor a policy cf Thoy disliked 
program production and scheduling by individual state m.:-inagers and hoped 
instead to establish a coherent programming policy (Inglis 1 G83a: 46l. 
Head OWce began appointing 
co-ordinate and produce material for a national service, From 1935 thR 
acilv!tlos oi the wtatos v1ere closely directed irom Sydnoy. f\s Inglis notes 
Managers in tho states might well recall those 
v1is1tul!y. like barons cut down by tho rise of 
monarchy. for their autonomy was much reduced 
administration and national planning. Ubid: 49l 
earlier times 
a national 
by central 
Stam branch autonomy was further reduced during the s0cond world war 
by a ronevfod emphasis on the ABC's rolo as a 'national broadcaster", 
VVartirno censorship r0qulred centralised control over contont, 
and regional s.r:rvicos woro novv planned from Sydnoy: branches inserted 
locai materlai only cf a type and at times specified by Head O!iicc, 
In 19:!2 ;1n amendment to ABC !egislntion required that the Comrnission'J 
t-iead (J!flco ··:.ha!! be established in tho 1\CT on or before a cate ttxod 
thB Min.istor" (Broadcasting and Televjsion 1\ct s. 30. 4). ·rh(;} scat of 
government hctd rnovcd to Canberra and lt saerned that ministers 1Nishod to 
maintain closo wartime controls on the ABC by having it noarby, The ABC 
was given a huge site on Cnnborra's Northhourne /\vonue but $Uccessivo 
ABC managers resisted pressure to lor.1ve Sydney. ln memo::; and 
submissions to public inquiries the ABC dwelt on the high cost ot moving 
to Canberra and the disadvantages of separating centrul administration from 
program··ma~ing (Inglis 1983a: 200, Dix Report Vol. 2: 709). ln private. 
ABC officials emphasised the dang0rs of being too close to tho :::0at of 
governm0nt and tho intrigues oi Canberra's bureaucratic politics. 
Because no minister fixed a date. tho i\BC's Head OHice romoinod in 
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Sydney. The Canberra clause does not appear in the 1983 ABC Act. 
despite the recommendation of tho Dix Report that it be maintained. As a 
result tho ABC's Canberra complex remains "a modest structure with the 
most spacious ABC car park in /\ustralia · (Inglis 1983a: 200l. 
A National r\BC Television Network 
In 1856 tGlovlslon was introduced to Australia and the ABC given 
permission to ostabllsh a nationai television netv~ork. At first there was no 
effoctlvo method of recording and rHlaying programs for slmultaneous 
interstate transmission. Managers in the state branches thus had a 
"virtually Independent station". In a brief restoration of the authority they 
once on1oyed over ABC radio (ibid: 199). 
f\ new process oi 'federalism' accompanied increasingly sophisticated 
aquiprn0)nt, Some national prograrnming 1or television became feasible with 
th.::; introduction oi videotape in 1962 and -the installation of co-axial cables 
bet\NGen cop\tal cities. As the ABC devolopod 11s own copying nnd 
production facilities, moro te!ev'1sion materiai was producod tn Sydnoy and 
copies ilov;n to the states ior transmission. 
In 1970 /.\BC onginB·ors ucquirod tho technoiogy to ~-end 2 television 
prograrn 'live' to all states simultuneousty. Thu 
celebrated by a n<l1ionany broadcast shov1 on O ,July 
achicvoment 
1970. The new 
credit. 'An 1\BC \\Jational f\lotwork Production', signalled to state branches 
thnt Head Oifice would from now on contraiise progri:lm production and 
scheduling \ibid: 294). 
The Current Structurc: 
Though tho ABC has i<ept its federal ;::;tructuro, and promlseij a return of 
responsibilities to the states, the organisation remains cominated by 1-ioad 
Office. Most material is produced or bought in Sydney and ail television 
and radio sorv1cos are co-ordinatc;d from there. ABC Head Office 
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at.tministrators havo an expression for branches v.riih fev-J resources and 
little autonomy - they call thom BAPi-1 states. nn acronym for Brisbane. 
l\deiaido. Perth and Hobart 
Tho nalional ABC teiovision network is programmed in Sydney. with only 
limited production and !r:put from local stations mainly news and 
weather. ABC radio is divided into !our domestic networks. all 
co-·ordinated by Controller!'· in Sydney. Radio I is produced in the capital 
ci1y of each state. Rndio 2 is a nationn! service from Sydney, Radio 3 
1s 1hc rurai service. a mixture ot material from netv1orks 1 and 2. Radio 
4 is the ABC's FM service. produced in /'.\delaide but controlled from 
~;y(jney. 
(:";ontro! oi news. cinginoering and support serv!cEJs are aH based in f1ead 
C~ftlt.:o, State manugors (now called State Generat Managers} v1ero once 
3rnongst the most inf!uentla! positions in the /~BC, In theory 1hey are still 
responsible tor everything that happens within the branch. In practic0 
program. nev1s and englneering decisions are rnada in Sydney ;::ind 
ThG C'ienera! ~ilanager 
of a branch has o\"1co1ne a symbolic \2ador lefr to h:Jndle administrutive, 
personnel ::ind publlc relations dutie::;. -rhc;::;o inc!ud8 cversGoing tho 
operations of the f\BC's six state symphc-ny orchestras.. !viany Genera\ 
Managers ccmp\ain of Httle to do { Balodis 1983): ABC spokesperGons deny 
that the position ot state Goneral Manager h0s bGcome a "polntk;;ss post". 
but concGde that the uct\\dties of Gonorwl fVianagers "depend on thc!ir O\Yr1 
inHiativo" (Grant 1983). 
Dix has argued that the /\BC needs '';::; manng\~ment presence in !oc<Jlities 
where political power :n the federal systern ln conconirwted" CVol 2: 711). 
Yet tbeir performnnce suggests that ABC brancl:es are, to ~ome oxtent. 
expensive aniJchronisms. Somm1ar notes that despite rnnssivo oquipmont 
investment, B;\PH branches 
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, , verge en boing white elephants, The lact is that program 
poi icy, cornont and planning are rigorously controlled from 
Sydney, St<ite managers. theoretically in control of their 
branct'HJ;J, have Ht1le or no program autonomy , , , state managers 
am largely figureheads and public relations officers within their 
bailiwicks, (Semmler 1981: 50-60l 
Semmlrir concludes that the ABC suiters from an "Ill-defined federal-state 
re:lationshlp'', There seems litile ambiguity, however. about the 
centraiisation of control and resulting centre-periphery tensions within the 
organisation. Bf1HP branches argue that centralisation reduces the ABC's 
ef!ectiveness at a local level. Head Office justifies its dominance by 
pointing to a legal obligation to provide a "national service". 
With four radio networks the ABC has some scope for providing 
inforrnC1tion of interest to a regional radio audience. ABC television. 
ho·11ever. hns :::erious problems catering ior specialised rural audiences. 
The ;\BC has only onG national telcvtslon netvvork, and the requirtJrnent 
that it provide: a 'netlonal service' cifectlvely prohibits sub~nc:i.working on a 
staie or rogional basis. Thus the ABC's telev!slon service in Sydnoy and 
rv1r::1bourne. vvhore there aro tour other channels to chose frorn. is thH 
sumo 2s 1r,at offered to rural communltles 'Nhere the f,Bc is ofton the only 
television service avai!ablt:~. 
ABC'.: progrwrnming must cater for both rural and urban audicncGs .:it ~ho 
risk oi satisf~ying neither, /\n inabiiity to use rnore local m(Jterla! rnakes 
ABC television citen unresponsive to the pnrticuiar nG'ed ot a specialised 
audience, BAPt-! states have the facilities to produc8 !cca! content but are 
rarely given the opportunity, Former Genern! Manuger Tnlbot Duckman1on 
was puttlng on a brave iace 'Nhen he justified this centralism as a 
!ong~Jerm attempt by 1he f'IBC to overcome state parochialism 
Operating in such a large country. we have sought to provide 
the nation with a shared experience which no other communication 
system can supply. This is why Initially we concentrated on 
national networking ... , In recent years we havEJ sought to striKe a 
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balance between the value of information and entertainment shared 
in common by a national iludience with the need to give time to 
regional interests. And lt's not an oasy balance to strike! Our 
different states have diifornnt imeresl:> and in each state capital 
the ABC has established facilities to make radio and television 
programs for state use ;:ind !or contribution lo tho national 
schedules. Again, within each stat0, there are regional offices 
making programs and compiling n0ws buiietins for their own areas 
- areas which are citen smLlll in population but geographically 
onormous in some ;:ireas up to 250 000 squarn miles. 
\1075: 14) 
Desp1te Duckmanton's enthusL:ism for BAPt-1 resources and services, there 
ls considerable branch resentment of centrnl control - a feeling within the 
slates th al their equipment and talent is being underutllised. 
Tho Allocation Of Resollrr;es to Branches 
Details of branch staff numbers. equipment purchases and production 
expendilure are decided by Head Office, A manager from Head Office 
ned that are set for production within each regional unit to 
prevent dupl!catlon of national service!'.}" { tviuidoon 1983) . A branch 
Genera! fvlanager on the receiving end of lhase targets noted ·\ve are 
given .-:i. surn and ~old how many 5taff 'NO can have,,. the budget corr1eB 
frorn t-tead OfHco and v-101 adtr.inister it in the ;;,tates" (Grahame 1983), 
Tf1G annual aHocnt!on fol!ovvs an informal bidding system \¥here branches 
put up estimates and proposals, though v-/nh no guarantee tht::y \v\li he 
accepted. 
Branches enjoy little dlscret!on in thB uso of tholr budget: thoy can;iot 
reallocate large sums according to !oci'.:II prlorlt!es v1lthout permission frorn 
Sydney. The Quecns!and bronch, for e;<amplo, currently faces a S{?fious 
lack of accommodatio:i. Tho branch (1ennral Manager h:::ts consistently 
complained to Head Office, bet thus far unsucc;;:sstully; "\ do not have the 
budget or the power to go ou1 and buy or ev~.tn substantially refurbish a 
building .. ,\ mur;t consuH thG rnanagcment group in Sydney cnn'i make 
expensive docisions unilaterzd\y" (Grahame 1983), 
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ihe ABC wiil no1 release figures on tho budget appropriation for each 
branch. though clearly tho buik of resources are consumed in Sydney. 
Only staff distribution figures are available. In June 1984 the ABC 
employed 6 598 staff. distributed by branch 
Branch Percentage of Total Staff 
Head Office 42. 7 
(includes NS?l) 
Victoria 19.2 
Queensland 8.9 
Soi1th Australia s ~ B 
WeBt Australia 7. 9 
Ta.-;;mania 6. 8 
Radio Australia 2. 4 
ACT l.S 
Overseas O.B 
Norlhern Territory o. 8 
(ABC Annual Report 1983/4: 74l 
Resources v1itt1ln the ABC aro thus heavily concentrated In Head Office. 
Though trrn ABC retains a federal structure. power is not shilred but 
r~rnains vested Hrmiy \vith U1G centre. 
The f-\BC's OuEJen::;!nnd operation \s the of the B/\P~·! branchGs. 
587 full··time staH2 operate a iec;,I radio network ( r<Jdio l l . ihrne regional 
networks <radio 3) and insert blocks of n9v1s 1n to t!1c national ssrvlce 
(radio 2) . Quaensto.nd material is ulso produced fer !ocEJ.t insertion and 
tor the national ieievision network; approximc:Itely 15°/o of t\BC Queon01nnd 
television air timo is local branch content. 
VVithln 1ho Queens!o.nd r'\BC brzinch there is i1 widosproad bolief that it 
2..A,c at June -;934 the 
72, actm1nistrat1on $1. 
1983184: 741. 
S87 tu\!-·t1rne .:.;taff \vere deployed : televi::::ion 95. r;:tdlo 107~ orche:::;tr-:i,. 
rnanr,gem-ent 3, news G5, engine-e-nng 102- {_AOC .-~·.nnu.:1.1 Report 
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has been 'forgotten' by Sydney, that Head Oliico does not pay suff!cient 
attention to \he particular needs of Queensland, Talented local people are 
frustrated by a lack of production opportunities nnd resent a perceived 
dominantie by the 'Sydney bureaucracy'. 3 
Th9 1\BC's Oueen$land Genoral M~nager, Char!t1s Grahame, has overoil 
responsibility for the branch, He nominally controls the state directors n! 
engineerh1g, rH.~ws, media managers for radio and television and an 
oxe-cutive officer. The precise iines of responsibility, however, are 
arn:biguous. The media management division requires the Queensland 
officers in charge of radio, television, news and engineering ta report 
direcily to Controllers In Sydney en matters ct policy and programming. 
They rnport to the branch General Manager only on staffing and 
;ad1nintstraUve matters, wh8re Graharne acts as a "sort of court of appeal", 
The (Jua0nr,tand C~Etnerat Manager acknowledg0s "confused lines of 
authority'', ~~e confines himseif to looking after thG 1\BC'~) ·'corporate 
entity" tn ()uoens1and 3nd leaves specific progr;:1rn matter0 to the tned\a 
This "iooseness about defining authority" v.;crxs in Queensland. 
suggests (2rahSime, because of h!J good personal r01ations vvith his n10dla 
m3nagt?:-rs: "'l'Je unde-rstand our particular sphere oi responsibility·· He 
foresees ditflcu\ty, ho\vever, fer t:1e current hr an.ch structure lf thosi:~ 
relations 'f1ere not so friendly a sentiincnt echoed rathor bittoriy by one 
employee critical of the administrative arrangements ot /\BC branches, \Vho 
complained that "an organisation can't be run on good v:iH" 
The Queensland rnedia manager:; -- Bob Haiiston"'1 far rac10. Rory Sutton 
for television - both describe the office of Genoral !i1.anagor as a "title 
without pov1er" and see their loyctlties lying witri the1r Controiiers in Gydney 
0 
"'Observations are bnsed on neldworX in !J(1sb~'lfle tn r.~ay-,lune 1083, \Nhere quoter; -3re 
~0erced it i.:; wrtt": the permiG3!on of tt:ose interv1e'Ned. 
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rather than with their local branch manager. Oueenslcrnd programming 
must be nccoptabio to Head OfficG rather than to tho Queensland General 
Manager, 
Both Quoensland media managers are crttic;:il of the way "media 
management'' has been implemented and itz; effect on the branch 
.structure. ~-!ailstone sugg0st0d that the ABC has created med Ii:! managers 
v;i1hcut gh1ing them sufficient responslbility for resources, a support 
::;ubstructurc or adequately defining their lines ol authority, This has 
created confusion amongst staff and potential tension between senior 
branch management, Sutton believes the media. management concept has 
been "implanted on top of an already crumbling system". 
/<\il Quecnf}land managers complain of a lack of resources. They feet 
1hey havo no flexibility to manage 1heir responsibilities. At the same timo 
m3-ny corn n that Sydney does not nogotialo with Queensland before 
inoking decisions v1hich a1foct the branch, One Queensland television 
producer blamed ihG "tyranny oi distance" bet.,voen Brisbnno and Sydnoy Tor 
the 1ack of rnr:aningfui consultation - "if it's o, k. in Sydnoy. overyonn hnro 
has got le !ump it'', Proposals to buy new f:quiµmcnt ure ''rejected if 
Sydnoy h:isn't got one"; y0t without the new equipment BAPl-l state:::. cannot 
compete w!th their Brisbane commercla! competitors bocnu::e local .£\BC 
productions "niways look sllghtly antiquated", 
This lack cf opporitir:ity for local talent is B cnmrnon co1T1piaint wiihin the 
branch. There was sorne bitterness th<:1t iirr;ltf?d rz::sourcos restrict 81\Pti 
states to unambitious "$hoe-·string b;Jdger· proouctions. One lroquent 
suggestion v1as that the B1\PH states be nl\ov1ed to specialise, 
managers cite the example of the BBC's Bri~;tot branch, wiiich \s highly 
regarded 'for its v1i1dlife documentaries ( kno\.vn in lhe trade Ds 'furrit.1s') 
and ls able to attract nppropnate- talent wnd r0sources. Sutton bo!ievos 
Queensland ABC TV could ideally produce good light ontor!ainmont ;,md 
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specialist documentaries in its large t0!ovision studios, but it v1ould requtrG 
an addi!ionai $ l Om to upgrade production facilities, /-1t present Queensland 
/\BC television has some $20m worth of equipmeni. "In terms of routine 
produc1ions vie can justify our existence but vie are not getting the 
maximum production value we couid" said Sutton. Some production staif 
were not so kind, suggesting that studios and equipment worn often idle, 
The Media Manager for Television in Queensland concluded that his 
1;ranch could not onjoy much "autonomy" while locked into a nationul 
television network, di meted irom Sydney, with very little scope for local 
initiative. 
1\BC radio appears to ofior more opportunity for Quoensland content -
porharJ:'; because it is less capital in1enslve and has more ovtfotG constan1!y 
deninndlng new material. Radios 1 and 3 are programmed Jn Brisbano, 
though thoy drav1 on interstate material, Tho ABC Queensland Modia 
Manager for Radio, Bob Hnilslone. talked of his considerable rndGpendence 
in progrr:imrning Queon$iand radio but also of a neod to De in ·constant 
touch \Nit!1 the Control~srs in Sydney. His main corriplnints wnro n lack of 
staff 2nd ;-~n inqbility to dlvert resources ot arnpioy oxtra staff v,;\thout 
roferring to t·lo;;!d \)tf!co, 
The need for radio to be rcsponsivo to local noods provides oppor"tunltios 
not present in television. This is particularly irri.porto:lt for the tho 
'western nnc' the r<.idio 3 regional service broadco.st to u vust area ot 
inland Queensland. There is no to!ovision avaHable <lt present 10 rnuch of 
the outback, so the western iine resernb!es Austru\lan radio ot the i 950;:., 
with quiz shows, plays and country drince hours" The tirst Au:::triJlian 
domestic communica1lons sate\Hte. to be launched in July 1985, will 
provide outback Queensland v1i1h teicvision for the first timo, Now 
technology may once again encourage ABC 'federalism', 
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Many people within tho Queensland branch complain al a "lack ot support 
from Sydney" and time wasted dealing with bureaucrats from Head Office 
over 1he phone. Tho i\1edia !v1nna.gers both claimed to have been. on 
occasion. "hideously let down by Sydney". When resources had r10t been 
available they had taken unpcpular decisions. When the result was a 
threat of industrial action by Queensland ABC journalists. Head Office had 
"sudden'y found the money" and local management had been made to look 
petty. Rory Sutton complained that Sydney avoided making unpi0asont 
decisions, often leaving the branches unsure about current policies. v1h1le 
another manager felt that Head Office only backed branch managers on 
popular decisions: "but ii it's a tough decision Head Office doesn't want lo 
l<nov-1 about lt and says that i1 is a local decision. This makes ior 
conservative management because the branches have ii1tl~ trust in 1 !"" r'l 
•'I" 
$Upport of their tJenior managers in Sydney". The skills deveiopad by 
"Syd:ley bureaucrats'' in avoiding responsibility oiten- caused contusion and 
:::no!ess delays at branch level, This was described as "management by 
.:;ittrition" by one Queensland producer, and as "crisis m3nugemont" by 
.;:;:nether, 
ccntrast !ocat managers ciaimed to consult staff then rnake flrrn. 
quick "·ur:bureaucr;Jtic" declzdons. Certainly ihs indu::>trin! rcdatlons, rocord 
of the Queen~.\and branch 0ppears good in comparison with thnt of i'JSVV or 
Victoria. 
The Qunensl;::ind Brnnch and State Politic1an3 
f1rGssure from state politicians \vas not an issue vvithin the 
branch. r-.iany 1,vere genuinely puzzled when the subject \Vas r;'Ji0ed: 
nobody could think of a stngte serious attempt by a ~oca! ~oi!tician to 
influence ABC reporting. The executive producer oi the Queensland edition 
ol Nationwide said ha had "not ever experienced political pressure at a 
state or federal level". He reported receiving no more complaints from 
politicians U1an irom tha public at large about Nationwide stories. 
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Samo manngors attribute this absence of po!iticul pressure to thoir ovvn 
skills at handling !he occasional irate Minister or Leader of the Opposition 
on the telephone. Others. perhaps more plausibly. point to tho difficulties 
of anyone in Queensland being ab!e to lean on an organisation ns 
centralised as the ABC. Most !\BC progrnms originate or are produced 
under direction from Sydney. Progrnm makers in Queensland are 
respons~ble to Controllers in Head Office and can always channol 
complain1s to their super!ors outside Queens~and. There is no point a 
slate poil1ician applying prcssuro to the ABC's General Manager when that 
person has no editorial responsibilities, Queensland Premier Joh 
Bjelke-Petorson has. on occasion, sent the ABC Board telegrnms 
protostir.g against Head Office decisions affecting /:t.BC operations in hi:; 
state, but \Vith no noticeable resuit. t't 
Thz?.re ciro fe1,v sanctions a state government could exercise aguin-st a 
Co1nrr,onv1ealth tnstrurnentaltty such as the Jl,BC, ln Queenstand, 'HhP.re the 
/i..BC lf; often the only tncdia available to vast areas. no go'v'ernment could 
offord to boycott this important llnk with the elHctorate, 
.An cutlyirg ~;taie government may hnve difficulty influc)ncing .£:\BC~ 
prograrr.rrii ng or policies because ot the contralisatlon of l\BC 
decision-making in Sydney. The situation might bf'.J different !i a f\ISVV 
government <vvere involved. puriicularly one oi the same poli:ic2I per3u2Gion 
as the feder;J! government. 
4on 8 ,lune VJ78, tor QXGJnpTe, A.BC Genera\ L1anager T;:i.lbot :Juckm<:tnton rece-ivect a 2- ptl~Je 
telex from Premier BieH-<e-Peterson, protecting .;;bout Hreport'..> cf proposed ff1$jor 14iterationc: to 
the role and tirries of ,:._ec nBws both nationally and \n C:uei'.:}liS!and", T!1e Queen::IZ'l.niJ 
government wt<.s k8en to ensure that ABC news and rural progr~mc \Vere not ";:,lt8rB-d ~nti n>(H;le 
sub~ect to entertair.rnent", ThB Premier was critic(;! of cornmBrci3.r G.nd ,r,,ec (;Urre:nt ~ffi:ur-s 
programo~ concluding t~:at only t!",.:;: 7:00 pm l•BC nBws could be rel\ed upon to be "b~l.:i.nc-ed" 
and ''1mpart1ai .. , His tet~x was di:::tnbuted to ABC Commics!oners but not included on: u·,i; 
,3genda of Comm\s:s1cn meBtings ch~r.u::::>1ng !ong-V~rm changes to PIJC news and current it.fta1rs 
programs, 
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On Saturday 30 /\pril 1983 the ABC current affairs program Four Comers 
rooorted on ''The Big League". Included were allegations that the NSW 
Labor Premier. Neville Wran, attempted to influence a court case involving 
Kevin Humphries, then exec<Jtive director of tho MSW Rugby League. 
Humphries had been discharged on nine counts of alleged rnisappropriatlon 
at $.52 519 from the Bafmain Leagues Club in 1977, 
Wran described the charges as "totally false" cmd issued a writ against 
the f,\BC for defamation (Sydney Morning Herald 5 Mily 1983: i) , The then 
ABC Chairman, Professor Leonie Kramer, defended the decision to screen 
tho program as being taken "without fear or favour", The r~sc, she said. 
"had acted independently and impartialiy at all times" (ibid: l l, 
The Premier at first declined to hold a judical inquiry into th8 chargc;s, 
Only \'Jhon the Australian Democrats threatened an independent Sonwto 
inquiry did \ti/ran relent and announce a Roya! Corrimission in1o the 
a!!egn1lonz. The whole matter 1hen became sub fud!ca:, 
/\t the tirne of tile program \tVran was Prosldent oi the l\ustr;:ilian Luber 
f'.1z;rty. \Vhlr,h hod VIOr1 federal office only 8 1<\ICOkS beiore, 
ttir.: l-\8C v.ras Senator John 
Button, \.>Vho 
::;upported in the 
questioned the integrity of Professor Kramer, BuHon's 
intemperate attack v1as not well received by the commercial mcaia anz1 
cau~ed the ne'<v national Laber government considerable embarrassment. 
On 28 July 1983. nearly three months alter the Four Cornorn prcigram. 
the NSW Royal Commission reportec. It oloared the Premier of all 
allegations but found a prlma facie c21se on other claims again0i ~<evin 
Humphries and former Chief Stipendi0ry Magistrate Murray Farquhar. 1\ 
jubllant Premier held a press conference to announce his vtndlcnt!on. He 
refused to answer questions from an /\BC reporter, (3eotf Sims, and vowed 
to continue his defarnBtion r.1ction against tne /\BC, saying 
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... the ABC did a most disgraceful and wrong thing to 1110. 
And do you think the ABC can be !iko Pontius Pilcite now and 
'Nash its hands and walk away from what it sought to do to me? 
T'1e ABC. In a most malicious way, set out to hurt me. 
(ABC-TV National News ;?8 July 1983) 
Tho 1~BC had not been afraid to make allegations about a NGW politician 
even at ::he risk of upsetting a now federal governrnent. The Hawke 
government supported Wran in the Commonwealth Parliament. though 
probably at more cost to government credibility than to the ABC. 
i\t 1he time ol tho con!tovorsy the Commonwealth Parliament had be0n 
considering thn Austraiian Broadca.'.lting Corporation Act. There v1as 
considerable speculation thm, as a result of this controversy. the 
governrncnt 'NOU!d not appoint Professor Kramer to the new Board, despite 
h<:>r evident enthusiasm for a place with the Corporation. \i\!hen iho 
legislation was pas sod and tho new Board Dnnounood, on 9 June 1083. 
no !::C1rving Commissioner was ~t::tained. 
Tho ·1923 f\BC 81!1 required tho uppointment of a nrp,y 1\BC Eloara ln any 
clrcurnstancos. so it i::.; lrnposstblo to tell v1hether Protessor Krnmer's pub!lc 
support for the scroening oi tho Four Corners progrr:i.m cost hor {he 
Chairmanship. Given the considerable distrust within labor circles fer the 
identified. it ls uniikoiy thdt she \Nou!d hav0 been a tovcurEJd candidate at 
the best cf times, /\sked about v.:hethor the Four c;orner:J progr;:::m had 
cost her the Chair. Proiessor l<ramor "r'robably not I thlnk. 
had a feeling before that 
Board" (PM 9 june l 983l . 
probably 'NOu!d not continuo to be on the 
Throughout the dispute all ~;ides gave zit least lip service to tho need lor 
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an "independent" ABC and deniod they had any Interest in changing ABC 
policy. Federal government involvement was largely confined to verbal 
attacl<s, wh•ch Professor Kramer handled easily. Beyond the outcome of 
any court actions. there is no evidence of sta.te or fedorai sanctions being 
taken agttinst the f;8C for its allegations against a state Premier. The 
media rire so much a part of tho political system that. having made his 
gesturr~, the Premier renumed speaking to ABC reporters ut his noxt press 
conference. 
The ?,BC~ ls a fed era! s1ructure with highly centraHsed decision-making, 
This upsnts f\8C branches who feel they have inadequate resources anc 
cannot net without the permission of the "Sydney bureaucracy", It is not 
surprir.;ing that branches, particularly those upset by the BAPH syndrorr1B. 
tend to be high!y critical of the adminisirative abilities of ABC Head Office. 
ln spite of branch criticisms about the allocation of resources and stn1i . 
.1\BC progr.:i_rnn1i:;g does provido some balance between local and natlonu! 
noc-?ds, lhcug h Vtl1h an undoubted emphasis on national information, This 
reflects the 1\BC's. mandate to encourugo a :;;ingle f.\u5traliun identity. 
~.ttany i·l0ad C\tficc rnan1:1gers nrgU(:1 that this overriding function, 
Duck:nanton's 'shared oxperit?nce", is not fully understood by those 'Nho 
work ;n /.\8(~ Dranchn:::. 
As a con$t::quonce r;t;ite politics usually do not fc21.turc prorninsni!y on 
1\BC ncv.rs bulletins. 
lnternatlonal analysis. 
ABC curront affairs progrnms prefer nationol 0nd 
This policy reduces the reasons .:ind scope tor 
art0mpted Intervention in ,1\BC SJfftiirs by :itate politicians, In tho /1ustratian 
federal division of pawors the ABC is firmly part of the Comrncnwealth 
sector, beyond 1hc interor:"t or gra::.p oi mC$t !ocni politicians, In turn ihe 
/\BC is rarely an lssue in sta1e pol!tic:;,~ ln the excoptfon of lhe VVrnn 
controversy it was the f\BC which 111torvened in Cl state rnalter, 
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This centrali~;m l$ not ahr1ays popular \AJith the ABC uut:Hence in the BAPH 
s1atns, l·{o!royde has argued that the /\BC 
... sufters greatly from a fundnrnenta! indecision about how to 
intorprnt its own self-proclaimod role vs tile main nationai 
service. It certainly doos not see th0 nation ::ic: being equally 
rn;'.Jda up of its constituent parts, but neither as radiating outv1ards 
from its own headquarters, Speaking as ono from Western 
,t:\ustralia. and having already dravvn your uttention by implication 
to the fact that broadcasting is larg0ly a question of one-way 
traific. it is plain that the ABC doos not find it easy to !ivo up to 
the very fine objectives it prociaims. it is clear to many, ! 
believe. that the futuro for tho ABC must include iar greater 
decentralisation. and that its nationat image could be measurably 
enhanced by recognising that Australian talents are nationwide, 
(1980: 38) 
Tho rn1onns announced on January 31 1984 am intended to dolegate 
rosponsibHity within the l\BC, following a review of all financial and st;:iff 
delegations to 3tate branches. Tho now ,~rrangoments will take several 
ye.:trs to become Gffectivo, as the now media rnanagement structure 
Grrit:;rgos and the role of Hoad Oft!ce is reduced. \JVhltot·1ead has said ~hat 
,;J.BC; np0ration0 in ouch stato can only b0 Gfficient if there is "grea1or 
;:nrn''" billty, hut. at the s.0n1e tirne. greater :tccountnbility" (;\BC 
19840 '. l) ' VVhltehead 
"makes !ltt·e sense 
bounc.L0r!(tS ::tno 
Hl80:551l. 
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2. 4 THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
Responsibility for the efficiency. accountabilily. integrity and 
independence of the Corporation is vested by iegislation in a Board of 
Directors. 
There are nine members. Seven. including the Chairman, are part-lime 
Directors appointed by the government. The others are ABC employees -
the Managing Director and a Director elected by Corporation staff, 
The Board normally meets for one iull day each month, though its 
subcommittees may meet more frequently. At each meeting the Board 
considers an agenda prepared by management, reports from senior 
ABC staH and policy papers prepared by Directors or their Secretariat. 
The V•3nue 1s rotated around f1ustralia. 
Directors and the Public interest 
The ?1BC began in 1929 as a private company wilh a Board of Directors 
representing the interests of shareholder$, In 1932 the company was 
purchased by the federal government and became a statutory corporation. 
a device used in Australia since colonial times 10 place certain activities 
under public control but beyond ministerial direction in day-to-day matters, 
The new Commission retained the structure oi a company. with a 
par!-·time Board formulating policy for management and staff. Board 
members, however. found it diliicult to define their role following the 
change to a statutory corporation, Commissioners were no longer selected 
by shareholders and no longer responsible for an output as unambiguous 
as 'profit'. Commissioners were now appointed directly by governmenl. 
Because they were not professional broadcasters, Commisstoners could 
play only a limited role in many of tho technical and programming issues 
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confronting the ABC, With few precedents to guide them, Commissioners 
began searching for a new raison d'etre. They found it in the language 
ol the Governors of the BBC. and soon lollowed British praclice in calling 
themselves "trustees of the public interest" <Dix Vol. 2: 89) , concerned 
with preserving within the ABC the "moral and social values to which our 
communily subscribes" ( Duckmanton 1966: 271). 
The concept of a 'public interest' is a justification but not an explanation 
of the purpose and activities ol a Board oi Directors. Since becoming a 
public corporation, the Board of the ABC has always been appointed by 
governments. not the public, Directors have been chosen as regional or 
interest group representatives not elected, but selected for their 
expertise. social standing, or ideological outlook. The public have no 
sanctions against the Board. They cannot vote Directors out of office, nor 
apply electoral pressure for a change in policy (the statutory coroora1ion is 
specifically designed to prevent governments influencing Board policy) , 
Directors have no special access to 'what the public wants' and no special 
insigh1 into what will benefit the public. 
The phrns0 'public interest' is nevertheless a neat formulation for oliicial 
ABC Htera1uro. it implies intense deliberations on matters oi high policy 
and an ability to objectively judge what will best serve all Australians, The 
expression appears often in speeches by ABC Cha~rrnen to cornmuniiy 
groups and the National Press Club, Beyond its rhetorical use, however. 
the concept ol Directors working for the 'public interest' explains little 
about the routine aclivitles of the Board, Instead it enables legislators lo 
hand responsibility tor the Corporalion to a Board without having to 
precisely define their role. As Tom Burns notes. the vagueness of a 
concept such as 'public interest' gives the phrase immense practical 
utility, It delivers legislators from ",,.the labour of enunciating principles, 
ol designating precisely how thesri principles are to be applied" and of 
"defending their decisions by reasoned argument" <1977: 28l , 
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'Public interest' can be a convenient fiction. No legislation 1or the ABC 
or Charter for the BBC has ever quantified the 'public interest' nor detailed 
what Directors are intended to do in a statutory corporalion. Legislators 
prefer to speak in the broadest possible terms. leaving Boards to decide 
for themselves how involved to become in the activities of their 
Corporation. 
Defining the Role of the Board 
Corporation boards traditionally define their roles 
distinction between policy and administration. In 
by drawing upon a 
this simple model, 
derived from the operations of government departments. boards formulate 
'policy' to be implemented by an impartial career management. 
In practice however. the boards of public corporations may need lo 
intervene in a range of adminisirative concerns. In broadcasting. for 
example. ABC Boards discover iha\ their organisation generates technical 
and program issues which combine with questions of taste and balance to 
present complex problem;>. There is no unambiguous dichotomy. no neat 
division of Corporation issues inio policy and administrative componenls. 
Almost any problem can be defined as requiring either policy or 
administrative solutions. so that ultimately, as in many other large 
organisations. "thr~ line between a policy-making group and a solely 
executive group cannct be clearly drawn ... where does policy-making end 
and execution begin?" <Duckmanton 1966: 272J, 
Beards have iimi1ed lime. expertise and interest. They must chose the 
level ot their involvement in decisicn-making. Some Boards are content to 
se1 long-term goals while others try to direct every aspect of an 
organisation's activities, Each Board must declde for itself at what stage 
intervention is required: the policy/administration dichotomy and the 'public 
interest' concept are both too iimited to guide Boards abeut the optimal 
level of involvement in the organisations' affairs. 
184 
Faced with arbitrary decisions about the depth of their involvement, ABC 
Boards have turned to other organisations for guidance. Ken Inglis 
identiiied three models which have influenced the thinking of ABC Boards 
about their role - comparison with the government minister. the council of 
a universily or school and the directors of a public company (Inglis 
1980a: 18-21). 
The ministerial nnalogy embodies the traditional policy! administration 
dichotomy. lt was best expressed by Richard Boyer when he was 
Chairman of the ABC in 1957 
I have always felt that the relationship of the responsible body 
of a corporation to its permanent executive is precisely that of a 
Minister 1o his departmental officers. Ubid: 19l 
It was a model used by General Manager Talbot Ouckmanton, who 
prn!erred to work to the ABC Chairman as though the Chairman were a 
Minister ;ind Duckmanton the Secretary oi a Department (Hackett l 982l . 
Tho comparison botwoen the activities cf a Corporation Board and a 
minister discussed In Britain. where the 1951 Beveridge He port 
on the BBC commented : 
From the same analogy with the Minister follows tho conclusion 
that the (Di meters) , collectively, must be completely masters in 
their own house. They cannot. any more than a Minister does. 
themselves undertake the dai!y worl1 for which they are 
responsible. but they must have the unquestioned right to leek 
into every detail as a Minister has and like a Minister they must 
be prepared to defend or corroct every detail. (quoted in Bums 
1977: 30) 
Lord Beveridge's Roport suggested that EBC Governors "themselves 
undertake the function of the Minister, that of bringing outside opinion to 
bear upon all the activities of perrnanent staft, of causing change \-vhere 
change is necessary, of preventing broadcasting from falling in any way 
whatever into the hands of a bureaucracy which is not controlled" (Wedell 
1968: 113). Beveridge was mf!uencod by BBC Chairman. Lord Simon, who 
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tofd him that ii was "simply not feasible to draw any line between 'policy' 
and 'day-to-day management'" <Burns 1977: 31 l. 
There are, however, signi!lcant differences between a Corporation Board 
and a Minister (beyond the difficulty of working out where the actual 
Minister iits into this modell . A Board does not have the sources of 
policy advice nor the responsibilities of a Minister. The Board of the ABC 
is not intended to be political: it must be seen to act impartially. to 'serve 
all Australians'. In return a Board does not have to face Question Time 
and, provided it acts within the law, is not directly accountable in the way 
a Minister is responsible to Parliament. 
Australian governments are elected on a platform of promises; a minister 
brings to office a party policy to be implemented. The ABC Board does 
not have this electoral mandate to carry out particular promises, Directors 
do not arrive with ready-made positions on the questions they will face. 
They rely on ABC management to indicate whero policy decisions are 
needed. The interaction between policy and administration draws ihe 
Board into a closer working relationship with its career management than 
is permitted by the divisions of responsibility of the traditional Westminster 
ministerial role. 
Academics who chair statutory corporations sometimes use a different 
model to define the level of Board involvement. They draw on their 
experience with a university or school senate. Leonie Kramer, Prolessor 
of Australian Literature at Sydney University, found the university analogy 
•quite a good guide" during her term as a Commissioner and ABC 
Chairman, She saw the ABC as "a bit like a giant Faculty of Arts with a 
very large school of sociology" and found a similar sort of people in 
universities and the ABC, with a similar relationship between administrators 
and broadcasters '. •you hear the same sari of criticisms in both" ( l 984l . 
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This is a non-interventionist role. with the Board protecting the 
organisation while interfering as little as possible with the creative wcrk 
over which it presides and for which it provides resources ( lngiis 
1980a: 20l. One BBC Governor compared the Board's role to that of the 
governors of a British public school. "cherishing lt but keeping in the 
background. and certainly not having any say in the school curriculum or 
in its management" C Burns 1977: 29l. Such benevolent supervision 
reduces the scope for Board intervention if major administrative or 
structural changes are required. It assumes a certain degree of 
competence in management and creative staff, for as ABC Chairman 
Darling noted. this type oi Board ", . , could hardly be expected to control 
or even supervise the day-to-day management. , .. (it has to bel concerned 
with policy matters and general responsibility rather than control of staff 
and programmes" (Inglis 1980a: 19-20). 
A third model available to help a Board understand its role is the public 
company. The Directors of a public company set goals and start asking 
questions 'f I. these are not achieved: otherwise they rely on their 
professional staff to make day-to-day decisions. Directors actively monitor 
management's performance-, and aro prepared to intervene in adm1nis1ra1ive 
arrangements when these appear unsatisfactory. The boards of public 
companies usually work part-time and often include people with a broad 
knowledge of the field but no airect experience of the operations ot tho 
particular organisation. The chiof executive of a company ~s usualiy a 
Board member. 
The first Chairman of \he Corporation. l<en Myer has stated that he 
... sees 
corporation 
- they are 
demanding 
1983: 33l 
no difleronce between the ABC and any other 
except that the ABC is wholly owned by the taxpayers 
the shareholders. 11 (isl up !o them !o be more 
in the ABC's accountability. (The Bulletin 5 July 
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Myer's comparison of 1he ABC with a business organisation raises the 
diliiculties of the 'public interest' concept. The Directors might think of 
themselves representing the taxpayer. but how is that taxpayer to forne 
accountability? O\ssatis1ied shareholders can vote out the Directors of a 
company: the taxpayers cannot dismiss an ABC Board which is appointed 
by Cabinet and funded through compulsory taxation, 
These three models posit different levels oi Board involvement in the 
activities of the organisation. They are useful guides for Directors who 
must make judgements about the most appropriate way to work for the 
'public interest'. But though the behaviour of Directors may be based on 
one of these models, the precise role of a Board wiil be defined in 
practice by the personalities and experience of its membership. 
Bo;;rd Activities 
Whichever model ot involvement prevails, certain activities are common to 
all ABC Boards. The ABC Submission To The Committee of Review listed 
these as 
o in\tiation and exarnination of major program and other poiicies. 
objectives and plans: 
¢ progressive evaluation of approved 
plans: 
,. poi1c1es, ob1ectives and 
" evaluation of the service to determine whether adequate and 
comprehensive programs are being provided: 
" formulation and examination of annual estimates of expenditure: 
" review of relations with relevant staff bodies: 
o allocation of time for party political broadcasts in pre-election 
periods and decisions regarding the right of reply at other 
times: 
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o appointment ot senior staff: 
" purchase ol major items of equipment and program series: 
o relationships 
broadcasting 
with departments. 
organisations: 
other authorities and 
" progress o1 industrial. legal and property matters: 
" review of reports from Advisory Committees and attendance at 
tholr meetings; 
o informing itself about tho views and opinions of the Australian 
community in various ways including meetings in cities and 
regions other than Sydney: 
o setting aside a part of each meeting specifically for discussion 
about programs and programming in television and radio. 
(ABC 1980: 4l 
Ken Inglis has summarized these as concerns with staff. finance and 
programs ( 1980a: 21). The first Corporation Board has included a fourth 
major activity - oxtensiva long-term planning. 
The Board participates !n selecting some senior ABC staff and rnembers 
o! the Secretariat: the previous Commission had responsibility tor about 30 
senior appointments and for overseeing industrial relations. 
The mast important appointment is that of the Managing Director. The 
successful applicant becomes an ex officio Board member and has direct 
responsibility !or the ABC's day to day running. The Managing Director is 
responsible to the Board for the structure of management and supervision 
of senior staff. The Board has stressed that this sensitive post is not a 
government appointment. Chairman Myer emphasised the duty of the 
Board to make its own choice : 
The decision will be made by the Board and by nobody else. 
It is not the 
government or 
when we have 
June 1983l 
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responsibility of the government nor will the 
the Minister be consulted. They will be advised 
made the appointment. <City Extra ABC Radio 23 
In financial matters the Board must approve estimates oi expenditure 
prepared by management before the figures are sent to Canberra. A 
survey oi Commission papers from the late 1970s indicated little detailed 
discussion of financial matters. Every meeling received memorand•c on 
rates of expendi1ure and budget forecasts, but while expenditure on a 
specific item was often raised, Commission minutes suggest that !he 
overall allocation of resources within the ABC was rarely discussed, Even 
in the first months of 1976. when the Commission had to cut $8. 4m from 
the ABC's budget. information supplied by management seemed sketchy on 
the costs of established projects. 
The first Corporation Chairman has been highly critical of the ABC's 
financial monitoring systems and, by implication. of the financial 
performance of the outgoing Commission (The Bulletin 5 July 1983: 33!fl. 
A detailed critique of the Commission's financial supervision was contained 
in a memo Richard Boyer sent to fellow Directors on 25 July 1983. Boyer 
noted perception of the ABC as "inellicient and wasteful" ( l 983: 1 l. He 
concluded with recommendations for "complex and sweeping changes" to 
the financial systems used by the ABC. Boyer argued that the Board must 
become more involved in deciding and monitoring inlerr.ai resource 
allocation and use, It would no longer do to concentrate on lobbying 
Ministers for the largest possible budget aliocation and then leaving ils 
dispersal to ABC management. 
The Board's involvement in program matters is more problematic. Public 
broadcasting Directors do not usually want to be censors. As government 
appointees, Directors do not feel they have a right to dictate what may or 
may not be seen. The Chairman of the BBC told the Annan Committee 
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that "programming presented incredibl/ diflicuit problems for the Board to 
get to grlps with. He did not think it was possible for the Governors to 
form guidelines. and the most that the Board could do was 10 build up a 
sort of case law. built on the Governors· reactions to programs" (Inglis 
HJ80a: 22l. His Board would watch programs referred to it by 
management. but preferred to set only broad parameters for program 
policy. Professor Leonie Kramer was more explici1: "I don't believe the 
Chairman of the ABC should be a censor" she told the Canberra Times 
during a Four Corner.s controversy (5 May 1983: ll. 
That incident. the screening of a Four Corners program alleging 
interierence in the NSW judical system by the Premier. invited Board 
members to consider their own positions. One person later appotnted as 
an ABC Director. Wendy McCarthy, concluded that she disagreed with the 
conternpla1ed censorship 
I may not agree with everything that goes to air. But that is 
not my direct responsibility. It's the job of the department head 
or program producer. I would not interfere. I'm very ciear 
about my role and it is not to make programming decisions. 
Yes. we as a Board are ultimately responsible to Parliament for 
the way things go at the /'.IBC. But our job is to make sure that 
we appoint people who have the judgement and sense to make 
tne right decisions. After that we have to leave it to their 
professional judgement and back them. U\Jational Times 13 
January 1984: 10l 
In an age without social consensus on 'good taste' or 'stan,:lards', few 
people happily mai<e judgements abou1 suppressing material. Boards 
protor 10 sot guidoiinos and stay out cl arguments about the merits of 
particular programs. 
Instead the first Car poratior1 Board has concentrated Or1 its fourth 
ob.iective. long-term planning for the organisation. The lack of what the 
Dix Report quaintly labelled 'forward planning' was blamed by !hat 
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Committee for many of the failings of the ABC. Chairman Ken Myer. 
drawing on his business experience. announced that !he top priority of the 
new Board would be to establish a "long-term corporate plan" to set goals 
and priorities for the ABC ("The Guide" Sydney Mcmina Herald 15 August 
1983:1). 
Long-term plans require guaranteed capital. This has been hampered by 
the system of annual appropriations. through Boyer argues that the ABC 
has used its fluctuating annual income as an excuse for not planning and 
so "made a rod for its own back" ( 1983: 5l. Myer has lobbied the 
government for the right to borrow money from the public through bond 
subscriptions of the type already used by Telecom and state utilities. A 
corporate plan underwritten by this capital would address personnel and 
resource issues and so influence the type of programs produced by the 
future ABC. Such a plan. outlining ABC allocation of resources and 
long-term capital and operational financial commitments. has been under 
development since rnid-1983 and will be implemented during 1985. when it 
will become the basis for all future ABC internal budgeting. 
The Board must achieve its staff. financial. program · and planning 
priorilies in 12 meetings a year. though Directors may consult more 
frequently in subcommittees and by telephone. 
Meetings are attended by the Directors (including the Managing 
Director) . the Board secretary. and the head of the ABC's Information 
Services. who is a permanent observer. Directors may also invite senior 
ABC officials into the room when they have a specific inquiry. The 
agenda is prepared by the Corporate Administration Office. which is part of 
the ABC's Corporate Affairs division. The Corporate Administration Of!ice 
collects information ABC divisions want to go to the Board and prepares 
any information requested by the Board. 
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in the past Commissioners have complained that so few meetings and 
such a large agenda allowed them litle time 1o do more than react to 
management initiatives. David Williamson resigned in 1978 after a Jew 
months on the Commission. because he found it a " ... rubber stamp !or 
1he top management" on which he could have no inlluence (Williamson 
1982). Dr. Earle Hackett. on the other hand. found Commissioners could 
have some in!luence ii they carefully scrutinized each management proposal 
(Hackett 19821 . He agreed. however. that most Commission policy 
originated from ABC management. Professor Kramer shares Hackett's 
view. She was disappointed with Williamson. feeling that he had not 
understood the role of a Commissioner or the division of responsibility 
between the Board and management : "a Commissioner should not expect 
a personal achievement out of what is basically a corporate body" ( 1984). 
The first experience of a Director is the sheer weight of papers to be 
reaa. commented on. understood. ABC Director Wendy McCarthy found 
that alter ;:i short whilo on the Board her house contained two tloor to 
ceiling bookshelves full of paper; "the soft swishy thud o1 heavy duty 
envelopes at the front dcor every evening is part of the daily ritual" 
( 1984: 8-91. Every month. about a week before the next Board meeting. 
ABC Directors receive a thick dossier containing an agenda and supporting 
papers. The Board does not release its working documents or minutes for 
public scrutiny. so any analysis of Board procedures depends on 
extrapolating from the experience of the Commission. Though 1he 
Corporation Board has put more emphasis on long-term and corporate 
planning, and has some support from a Secretariat. it shares with its 
predecessor the sort of pressures and formats which influence Board 
meetings and decisions. 
The minutes of a typical. uncontroversial Board meeting might resemble 
those. for example. ol Commission meeting no. 523. This all-day 
meeting was held at Broadcast House in Sydney on Wednesday 18 October 
1978. commencing at 9: 30 am. 
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After imdersing the minutes of the previeus Commission meeting. the 
morning began with ABC Chairman J. D. Norgard presenting an oral report 
on his activities over the last month. These included a meeting with the 
Minister for Posts and Telecommunications to "discuss financial. staffing 
and administrative constraints placed on the ABC". The Chairman 
concluded by relaying a request from the ABC Staff Association that its 
representatives meet with the Board to consider the future status of the 
staff elected Commissioner. a position then about to lapse. The minutes 
record that "a vote was then called for and a majority of Commissioners 
voted against admitting the Staff Association representatives to the 
meeting". 
Following the Chairman's address. documents were tabled. These 
lncluded correspondence with the Minister and government departments. as 
well as lellers from politicians and various interest groups. 
Next lhe ABC General Manager. T. S. Duckmanton. gave a long oral 
report on current ABC activity. Much of this was administrative. though 
Duckmanton also toucheo on the operations of Senate finance committees. 
accusations of bias in programs and industrial disputes within the ABC. 
The General Manager was followed by the Assistant General Managers for 
Ra.din and Television, 
minutes suggest that 
who outlined developments in their areas. The 
all managers were heard in silence. with no 
discussion of their reports. 
General reports were followed by a brief financial statement. outlining 
current and expected expenditure. and then by consideration of technical 
and financial questions concerning purchases. staff vacancies and 
aocommoda1ion. A number of administrative decisions were made : the 
Commission endorsed appointments to a Promotions Appeal Board and 
upheld the General Manager's decisions on several staff rule appeals. 
Reports labelled "items for information" were distributed but not discussed. 
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What must have seemed a long a tedious meeting concluded with "other 
bu:;iness". this month comprising a brief rnply by the General Manager to 
a question about whether in a hypothetical case ABC staff would be 
breaking program guidelines. The meeting concluded before 6: 00 pm so 
that Commissioners could catch planes back to their home states. 
This one day meeting considered a large range of management reports 
and endorsed decisions made by the Chairman and ABC management. 
Program ma1ters were considered only peripherally. The minutes suggest 
a briefing for Commissioners about various issues rather than a 
decision-making forum. The only major area discussed in any detail was 
the future of staff rnpresentation on the Board, and any decision was 
deierred until furlher ccnsultation with the Minister and the ABC Staff 
f\ssociation. Commission meeting No. 523 followed the standard. crowded 
1\BC agenda: with so much information to absorb and so many items io 
work through tnere simply was not time for In-depth discussion of issues. 
Complex Issues were either settled by the Chairman, referred to Board 
sub-committees or left by detault to management to resolve: Wedell argues 
from the British experience that Directors in lac! play a largely passive role 
because they are trm;tees. power devolves to management 
( 1968: 127-128). Certainly the complexity and numoer of issues the Board 
has to consider and the nature of the Board - part-time. inexpert and 
often lacking knowledge about financial matters - makes ii dillicult for 
Directors to get on top of their agenda and question management 
decisions with any confidence. These are the structural limitations on time 
and information which have frustrated so many ABC Boards. 
The Board appointed in 1983 planned to use sub-committees to deal 
individually with issues; they hoped such committees would solve the 
problem of their predecessors. who complained that the pressure of work 
meant they "tended to be putting out bushfires rather than dealing with 
issues" (Boyer 1984J, Sub-committees were set up to deal with key 
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policy areas. with regular reports back to the full Board. The Board 
Secretariat, it was hoped. would support these sub-committees by 
providing detailed position papers. Though important work has been done. 
it would appear that not ail sub-committees were successful. After a flurry 
of delegation the Board returned to more frequent full meetings. This 
suggests some disharmony on the Board about priorities: it also 
strengthens the hand of management because issues can never be dealt 
with by a large group of people with a full agenda in the same detail that 
a small specialised team with more time can achieve. 
The Secretariat 
The 1973 McKinsey and Company Report into the ABC recommended that 
Commissioners be assisted by papers from ·one or two young. high 
potential people who are analytically inclined" <quoted in Dix VoL 2: 1 OOJ . 
The Dix Report went further in suggesting a permanent research division at 
an annual cost to the ABC of around $ l 00 000 (ibid: 100). 
The result is a Secretariat to provide Directors with "independent 
research and analysis on broadcasting and corporate matters" <ABC 
1983b: 8l. The Secretariat. initially established as a two year pro\ect. 
includes a Director. Co-ordinator. administrative stalf and 5-8 contract 
research officers. Staif 
Secretariat Director. the 
are chosen by a committee 
ABC Managing Director and 
comprising the 
some Board 
members. The · role of the Secretariat is to write papers on "specific 
areas where the Board wants to establish a policy" (Bennett 19841. It is 
interesting to note that ABC officials feel the Secretariat does not overlap 
with the activities of management because management "has never 
prepared policy statements for the Commission" <Bennett 1984) . 
The Secretariat Director is responsible directly to the Board though. 
when appointed. Judi Stack promised the "closest co-operation" with ABC 
management. Even before the Secretariat began in January 1984 it had 
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become a focus of con1roversy. The Sydney Morning Herald of 31 
December 1983 quoted Stack criticising the ABC for screening too many 
"irrelevant" Briiish programs and catering "by and large" for the 
"uoper-middle-class Anglo-Saxon elite". A host of angry correspondents 
disputed Stack's assertions and despaired of the Secretariat achieving 
anything 11 1hls were to be its level of analysis. J. R. Ross even offered a 
Clerihew on the ABC's new priorities : 
Ms Stack of the ABC's Secretariat 
Plans programs for the Aussie proletariat. 
No more BBC. Betjeman or Berlioz 
(sadly in memoriam). 
We expected be11er things 
from the Myer emporium! 
(Sydney Morning Herald 16 January 1984: 6) 
Secretarial Director Judi Stack likes to describe herself as a "bit of a 
radical" with duties resembling those of the court jesters of medieval kings 
being charged with criticising and advising those in power with a 
freedom allowed no one else ( UNSW Alumni Papers October 1984: 2l. 
This function - or any hint of radicalism - is scarcely evident. however, in 
the work of the Secretariat. which has restricted itself to management 
support by writing long papers on stall matters and options for radio 
policy. In doing so ii has failed to address the wider Issues and functions 
for which it was created - to assess management proposals and offer 
alternative strategies. Under Stack's direction the Secretariat appears to 
have become part of management rather than an independent source of 
policy advice to the Board. The Secretariat is due \a be dissolved at the 
end of 1985. 
Appointments to the Board 
During debate on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation Bill in May 
1983, Iha Member for North Sydney, John Spender, toid the House 
One raalises that It is in the composition of the Board that the 
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rock is to be found on which the integrity of the ABC is to be 
set. and if that Board is not impartial. if that Board Is not 
impeccably neutral. not only may the ABC become the subject of 
political interference but it may also be judged by the Australian 
people to be the subject of interference. ICPD Vol. 131 11 
May: 467) 
The first Board of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation was announced 
by the Minister for Communications on 9 June 1983. The change to a 
Corporation abolished the existing Commission and gave the government a 
unique opportunity 10 appoint an entirely new executive in one sweep. 
Those appointed were 
o Chairman : Ken Baillieu Myer from Melbourne. Born In 1921 
Myer belongs to a prominent retailing family and is a well 
known patron of the arts. He was reputedly asked to head the 
ABC by Prime Minister Whitlam In 1973 but declined. saying he 
was "too close to the business community 
<Sydney Morning Herald 10 June 1983: 1), 
for such a post" 
Myer has chaired 
the National Library Council and the Victorian Arts Centre Trust. 
o Deputy Chair : Wendy McCarthy from Longueville NSW. born in 
1941. Originally a school teacher. McCarthy was executive 
ofiicer of the Australian Federation of Family Planning 
Associations when appointed to the ABC. She has served on 
the National Women's Advisory Council and the NSW Education 
Commission. 
o Neville Bonner from Ipswich. Queensland. born in 1922. 
Bonner is a former Queensland Liberal Senator and prominent 
in Aboriginal community activities. The Daily Telegraph ( 10 
June 1983: lOl welcomed his appointment to the Board as "the 
voice not only ol Aboriginals but of ail minorities". 
o Sister Patricia Veronica Brady from Loreto Convent. Perth. 
Born in 1921. Sister Patricia is a senior lecturer in English at 
the University of Western Australia. She has been a member 
of the University Senate and Involved In Amnesty International 
and campaigns against nuclear energy and racial exploitation. 
" Richard Boyer of Canberra. born in 1923. Boyer is a 
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pastoralist. economist. former Commissioner of the Industry 
Assistance Commission and member ol the National Press Club. 
He is the son oi Richard Boyer. Chairman of the ABC from 
1945 to 1961. 
" Jan Marsh of Mount Albert in Victoria. Born in 1948 and 
trained as an economist. Marsh has worked with the National 
Women's Advisory Council. Since 1979 she has been industrial 
advocate for the Australian Council of Trade Unions. 
" Bob Raymond of Sydney. born in the United Kingdom in 1922. 
;\ former war correspondent and broadcaster with the ABC. 
Raymond has considerable international 
was a co-developer of the ABC's highly 
program in 1961. 
media experience. He 
successful Four Corners 
The part-1ime Directors are appointed for three year terms and the 
Chairman for a five year term. Few people. however. could undertake the 
considerable work. social functions and travel involved in the office ol 
Chair in just a few days a week. Geoffrey Bolton has described as a 
"fiction" the notion that the Chairmanship oi the ABC is a part-lime 
appointment (Inglis 1980a: 6). Yet successive Comrnissioners have 
opposed making the position full-time. Inglis notes iears that a lull-time 
Chairman would become 1n effect the chief executive oi!ioer o! the ABC. 
supplanting the oiiice ol the Managing Director. The Chairman would no 
longer be what Dr. Earle Hackett termed a "moderator from the outside 
world" Ubid: 7l . ABC Boards havo felt that the powers and duties of the 
chair must be limited for as long as the position remains a government 
appointment. 
The non-government appointed members who complete the first nine 
member Board of Directors are 
" The Managing Director of 
in the United Kingdom 
the ABC. Geoffrey Whitehead. Born 
in 1934. Whitehead has extensive 
broadcasting experience with the BBC and Radio New Zealand. 
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He began the $70 000 per annum posltion on a renewable five 
year contract in February 1984, 
o The staff elected Director, Tom Molomby. In November 1983 
Molomby won a three year term from a field of six candidates 
in an election supervised by the Commonwealth Electoral Office. 
A lawyer by training, Molomby has worked with the ABC for 
over 20 years and been an executive member of the NSW 
branch oi the ABC Staff Association since 1964. Though a 
sla.H-elecled Directorship is not recognized in the 1983 
legislation. the Board has recommended to the government an 
amendment stipulating that the position continue and not be 
subject to change when governments change. 
Michael Duffy announced the new Board with the hope that these 
appointments would "revitalise" the ABC as an "influential and innovative" 
force in Australia's broadcasting and cultural life - hardly flattering to the 
out-going Commission t9 June 1983: 2). 
Commenting on the membership of the newly announced Board on ABC 
radio. political correspondent Mungo Maccallum noted 
There's something !or just about everybody .. , reading from the 
top we've got a retailer. a feminist. an aboriginai. a nun. a 
member of the National Press Club. a trade unionist and a 
commercial broadcaster. They come from Sydney. Melbourne. 
Western Australia and Canberra and it does seem to be a very 
wide spread indeed .. , I suppose in that line-up you have got 
people who are more likely to be thinking in terms of reform 
rather than reaction - which is rather in contrast to the last 
Commission. (ABC 2JJJ-FM 9 June 1983l 
In fact the geographical spread of the Board is not as large as previous 
Commissions. There is no representative irom Tasmania. South Australia, 
the Northern Territory or from rural interests. Nevertheless, media 
reaction to the appointments was generally favourable, with most reports 
prefaced by remarks about the lack-lustre performance of the ABC in 
recent years. These faiiings were usually attributed to ABC management; 
Tile Age reported Senator Button's description of senior ABC oificors as 
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"nearly all bad" and claimed that the new Board had a clear mandate from 
the government to "clean up the ABC's management" ( 10 June 1983: 6). 
The Federal Secretary of the ABC Staff Association. Nick Collis-George, 
welcomed the appointments as bringing to the Board considerable expertise 
in a wide variety of fields. He warned. however, that the Board faced 
difficulties with what he called "the management problem" (Canberra Times 
10 June 1983: 1 l. 
The Federal Opposition made no public comment on the appointments. 
The only dissenting note seemed to come from the Ethnic Community 
Council of NSW, whose executive officer described the composition of the 
Board as a "great let-down" in light of an ABC Charter which requires the 
Corporation to take into account the multi-cultural nature of Australian 
society (Canberra Timec; 10 June 1983: 1 J, 
Comoosition of tho Board 
Tho Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act C 1983) stipulates that ABC 
Directors should have relevant expertise in radio. television. 
communications. management. a financial or iechnical field or have 
cultural or "other interests" relevant io the operations of the Corporation. 
Yet the range of experience represented on the Board is not markedly 
different from that of previous Commissions. 
iii! 
The first ABC Commission 
was also chaired by a retai)li"r. .Charles Lloyd Jones. Only one appointed 
Director, Bob Raymond. has extensive media working expertise. 1 The 
clause requiring relevant expertise apparentiy has not been a major 
influence in the selection o! Directors. 
110 his critique ot the Dlx Report, Senator John Button prefigured the selection of Bob 
Raymond, by suggesting that the ABC Board stiould Include a staff etected Director and a former 
ABC employee : "'This procedure could be used to ensure selection ot, say, two professional 
broadcasters ... one could be required to have ;\80 experience without necessi'\t\ly being a 
representative of the staff" {1982.: 17). 
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The use of generalis1s has been the traditional pattern of ABC 
appointments. This is defended by Professor Kramer. who feels !hat the 
ABC Board needs "well-educated people from a variety of backgrounds" 
( 1984) ' Nevertheless. she acknowledges problems with appointing 
part-time amateurs. Such Directors are "not as competent in policy 
formulation as ABC management", they have limited time to masler 
unfamiliar and complex areas and they can easily be made "entirely 
dependent" upon the advice of an astute management {Kramer 1984). 
One significant difference between the Board and its predecessors is the 
sex of its members. Three out of seven Directors are women, all with 
considerable professional standing in their own fields. 
the ABC radio program The Coming Out Show 
As Jan Marsh told 
, , It's more than symbolic value .. , it goes beyond that and I 
certainly know that Wendy and Veronica have got contributions to 
make which iar exceeds anything that could bs seen as being a 
token female, a token women. or just a symbol .. , (ABC 
1983c:9l 
The 1983 Act does net contain the previous requirement that at least one 
Commissioner be female: the government was apparentiy confident that 
' . 2 provisions unnecessary , changed times made such 
The provision that the Board include a representative of each Australian 
state also does not appear in the 1983 legislation. The requirement 
created large and cumbersome Commissions. made communication between 
Commissioners difficult and preventt1d use of the best available talent. 
Herb Elliolt, for example. had to resign his position as Western Australian 
Commissioner because he moved to Victoria and thus no longer fulfilled his 
? 
""There Is some evidence. ho\vever. of last-minute Cabinet chang.es to the Board membership. 
A brief report m The Australian [7 June 1383:3) claimed that some (unidentihedl feminists hM 
crlt\cised Cabinet's original short hst of nominees for including only one tema.le; Cabinet then 
revts:ed its choices, 
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re.sidential requirement (Scan 30 March 1981: 5J . 3 As the Sydney Morning 
Herald noted 
In the past most Commissioners have been appointed as 
community representatives rather than for their media experience. 
As a result, successive Commissions have tended to rubber-stamp 
managerial decisions. (22 April 1983: 7l 
Directors do not represerit iriterest groups but are selected (at least 
thaoreticailyl on a criterion of expertise. The Charter and composition of 
the Board are intended to incline Directors toward a national rather than 
sectional perspective on the activities of the Corporation, 
One important development is the appointment of an ex-politician to the 
Board. Australian governments have been reluctanl to appoint former 
parliamen1arians to a sensitive organisation such as the ABC. though this 
has not prevented highly partisan appointments, By contrast the BBC 
Board o1 Governors frequently includes former members oi Pariiament, 
British practice requires former politicians not to express partisan altitudes 
once appointed lo the boards of public institutions. Neville Bonner 
perhaps had this British tradition In mind when he told reporters that. as a 
Director of tho ABC. ho was not working for the ALP or the ALP 
government - "I'm working for Australia as a whole and serving the nation. 
not a governmem". Freed ol open partisan loyalities, a former politician's 
practical knowledge of the operations of government may be ol 
considerable benefit to ine ABC in recognizing and resisting political 
pressure, 
3t::!hott was tater reappointed, tiowever. for a two year term, This was not C'.omplete<l because 
of the abolition ot the Commission in June 198-3, 
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The Selection O! Directors 
With the exceptions of the Managing and staff-elected Directors, Board 
members are chosen by the government and appointed by the 
Governor-General, There is thus always a risk that governments will 
appoint people broadly sympathetic to the ideology of the ruling party, In 
1953 Joan Ryden estimated that about "two thirds of Commissioners so far 
had been supporters o! the party in office" {Inglis l 980a: 17l , This figure 
increased dramatically in the 1970s when the Whitlam and Fraser 
governments each appointed close supporters to the Commission, By 1975 
Dennis Minogue could claim that ABC Commissioners were so 
ALP-orientated that the Commission "mirrors Labor ideals perhaps more 
accurately than does government performance" ( 1975: 9), Humphrey 
McQueen listed the business, political and social afiil!ations of all 
Commissioners since 1972 to demonstrate that Australian governments 
appoint Boards "from the ranks of party supporters· ( 1977: l 06) , McQueen 
found that Labor appointees were replaced after 1975 by a "combination of 
businessmen and political reactionaires" Ubid: 107l, With any statutory 
authority where the Board is chosen directly by uovernment there is the 
risk of political patronaue, with power placed In ", , , hands of people who 
are less than accountable in a desirable form" lRae 1979 ANU f~ddressl, 
Attacking the government's power to appoint Commissioners without 
reference to Parliament. Clement Semmler '.lpoke oi 
, , , Hie completely cavalier and shameless way in which 
governments have made political appointment:; to the 
Commission. , , This blalant stacking of the national broadcasting 
instrumentality has gone on under both Labor and Liberal 
governments, There has never been a politlcallf neutral 
Commission, ( 1981: 30l 
Once appointed Directors are expected to be independent of the Minister 
who recommended them and of the government which has the power to 
renew their term of office, Although the power to appoint does not 
204 
necessarily mean control of Directors, the ease with which some 
governments dominated Commissions with people of a sympathetic outlook 
must raise questions about the ability of the ABC to remain autonomous 
under the direction of these political appointees, Inglis notes 
suppose governments tend to look for Chairmen and 
Commissioners who wiil make it unnecessary for them to intervene 
in the alfairs of the ABC: and although the nature of politics and 
of broadcasting make ii improbable that they will always succeed, 
well-informed cri1ics have accused the Commission from time to 
time of acting as agents of the government in power. That was 
the burden of W, MacMahon Ball's critique of the ABC in Press, 
Radio and World Affairs <Melbourne 1938): not that ministers 
interlered with what was said on the ABC, but that the 
Commission made sure they had no need to do so. ( 1980a: 24} 
In The ABC After Dix, a March 1982 ALP policy statement. Senator John 
Button deplored the system which allowed partisan appointments and 
promised reform, He laid down this precise formula for the selection of 
tho l'.BC Board under an ALP government 
1. public applications tor positions 
2, the list of applicants to be referred to a parliamentary 
committee with a government chair and majority but opposition 
representation 
3. appiicants to appear before the committee in open proceedings 
and to be questioned by committee members 
4. the committee to then recommend to the government a list of 
suitable people for appointment. 
( 1982: 15·· 1 8) 
A year later the ALP was in office. Announcing the lirst ABC Board the 
Minister for Communications, proudly claimed 
, , appointment of the Directors by the Governor-General 
followed discussion by an all-party committee and Cabinet 
consideration ol its views, This process of appointments reflects 
a welcome bi-partisan approach to consideration of appointments 
to the Board of Directors. (Dully 1983b: 21 
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The procedure suggested by Senator Button in 1982 has been foliowed 
only in some aspects. There were no public applications or interviews. 
The government and the Department of Communications deveioped lists of 
suitable people, a process known in Britain as finding the appointable 
"great and the good". The Department collated names from community 
organisations. the ABC Stall Association and other interested parties. The 
government list appears to have been prepared by Senator Button from 
contacts within the labour movement (National Times 13 January 1984: 10). 
These lists were co-ordinated by the office o! the Minister for 
Communications and taken by Duffy to a Cabinet sub-committee comprising 
the Minister and Senators Susan Ryan and John Bullen, with Prime 
Minister Hawke as Chairman. This sub-committee cul!ed a list of about 30 
names down to 9 which were then put for consideration to an ad hoc 
all-party committee. The leaders of the opposition nominated Bruce Lloyd 
and Senators Peter Baume and Don Chipp to represent them. The 
government was once again represented by the Minister and Senators 
Button and Ryan. This committee. meeting oniy two days before the 
ol!icial announcement of the new Board to replace the 11 member 
Commission. pared the list down to the final sevrrn names 
Australian 9 June 1984: 5l . Cabinet endorsed the list 
announcement was made. 
(Weekend 
and the 
While this ad hoc procedure introduces some bi-partisan involvement in 
Board appointments. it falls short of the standing parliamentary committee 
with public nominations and hearings promised by the ALP oniy 12 months 
earlier. The choice of names to go forward to the committee suggests a 
continuation of tho familiar patronage system which for so iong kept the 
ABC supplied with Commissioners. Duffy's o!Hce will not release the list of 
names considered nor discuss the criterion tor selection of candidates. 
Some light on the procedure. however. is shed by an interview with ABC 
Director Wendy McCarthy Uliationai Times 13 January 1984: 8-1 Oi . 
2()6 
In April 1983 Senator Button was asked by Cabinet to begin looking for 
suitable candidates for the new Board, Button travelled to Sydney to 
speak with his old friend former Senator (now Justice) Jim McClelland 
about likely candidates from NSW. McClelland is married to Gil Appleton 
who worked for the Dix Commi1tee in 1981 and has been involved with 
McCarthy in Sydney feminist circles. Gil Appleton suggested McCarthy's 
name, which had also been put forward by the ABC Staff Association and 
Senator Susan Ryan. Her name went to the all-party committee, McCarthy 
was approached, expressed her interest and ", . , with several other 
ministers like Susan Ryan pushing her case she got the job" (ibid: 10). 
The Board and i\BC Management 
If the new Directors are confident of revitalising the ABC. many 1'.BC 
managers are ln tum hopeful of preserving some of their traditlonal 
inlluence on ABC policy. They refer to the failure of successive 
Commissioners to intervene in areas considered the preserve of 
managemen1, Some managers claimed (without offering proofl 1hat their 
coiieagues were able to control the Commissioners: " ... management tel is 
ihem what to co, , . by and large management manipulated the 
Commission·' 
characterised by 
cus'tard": laced 
The people appointed to oversee the ABC were often 
with a 
as having 
secretive. 
"hearts of gold and boots of 
intransigent and conservative 
management. any good intentions of the Commissioners were easily stalled 
by "bureaucratic imperatives" ("The Guide" Sydney Morning Herald 27 June 
Hl83: 8J. 
Senator Button noted the tendency for management to 'educu1e' 
Directors, Ho observoo the development within the ABC o1 a corporate 
spirit, "a sort of free-masonry", enmeshing both Directors and senior 
managers. New Directors are drawn into this network. educated and 
inculcated with the values of the organisation through information ilows and 
social contact. As a result it becomes "distinctly unpleasant" for a Board, 
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or an individual Director. to "buck the system" - to bring in an outsider, 
to go against a recommendation, or generally to impose its wili ( Bulton 
1982:23), 
As Director of ABC Corporate Affairs, John Hartley was responsible for 
preparing Commission agenda. He described the relationship between the 
Commissioners and ABC management : 
While it is true that management steers the Commission in the 
way it hopes the Commission will go, there is no guarantee that 
this will happen. When management puts things to the 
Commission they are very conscious of who the Commissioners 
are and who is likely to be difficult or supportive on a particular 
subject. So you get this subtle interplay between management 
and the Commission, with management trying to put things to the 
Commission in such a way that they will get it through. (l 983l 
Hartley noted that Commissioners did not know anything about the ABC 
when appointed: "the first three years membership of a Commission is 
spent tinding out what goes on and it's really in the second term of office 
that a Commissioner becomes a positive influence" ( 1983). 
Very few Commissioners in the 1970s enjoyed second terms. When the 
ALP came to power in 1972 it declined to renew the appointments of any 
existing Commissioners. The Liberals responded in kind alter 1975. The 
same happened in 1983 with no continuity between the last Commission 
and the first Board of Directors. 
The turnover of Commissioners since 1972 has been considerable. Few 
had time to acquire a solid understanding of the operations ol the ABC. 
The notable exception was Professor Leonie Kramer, who spent 6 years 
with the Commission including 18 months in the Chair. There has been 
speculation that General Manager Ouckmanton brought forward his 
retirement because he felt that Chairman Kramer was encroaching on his 
responsibilities with her "more activist s1and" Unglis. National Times 
1983e: lOl. Duckmanton was not accustomed to experienced Chairmen 
capable of pursuing !heir own policies. 
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The rapid turnover of ABC Boards provoked Semmler to complain of 
" ... a failure of successive Commissioners publicly to declare a coherent 
program policy far the ABC" ( 1981: 51l. Most Commissioners had little 
time to comprehend the complexities of the organisation: few had technical 
or broadcasting experience. It is not surprising that Commissioners were 
unsure about tho extent of their responsibilities and found it difficult to 
articulate a coherent program or administrative philosophy. Most relied on 
ABC management to suggest initiatives. As one ABC manager noted. 
" ... you can't expect part-lime Commissioners to analyse plans which 
should have been well thought-through before they are presented" 
(Muldoon 1983l . 
The Board of Direc\ors which took office on l July 1963 was well aware 
of !tie failure of same Commissions to fully control and direct ABC 
management. The incoming Chairman signalled his intention oi ending 
"the reign of the ABC's grey mandarins" ("The Guide" Sydnfily Morning 
Herald 27 June 1983: Bl, He looked forward to the removal oi some 
structural problems Which had frustrated Commissioners. Yet Directors are 
stiil part-time appointments with considerable commitments outside the 
ABC, They lace a considerable task wrestling control of much 
decision-making from a management grown used to inexperienced 
leadership. 
Approaching the end of their first two years in olfice, the enthusiasm 
within the ABC and in the commercial media for the first Corporation Board 
dissipated. The Sydney Morning Herald called on the Directors to resign 
"in recognition of tailure" ("Good Weekend" 24 November 198·1'. 10). The 
Herald criticised the selection procedure. saying : 'Some unchari1abie 
souls have suggested that Canberra could have done better with a pile of 
phone books and a pin": the Board. it said, had been "naive. quixotic, 
indecisive. posturing and just plain wrong at times" though it had "also 
made some tough decisions" <ibid: 101. 
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The first Corporation attempted to restructure the .l.\BC along media 
management lines, to put greater emphasis on a comprehensive range ot 
programs. and lo get ABC finances on a firm footing. In the process the 
Board upset much of the traditional ABC audience, projected an image of 
an organisation in upheaval and disturbed management. One senior 
officer claimed "The Board has been somewhat careless about alienating 
senior staff by broad general attacks on all of us. To brand us all as 
lnetficient and with nothing to contribute seems a strange way to promote 
morale" (The Australian 18 August 1984: 15l. 
Because the structural and financial reforms initiated in 1984 will not be 
complete until 1987 /B. it is premature for the pundits of the print media to 
make definitive pronouncements about the record of the Board. As Robyn 
Williams notes, changes to a broadcasting outfit require a long lead time 
before the eifects are apparent: instant claims of disaster "create a siege 
mentality" within the Board by portraying "an atmosphere of constant crisis" 
C"The Guide" Sydney Morning Hera.id 24 September 1984: ll. 
Nevertheless, the first Corporation Board quickly learned the difficulties of 
changing the ABC. Every decision upsets some entrenched interest witt1in 
the organisation or brings condemnation from outside pressure groups. /.\n 
interventionist Board. attempting to totally restructure the organisation 
without the experlise of a capable management or the close support and 
advice of a Secretariat, has inevitably made serious errors of judgement. 
The Board and ABC Stall 
All large organisations experience some communicallcns problems. ABC 
staif complain that the ABC is worse than most complex bureaucracies. 
They oiten claim they are told nothing about what is going on at senior 
levels, are not consulted and o!ton !earn of executive decisions only 
through impersonal memoranda. tho grapevine or from the aiternoon 
newspapers. 
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Fo!lovving a bad industrial re!lltions record from the rnid-1970;:;. 11ttempts 
were made to improve the information flow through the organisal!on. 
Summaries of Commission decisions were regularly published in Scan, the 
ABC staff lournaL Department heads and other senior managers were 
invited to discuss with the Board their area of responsibility. Meetings in 
different cities made Commissioners at least occasionally visible to ABC 
staff outside Head Office. Resident Commissioners from each state were 
encouraged to develop individual links with staff in their home state. 
Regular meetings were held between the Commission and ABC Staff 
Association and the ABC Senior Officers' Association (Dix Vol. 2: 101) , 
The first Directors of the Corporation have continued these practices. 
Ken Myer's first act as Chairman was to make a video-tape explaining to 
ABC staff the plans ol the new Directors to reform the structure of lhe 
organisation. This rambling Interview was later replayed for a national 
audience on ABC television. 
The re-Introduction of a staii~e!ected Director may prove a significant 
factor in improving the relationship between the Board and 1'.\BC staff. The 
post was fi;st introduced in 1975 1Nith the election of Marius Webb from 
2,JJ. Webb published a regular newsletter ior his constituents and was 
available to talk to any ABC staff member, though he was obliged to 
respect the confidentiality of sorne Commission matters. 
When his term expired in October 1978 the Liberal/Country PClrty 
government did not favour its renewaL The Comrnission was invited to 
lodge a submission arguing ior the retention ot the post, but 1t did not do 
so Ubid: 103l. Opponents of the position oi sta!f-oiected Director argued 
that was inappropriate fer a Board designed to represent illi Australians to 
include a representative of any specific group of people, even ABC 
employees Ubid: 104l, Semmler claimed that the presence of a 
staff-elected Director on a Board where policy and decision-making are so 
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oiren bound up with sensitive political issues and. more particularly. "with 
a frank and critical appraisal of staff performance will simply be disastrous 
to confidentiality and to efficiency. 11 will often mean that certain 
decisions will tend to be made in private cabals - and not around the 
(Board) \able" CThe Bulletin 24 May 1983: 32l. 
The staff position was revived by the ALP government and filled by the 
election of Tom Molomby in November 1983. The return of a staff 
representative may have some impact on the ABC's industrial relations. 
through Molomby has a difficult task representing the diverse (and 
sometimes conl!ictingl interests of 6 509 ABC employees. Despite a 
recommendation in the Royal Commission On Australian Government 
Administration that the experience of the ABC, Telecom and Australia Post 
wilh staff members on the Board be studied. there has yet to be a 
detailed assessment of the results of these limited experiments in 
organisational democracy. 
I\ is unlikely that ABC managers ever directed Commissioners with quite 
the ease some claim. The evidence from the minutes of Commission 
meetings. however, suggests that successive Boards had diiliculty delining 
their role. Because o! the enormous amounts ol information to be 
mastered and the difficulty of discuss•ng in detail complex issues within thG 
agenda of busy one-day meetings. Boards have tend0d to rely on 
managers for advice and policy options. This is not an lnevitable 
devolution of responsibility. Board members with the time and ability to 
master their briefs and to define for themselves an appropriate lovol oi 
responsibility were able to exert a strong iniluence on ihe ABC. Many 
Board members. however. found their time with the ABC one more of 
frustration than contribution. 
The changes to the ABC in July 1983 did not resolve ambiguities about 
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an· appropriate level of ln1ervention !or a Board. but did provide practical 
assistance through access to \he exp1~rtlse of the Managing Director and 
the Independent advice of a Secretariat. Nevertheless. being a Director 
will continue to be a dlfficul!. exacting task. Directors are trying to 
understand lhe organisation. make the right decisions. not provoke 
Industrial or management proolems. maintain the independence of the ABC 
but not unnecesssarily provoke governments and look after their reputation 
and so eligibility for re-appointment. Peter Sm ark. writing in the Sydney 
Morning Herald's "Good Weekend". caught the sense of isolation and 
conflicting pressures on the Board : 
The Prime Minister senses an ABC plot against !he federal 
government. joining several Federal Ministers and the NSW 
Premier who perceive plots against them personally. Mr, Myer. 
Mr. Whitehead. the Managing Director of the ABC. and several 
other Board members see a commercial media plol to 
misrepresent their endeavours and !ear a Canberra plot to 
frustrate and hobble them. They know there are despairing 
efforts to whip up a plot amongst some imperilled senior ABC staff 
to still the winds oi change. (24 November 1984: 8l 
Directors will continue to use rhetoric which implies a much more 
rigorously deiined role th on they really occupy, Asked about the functions 
of the ABC Board. Ken Myer replied 
The Board's job is to see 1hat political interfGrence does not 
occur. Bui we will listen to policy directions. <Canberra Times 
10 June 1983: 2) 
To some extent Myer begs the question. Hie; appoinimonl is a political 
act. The Corporation has been created by Pariiamenl and its functions 
defined by law. Nomination to a list for consideration romnins a 
government preroga1ive, 
Directors must tind their own course within the framework supplied. Tho 
actual power of a Board is negotiated. subtle and subject to constant 
change. The precise involvement of Directors in dealing with staff. 
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finance. programs and planning will ul1imately derive from the personalities 
o! the Board and the managers and from the model of intervention they 
choose. 
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2. 5 M/l.NAG!NG THE ORG/l.NISATION 
Burnaucrats and Bureaucracv 
A program-maker is said to have become so exasperated with the 
demands of a senior ABC bureaucrat that he yelled "what you don't seem 
to realise is that we're in the business of putting noisas and pictures into 
those lil!le boxes in peoples' lounge-rooms". The administrator reputedly 
replied "I think that's a very narrow view to take a! things". 
This oit-told ABC anecdote suggests considerable tension exists between 
the Corporation's production · staff and management. It exemplifies talk 
wisdom that ABC bureaucrats have displaced the goals of the organisation 
by becoming interested in administration for its own sake. 
Chapter 2. 2 drew a distinction between an organisation's structure 
( bureaucracyl and its administrators (bureaucrats), The ABC structurn 
was examined and quesiions raised about whether the ABC's traditional 
puhtic service orientation w13s appropriate for Its -function as a creative, 
entrepreneurial brcadcastlng crgarusation, Further constraints on oflicient 
management have been noied : 
<> an incomplete structural change to medla management has 
confused lines of authority and Increased rather than lessened 
the workload and strat<Jgic importance of senior managers. 
o Because the ABC is accountabie to Parliament nnd various 
federal bureaucracies ior use ol public money it must invest 
time and resources in mCJintaining records and justifying 
activities, 
<> the centralised decision-making ot thG ABC requires even minor 
decisions to be referred to Head Office, An inability lo 
delegate increases the administrative workload nnd invites 
frequent disputes between branches and Sydney. 
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" administration is dillicult in an organisation where ABC staff and 
facilities are scattered throughout an enormous number of 
buildings. Most ABC staff ( 58%) work in the branches while 
most managern are located in Sydney. 
Whatever the ablllties of individual bureaucrats. the structure of the ABC 
is a significant impediment to good management and creative 
program-making. Nevertheless. as Senator Button commented. "it is the 
calibre and aititudes of the people in positions ol power which count. and 
not the formal arrangements between them" { 1982: 6). 
Functions and Duties of Management 
Managem8nt' is a broad term. applied in the ABC to everybody at or 
above the level of department head. This includes around 120 positions. 
ranging from those who directly supervise program output to chief 
accountants. branch heads. engineers. lawyers and support service 
manage-rs. 
The ABC Annual Report 1983""84: 73 divides ABC staff by division into 
(by percentage ) 
Television 26. 7 
Radio 15.G 
Engineering 25.7 
ABC Enterprine-s 0. 6 
Administrative Services 14.2 
orchestras & Concerts 6. 9 
News G.7 
Radio Australia 2 ~ S 
100.0 
The ABC releases only aggregate details of resource expenditure 
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( 1982-83: 32--33, 36); in 1982-83 its distnbulion of general activities gross 
expenditure was : 
D"'v-ision Expenditure 
in Sm 
Radio - 70.529 25.8 
don1estic 
Television 146.874 S3,/ 
Orchestras & concerts 21.946 13 .0 
Merchandising 4.607 l.7 
Administration 15.274 5.6 
Capital 14.3BO 5.2 
-----
273 .Gia 100.0 
Adminisu2tion consumes 5. 6% of ABC resources and Involves 14. 2% of 
ABC staif. Approximately 2% of the ABC's 6514 staff (al 31 June 1984) 
hoid senior manag0ment positions. ThGse admlnlslrators, mostly based in 
Sydney, arc tho final arbiters in the frequent and lnevltable disputes In the 
complex, muii:ifunctionai ABC. 
The problems of managl11g the organisation are exacerbated by the 
dispersal of the ABC. ln almost every capit1~i city the i~BC bureaucrats 2.;t 
in a building some distance from the sludios. This remoteness has 
accentuated !he tendrrncy for adminls1ra!ors to think of themselves as "us" 
and program-makers. as "them", The distance betv1een s1aff ond managers 
led to Head Office in Sydney being kncwn amongst ABC employees 
variously as "The Vatican" (because managers Claim lntaiiibllity), "Fort 
Knox" (less for its treasures than for its Impregnability to the real world). 
and "Geriatric House", Lyndall Crisp described the first visit of the 
Corporation Board to Head Ofilce : 
The new Board was aghast to find that at Broadcast House. in 
217 
many ways the nerve centre of 1he whole ABC. there were lots of 
bureaucrats but not one front-line stafier. no access to production 
staff. no one seemed to have an overall idea ol how the system 
worked or what It cost and there appeared to be no mechanism 
for making rational decisions based on real information. 
( Narional Times 11 May 1984) 
ABC crea1ive staff frequently criticise those managers with responsibility 
!or programming decisions. Before the structural and personnel changes 
ol i984. network managers were typically portrayed as unable to delegate, 
of selecting peers for promotion through an old boys network. of being 
badly trained. of having little grasp of financial matters, of being failed 
broadcasters and ultimately of being more concerned with bureaucratic 
procedures than with producing programs. 
Many ex~ASC staif blame their departure on sheer exasperation with ABC 
program bureaucrats. Former political correspondent Ken Begg !ell the 
ABC with the curious metaphor "I liken the ABC management to a 
marsh-r:i odow you can go on punching it forever" ("The Guide" Sydney 
Morning Herald l 0 May 1982: 4) Public Affairs reporter Gerald Stone 
resigned i:< 1974 alter frequent disputes with ABC management, whom he 
accused cf being unable to delegate responsibility. Tho final straw for him 
was reournd!y a long argument over whether he was senior enough to be 
allowed to use an STD phone without supervision for the 20 or 30 trunk 
calls he had to make each day for the Open End program ( CanbEnra 
Times 2 July 1983: 17l. Sue Corrigan left because she found ABC-TV to 
be "radio with pictures. and radio is still run on the lines of an English 
newspaper of the 1930s" ("The Guide" Sydney Morning Herald 10 May 
1982: 4l. Though there is a <jangor of getting il distorted picture from the 
opinions of these refugees. their sentiments echo tho Dix Report's finding 
of • ... unbridled bureaucracy .. little co-ordination or co-operation in terms 
of staff or resources, or in program output" (Vol. 1: 14l, and Jackson and 
Yerbury's f1nding that ABC administrators tend to "deal with problems on a 
short-term, ad hoc and piece·- meal basis" ( 1981: 70l . 
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Managemenl's functions. In broad terms. are to 
Q provide support tor the Board and implement Board policy. 
" ensure the smooth running of the ABC - programs go to air. 
technical services work. industrial problems are solved, 
o allocate resources and ensure they are used efficiently. 
o encourage creativity. 
programs are to be: 
broadcast. 
assess program proposals. decide what 
made and when and how they will bG 
" ensure the future of the organisation through planning. capital 
purchases. recruitment and staff training. 
These tasks defy quantification they only become apparent when 
something goes wrong, Because there is no standard product and no 
procls0 formula to measure success, there is little opportunity tor 
independent assessment of management's performance. Neither the ABC 
nor \ts commercial rivali.J release d0tai!ed figures on the running costs of 
variouG adminis~rative functions, \JVithout a standard 11.BC product or proiit 
criterfon, there can be no precise forrnula to determine vvhether a function 
has been e1liciently performed ( Ouckmanton 1966'. 273i. Most 
comrnentators assume that the ABC is Inefficient: one newspaper assured 
readers that no reform cl the ABC couid make it work as weil as iis 
commercial rivals. because "the commercial stations are smaller and 
slicker. they are not handicapped by tne Public Service rulos so ulierly at 
odds with tho business ol broadcasting and over the past decade they have 
attracted many of the best and brightest of ABC staff' (Tim Australian 18 
August 1984'. 15). Nevertheless. a study by Dr. Glenn Withers came to 
the surprising conclusion that the ABC is more Gfficient in cost per 
program hour broadcast and employs less staff per transmission hour than 
commercial rivals ( 1982: 228-235), The ABC's relatively small audience, 
however. means that in spite of its technical e1ficiency the ABC expends 
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considerably more per listener and viewer lhan does commercial 
broadcasting (ibid: 235l , 
Withers cautions 1hat though encouraging for the ABC. such figures must 
be treated with caution, Aggregate figures are not necessarily a 
judgement that individual ABC managers are better; it may be that ali 
broadcasting in Australia is ineflic:ient. Alter all. most commercial radio 
and television stations operate as monopolies or as part al an oligopoly 
and so have no grnat incentive to efficient use of resources ( 1984l, 
Withers concedes that individual program cast data is not available but 
defends his aggregate approach as "much more robust" < 1902: 230l. 
However. his comparative commercial figures are based an company 
reports and may not accuraicly reflect actual running costs or profitability, 
Aggregate figures do not take inlo account the amount of repeat 
programming with its obvious implications for broadcast costs. nor the 
relative amount of local content included. There is no allowance in the 
figures lor diilerences in salaries between the public and private sectors, 
nor for ABC equipment being outdated when compared with new and 
expensive technology purchased by commercial rivals. particularly in 
television, l\Jeverlheiess. the Withers study suggests that ABC management 
may not be as financially inept as some of its more vocal critics suggest. 
His conclusion qualifies the finding of the Dix Committee that there have 
been significant failings by ABC management <Vol. l: 12-13). 
The Managing Director 
The single 
Director, the 
most important administrative post is 
chief executive oificer of the ABC, 
that o! 
The 
Managing 
Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation Act ( 1983) makes the Managing Director 
responsible to the Board !or the cay-to-day affairs of the Corporation and 
provides the office with extensive powers of delegation. 
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Before Ju!y 1983 the ABC was - some might say dominated 
- by a General Manager who attended Commission meetings but was not a 
Commission member. General Managers could expect "tenure until 
re1irement" (Inglis 1980a: 9l: Charles Moses was General Manager for 30 
years and his successor, Talbot Duckmanton, ruled for 17 years, The 
new five year renewable contract system for the Managing Director is an 
a!1empi to minimise the risk of lethargy overtaking an organisation with so 
little change at the top, 
Appointment to the post of Managing Director is a Board prerogative, 
Advertisements for the post, which appeared internationally, required the 
successful applicant to demonstrate leadership and success, particularly in 
strategic planning and policy development and implementation, experience 
within communications or reiated industries. experience and skill in 
understanding government administration, a capacity to encourage creativity 
and imagination in the artistic, marketing and administrative activities of 
the Corporation. an understanding ol the rapid technological changes 
taking place within the field of communications and an awareness of their 
po!ential impact upon Australian society (Canberra Times 2 July 1983: 7) , 
Many ABC staff called the Managing Director's job a "suicide mission". 
too daunting for even the most skillful administrator because of the ABC's 
"endemic problems" (Sydney Morning Herald 29 October 1983: 331, 
Nevertheless. over 150 aopiicants answered the first advertisement. half of 
these from 1he United States of America. The position was eventually 
filled by former BBC and Radio i~ew Zealand employee ,, Whitehead, 
who left school at 16 for a life working as a journalist. broadcaster and 
administrator (Senate Committee f;,, 4 September 1984: 158}, The 
Managing Director. like the post of General Manager it replaces. is in a 
powerful position to direct f\BC programming policy, The Managing 
Director is also responsible for personnel matters, including the 
appointment of senior ABC bureaucrats and the definition of their duties: 
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the Managing Director "inherits the powers of the Public Service Board 
which used to approve staff classifications and terms of employment" (The 
Age 10 June 1983:61. 
The day-to-day working relationship between the ABC Board and 
Managing Director is not addressed in the legislation but must be worked 
out by trial and error. Chairman Myer indicated that he intended to leave 
all program decisions to the Managing Director and then "support him. 
come hell or high water" (The Australian iO June 1983: 21. The Managing 
Director is a crucial figure in the Corporation, reporting lo a Board largely 
ignorant of the intricate. structure of the ABC and therefore uncertain how 
to frame appropriate policies. To characterize the relationship between 
Board and Managing Director. Chairman Myer could only fall back a 
policy/ administration dichotomy : 
... in most matters except perhaps major policy matters and in 
the annual report. the Chief Executive Officer should be the 
spokesman for the Corporation .... in my experience Boards 
sometimes make the mistake of getting unduly involved in 
management matters which are not really Board matters and as a 
consequence they don'\ give enough consideration to the policy 
considerations which are tne•r joo ... we won't go that route. <PM 
ABC Radio 9 June 1983) 
Myer here expresses inevitable tensions for an interventionist Board which 
also recognises that management must be left alone to do its job without 
undue interference. Relations between the Board and management and. 
more particularly. between the ABC Chairman and the chief executive 
officer have often been strained. Sir Charles Moses. for example. had 
little respect for successive Commissions. He "flushes with resentment 
when he recalls mediocrities to whom he had to report. He says some 
were 'lnelfectual nobodies who tried to justify their positions by niggling at 
the General Manager'" <Sydney Morning Herald 10 May 1982: 7l. On the 
other hand. Sir Henry Bland, as ABC Chairman. disliked his General 
Manager and behaved instead as if he were chief executive. Inglis 
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describes the Chairman's action in by-passing 1he General Manager and 
giving direct orders to other staff as a grave departure irom what people 
within the ABC considered "a settled constitutional convention" (1980a: 11 L 
Kramer believed the relationship between the Chair and chief executive 
should be similar to that between the Chairman and Minister, The 
Chairman does not take all the real decisions but the Chairman should be 
daily communication with the chief executive on a discussion/information 
basis, Kramer would discuss but would never "lay down the law" ( 1984), 
During their first term, the Corporation Board and Managing Director 
have slowly constructed a working relationship. Whitehead has proved to 
be Influential, particularly In formulating plans for structural change and 
entrepreneurial activity: his commercial instincts seem to align him with 
Chairman Myer. Whitehead has. however. been over-ruled by a Board 
majority on certain issues. most noticably over his support for censoring a 
Four Corners report on Papua New Guinea, and on faomo recommendations 
for senior appointments. So tar the Managing Director has needed to 
work closely with the Board, persuading it but also accepting its authority, 
The considerable tension which characterised some deaiings between past 
boards and chief executive oflicers have yen to resurface, 
On 31 January 1984 Geoffrey Whitehead. with the approval o! the Board. 
announced reiorms to the structure and personnel of ABC management. 
Previously 22 senior managers had reported to the General Manager: these 
posts were abolished and replaced by nine new positions so that only the 
new Directors of Radio. Television, lnformaticn Services, Engineering 
Properly. Finance and ADP Systems. Human Resources, New Business 
Opportunities. Radio Australia and Concert Music now report directly to the 
Managing Director, 
head office group, 
The re-organisation is designed to create a small 
Whitehead. said one commentator, will "dGiegate 
power merciiessly, whereas the provlou s style has been lo accrote power 
in Broadcast House" (Sydney Mornrng Herald 4 February 1984: 33l, 
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Responsibility for finance. budgets and programs will be pushed down the 
line to branches. This is designed to "give the ABC operations in each 
state greater responsibility but. at the same time, greater accountability" 
(ABC l 984a: 1l. A devolution of controls may eliminate some 
centre/ periphery tensions by allowing resource decisions to be taken closer 
to where they are used, and make Head Olfice management's task more 
one of monitoring than directing, By delegating responsibility the 
Managing Director will be ab!e lo spend more time working with the Board 
on policy issues. 
The Selection of Managers 
Or. Earle Hackett was a Commissioner from 1973 to 1976, serving as 
Aeling Chairman of the ABC for three months. 
the managers he dealt with in those years 
He was unimpressed with 
and spent some time 
contemplating reasons for what he saw as their "uniform mediocrity". 
Hackett focused on the generation of Australian males who missed out on 
tertiary education because of the second world war. Hackett believed that 
many formar soldiers chose to join the prestigious ABC under the 
"preference for returned servicemen" scheme. The less adventurous o! 
these recruits decided to leave the studios when television was introduced 
in 1956 and instead try their hand at management. This generation of 
former ABC broadcasters reached the senior ranks of the ABC by the early 
1970s. As senior managers they found themselves faced by bewildering 
technical change and the rapid expansion of the Whitiam years: these 
"unimaginative careerists suddenly had to provide the management skills for 
a vastly more complex organisation" CHackatt 1982). 
Hackett concluded that senior managers had failed, The legacy of their 
shortcomings, he says, became apparent during the lean times of the 
later 1970s and remained until the abolition of the Commission in July 
1983. 
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Certainly the organisation struggled to cope with the expanded budgets of 
the Whitlam years and then the equally rapid contraction which occurred 
during the Fraser era. During the traumas of budget cuts and staff 
ceilings from 1979 to 1983. ABC management saw itself under attack from 
the government and irom its own depleted staff. In particular, 
management was heavily criticised within the organisation for the apparent 
maintenance oi administrative positions during a period of staff reductions: 
some estimates suggest that the number of managerial positions actually 
increased by 10% while output and employment of production staff iell. 
The Sydney Morning Herald noted : "There is an echo in this of Professor 
Parkinson's famous example of the British Colonial Office growing larger as 
the British Empire grew smaller" ( 13 June 1983: 6l. 
Managers closed ranks in the face of criticism and recruited in !heir own 
image unlii they became "overwhelmingly grey. male. fearful of outsiders 
and resistant lo any sign of change" - a problem shared by many other 
Commonwealth instrumentalities and government departments ("The Guide" 
Sydney Morning Herald 27 June 1983: 8) . The mediocrity of those at the 
top was noted in an acid editorial when an outsider was appointed as the 
Corporation's first Managing Director 
Probably the most damning indictment of the ABC is !hat 
despite Its thousands of people there was not one person in it 
who could be considered a strong candidate for the 
leadership.,. With a vague philosophy and a moribund 
bureaucracy. a great deal of what It does has become irrelevant. 
(Sydney Morning Herald 1 November 1983: 6l 
Not everyone agrees, however, that the performance of management in 
the last years of the Commission was as bad as Dix and others have 
suggested. One persistent champion of the ·old guard' has been former 
ABC Chairman Professor Leonie l<ramer. She argued that blame attributed 
to management properly belongs to conservalive ABC staff who also 
resisted change. enforced mies, protected their niche. opposed rotation 
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between departments and fought against outside appointments. Responding 
to !he Whitehead reforms, she again noted Iha! ii was a "myth that ABC 
management is top heavy. , . if you look at the ratio of administrative 
personnel to production personnel, it is not very high" <Sydney Morning 
Herald l February 1984: 4l, 
The unreformed structure of the ABC, with its referral system for all 
resource decisions, placed a considerable work burden on senior officers, 
The controller of a radio network, for example, had to program a radio 
station, deal with six state branches on matters of local content. allocate 
budgets and monitor their adherence, negotiate with ABC federal program 
departments, news, engineering, support services and all the time be 
reporting upwards and bidding for increased funds. 
Robert Jordan argued that "the real bar to an innovative ABC is that 
great grey mass of middle management, conservative to their very marrow, 
serving out time in the bureaucracy" ( 1983: 7l . With only 2% of ABC staff 
working in senior management positions. it would appear, however, that 
the problem was not too many bureaucrats but a structure which placed 
too much respcnsibility on too few people. The unreconstructed horizontal 
profile of the ABC hierarchy was not wide: there were. ior example. only 
three olficen; between a program producer and the General Manilger, The 
problem was the demands placed on even the most talented of managers. 
Heavy workloads resulted in slow decision-making with managers rarely 
having time to communicate in detail their reasons to those stall affected. 
As one staff member observed : 
In Public Alfairs, where we are constantly under pressure and 
fire, we would get a tremendous morale to boost to know that our 
General Manager was around. watching or even internsted in what 
we are trying to do.,. but not one word, not a murmru. not a 
single suggestion that our work has any relevance comes from 
Broadcast House - or il it does we never hear about it. And for 
that matter we seldom hear any encouraging words or praise from 
(management closer to home) ... But we hear from management 
alrlght when something goes wrong, when we are criticised for 
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offending some powerful body because of a report we produce, 
then Management's interest is very intense, (Dix Vol. 2: 605) 
The pressure of work gave managers little time to gain a perspective on 
their own roles or to construct long-term plans for the organisation. II is 
this structure and this generation of career managers who are being 
replaced by contract staff as the first Corporation Board seeks to dispel a 
widespread public image of an ABC senior management "rotten wilh 
superannuated bureaucrats and burnt-out performers" <Canberra Times 2 
July 1983: 17l, 
Geoffrey Whi!ehead's structural changes abolished the top 120 ABC 
management positions and replaced them with new posts: the effect was a 
spill. Managers had to reapply for fixed term but renewable contract 
positions and compete with outsiders. Years before ABC journalist Robert 
Moore had commented that "if there was a spill of ABC senior management 
positions. very few of the incumbents would have the necessary educationai 
qualifications to join the ABC as trainees" (Semmler 1981: 202) . Press 
reports of the altermath of the spill have been critical about the high 
number of former managers re-appointed, though the ABC declines 10 
reveal how many managers survived what was dubbed 'the night of the 
long white envelopes', Speaking to Senate Estimates Committee A on 4 
September 1984. ABC Managing Director Geoffrey Whitehead defended his 
restructuring of the ABC as an attempt to introduce a system of 
"management by objectives". The Committee, he implied. should not 
listen to press claims that the new structure did not work because it was 
not yet fully operational : 
The new executive directors begin to take their appointments 
only in July and August 1984 and are thus only now able to 
introduce fresh thinking to strategies for the 1985-86 budget and 
beyond. basing themselves on a new structure which is not likely 
to be fully implemented until some lime between September and 
December 1984, Experience gained during 1985-85 will. it is 
believed, lead to benefits when the 1986-87 budget is drawn up, 
A realistic evaluation of the impact of changes begun in January 
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1984 will therefore perhaps be possible only in July 1987. at the 
end of the 1986-87 financial year, , , (Record of 
Proceedings: 1491 
A Corporation promotional campaign in October 1984 sought to reassure 
politicians and the public that ABC management had at lasl changed, 
Newspaper advertisements acknowledged the widely held belief that ABC 
management was less than capable but promised that with a revised 
structure and fresh recruits "a new style of ABC management has 
begun. , . The new ABC Board has adopted a style of results orientated 
management. People won't 'own' jobs anymore. Instead. they'll be 
reviewed regularly, with management judged on performance, And for the 
first time we have set corporate goals which clearly set out the ABC's 
direction so that the whole organisation has a common sense of purpose" 
(Canberra Times 20 October 1984: 7l, 
Tho Ca.reer Structure 
Under the Commission, management vacancies were filled internally, 
There were no contracts and few outside candidates. Once appointed. a 
manager 'owned' that position and could expect to hold it until the next 
promotion. Dix was particuiarly critical o! this aspect oi an organisa1ion 
which had "come to prize its own complexity and inflexibility" : 
The concept of individual 'ownership' at jobs has grown to the 
point where transfers from one position to another without salary 
loss are seen as taking place in a discipiinary context. This 
prevents the organisation tram being able quic!lly to place staif 
where requirements dictate. or from withdrawing easily from 
low-priority activities: and it has helped create a high degree of 
resistance to technological change and ignorance of the 
possibilities of training or retraining. (Dix Vol. 1: 13l 
Discussions with ABC executives before the Whitehead changes revealed a 
disiurbing lack of knowledge about ABC organisational arrangements. 
particularly in financial matters, When pressed, most managers would 
point out that their career had been within one division of the ABC 
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O!'lievlsion. radio. engineering. management services etc): specialisation 
had given them liitle chance to acquire a broader working knowledge of 
the complexities of the .l\BC. When the same managers were questioned 
about the bad reputation of ABC administrators. most acknowledged the 
validity of some criticisms but were generally complacent: "the ABC is a 
very big organisation and all organisations tend to rigidity" said the 
Director of Corporate Affairs (Muldoon 1983). Semmler noted the same 
phenomenon when he observed that managers tolerated some inefficiency 
as "inevitable in such a big institution" \ 1981: 781. Every manager had a 
story about a friend who left the ABC for private enterprise only to discover 
that the 'real world' was even more bureaucratic and wasteful. 
Until the changes in pay scales which accompanied Whitehead's reforms. 
the career structure of the ABC oifered little incentive to stay in the 
creative side of broadcasting. Production employees have been gEinerally 
poorly paid in comparison with managerial staff. For an ambitious ABC 
officer. advancement in salary and responsibilities could only come through 
leaving the studios for commercial broadcasting or going into 
administration. Robyn Williams, presenter of ABC radio's The Science 
Show, noled ruefully that "thi?re are very few veteran broadcasters in 
1'.\ustralia. If I want advancement where I am. become a manager and 
give up broadcasting for tho rest of my life. II I want more money I leave 
the ABC" ( 1982: 40). Ken Begg l0ft for commercial television because 
"there was no future for me in the ABC, nowhere to go. no prospect of 
any more money, which at 40 was starting to worry me. I didn't want to 
be an executive. I wanted to stay on air. and there wasn't enough money 
to keep me there" ("Tho Guide" Sydney Morning Herald 10 May 1982: 4l. 
Once in the management stream. former broad castors had no more 
direct involvement in making programs. It took Talbot Ouckmanton. for 
example, 16 years to work his way through management posts to that of 
General Manager. For almost all senior ABC managers. direct experience 
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ol broadcasting was something of a distant memory. The time iag 
between leaving broadcasting and reaching a senior rank made it di!ficult 
tor senior managers to assess the impact of their decisions on the studio 
floor, lt created problems for a manager trying to understand the 
dramatic changes in broadcasting practice and potential created by new 
technology. As former ABC employee Warwick Adderley has observed. the 
"people making decisions may have been good broadcasters in their day 
but so much has changed and they have lost contact" \ibid: 4l. 
A frequent charge inside and around the organisation was that ABC 
management 'recruited its own' through an 'old boy's network'. Many ABC 
employees have a favourite story about the different networks: one 
producer tells of joining an ABC dominated by 'old school managers'. to 
discover that the manager of Queensland television had different coloured 
cups for those invited into his closed office - white for trainees. yellow for 
supervisors and blue for managers. Other branch managers complain of 
the 'old school tie' network In Sydney's Head ofiice; "if a position has to 
be filled on an acting basis it is always someone from the Sydney 'club' 
who gets it rather than someone from a branch" (Hailstone 1983). One 
can never disprove the existence of such networks, only note that 
managers were more likely to recruit those who shared their values rather 
than their school tie : 
The "old boy" network In the ABC is more akin to a "safe boy 
network". One of the criteria for promotion would seem to be a 
capacity for caution distrust of adventure and experimentation 
in the ABC is high. (Button 1982: 22) 
The network has been described as a "defensive measure", a "sort of 
closing ranks operation" by management over an ABC "absolutely riddled 
with Internal dissension" (Hartley 1983}. 
Managers. oflen without formal qualifications or training. naturally felt 
under threat from the constant criticism which has been their lot, For 50 
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ye.-ars management skills instruction within the ABC was haphazard at best. 
In 25 years only 53 managers were sent by the ABC to a public 
adminstraiion course at Mt. Eliza (Newsom 1983l . Some managers were 
able to attend ABC Training Centre courses or one-day seminars but most 
acquired their skills by reading duty statements and learning on lhe job. 
Many complained that the little in-house training available tended to be 
"too narrow .. very heavily into a behavioral science approach to 
inter-personal relationships" and missing "fundamental skills" such as 
training in basic financial techniques. 
The Dix Report found little enthusiasm within the ABC for improving the 
training cf managers: Volume 2: 583-584 noted that "while many staff were 
prepared to criticise the management skills and abilities of people currently 
occupying supervisory positions at ali levels in the organisation, few 
suggested as a remedy an expansion of management training activities. " 
ABC managers historically have limited training and little outside 
tixperience. The career structure which took them into management 
required years of service within the ABC to qualify for promotion - outside 
appmntments to senior levels have been rare. This practice encouraged 
an insular worid view for managers cut 01! both from the production floor 
and the competitive outside world. As long as the ABC was public service 
orientated with promotion largely based on seniority. there has been little 
incentive for managers to be imaginative or seek wider experience. 
Changes announced by the Managing Director disrupt this long 
established career pattern. Simultaneous with the full introduction of 
media management, the 120 top positions in the ABC w1ll be filled by fixed 
term contracts and open to external competition. Management will be 
streamlined so that it would now "operate as a support group to the radio 
and television staff in the networks and the field" ( f.\BC 1984a: 1 l. The 
Managing Director expressed the hope that current managers would be able 
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to 'stand up to international competition" when they applied for contracts to 
continue with the ABC <PM ABC Radio 31 January 1984l, He promised 
that ·we are going to spend a great deal more money on training and 
retraining' (Scan 14 May 1983: 3l. 
Role 01 Managers In Program Decision-Makino 
Geo!lrey Whitehead has observed that "there's a lot of sniping in the 
ABC. Many statf think the managers are incompetent and some managers 
think some staff are aggressively political" (Sydney Morning Herald 25 
November 1983: 5l. 
In political terms the most significant responsibility of ABC managers is 
deciding which programs will get to air. Managers portray this activity 
positively - they "encourage" creative workers and "assess" program ideas, 
Muldoon described management of as a "system of referral for creative 
staff gelling into difficult areas" ( 1983), 
Frustrated staff use different terms to describe the same activities -
managers 'censor" programs and ditfuse an ethos of "polilicai orthodoxy, 
cultural gen11lity. social conformity and hierarchical obedience' ( Ashboit 
1980: 15\:D. 
Senior managers are the gatekeepers of material likely to be 
controversial. During the first years of This Day Tonight the prerogative to 
censor was exercised by the General Manager himself. though now that 
current affairs are an accepted part of ABC services few managers have 
the time to survey or intervene in specific ABC programs, Only when 
program-makers bring a problem to their attention do management become 
involved in editorial decisions. Ash bolt. howc;ver. sees rnanagemc;nt as 
being more directly involved in setting the tone for ABC programs. He 
has described ABC management as 
... an elite corps occupying positions in which they can keep 
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material of! the air, either by denying production resources, or 
usually called slashing budgets, or by,,. censorship: It is 
"program judgement". Ubid: 158) 
This power to censor material. even if rarely used, makes ABC senior 
management a logical target for political pressure, Clement Semmler. 
once Deputy General Manager of the ABC. claimed to have been phoned 
by an irate Australian Prime Minister, who complained about the choice of 
speakers in a current a1fairs program. The Prime Minister was dissatisfied 
wilh what had been arranged and wanted changes. Semmler replied that 
he would look into it and consult the powers-that-be, "You are the 
powers-that-be" roared the politician, "that's why I'm ringing you" 
<1981: 32). 
Semmler provides no evidence for this and other alleged attempts at 
political interforence in ABC program decision-making. It could be argued 
that he over-estimates the power of individual managers to intervene in 
specific program matters: lhe work environment ethos ci 'objective. 
impartial and balanced' programs which pervades the ABC and guides 
program judgements. the rule.,bound nature of internal processes and ihe 
industrial power of prcduction staff to resist orders they perceive as 
censorship a!l 
from political pressure. 
against arbitrary management intervention flowing 
Nevertheless. Semmler does point to the dangers 
of centralising decision-making within the highest level ol ABC 
management. which makes a few senior managers particularly vulnerable to 
attempts at political interference. There is a possibility that key managers 
may attempt to minimise the risk ot political pressure: senior management 
allocate resources within the organisation and so can pursue cautious 
policies. To achieve an image of being "above politics" and avoid 
upsetting public and politicians, ABC managers may have sometimes 
eschewed controversial matters. The organisation, it is frequently alleged, 
has engaged in self-censorship to avoid political entanglement - known 
within the ABC as the 'pre-emptive buckle'. 
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Production sta!I have found themselves frustrated when projects are 
curtailed or restricted: the result has been low morale and inevitably 
strained relations between production units and management. As Richard 
Boyer has noted, "creative people must be enthused, rather than directed, 
ii they are to give of anything like their best" < 1983: 12). This clash of 
interests is perhaps inevitable. for managers and production staff are 
working toward different goals. As Professor Leonie Kramer notes 
The ABC has administrative problems which are inherent in its 
very nature as an organisation which provides information. 
education and entertainment. and which employs at the centre of 
its activities a large number of staff engaged in the production of 
programs - musicians, journalists. writers. producers. actors etc, 
For administrative processes tend toward order and stability: 
program-makers need an environment which allows them room to 
experiment. to investigate, even (though not too frequently, one 
hopesJ to taii, So there is. and perhaps always will be, some 
tension between administrative necessities and program-making 
needs: just as there is a tension between programming 
independence and public responsibility; and between recognising 
both the rights and duties that fiow from our position as a 
national broadcaster within a parliamentary democracy 
C 1983c: 129J, 
Managers are usually ex-broadcasters, older than the young lurks of ABC 
television current affairs or ABC Radio's Radio Ha/icon. Managers work in 
offices often kilomotres irom the studio floor. Having reached positions of 
responsibility within the hierarchy, the ABC has become their earner. It is 
their reputation as elflcient managers - able to keop the ABC out of 
trouble - which decides their promotion prospects, Managers deal with 
the administrative side of the ABC. They become capablo of working 
within a bureaucracy and its prevailing political climate. They may expect 
others to be as sensitive as they are in protecting the iong-term interests 
of the organisation by not offending the paymaster. 
Managers know that production stall do not understand the structural. 
political and administrntive pressures on management: hence their tendency 
to talk of 'creative' staff as wild and imaginative but 'undisciplined', like 
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children. This attitude is embodied in the ABC's 1980 Submission to the 
Commission of Inquiry : 
... creative people emphasise the importance of imagination, 
They test ideas against what their instinct and their aesthetic 
iudgement tell them, It is in the nature of their activity that they 
olten know for certain that one program idea is better than 
another without being able. beyond a certain limit. to explain 
precisely why, , , their emotions are often involved in their work. 
( 1980: 48) 
Becausf! creative staff are perceived as being 'emotional', management 
may feel it should exercise judgement on behalf of the whole organisation. 
The ABC submission continues : "Managers, more often than not. feel 
they should introduce some element of scientific analysis into the way in 
which they make decisions" Ubid: 481. Management may. ior example. 
decide not to go ahead with a particular program because it would not be 
politic at presen1 to cause controversy, Management and creative staff are 
thus working to a different set of values and priorities. 
The Internal Aliocation of Resources 
Successful deiega\ion is the key to efficiently a large and 
comp le" organisation, Without delegation. an organisation is slowed by 
the constant need of its siaff to refer decisions upwards and await 
approval. At the same time. the organisation must be accountable !or the 
large amounts of public resources it consumes. Thus management 
requires control systems to regulate and monitor the activities it has 
approved. 
The Dix Committee concluded that "the ABC has not managed its 
finances as well as it might" (Vol 1: 141 , The report noted that the ABC 
did not know the real cost of many ot its activities and had Jew financial 
control systems in p!;:ico, 
There exist two opposing critiques of /\BC resource management. Staff 
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argue that ABC managers lack financial skills but keep tight control over 
resources and so impede the organisation's effectiveness. Managers reply 
that they are only allowed inadequate control over money flowing through 
the organisation and so cannot control frequent extravagance by production 
units. 
The first Board of Directors discovered an urgent need for financial 
reforms. In a memo to fellow Directors. Richard Boyer noted the ABC's 
lack ol credibility as an "efficient user of scarce public funds" ( 1983: 4l, 
its use of resources has important political implications. The first, as 
Boyer points out. is that governments are unlikely to be generous at 
budget lime to an organisation known for its "waste and inefficiency" (Dix 
Vol. l: 14l, The second is the possibility that inefficiency has deprived 
the public of services and information, The third and most disturbing 
implication is the charge raised by Ashbolt that managers have used their 
control over resources lo keep potentially controversial material off the air, 
Ashbolt points to the long list of proposed program ideas or existing 
projects scotched on financial grounds and suggests that resources are 
used to enforce "self-censorship" within the ABC ( 1980: 158-159) , 
The control and allocation of resources within the i:1BC have historically 
been the responsibility of senior management. within broad policy 
guidelines set by the Board. Until budget cuts in the later 1970s. the 
ABC's annual allocation from Parliament grew in line with inflation and 
rises in Australia's gross domestic product. The ABC used a public 
service model of incremental budgeting to divide its income: divisions 
could look forward to predictable, steady growth where "if you've got a 
cake of a certain size from last year and its going to be increased by 5% 
then all the siices tend to be increased by 5%" (Newsom 1983l . 
Incremental budgeting helped preserve a status quo al the expense of 
new projects. Because it assumed that divisions required the same 
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re;;ources this year as last. incremental budgeting did not encourage 
eiliclency through re-assessing priori1ies or adopting new resource-
conserving practices. Indeed Incremental budgets invited divisions to 
protect their level of funding by ensuring that their entire allocation was 
spent before bidding began for the next financial year. Precedent became 
the ba&is for continued support. Management had only to justify its 
actions when ii altered the allocation formula. so it had an Incentive to 
resist change. 
This static system could not survive a sudden reduction in overall 
available resources. In 1976 expenditure had to be cut. long-established 
projects were called into question and the competition for resources 
intensified. Such circumstances Inevitably gave rise to suspicions of 
arbitrary or political resource choices: management, claimed its critics, 
was reducing funds for potentially controversial programs because it did not 
1 
want lo provoke further government displeasure. 
The internal conflicts of \hat era broke down incremental budgeling and 
encouraged the partial emergence of a limited system of 'bidding' within 
the ABC. Specialist departments put up estimates of the new year's 
activities: division managers then bid for resources. Tho bidding system 
was never formalised or completed but it managed to introduce some 
competition for priorities. Though not as severe as a zero-based 
budgeting system. it "does at least mean that what is produced this year 
is not taken for granted next year" <Newsom 19831. The disadvantages of 
any bidding system is the dependence on advocates. It creates the risk 
that an articulate department head may be able to get a better deal for a 
department at the expense of others, though as one department head 
commented. "that's a heiter risk than the one we were taking by just 
drifting along". 
1This claim ls assessed Hl chapter 3: 1, 
237 
In the system which emerged. the final decision on bids belongs lo the 
Managing Director and the Board. Each division is then allocated a 
budget and staff with expenditure co-ordinated through Head Office. 
Targets are set for production within each regional unit to prevent 
duplication of naHonal services. 
Earle Hackett argues that the crisis of 1976-79 revealed the inability of 
the then senior management to cope with change ( 1982) . Management 
experienced difficulties with its financial responsibilities because il was not 
adequately trained and did not have the accounting or computing skills to 
properly control the flow of resources through the organisation. In a 
creative organisation, financial skills are not highly prized. Producers are 
remembered for the programs they make. not whether they came in on 
budget. Managers have been largely recruited from these production staf!: 
they have entered a career path with little or no training. Individuals may 
have picked up some budgeting or accounting skills. but without systematic 
training they were unlikely to acquire the larger experience necessary to 
set up sophisticated financial monitor and control systems, 
Financial experts recruited by the ABC's Finance Department or Internal 
f\udlting Unit in the i970s often found life frustrating. Management knew 
little about financial matters and did not prove overly keen to learn: the 
Acting Chiof Internal Auditor complained that managers paid little attention 
to his recommendations unless he could find evidence of 'non-compliance' 
<Smith 1983). The Internal Audit Unit could not order changes when ii 
uncovered inefficient praclices within a particular section of the ABC: it 
relied on "management response" to its reports. The ABC's auditors knew 
they are not very influential in management decisions. 
The attention of the Finance Department, the only other group o! 
financial experts within the ABC. was primarily directed outward. The 
department was concerned with negotiating with the federal bureaucracy 
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over the annual budget allocation and then physically allocating the money 
according to the decisions of the Board and ABC management, Semmler 
argues 
A root cause of the ABC's problem with finance has been that 
those with specific responsibility in this field ( occountants, budget 
oiiicers otcl had little status or influence in \he organisation, and 
any e11orts they made to Introduce normal techniques of financial 
management were frustrated, ii not ignored, ( 1981: 80-8ll 
The lacx ol interest in financial matters could be found at all levels of 
the ABC, The Director of Corporate Affairs did not know how the ABC 
allocated or distributed resources when interviewed, In the state branches 
there was considerable uncertainty about how financial decisions are made: 
branches found out their own budget from Head Office and endeavoured to 
remain within them, Those in Head Ofilce with some financial experience 
expressed (in private) strong criticism of their numerous non-financially 
skilled colleagues; they identiiied a ", , , deeper failure to perceive how 
financial sysiams do work in other places and could work in the ABC", 
The conflict between management and stail over the alioca1ion of 
resources resulted In frequent argumonts over resources available for 
particular programs, Admlnistrators tried to nold down production costs 
while production staff used ml available resources to produce the best 
possible product, This clash ct interests - economy versus quality -
inevitable caused friction, In a period of intense competition of priorities, 
creative staff resented management's upper hand: any attempt at financial 
curbs was seen as the actions cf a "rostrictive management - 'they' who 
do not roally understand what is involved in a 'success!ul' production" 
(Semmler 1981: 751, 
Management has lacked the financial skills to accurately assess costs, so 
the production budgets it has Imposed have been, to some extent, qulle 
arbitrary, Without financial responsibility there has been little incentive for 
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a · production unit to strive to stay within set budgets or use the most 
cost-efficient production techniques and locations. 
commented when he left the ABC : 
As Michael Willesee 
I am highly critical of the ABC. There is no TV network in 
the world which spends so little of its overall budget on 
programmes and no network which gets so little for the money it 
does spend on them ... I wasted a lot of money on Four Comers. 
There was never any pressurn to economise. In my time it was 
common for a reporter to fly to Adelaide from Sydney with a orew 
to interview one man for two minutes. And it could have been 
done in Adelaide anyway. (quoted in Semmler 1981:80) 
Thus the ABC iustified both sets of critics of its financial performance by 
being over-centralised and wasteful at the same time. Tight control over 
initial allocation of resources Increased the managemeni workload. 
Centralisation might have been an asset if management had the skills to 
ellectivoiy control expenditure: because the ABC did not have total costing. 
the use of studios. equipment and workforce was not counted as part of a 
program's b11dget. management could not know whether resources were 
being used effectively. Where there is no financial responsibility there is 
no incentive to be prudent: hence a centralised non-skilled management 
could result in consider;:ible extravagance al the production level. 
The Dix Report was sharply critical of management's inability to control 
the flow of money through the organisation. It found over-centralised 
control of resources and a management trying to administer finances 
without the aid of training in accounting. computers. effective financial 
monitoring systems or su!ficient information about costs. The Dix 
Committee took to task the reiusai of management to make program 
makers "financially responsibie' <Vol 1: 16l. Their Report recommended a 
drastic re-organisation oi the ABC's internal financial procedures. 
Production units should be freed from the need to refer to Head Oliice 
over every variation in expenditure from an original estimates of costs, 
Dix argued that more local control over resources would make producers 
more efficient. flexible and potontially more creative. 
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In particular. the Dix Report criticised ABC management for its lack of 
sufficient Information about costs. When Geoffrey Whitehead became 
Managing Director in early 1984. he discovered that nobody could tell him 
the precise cost of running the ABC's six state orchestras (PM ABC Radio 
31 January l 984l . 1\s Whitehead was quick to point out, without such 
information it is impossible to do cost-benefit analyses or assess whether a 
function is being performed efficiently. Neither management nor !he public 
could know whether the taxpayer was getting value for money. 2. 
To improve the management of resources. Whitehead ordered the ABC to 
adopt 'output budgeting'. as recommended by the Dix Report. Every input 
to a program or activity. including the cost ol studio time and personnel. 
will be priced. A producer is then given an overall budget and need only 
refer to management should \he project cost look like exceeding its target. 
Output budgeting gives production units some independence while leaving 
management capable ol supervising the flow of money. 
E!iective monitoring of resource use will require an integrated computer 
system so that management and produc1ion units can know at a glance 
>.vhether they are vvithin estlrnates, The 1\BC has formulated a strategic 
plan for introducing Automatic Data Processing ( 1\DPl and a 
comprehensive "commercial financiai reporting system": these should be in 
place by 1986 (Duffy 1983d: 1). These have long been standard practice 
in other public broadcasting systems. such as the BBC. and in most large 
Australian commercial broadcasting organrnations. 
"Inadequate" financial records kept by management were reported ta have 
z~,yer blamed thi:; lack of detailed financial information <:in- the ABC's cash uccountlng sy&tem 
\Vhich does not include cre-dits and debits remaining at end of year, p-re-pflyments of 
expenditure. accrued charges tor salaries. depreciation of assets and values ot stQcl\s at hand, 
Myer indicated that U1e ABC wilt chonge to the standard buslne-ss accrual accounting system 
dunng 1S85. 
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filled Ken Myer "with aiarm" when he first became Chairman of the ABC. 
His business experience made him very critical of the ABC's annual 
financial statement to Parliament: he warned that in future the ABC must 
present accounts identical to those of similar large organisations from the 
private c;ector (The Bulletin 5 ,July 1983: 33l , Myer a!so gave notice that 
the 1\BC would begin more extensive long-term planning, despite 
management's traditional argument that this is impossible given the 
vagaries of an unknown annual budget. The corporate plan, the adoption 
of new financial monitor and control systems and the introduction of new 
methods of accounting, are all intended to improve the financial 
accountability of the ABC. They should also reduce inefficiency caused by 
over-centralised control over resources and reduce the risk of arbitrary 
management resource decisions for editorial purposes. 
Probiems In The Work Environment 
During the Fraser era the ABC appeared to be an organisation in 
decline. its output foll in the wake of budget cuts and staff coillngs. The 
organisation tended toward rigidity, Industrial disputes significantly 
increased - the stall were united in opposition to government policy but 
also divided in bitler demarcation disputes as each division fought to retain 
its shrinking resources, A host of experienced broadcasters leit the ABC 
for lucrative contracts offered by commercial television and radio. They 
were followed by technicians, writers and support stafL 
In 1981, the Dix Committee found an organisation suffering from a 
"widespread maiaise" (Vat 1: 12). Poor morale, concluded the committee, 
"is symptomatic cf deficiencies in the management practices and/or 
organisation structure of the body concerned' (Vol 2: 598). 
In January 1976 the newly elected Fraser government had made the first 
o! a series of reductions in tho ABC's overall budget allocation. Funding 
fell over four successive years, with 1979-1980 the nadir of the ABC's 
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fortunes. These budget restrictions were part of an overall reduction in 
the public sector. Sudden financial constrain1s are difficult for a large. 
complex and inflexible organisation to sustain without drastic effects on 
e11iciency. Broadcasting requires long lead-times for new equipment and 
projects. Capital has to be committed in advance. II there has been no 
time to plan and implement a progressive "run-down" after carefully 
<:ivaluating priorities. savings can only be made al the margins 
CDuckmanton 1980: 13). The ABC could not cancel equipment already 
ordered. Being part of the Public Service. it could not retrench redundant 
staff and so only by reducing output could it achieve a quick cut in 
expenditure. This inevitably generated inefficiency. The ABC completed 
the construction of some studios but lacked the funds to use them. 
Eisewhere studios had full production crews but no programs to make. .l\s 
Duckmanton observed. the winding-down of program production made the 
staff resentful of management's cost-cutting exercises and baoly "fleeted 
morale. Employees felt they had less chance lo develop their creative 
ideas and advance the<r professional careers Ubid: 16-17) . 
The budget cuts of the Frnser government were accompanied by me 
imposition of staff ceilings set by Cabinet on all government departments 
and instrumentalities. including the ABC. The cs.Heels of stall cuts were 
aggravated by the requirement ior reductions through "natural wastage·. 
This was a random and destructive method of achieving stall ceilings whicn 
created signilicam imbalances between ABC departments. The "natural 
wastage" policy meant that the ABC 
... does not itsell determine the areas in which staif d;minu1ion 
occurs. The result of such staff loss in an organisation crucially 
dependent upon highly specialised and often unique skills 
compounds the problems o! efficient operation. and limits 
progressive development. (Annual Report 1977-78: 6) 
Stall ceilings and Public Service Board controls were lifted with the 
passage of the Austraiian Broadcasting Corporation Act ( 1983) . But the 
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external constraints inevitably lefl their mark. The first Corporation Board 
inherited an ABC depleted of many of its most talented staff and missing 
much of the advanced technology available to commercial rivals. The 
Board faced major induslrial problems initiated or aggravated by the 
deterioration of the /\BC work environment during the later 1970s and early 
1980s. 
Internal Problems - Personnel 
The Dix Report noted the poor morale and inefficient use of human 
resources within the ABC The Commiltee observed an increasing tension 
between staff and management 
... the level of morale in the organisation is poor to the point 
wnere its effectiveness is reduced. While the discontent remains 
largely hidden from the public who watch and listen to the ABC'c 
programs, it is sometimes visible when industrial stopp<:1gos 
occur. While much of this may be caused by inadequacies 1r1 
the management systems, there has also been a failure to 
recognise the vital role of the individual and to foster ralont 
ABC management is not as visible or accessible to its sia11 as it 
:ohouid be. and this has created a gulf between the two which 
has aimost become an ABC tradition. In this gulf the ioeling is 
genor21led that the organisation discourages talent and creativitv 
'<".'hile pernatua1ing the safo and unadventurous: 'the mediocre 
appointing !he mediocre' as one staff member put it. . . l Vol 
l : ., :2) 
Clive Speed was one critic ~vho blamed management as much as buogot 
cuts for the deterioration of the ABC. He left \he ABC in 1981 alter 11 
years as producer oi PM. blaming his departure on physicai exnaustion 
brought on by "the frustrations of constant fighting with a complacent 
management" <Sun Herald 29 November 19Bl:g). His criticisms were 
echoed by the many staff who accused management oi not sharing the 
burden of cuu;. 
The employees had plenty of time to contemplate their complaints - many 
had iitt!e to do in an organisation which could not retrench redundant 
employees but lacked the money to keep talent fully occupied. 
claims 
Semmler 
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... in one department alone with 17 producers and directors. 
and twenty-six script assistants. since money for production had 
been cut short. one series only was produced in a period of six 
months. I uncovered the case ol a producer in another 
department who had retired to a city flat to pursue other activities 
for nearly a year. returning to the ABC each fortnight only to 
draw his salary. <1981: 78l 
Those who remained within the ABC were troubled by an increasing 
disparity between the wages of creative staff and ABC managers. Until 
1983. tho ABC could only pay salaries approved by the Public Service 
Board. These rates rewarded managers with significantly more money than 
was paid to production staff, The differentials were strikingly emphasised 
in Steamoower. an irregular and anonymous scandal sheet circulated 
amongsi A8C staff. Whenever it mentioned a senior manager. Steam power 
included his or her salary in brackets - an invitation ior stai! to compare 
their highest attainabie salary ( $28 000 for a producer /presenter in 1983) 
with that of a senior manager ( $50 000 in 1983 for those at Division 
Head levell . Steampower delighted in stories which emphasised the 
alleged self-serving bureaucratic nature of the ABC's senior managers. 
Frustration, poor morale and the relatively low wages of even the ABC's 
most popular ana successful performers made \hem easy targets for 
cornmercial 'head hunters', 
The ABC also ios1 many of its production stali. Alter six years of 
training. an ABC Broadcasting Engineering Officer earned between $19 000 
and $21 000 a year, Promotion after slx years oi service earned the most 
senior technicians, Broadcasting Engineering Officers grade 6, between 
$28 000 and $29 000 m 1983. By contrast, an experienced technician 
could earn $35 000 with a commercial broadcaster (Sydney Morning Herald 
9 May 1983: 16). 
About half the ABC's Broadcasting Engineering Officers left the 
organisation, The "natural wastage" provision prevented the ABC replacing 
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its lost staff, so by the late 1970s there was a marked shortage of trained 
engineering personnel within the ABC. Tho shortage delayed production 
work and created industrial disputes. with the remaining engineering staff 
complaining of being "over-worked". The specialisation of technical 
officers. and the inability of management to resolve demarcation disputes 
between production and technical staff. hindered the internal transfers 
required 10 relieve an Increasingly acute lack of trained personnel to 
operate and maintain production facilities. 
The situation was not helped by decisions of the Commission and 
management to cut costs by reducing the training available at all levels of 
the ABC. When recruitment and !raining of new Broadcasting Engineering 
Officers ceased aitogether in 1976, the remaining technical staff responded 
with a three year ban on all equipment involving new technology. 
Broadcasting Engineering Officers blamed the ban on "demarcation issues, 
salary rolativities. inadequate staffing levels ior the present and insuilicient 
trainees to ensure effective staff levels for the future" (Dix Vol. 5: 26-27). 
ABC annual reports continued to list the large number oi "training and 
development activities" run in-house. Staff. however. believed that training 
was becoming a "neglected activity. underiinanced and understaffed" ( NSW 
ABC Staff Association to the Dix Committee Vol. 2: 566) . The reduction of 
training courses available after 1976 further reduced morale and inhibiled 
career opportunities for employees, who had to wait for long periods to 
get into training courses necessary for promotion. Reduced internal 
mobility also affected the quality o1 ABC output, 
Technical Problems 
In the later 1970s the !1BC. particularly ABC-TV. became well-known ior 
its constant technical failures. The nightly spectacle of an ABC 
newsreader announcing a story and looking embarrassed when nothing 
happened became familiar. ABC staff would say "and then the rubber 
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band broke". indicating that outdated. inadequately maintained equipment 
had again broken down. 
As Michael Carlton observed. in 196g commercial television had been 
able to carry sound and pictures from the surface of the moon but in 1983 
the ABC still found it difficult to co-ordinate simple link-ups between 
Canberra and Sydney for Nationwide. Carlton blamed the ABC's 
equipment. observing that Edison and Marconi "would likely find some of 
the gear quite familiar" <Sydney Morning Herald 25 May 1983: 8). The 
Australian felt that the ABC's technical and human resources "inspire. in 
the main. either laughter or pity" and noted that "In wet weather it is 
impossible to guarantee the function of the main sound studio at the Gore 
Hill Sydney studios" ( 18 August 1984: 15). When a production company. 
Crawfords. wanted to film an episode for a television serial In a pre-war 
radio studio. they used one belonging to - and still used by - the ABC. 
In iact the ABC's technical problems were not solely due to inadequate 
equipment. Budget cuts had prevented the replacement of some 
equipment, while demarcation disputes amongst managers and staff kept 
urgently needed technology out of the studios. Preventative maintenance 
was reduced as an economy moasure. increasing the probability of 
equipment breaking down on air. 
Frequent equipment failure reflected on the proiessionallsm of the ABC. 
It contrasted with the apparent slick operation and advanced technclogy of 
commercial rivals. The ABC newsreader - embarrassed because the 
Ma,iestic didn't play. a microphone would not work or the tapes of 
correspondents were lost became a vivid public symbol of the 
organisation's decline. 
A lack of capital funds to update production facilities also made lt 
difficult for the ABC to buy or erect new buildings. An increasing reliance 
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on rented accommodation further dispersed ABC personnel. By 1983 the 
ABC owned 77 properties in Australia and rented a further 97 properlles 
("The Guide" Sydney Morning Herald 13 February 1984: 4), As an ABC 
staff member observed about the organisation's operations in Sydney 
Efficiency must suffer and needless expense must result when 
the ABC is housed in so many different buildings scattered all 
over Sydney. We have departments In Kings Cross. William 
Street. Elizabeth Street and other locations in the city. At St. 
Leonards we have Chandos Street and the Pacific Highway office 
buildings. Near Gore Hill is the Valetta Building in Campbell 
Street. Drama and TV Entertainment are in Dickson Avenue, 
rehearsal rooms are in Carlotta Street. Artarmon. Outside 
Broadcas1s are situated In Cleg Street. the Arcadia Theatre is in 
Chatswood and the Film Studios are in French's Forest. not to 
mention the scenery storage warehouse in St. Marys. <These 
are the ones I know about!l As most of these buildings are 
leased. imagine the cost involved. (Dix Vol. 2: 671) 
Dispersement fragmented the ABC. Producers and production stall from 
many program sections seldom met to discuss common problems atiecting 
their work. Senior managers were rarely visible in the studios and otflces 
where most ABC employees worked. Dispersement increased the alienation 
oi creative staff and shielded management from the prnct1cal etlects of 
their decisions on the morale and operation oi production unils. 
Industrial Relations 
Suellen Corrigan was one of many employees who left the ABC during 
the Fraser era. She later described the environment in which she had 
worked : 
The place was just appalling, absolutely no sense of direction, 
no morale, no definition of what we were supposed to be 
doing. , . The stuffing has been knocked out with the money cuts, 
There's no emphasis on the quality of staff. people are just 
slotted to fill a roster, There's no promotion or encouragement 
of the staff, promotion is according to who drinks in the cliques 
or has a wife ancl three children, no1 whether they're good, or 
eager, or quick, ("The Guide" Sydney Morning Herald 10 May 
1982: 4) 
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Many slati. like Corrigan. initially blamed external constraints for the 
decline of the organisation. To protest against government imposed 
budget cuts and staff ceilings. staff held stop-work meetings and strikes in 
1976 and 1978. "Did you miss the ABC?. . 1600 Commission staff were 
prepared to forfeit a week's wage to alert the public to the dangerousiy 
run-down condition of the national broadcasting service" proclaimed a 
newspaper advertisement placed by Patrick White and 300 other "Friends of 
the ABC" in support of a November 1978 strike by the NSW ABC Staff 
Association (Inglis 1983a: 422l . 
The government. however. did not budge and the focus of discontent 
turned inwards. The years between 1978 and 1983 were marked by an 
internal obstruction to change which reinforced the inflexibility of the 
organisation. Each division sought to protect its own interests. Board 
and management initiatives were viewed with hostility by divisions with a 
siege mentality about their resources and sphere oi operations. 
Divisional conflict extended to demarcation disputes between the various 
unions representing ABC employees, though these unions in turn blamed 
their industrial action on decisions taken by managers. /l,BC management 
and staff are represented by : 
o the ABC Staff Association. which represents about 70% of ABC 
employees. The Staff Association is a foderai organisation with 
branches corresponding to ABC 
to all employees of the ABC. 
offices. Its coverage extends 
with the exception of news 
journalists and reporters. actors, dancers. vocalists and various 
senior ofiicers. 
o the ABC Senior Olficers' Association - virtually all 120 senior 
managers are members. Based in Head Office. it has no state 
branches. 
o the Australian Journalists Association. There are about 500 
AJA members employed in the ABC. with most working in Iha 
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News or Public Affairs Divisions. The ABC is the single largest 
employer of journalists in Australia, The AJA is a federal union 
of over l O 000 members, 
o Musicians' Union of Australia. The ABC employs over 450 
musicians. mainly in its state symphony orchestras. All are 
members of the MUA and refuse to work wiih non-members. 
The MUA is a federal union with around 15 000 members. 
o Actors' and Announcers' Equity Association of Australia, Equity 
represents every type of performer in the ABC over than 
musicians. Most ABC Equity members are not permanent 
employees but are hired at casual rates for specific jobs with 
the 1\BC. 
(Dix Vol. 5: 128-130l 
With the removal of the Public Service Board scale of salaries In 1983. 
pay and conditions for all permanent ABC empioyees are set by federal 
awards and sublect to decisions of the federal Arbitration Commission. 
Negotia\ions with unions are conducted, in the first instance. by an 
internal ABC Industrial Relations Department. The Controller of Industrial 
Relations is charged with a duty to "evolve, develop and implement 
industrial policy and practises throughout the ABC and to advise 
manager;ient on the Industrial implications of muior policy proposats" 
(ibid: 224), When industrial disputes occur, managers and even Board 
members may become involved In negotiations. 
The Staff Association, which represents most ABC employees. has been 
able to push for participation in ABC decision-making. 
represented on ad hoc working committees. the Board of Management. the 
management consultative boards for radio. television and engineering and 
on the Board of Directors through their staff-elected Director. 
The emphasis on consultation and negotiation reduces the scope for 
management to make unfettered decisions, but slows down decision-
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makmg: it means the "authority of command is being replaced by that of 
consent" ( Duckmanton 1980: lll, While the claims of some managers that 
the Staff Association has become so influential ii can obstruct unpopular 
decisions are somewhat exaggerated. it is true that management is usuaily 
careful to consult unions before announcing major decisions. Writing in 
The Bulletin. Anthony McAdam claimed that the ABC has "handed over 
more power lo the Staif Association than has any other public body to a 
union" (25 January 1983: 27), an assertion rejected by Professor Kramer 
(8 February 1983: 29), 
John Newsom compared the Staff Association with ABC management 
saying "both tend to sit back and react to events rather than try and 
shape them" ( 1983). "Any industrial group will be conservative about job 
descriptions and demarcation" says Secretary of the ABC Staff Association 
Nick Collis-George ( 1984). Professor Kramer was more forthright aboui 
the NSW Staff Association, which she believes holds "very conservative 
altitudes despite pretending to be radicals" ( 1984l, The Staff Association 
has oiten reflected the rigidity ilnd adherence to rules which mark the 
ABC. It has been staff as much as managers who have opposed 
structural change and viewed new technology with suspicion and hostility. 
This was most evident in the staff resistance to an Organisational 
Development Project where some staff felt \hat "humanising and 
democratising work was a management device to get more out of staff and 
dilute the bene!its unions have won en behalf of members" C Dix Vol. 
2:604), 
Summary 
By the end of the 
extremely low. The 
ceilings, lost much 
Fraser era. tho morale of ABC employees was 
organisation had experienced budget cuts, staff 
of its talent and expertise and sul!ered the 
embarrassment of numerous equipment "gremlins". II was a less than 
ideal working environment. It had a structure which placed key managers 
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irr vulnerable positions; there were accusations that these managers were 
using the 'pre-emptive buckle' to prevent clashes with government. 
With the passage of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act ( l 9S3) 
many of the external constraints affecting the ABC work environment ceased 
to apply. Funding in real terms finally rose above the 197 5-76 level and 
staff ceilings were lifted. The Public Service Board no longer set wages 
and conditions. so the ABC couid pay for talent and olier financial 
inducements to keep or win back those tempted by commercial stations. 
Nevertheless, an organisation with a "conspicuous failure in managing its 
human resources" (Dix Vol. 2: 5621, roquires extensive change to its 
structure and attitude if the work environment is to encourage creativity and 
good management. The reforms of Managing Director Geoffrey Whitehead 
and the iirst Corporation Board were intended to address these deficiencies 
in the national public service broadcasting organisation. 
Ashbolt has argued that "the ABC is not managed efficiently. If anything 
it is over-m<:1naged. over-disciplined. far too tightly controlled" 
( 1980: 159) His comments identify two salient features about ABC 
management, The first is that the structure of the ABC has traditionally 
concentrated responsibility for decision-making on a few senior officers. 
Centralised conircl ol the organisation and its resources made senior 
managers potentially vulnerable to attempts at political pressure. The 
second is Ash bolt's identification of the long-standing reputation of ABC 
management as mediocre administrators. Notwithstanding the considorabia 
constraints on good management. senior officers have created an 
atmosphere of inefficiency and timidness within the organisation. These 
combine to lim1t the scope of ABC activity and to frustrate - and even 
drive away some talented production staiL 
In the past, the inexperience of Commissioners and the ambiguity of their 
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role often workGd against Boards exerting control and imposing policies on 
ABC mar>agernent. The reforms announced by the first Board of 
Management in January 1984 recognised the failings of the old style ABC 
public service administration. The Chairman and Managing Director 
announced structural and personnel reforms intended to •turn the ABC 
around". Their three year plan envisaged decision-mal\ing and control of 
resources being decentralised with ABC management positions no longer 
tenured but held on limiled contracts. The Board planned to install new 
financial monitoring systems and produce multiple centres cf authority 
within the organisation to reduce the vulnerability of individual managers to 
outside pressure. Myer is optimistic that these fundamental changes will 
improve the ABC's output. His enthusiasm must be balanced against tho 
observation that the Board ls up against " ... the entrenched inertia cl a 
big managerial bureaucracy that has fought many power struggles and 
always come out on top" <Sydney Morning Herald 4 February 1984: 33), 
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Chapter 3 
THE PRODUCTION OF POLITICAL PROGRAMS 
3: 1 THE PRODUCTION OF POLITICAL PROGRAMS 
"The job of the ABC" Chairman Sir Robert Madgwick !old 1he National 
Press Club in 1972. "1s not to express opinions or lo editoralize. but to 
net ,'J£, a forum". To do so. said Sir Robert. the ABC must be 
independent Tree from government censorship so it can produce 
programs which are balanced ano neutrai ( 1972: 6l. Tho sustaining 
ideoiogy cf puol1c service broadcasting, the legislative device of a statutory 
corporation and the expectations of Parliament and public all demand 
function;il independence for the ABC. it is an organisailon whose raison 
d'etre i~) its ab\iity to make programs vvithout fear or favour, 
Th0 ccrnmcints of Sir Robert iviadgv.tick aptly summarise the ABC's 
iniended function. but a!so raise the problem oi assessing how closeiv the 
.l\B('; comes to fulfilling this role, The level ot government and 
managornent interterence in ABC decisions about who should have access 
to "'th0 for11m" is not easy to establish, The nature ol program 
declslon-n1nktng maKGs lt difficult !o separate fact from rumour; 
lncontestahiG proof of outslde interference in the /\BC's functionai 
independence is very herd to produce, Ken Inglis has noted : 
The ditllculty goes beyond missing pieces o! evidence. ii 
government pressure can be documented. that is conclusive. l~ut 
lf !t cannot. it may nevertheless have been ex~rclsed by means 
impossible for a later observer to detect { un!ess someone ov.J"ns 
up) . or it may be 1hat people in the organisation acted in 
anticipation ol government pressure, or in the knowledge thBt men 
in power would not have wanted certain material broadcast if thoy 
had known of 11. l 1980a: 26l 
There hav0 been unambiguous attempts by governments to censor the 
ABC, both thrnugh the statutory dovlce of a rr1inlsterial direc1iv0 ana 
through loss formal pressure. Such a!lempts. however. have been rare 
and often unsuccessful, u::;ual!y bocause government threats have been 
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exposed by the commercial media, Public expectation of functional 
i;idc:µendence for the ABC has provided some protoction from political 
oressure. 
There are problems, however documenting censorship which may occur 
from personal initiative by ABC employees - the famous 'pro-emptive' 
buchle in expectation of a hostile government reactlon, Only by examining 
program decis~on-making possible to assess tho scope for 
internal and externai censorship. This chapter surveys the institutional 
setting of functional independence. it argues that the enviTonment in 
wh1ct1 program decisions are made, the constant tension between 
managemrmt and production units, the distance of the Board from 
production decisions and the political consequences of attempted 
in1erference all make it difficult for politlcians to intervene in specific 
program matter5, Through discussion o'f program practice and case 
stud i8'S cf contentious decisions this chapter assesses lhe scope 1or 
tunctional independence for ihe ,i\8C, 
Tho C:\x CommittcH:: concluded that the 'primary role' oi tho 1:\BC should 
be ''the provision of nev1s, information and comment" - precisely those 
areas Hke!y to 8mbroi! the i\BC ln political controversy lVof, 2: 184). ln 
the 1980s the 1\8(:; en)oys an 8St.:lbilshed rolG oi providing a wide range of 
news and current aifei:-s programs. This has not always been tho case, 
Aian Thomas and t(en ingHs have documented the ABC tradition of befng 
wary of programs to Qrouse tho displeasure of politicians "of uil 
programs talks v,1ere tho rnost likely to causo trouble to f.\BC; 
ad mi rllstrators. for any serious oxprossion of opinion rnight be 
controversial: and controver;;y was something to be eithor avcidod or 
assembled with care' (Inglis Hl83a: 30-3ll, The shift from avoiding 
controversy to fo0tering public discussion was gradual. 1\lan Thomas noted 
thal when the p,ac began in 1932 
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Only a tiny percentage of broadcasting time was devoted to 
ta!l1s. partly because they were dubious audience pleasers. but 
also because the ABC wished to eschew broadcasting items which 
might attract government attention. With institutional survival far 
from guaranteed, it was easier to play music. ( 1980: 41) 
\nghs notes sev0rat occasions on which an early General Manager of the 
f\BC stopoed material going to air. ruling that it was "scarcely the 
Commlsslon's place to criticise the actions of the constituted government" 
(]983a:3ll. Tho ABC apparently Jell vulnerable. Writing in 1938 
Professor MacMahon Ball stated emphahca!iy : "The ABC exercises active 
anrJ continuous censorship over broadcast talks" (quoted in Ash bolt 
1980: 158)' The same year witnessed the irony of ABC Chairman Cloary 
banning sections of a talk by Judge Foster on 'Freedom of Speech' 
bocause the address referred to censorship by churches and government 
(Fh,1don fvlarch 1952:21). Foster later wrote : "It is a little humourous 
p8rhaps to contomp!a1e a broadcast upon free speech under restrictions 
that arc so ot,vicusiy a denial of it" (Inglis 1983a: 62l. 
f'rom 1047, at the direction of the fc;deral Labor government. the l'.\BC 
When /uistralian lelev1sion began 
in :nss. ,1\2C.: C::hairrnan Boyer did not want news on ABC television. 1·1is 
opinlon aid not prevail and ABC--TV began \.Yith daily ~15 rninutG news 
bulle1ins; by 196-l f1,8C television nev1s \Vas the organisation··s most popular 
program (ibid: 211'"'213). 
ln 1960 1he i\BC, encouraged by the success of tBlevision nevvs und 
looking for a v1fly to transfer taiks from radio to television, decided to 
ada: pt the popular BBC television current aifairs program r1anaroma, On 
Saturday 19 August "1061 at "tO: 00 pm the ABC launched Australia's fir~t 
na1ional current affairs program, Four Corners, Though p,sc management 
vetoed some subjects us too sensitive, Four Corners was nevertheless Goon 
"eroding old inhibitions" within !he ABC and providing a now inlorm<Jtion 
service for Australians (ibid: 215~Q18). The Commission did not relax its 
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rule that poiiticians could only be intc:rviewed on tho ABC with the 
permission o! the General Manager. 
Four Corners inevitably provoked controversy. In August 1963 there were 
allegations that a Four Corners report produced by Alan Ashboll was 
cr~lical of the Returned Services League, Prime Minister i\1enzies asked to 
see the script and Ash bolt was transtorred to other duties. Semmler 
quotes Menzies telling ABC executives "l knov1, and my ministers know, 
that the sole reason for that wretched program on the ABC is to discredit 
mo and my government!" ( 1981: 28-29) , 
Four c:orn0rs attracted largo audiences and commercial imitators, in 
1961> TCN9 launched Proiect 64 and f~ TN? began Seven Days. The current 
aiiuir,; 'boom· of the 1960s was under way, soon aided by satellite 
techr;ologv. video tape, portable sound recording equipment and 
lncre2sn1g!y mobile telovls!on cameras. ln 1965 TEhllO began Telescope, 
A11s1ralin' s f1r$t caliy io!evision current aifuirs program, In 1967 the ABC 
responded ;Nnh Thi:; Day Tonight, ct:tch •.t1eeK night following 1he 7: 00 pm 
The same year /,f\-1 began on f\BC radio. lt v1as 
folio\ved !n 1969 oy f)1VJ nnd u nev.r em 
and curre:nt atfairs. 
ln f\BC r3dio en information 
Tho ABC began the 1D60s sttH using its traditiona1 format of short radio 
talks and news commcn-;taries: it tlnished the decade \Vith a fuii 
complement at television and r,:;xd\o current ufL::iirs programs. all rating we!i 
for the /\SC nnd embroiting tho organisation in froquont political 
controver$y. Those: nevi current a1falrs programs changed the ABC~ 
Confronted v1ith the imm0diacy of the eloctron1c rneola, 'Nhich could 
interview a politician live to air with no chance for management vetting of 
questions, the bureaucrotic restric;tion:z::. on prograrn-m;:iker::; ct1anged. 
Given the wide range and scope of daHy /\BC current atf;:ilrs programs 
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there was no longer time for managers 10 reao all scripts of talks and 
commentaries beiore transmission. nor to approve the se~ection of every 
speaker. Mm1agement still enunciated poi icy which had to be observed on 
all ABC programs. Vi/hen reporting the Vietnam war, for exarnple. and 
discussing t\ustraHan casualties, ABC journalt$ts ;vere not ollcwed to use 
tho word 'conscript'. In 1972. aiter making only three episodes of ihe 
politicui satire Our Man In Canberra. ABC management vetoed the program 
as inappropnatn for an election year (Canberra Times 1 .July 1982: 12l. 
Management's function, however. was changing. Tho direct concern 
with program content was being replaced by a concern with establishing 
ti1e boundaries permissible for ABC program-makers and disciplining 
procucors ,ludged to be breaking the spirit of edicts about 'balance' or 
acceptabie mpics, No manager could be aware of !he content of ovary 
program: instead they had to trust the judgement o! producers and oiler 
guidance oniy when they perceived repeated problems with a particular 
progr,:im. The ernphas!s changed from direction to reaction. The very 
oaco ot tho nevt programs forced management to devolve responsibi!Hy to 
production units, /\ reduced role for managers made thern less vulnera.b1e 
to poti1!c1ans hoping to pressure f\BC executives into intervening in th•0 
content oi spocitic ABC programs, 
Television current affairs programs transforrr1ed Australian politics. Prlme 
~~in!ster !\1enzies dlsl\ked television and avoided appearances whenever 
possible. In 1952 he toid a visitor from tho BBC "I hope this thing will 
no1 come to /\ustralia within my term ol office" ( lngiis 1983a: 193). 
Menzies belonged to a generation which knew politics as publ1c speeches 
and parliamentary procedure; he was uncomiortable with the demands of 
the eleclrornc media ano the new environmental 'quality oi life' issues 
being pursued by Four Corn0rs reporters. The media were becoming 
more sophisticated to m001 the neeos of an increasingly educated 
electorate. With the emergenne of television ano radio current aifairs 
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programs consorvative politicians lost con1roi of the presentation of politics 
and so, indirectly, of the political agenda. With ratings of This Day 
Tonigt1t providing grovJing evidence of public lnteresi in current affairs, and 
a new generation of politicians, led by Gough Whitlam. who understood 
the eiectronic media and could make use of television to reach the 
eloctornte, the power balance between politicians and media subtly shilled. 
Before the advent of the electronic mr0dia a politician could re!uso to 
commer.t and retain plausiblllty, t)n television, hov1ever, a refusal to 
comment or appear often seemed like admitting guiit. Politicians had to 
learn to cope with the intrusion of television cameras, with the necessity to 
encapsulate their comments into 30 second 'gr21bs' !or inclusion in radio 
news and with the constant scrutiny and superiicial authority of &n 
eic;ctronic press gallery wiih instant access to the nation through the 
night!:; news and current affairs programs. 
\\Jot aii poiiHcians found it oasy to accept the transformation, lv1inistors 
vvere used to being treated vvith deference by the press, For politicians. 
radio an(j t~levision s1udios wore unfamiliar territory where the journali:"it 
wr::s now ;n control. ABC tolevision journalists could not be constralneo 
a worr:i to their r~di1or in the same way as their comrni;;rcial coileagur::s; 
"harmlesf; as tho ABC reporters were, they seemed often more 'aggressive 
when compared v1ith the even tamer comn1ercin! journalists" ( ~11ayer 
1980: 551), During tho Gorton and McMahon governments lhero vvere 
frequent charges by L/!\JCP rriinist.::rs that the medla in generzil .. nnd the 
ABC's This Day Tonight in Rarticular - vJere worl\ing in th;;; interests oi the 
ALP, VVhen Postmastor-Genoral Hulme tried unsuccessiully to cut 1t,250 
000 from the J\BC's budget for curront affairs television programs in 1970. 
his act was a recognition that the power to create and controi issues had 
passed frotn politicians to the rnedia; ''Huln1e's threat could v;eH bu 
interpreted in retrospect as a jittery punch thrown by " government 
begmn1ng to smlf defeat" (Inglis 1083a: 328i. 
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In a 1971 article for Quadrant. Sydney acadorrnc George Shipp developed 
the argument that This Day Tonight was undermining the conservative 
consensus in Australia, Shipp claimed that current affairs reporters tended 
to be negative, reporling the faul1s rather than the vi nu es of Australian 
society. He alleged that This Day Tonight demonstrated a "systematic 
bias" \n emphasising "certain storiGs censorship. the treatment of 
Aborigines and attitudes toward colour, deficiencies in sociai weliare, 
dissent and the conflict between civil liberties and the needs of the state' 
Cl971' 215-27)' Shipp charged Tllis Day Tonight with favouring the 
concerns o! "humanisi moralism" and "left liberalism" ( 1971: 28), 
If the /;),Bt: is seen to be editorializing then it can no longer justify its 
independence !rom government. The pubiic service broadcasting mandate 
fer independence can only be maintained as long as the /\BC Is neutrnl. 
Shipp observed : 
The least desirable and justifiable consequence of a finding of 
bias would be a governmentally-inspired attempt dirnctly or 
indire:::t!y to interfere in either the ABC's stalllng mrangemenrs or 
its orograrnrnlng policy. The autonomy oi tho ABC. as that ci 
the Univorsities, is oi the greatest impor1ance. Bu; noither 
ins1ltu1ion's right to self·-governmont is an unconditional one ir_ 
ls a right properly c!airnect to enable these institution:::; to perform 
their dis1Jnctlv0 iunctions, To tho extent to 'Nhich they are shov1n 
to be failing in some central rospect, to that extent is the prima 
facio claim to indepcrndence weakenea. (Shipp 1971: 32J 
Succes8ive r~BC boards have displayed acute sensitivity to ;;tny suggestion 
of program bias. In his briot stint ns an P·,BC Corn missioner, Dw.vid 
W!!liamson noted that some on tht> Seard seemed only interestGd in 
"left-wingers working in current z.n-fairs" to the detriment of their '1vider 
duties (Williamson 1982l. During Leonie KramGr's term ws Ch.Jlrrnan, the 
Board had a regular agenda item on 'program policy' to aiiow 
Commissioners 10 exprass their viev>1s to rnanagGmont about particular 
programs: on sorne occasions the Board required a prc-ducer to oxpfain 
his or her nctions and listen to Board criticisms, Kramer, however, 
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believed that !he problem of editorializing st<:ifi was !undamenlaiiy a 
"managemt:;nt decision. The Board shouldn't be consulted" ( Krnmer 
1984} 
Criticls:n of bias fn ABC programs has tonded to focus on specific /~BC 
radto documentaries and news commentaries. Claiming to n,:tve percoiven 
a !0H-v1ing bias in .!.\BC nevvs, one Quadrant critic wrote : 
I beHc:ve. z.nd ::inything stronger than a belief would require a 
PhD. thesis. that there is a bias. given the tenoency of 
journalists to be lef!ish in politics and the difficulty in electronic 
media of removing bias oy editing. (Minogue 1975: 11) 
!Viinngue's assertion was taken up in more detail by setf-proc!airn0:d 
'rnedia v,;a_tchman' Anthony McAdam. \l\Jriting in The Bulietin. f·Ac1\dum 
clairneo ;o have uncovereo a "gradual expansion of the influenco 0f 
Marxists and Marxist ideas in lhe ABC" ( 25 January 1983: 25). f.fic/\d;:;m 
ldentlf!Grj th8 Key figure ot this infiltration as Alan Ashbo!t, tho former ht::::icJ 
nmont oi Talks and Documentaries. 
from :ho 1\BC in 1078 and has since been one of its most thoughtful and 
!vlc/~dam named producers trained in TaH<s .:inc 
Oocurnen~:ir;Gs as "!\shbolt's kindergarten" and implied that "flugrant 
rigging·- oi current aifairs and discussion progran1s and ''prcpagunda c!c;ar!y 
hostile to the va1ues ~nd institutions of liberal democracy" oc8urred under 
the direction ct these "kindergarten graduates" (ibid; 25). 
This lino oi criticisrn, ;,.vhich has persisted since tho f\BC moved into 
wide-ranging current ;;nfa.lrs programs. nssumes that poople holding 
'!eit-wlng' opinions atQ incapable of acting as professional broadcasters 
who separr.ite their nloris from their work. It assumes that they !n1snd 
to use the ABC as a vehicle for propaganda and ignores any altachmenl to 
the traditions of publlc service broadcasting. It also asr.urne:; that 
individuals can flagr,Jnt!y 2nd persist0ntiy ignore ABC program policy 
guidelines without action. Cmtainly it can be difficult for management to 
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impose its wt!I in a specific case. Yet the career of Mc.'\dam's 
protagonist. f'llan Ashboit. indicates the efforts made by ABC management 
over ,,.overal years to isolate a man they believed did not always conform 
with policy guidelines on objectivity. Impartiality and balance, Ashbolt had 
a high profile outside the ABC as a polemlst and political activist: ABC 
n1anagernent apparently felt that the publ!c might find it difficult to 
"dl:csociate f\Shbolt the private citize11 from Ashbolt the ABC senior officer" 
<tngiis 1983a: 312). Semmler observed that !or many years . the 
Ashbolt problem featured in most Commission meeting agendas. How 
could they rid themselves of this turbulent priest? Staff rules and 
regulations were pored over, the advice indeed of the Crown Solicitor was 
scught" ( 1981: 36). i\shboit spent a career being moved irom program to 
program, from department to department in order lo keep him out oi 
controvorstal areas '. 
Tl;ci f'BC kept puning him in little boxes to contain him: he 
would quickly make that box th0 liveliest, most intellectually 
exciting pi ace in lhe 1\BC. Eventually the ABC gave him i1igh 
blood pressure and forced him to retire oecause ol bad health." 
( fvlcQueen ~l 982) 
Responding to Mc!\dam·s accusations ol Marxist influence in 1\BC 
programs, fi,BC Chairman Professor Loon!e Kramer noted that ivlcf\dam 
could only point to nine programs in two years as being biased ~ hardly a 
significant sample 01- ABC output, She asserted that neither management 
nor the Board tolerates any actions "v1hich are in conternot tJ-f tho 
Commission's ground ru!ec for broadcasters throughout the organisation"; 
in her opinion it was neither reasonabic nor just to assort fro1n a fo'N 
examples that an organisation ot 6 300 people v;1as "pcrmoatod vvith 
political activists" 
I hope !v\r. f'v1c/\dam wiH not exchange his rolo as program 
critic for the dub1ou1; ono of witch~twnter. Ii our programs fall 
Ghort of our own standards of dispassionate analysis and 
presentation, !et hirn tell his readers so and invito the 
program-makers to orove hirn wrong, But lot him not condemn 
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the whoto by selective references to a part 
illiberal in dofense of a liberal democracy. 
February 1983: 29·-30) 
or himself become 
l Thi:; Bulletin B 
Accusations of b•as from politicians and observers prompted repeated 
statements to stall about the need for objectivity. impartiality and balance. 
but critics did not (fo;suade the ABC from its commitment to provide a 
comprehenslv~ inforrnaticn service. Instead representatives from the 
org~nisatlon nttempted to explain thG new rote. Chairman Sir Robert 
1v1adgv;\ck pondered on the growing antagonium betwHon politicians and the 
media when tie addressed the National Press Club in September 1972. 
f\Jfirming thG ABC's commitment to objectivny and noting the t0ndency cl 
ooiiticlans to accuse the media of bias v;hen they felt reports lacked 
·~ympa1hy'. :3ir Robert concluded that the role of the media as an impartial 
if crrticai oosorver maoe it ''always likely to he at coniilct vvith governm0nt 
or 2t least to npp~:::ar to be" ( 1972: 4) . 
1972 tho i~.sues and treatment politicians would tolerate irom P.,BC 
program0 had lncronsed greatly, probably aided by exposure to similar 
prograrn::; 011 comrnorcia! ztations. fvHnisters no tonger disputed the 
lfHJit!macy at /\£3t-: r0portors questioning government decisions, though tne 
familiur charge of a 1ctt-wing bias in certain ABC programs re1naineo, 
Patricia Edgar suggests that oniy after 1975 did conservative governments 
m0ke a more determ!nad attempt to rein in the activities of iho ABC. The 
ABC. she noted. played a 
. central role in tho politics of the Hl70s, us it should have 
been expected to, but that ro\o 'NdS controverslat .::ind fod to 
considflrab!e dic;cussion 3nd debato v1ithin government circ;los 
about the future role, structure and operations ot the 1'.\BC, The 
debate resuitod in. and was formalised by, the appoinm1ent oi a 
Committee of Review "to examine all aspects of the 1\BC's 
activities", ( 1981: 9l 
it has been ciairned that the budget reductions, staff ceii1ngs and 
bureaucratic imposltions of the l::Jter 19705 v1ere designed to intimidate 1he 
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f~BC into toning oown its current aiiairs programs. Certainly the 
restrictions on overseas travel, the !act< of funds to buy new equipment 
and the constant drain ol talent from the 1\8C inevitably reduced the 
range. scope crnd quality of ABC news and current affairs programs. The 
arena of political debate. however, h.'Jd grnatly changed in the decade 
since Hulme tried to cut the ABC 1el0vision currnnl affairs budget. In 
1970 there was probably substantial support ior Hulme's actions from that 
sCJotion of the population. following G0orge Shipp, for whom the very act 
cf raising new issues for the political agenda could seem subversive. 
Hulme looked back to a time when the 1\BC avoided political controversy. 
A decade later, al the time of the Dix Committee. the electorate expected 
cri1ic;il ~nalysis from 1he /\BC, Any attempt to suppress a story on the 
ABC woula itself become e poli!ical Issue. reported by the plethora oi 
comm0rcia! television and radio news and current affairs programs, Tho 
d(::il!y f!o\v of information to 1'\ustra!ians was far more than Bny politician 
could to rnonitor, let alone controL 
/>, reduction of /\BC current affairs programs in 1970 'NOu!d have made a 
rnajor impnct on the information ana anaiysis 21vatiabic to the cornrnuni1y, 
but by 1980 sliencing 1he f«BC~ ;,vould :"HJ :onger rernove mcst nev-1s and 
current atiairs irorn thG airwave::J. The cornrr1orcial seclor had entere<j thG 
iniormation market Some capi1a\ city commercial radio station~.> had 
stopped playlng music allogeth0r, preferring <.1 ::;leady diet of news 
commentary and !rJ!k-bacK dltcussion. c:omrnerci.::11 teh?vision ulso 
emphasised current affairs programs becuuse thoy \Vero "reiatlvely cheap to 
produce, /.;,nd the thoori::>ts have !ong m21jntained that topical program::; 
have a much netter chance than soapios and quizz shovvs of beating back 
the threat oi the video 1n»1as1on ( Hoirnes "The Gulde" s·yciney i\1ornfng 
Herald 2 .July 1984: 5). By ~\984 one Sydney telnvis!on ::;tation vvas 
showing three hours of ne'NS 0nd current attairs daily; Channel 7 begrin 
the morning wilh 11 /\t\11, t1aif an t1our ot f'Jationaf {'\fews at 6: 30 prn 
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followed 30 minutos oi Terry Wilfe3ee ·ronight and iinlshing its daily 
rnpons vnth the late night. hour-long Newsworld. 
!he cornmercia! media niight not bo as independent, v-1ide-ranging or 
reliable .3$ tho ABC but it nevertheless offers other voices scrutinising. 
ana•y<0.iog and reporting on the activities oi the body politic. 1 t-\t tirnes of 
ccJntrover;:;y about the ABC's indetpenoence, the commercial media has 
otten focused on the national broadcastlng organisation, adding pressure to 
th01 1'.\BC~ io iive up to its obligations to resist poHticai pressur~. 
In thls competitive environment are made the ABC news and current 
affair?1 programs whtch might attract the wrath at politicians. It ls now 
that the ABC ha~. a legitimate role as a source 01 in!ormatton 
and anaty"'is; since 1983 the organisation has buen rt~quired by its 
on~·ib1lng iGglsiatlon to produce nev-vs and iniormation which is "accurate 
and lrnpartiai according to the recognised stand,ards of objective jcurna!isrn'' 
Wi;h public expectations o! independence and constant media 
focu;) ori lh8 i\BC, any politician contemplating lnterlering \Vith r\BC 
decision-making rr.us:t \Velgh tile potentiai gains against tile puoiic 
hu1riii\;;tlnn of being caught trying to pressure the ABC. 
Despite politlc,::1! accGptanco of a legi1imato ABC role in nGV/S ano curr2nt 
affairs brcadcasting, and dasplte the logislnt;ve and puvllc r::xpectation ot 
1~8C funct1onai independence. governments have 3'ttemp1ed ut times to 
interf0re 1vith t:\.6(~ prograrn dec!s!on-maKing, The public; record sugg~:sts 
a long nst of failures by government$ to impose their vvir-lles, f\Jo 
1The debate about tf:e cornpara-U,1e influence of \he .:\BC ;:ltid com1nerc1;:1! media i;:. long, 
circular and irresolvc,b!e, !o t~f~lr b00X .. ~us.tr;'.';li<'<'~ C0r:1merci.:::l 1-.. ·1(~d1::::, 1 au tr.or;; Conney ;;;nd Wll!::<Hl 
tgnored the AJ3C altogether. on t!"'!c tJ!'OUnds t~at they were lntere-sted in Hthe ctructur0 ot povver 
n1 Av.:.;trali0 :;;.,rn1 cee t~.e comrnerc1a1 ;nf:dia ~s in1mensft'ly mr>re powerfut than the ABC" 
{18-83:vdi}, 
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documents or evidence, only rumour. implies a parallel private record of 
d . l successful and iscreer government intervention over specific ABC 
programs, 
In 1984 the combined current affairs. nev1s. taH<s and documentaries of 
the ABC accounted tor iess than 20% of totai airtime, Yet is has aiways 
brjen such programs whlch attracted the attention of poti1icians. ;,vho havo 
focusod on a srnan part of the /\BC's output at the t;xponse of discussion 
obo'.1t broader programming issues. Aside from occasional crliicism of the 
r,BC for giving too much prominence to sport or British comedies, few 
pollticlans or med!a critics spend much time dweHing on the vvay the ABC 
alloCi11(i'S !10 resources to serve some special inierest groups. The rurar 
community, for example. has always been wel!-representod in fo18C 
programrning but trace unions have no-c Lovers of classical music huve 
beon VJ(!11-sc:rved at the expense of other forms of entnrta\nmGnt. An 
:,om0time0 covering events which atso appear on 
ccrnrnnrcid.l s1ntions ~ commits Llirtirne v-1hlcf', might be used for other iypos 
Ti;~~.e )udgemGnts Dy r.ne ABC r:ibout v;hat should be 
available to the 1'.\usr.ralian public. about vvhich intero::>t groups ;;hould oe 
served. are rarely questioned. 
This is partly because the ABC has educated its audience to oxpoct 
certl--"lin types of prog:ammlng fro in puolic service broadcasting. The ABC. 
as a creat;Jre of Pariictmont. uJso reflects in \is programrni:1g tho national 
distr~nution of po;r1er and 1he nation s pr0valllng ideo!ogies 
. the ontire dent::ite about tho ABC'$ bia$ toward this or that 
parliamentary par';'.y diverts attention from the fact lhat the /.\LP. 
the L/f\JCP and the ABC share one ovor-rid!ng characteristic ~ 
they aro all parts of the capitdlist state anti, in th0ir cifferent 
ways, help maintain the rule of capital. ( McQueon 1977: fl4) 
t\BC programming roproduces the values. myths and ho!icfs of 1\u~traiinn 
society. Program decisions are rnado by a Board. management and ritaff 
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\Vho artlculate thes0 social values through their '.-vork. Because the A.BC 
mirrors the position of irnportant in1erest groups and pervasive social 
values, its range of programs rarely becomes a political issue, Only 
ascendant interest groups \\•anting more representation will chat!enge the 
ABC's alloca\ion oi airtime. Because 1\us1rallans tal«O> the ABC's range of 
services. as given, the concern of politicians and the public has rarely 
strayed from the narrow issuri of the representation of politics on ABC 
programs, 
The fwciralian Broadcasting Corporation !\ct ( 1983), like previous ABC 
legislation. enables the Minister for Communications to lssue directivos to 
the /XBC. Section 78 of the Act allows the IVHnister to order or suppress 
rhn broadcust ot' any rnatter "in the natlona! interest", Such a diroctivH 
rr.ust be tabled in both t1ouses oi Par~tament within seven sitting days, 
Other than minis1erial directives in the national lnterest. "the Corporation is 
f:fJ~ SU to d.lrc:~tion by or on behaii ot the Government of the 
The /\BC 
had ourr:hasod 2 BBC fl!rn !n1erviov1 vvtth torrner Fronch Prom\or Bidau!t, 
recently exiled frcm his country under threat ot arrest ior treason, Tfl,3 
intervie.w VI/BS 0cllr0duled for /\BC televinion on Sunday la rv:arch 1063 but 
did not appear, Postrnaster-Genorai Davlcr,on had i~.sued a directive that 
the f\BC nor shov,1 the fi!1n ''on the grot:nd 1hat it '-'¥3.S offensive to .::i 
friendly nation" and would atfGct relotions \Y1th Froncn President Charles de 
Gaulle ( inglls l 033a: 252J, 
1·ne PtvlG had not Qxorcised h!s po\.ver to ::;suo directives to 
commercial stations on the- sarno mn.ttar nno thut night the film •Nas playod 
in full on Sydney commercial television ::~tution TCf\i9. ABC General 
f»Aanagor Charies Mo::;(~f, !1ad atortod station ov~ner Frank Packer about the 
film ;rnd given him 1.1 copy (Semmler 1981: 23l. Tho Pt>AG then issued 
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directives forbidding use ol tho li!m on commercial television but HSV7 in 
t!!r;lbourne put it to air before the message arrived. Transcripts ot the 
Interview appaared next day in most newspapers. "The ban ~Nas withdrawn 
on 17 ~Jlarch, hnving proved ineffective. and the ABC duly put on the 
\rrtr:rv1ovv" (!n91is 1083a: 253). 
Th\'.) i'vienzie::. governn1ent found it easier to restrain ihe /\BC through 
arJrnini:Jtr::rtive means than mlnisterial directives, In 1860 the ABC :;:gned 
an intern<J.tiona! tigreement to make a documentary about ro!a~ions beti.veen 
Canada and the USA. to be called Living With ,\ Giant. The ABC had 
recently come under the provisions of the Public Service Board and so its 
officers n<Indod the permission ot the Overseas Travel Committee to fly 10 
Canno:a to rnako the program. Cabinet dociined to approve tho travel. 
PMG l)avidson \¥rote to the Chairman of the ABC explaining ihat vvhilo thn 
fiovernrnont did not vvant to interfere in the independence of tho 
Cornrnl:-:.sion. it was undesirable that an instrumentality ~identif1ea in the 
pub!1c rnir.d and internationally with the Government of Australia. ::;houid 
n1ake \tscdf for television films relating to mat1ers of grGat 
\nternutional doHcacy' £ibid: 248) /\BC Chairman Rlchard Boyer died 
during tnis dtspute: if a r10art attack had not intervened he w<:!i! have 
rt~sigrH-:d in protest at the government treating the ABC as part of 1ho 
Public St:~rvice, Eventually British television company toot\ over 
tho f;,_BC's conirnct and made Living With A Giant, Thn program. 
described 38. ''not very exciting and not terribly provocative'" ·11as 3nown Jn 
full on ABC 1elevtsien in 1962 (ibid: 252). 
The ~an1e concern 'Nith f\us1ralia's foreign relations apparenHy 1rnp0Hed 
!he \Nh\tlam governmont in H174 to attempt to persuade the 1\BC not to 
show a film on the People's Republic of China made by ituiian dfroctor 
Michangelo t\ntonion1. Chinese diplon1ats had indicated 1hoir dfspieasure 
with the proposed screening tJnd the r\ustralian governmerrt 'l1as anxious not 
to upset newly established diplomatic relahons. Former Deputy Gon,;iral 
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rvlanagcr Clemont Semmler cl.;i.lms to have been present when ··3 senior 
Cabinet minister rang (/~BC Genera! Manager Duckn1anton) on his private 
line ;:ind made it quite clear th11t he and the government would be most 
up-set and dlspleased if the HIIT1. were shown", Semmler also al!ege5 that 
Jf!Ctions of the film \/'Jere \Vithdrav1n by management from $Creening on This 
Day Tonight at the last mo1,1ent (Sernm!er 1981: 25). 
ABC managomont referred the issue and. presumably, details of any 
informal message frorn the government ttJ the Commissioners. vvho VJatched 
the film on 6 June 197 ~. In the absence of a ministerial directive 
banning the iiim, the Commission authorised that it be put to air In full. 
The on!y rgpercusslon 'Nas that 1\BC correspondent Raffaele "and i.\NO 
correspondents of A11straiian nov~spapors v10re virtualiy confined to thGir 
ap,;:<r1rnentr. in Poking fer tho noxt six months" { inglis 1983a: 338), 
~fht::1 concern that the ABC \Vil! du.mage Australia's international rolaHons 
app1::~rs ;o have beon the primary motlvG behind attempted government 
Perhnps politicians fear that nations 
wlthoct experience of puolic service broadc21sting 'Nill assurr.e that ZillY 
crlt!cai comrnent on the ,r,gc rnpresern:s oificL::i! ;\ustruiian government 
poi icy. nan addressed 1l1ls pronlem 
ViihE?n opGr.ing new BBC r·leadquo.rr0r:::; in rvlanchestor on 18 ~~une 1D76 ; 
In this country it ·is the nrccidc.:Jsting o:ganlsaHons whtch are 
respon$ible tor progr3m ~..:01;1ont. Scrnolifnos your decisions ;;;i_nd 
actions g1vo rne pain .JnrJ ! find r11vsolf f1nving to oxp!aln to 
overseas countrios, ,,.~.;h~,;n they are nu rt by v1hat you say about 
them, that the Gcv0:rnmorn doos not con1roi you, Even \Vhen I 
have convinced thern of this t11ey still rh1nk tho Govornrnent could 
do something to stop you if it had t~e \NiiL l then go on to say 
that. dcines1ica1!y. you and 'NF: sorn0timos have cllfierences but 
that nonG oi H1ese d!tfergnco::; hJs 8\/1Jr disturbed the fundamE.in1a! 
principie that thG intlt;ent12l mediun1 of broadcasting is free frorn 
political contra! and 'Nlll 00 rom<:iln, (BBC 1~nnuai 11aport arui 
Handbook 1984: 156) 
Some chnilenges to the /\l~C's right lo functional independence ~'ire r11or0 
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domestlcally orienratcd. ln ivl.:trch 1975 i\lCP Count;y Party ~ .. 1P Peter i\Jixon 
began a year-!ong aitack on ABC programs, t-le accused ABC news and 
current atfatrs journai\sts of being "pinkos and out-and~out sociaiis1s", cf 
broadcas1ing the views of Communists and of accepting political directives 
from the ALP Government (While 1975: 22-23), l\lixon pram!sed that a 
future L/!\ICP Government 'Nonld hold an Inquiry into th~ ;~BC news service, 
His rem;~rks prornpted the ABC Commissioners to note in their annual 
report that critics frequently forget that tht:t com1nunlty has a right to hear 
from different points of view, broadcast by an ABC which is committed to 
"neutr~'l!lty" and an "accurate accounts of events". The Commission cited 
analysis of complaints received about the ABC's reporting of the federai 
election in May 197 4, Of 811 compl;:iints received, 399 accused the ABC 
of bias against the ,'\LP while 412 argt1ed that the bias had been against 
th8 L/i"JCP coalition. The Commission re-afiirmed its confidence In tho 
profe;:-.~:!i')nalisrn and integrity of its ztaff (Annual Report 1974/75: 11-12), 
f-jixon \vas not pe-rsuaocd and his attacks continued, f\Jixon • s motives 
vvere t\\IO'--fold to frightGn the 1\8C into retrecittng to a rnore conservatiVP 
ran go of f)f01Jr2111s. and to paint a picture of an f\BC so hopelessly olaseo 
that a future L/f\J(::.P governrnent vvould be justified in directly intervening to 
'restore' the bal0nco. i\Jixon's criticisms vvero discuss.ea nt tho 
Cornmission :neeting of 11 \'-Joverr1ber 1975 (lWinutes item no. 181160). 
Commissioners v1ere ~.hown flgures on the appearancG of poiitlcians on 
news 0nd current affairs programs during the previous month vvt1ich 
suggested that "the a!fegation of pro-1\LP bias could not be ~ustninad. :n 
fact. more t\me had been given to :~t;)tem0r11s z.u1d/or nppearances by 
L/f\JCP mernbers than to /\LP mernbc-rs'' Clviinutc::s: 9), 
During the;:;e discu:>sions tne Commissioners !earned of tho dis1n1-ssal of 
the Whitlam government and its replacement by the LI NCP Opposition as a 
caretaker government. 
responsibility for the ABC, f\Jixon hud intonsiiied his carr1 pwign aga1n~t tne 
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ABC; in the fast days of the \iVhltlnm government, ciaiming that "a cadre of 
bac1<room ALP supporters in the ABC had irresponsibly distorted national 
are being subjecied to a deviou::;,,. masterly political events, f.\ustralians 
planned. program oi pub!ic deception channelled through areas of /\BC 
News and Public f\flair:;, on both radio and television' \Harding 1979: 30), 
caretaker Postmaster-Gent~ral, f'Jixon immediately caHod fer a 
'n1oderator', perhaps a judge, to restrain the J\BC's. "now \veil-established 
bias tov-1arcs Labor and the soctatist side of politics." {!ngHs 1983a: 387). 
Coalition leader Fraser did not back the idea. however, and no moderator 
was appointed. Nevertheless. 1\BC Commissioner Richard Harding claims 
that ABC senior management, "fearful of the future and recognizing. 
doubt:ess, the e-xposed position in which Labor ha_d left the f\BC, f10'W set 
out to .:;pp0ase thD rightist critics''_ Programs discussing \rVhitlam as Prime 
i'vHnlster y,;ere postpo:ied. 
con1ent of r\BC programs, 
f\Jew guldelines on balance reduced tho critical 
The consequence. claims i-iarding, 'Nas that 
during tho 1075 election campaign tho ABC '.Vas 'n0u1ored'; "rI\r f\Jixon 
must nave bee-n wefl pleased v1ith tne fruits of his campaign'' ( ~~!araing 
1979: 32) -, 
disciplined by fund f·~ixon 's cail fer 
0n inquiry into the i\BC «Vas answered t\vice ~ by ihn Gronn inquiry in 
1 D76 and by tne Comm1t1ee o~ Revi&v1 Gstabli:ihod in 1 G79, Both 1nquirios 
vvero foilovved 
Thore is no c:vldonco, hoY.1ever, that the government hopo-d to u~e !he 
.squoez0 on rosourcGs to ohtain favourable trGatrr1en1 ~n p2rticuiur 
programs. Rathor the 1ntontion of the power bloc within Cubinet '.vhlch 
was hos ti le tc tr;e f1BC 
Anthony, f·~ixon. 'JVithers, 
The governn1eni did not 
;\BC r:::dio's Broadband 
-- identified by Harding 
Carrick and Cotton -
just 'Nant to oliminato 
wl1ich it idootifiod as 
{1970: 117) as Fr11ser, 
Goerned to run daopcr. 
those programs ~.;uch as 
le!t-wing, Rather the 
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government wunied tc reduce the entire scope of tho 1\GC's ac~ivities, to 
reverse the expctnt.ion into adventurous current uiiairs programs which had 
charnctorised the 1960s. It sought a return to !hG conservative status quo 
1n po!iHcs. 
(ibid: 116). 
to be "accompanied by a return 1o conservative broadcasting'' 
Thz:; governmo:nt succeeded in demora!i$ing the /-i..BC. 
reducing the quai1ty of its output and setting thG stage for a complete 
restructuring oi the organisation following the Dix Report. Whether !xBC 
prcgrarns declined In ctnalytical insight or range ot issues during the period 
Is. ult'mate!y. a subjective judgement. but tile available evidence does not 
suggest any signific,;lnt reduction in program scope which can be directly 
Hnked to financial restrictions. 
The hl;,tory of the 1\8C in the dscades since the independent ne1,,v;; 
:::-;erv1ce '."Jas estao!lshed in 1947 suggests -zhat governments find it difficult to 
iniorv0no in specliic program matters, Even vvlth a ministeriai directive the 
lv\cnzies 9uvGrr11n()flt vvas unaole to prevent a filmed lnterview r8ach1ng tno 
Aus-:roilan puniic, These falluras reflect the strength of 1he dev1cG ct a 
statutory ln protecting Internal program decision-111akers from 
·The experif3nce of the later 1 '.J70s, novn?'.tOr, 
demonstralos tr..:Jt t1ovnrnm0nt funding dnd bureaucratic restriction:::; mal\G 
the Al3C rothet rnoro vulnerable to a sustained can1pafgn io run (1ov1n th;;:: 
organisation. 
Having surveyed the L:Jrge-ly f;Uccesstul record of the ABC tn surviving 
external p0Ht1cal lntervonticn on ~,pecific programs. the tocus oi tn1s ~>tudy 
of the ABC's tunctiona~ indepnnaence now shifts to the work environrr10nt. 
1\n understanding of i':CW prograrn decision~, are made and implemented 
highlights tMe d1tiicu!ues for extorna\ intervention" The study reintorc:e~. the 
observation of earlier chapters tr:at the ,1\8(~ Board does not oiten htc:corne 
invoived in specific program doci~.ions. that ,1.-\BC managennent perforrns a 
supervisory rather than directive role and thot there is iittte direct pressure 
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politicians can bring to bear on ABC production stuff vvhose career 
prospects are protected by the logislaHve dovico oi 3 :3tatutory authority. 
Primary responsibility for program decisions is seen to rer,t v1ith oxecutiv0 
producers and production units, These operate wlth\n an organisat!onai 
ethou of "professionalism" which p!aces emphasis on objectivity, impartiality 
and balance ,JS goals for all ABC news and current affairs programs. 
in thnory 1hc program decision-making environment is established through 
broad guidelines on policy approvec by the Board of Dirootors. Those 
g1.1idc;lines arc translated by management into program briefs and duty 
stn1.0ments and t!naiiy by production units into programs. Tl1e Bomd does 
not see all ,L\BC output or try to assess all new program ideas. Richard 
Boyer bC?lioves that no 1'.\BC Director can hope to "slgniiicant!y irnpo:::;e hi"' 
arti;;;t1c or program judgement on programmers". He coinpares tho 
influence of an ?\BC Oir0c1or to that of a newspaper prooriotar over 
journalist;: not to \..:rite evc::ry story but to create the broad framo-.vor\.~ ot 
po!ic!ef) withir, which ~:taif must work. "You have to let programrnors havo 
th81r head or they ju:;t lose interesr and motivation, , th0 rcle of the Gourd 
ls to provide 'broad "' (Boyer l 984). 
Oniy vary contentiou::. programs or !ssu0s aro ilkely to be referred up ~he 
ilnes of authority frorr, production units thro1Jgh management to tho 5oLlrd 
for an opinion. \i-Vhen this occurs. such as In April 1983 over tno r:'.Jur 
Corner::.; progrum "Tho Blg League", the ()irectors view the program, 
consider recommendations from management and express an opin:on, The 
uh\ mate deci0\on abcu~ wt10ther a program goes to air, hovvever, ':Jelongs 
to management, ·rh2 Board wll! he roiuciant to discuss any program not 
referred to tt by managerne:<t, though onco given a refernnce the Eoard 
will con1ment on a spoclfic progrum wnd send messages back to the 
production units, "In doing so''. says Inglis. the Board "make ircquont 
crn~ssings of that vcgue and v;obb!y line between poHcy and execution" 
( 1980a: 22), 
274 
In M0y 1981 the ABC produced a document entitled Program Policw;:; and 
Practices For Radio and T<:.Jevision v,ihich aimed to "set aut tho program 
pcllcios of the ABC - some of vvhtch date baci.; to the establishment of the 
Comrrnssion. in 1932" (ABC 1981c:1l. The Dix Con1mittoo praised an 
Gar!ier ver0;on of these po!ic\es and practices as an "amo;tlous and 
comrr,c::indab!e"' attempt to "resolve the acu.tely difficult que~1ions facing 
pubHc "3ervice broadcasters how to reconcile the formal responsibi1itiGs 
of the S,;overning body for all broadcast output with the fact tha1 ind:vidual 
human beings must be the ones who. subject to editorial guidance from 
tl1eir superiors and ultimately the governing body. periorm the broadcasting 
activity" ( \/ol. 2: 187), 
Tho !081 document, which remains in force. sums up ABC poiicv on 
progr2rns, ~n1erviev1ing techniques, v1olonce in television prograrns. 
broadc,-:1sting ·and the law. advertising and the /.\BC, election b!'oadcusts 
3nd or.nnr program practlc0 which has evolved, The rnerl1s oi rhGSG 
poiiclo> have been much debated \Vlthln the /\BC. for they sum u:i th0 
cdrn"', .:n10 re::;1rictions of ABC prograrn-makers and v.ssert tr.o right cf 
rn,;n:iqorni?!nt to offer advice, or to decide, on 'important productio11 
i\JeverthG!es.s., in acknowledging tha1 the volume ano ra_ngo or 
f\BC progr;:Jms is iar rnore than manage1nt:L·~t could monitor, the document 
concludes 1hut "actuat production responsib1lity rosts with the producer in 
tho studio vvho is oxpc;cted to work to a program br!ei and in accor(1anc0; 
'.-"ilth os1aD!ishGd !' .. Be practice and guidoHnes'· (/\BC 198lc: 7), CJno 
manager, Termer Diroctor ot /'.\BC Corporate Affairs John ~Auldoon. t.irguos 
thzt these poiic1es croa10 an environment in 'Nhich !T,anagetTIBnt cc-nsorship 
of programs becorr10~:; unnecessary: these policies mean "prcgrnm :nnkP-rs 
know wha1 thoy can and can't do" ( 19831, 
Central to these guid(.?lines is tho notion oi "objectivity. impartiality and 
balance" <ABC 1981c: 10). Objectivity may be impossible to achieve in 
practice but is worth striving for: 1rnpan1Glity means more than not taking a 
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poin1 oi view, lt invoives the question of balance. That includes ba!ance 
betv;e0n poot1!.'.'lr and minority programs. bet~veen information und 
nnu-::rtainment and, rnore spec!fica\!y, bGtV'1een opinions and issues 
expres~:;c:o en 1\BC programs "People who appear on f~BC public a!falr~ 
program;> :120d not be lmpartla!. But tho ABC itself must be impartial" 
':";0ptornber 1972: 6l, Th0 1981 guidelines assert that tile ABC's 
roto is "0ot to propagandise. It is not to pursue a particular editorial 
fhe /~BC cctn hctv\~ no opinion on current affair~, and must, over 
a rnosrrnaoie period of time. rnmntaln a political balance" {ABC 198lc. 6l. 
Bv!ance i5 dlfficult to detine or achieve, Critics have argued that f\BC 
n1ana9t:i-mnnt has seemed obsessed v1ith obtaining quantitative ovidence ot 
FormGr Deputy General Manager Semmler spoke of seeirb';J a 
v.:r:ek's r:f!'N~i bulletins "dissected line by line and the resul1s tendered like 
.:J 1oc,tn.:i1t ;:core to convincEJ quoru!ous politicians that a controversiai 
~t;r:iicc-: 'N,JS giYE)n ou1:;7 'balance'" ( 1981: 95), Inglis relates how 1\\?,C; 
carrv no 1rt1pl\catlons" {Inglis 1983a: 151), Rohort Horno rolutes 
~,7'.J'vournc story, , about pol!tlclans and the ABC.,, is Oi'G 
told of the !ate Johnny O'Kcofe, when ho ;,,vas rousing tho nation'~·) 
tG::enogcrs \Viti\ his "Six O'Clock Rock" some twenty years <1go, 
/\mid the rcistertng at one rocordlng session ho heard that :he 
Prlme lv]inistor 'Nat~ \n the next stud~o making a po!!ticn! 1r~!2casL 
So tl1e story gcos that Johnny, over alert v.'ith bright now id0as, 
cailGd out. ··~--!0v. Bob PAenzies is in the building. let's get nirn ~n 
the program'' Tnen, as ,Johnny told it. "Hero was th~s ,L\3C guy. 
v1aving me in:o a corner r.d1outing, "f\Jo, no. no Don't you i-:ncv; 
that ii ycu have Bob t-J!c:n1zies this week, you'll have to gcr Dee 
Evatt for :he next prngrain". ( 1979: 52l 
ABC guioolines acKnovvicdge that "a balancing Qf vievvpoints c0nnot alv~ays 
be achieved vv\thin ti"'o on0 broMdcast ::>egment" hut pron1ise lhat ii ;.\Bl~ 
::,ta ff are "consist,3n1!y :;oen to be strivlng for objectivity and in1p0rt!all1y, 
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tnen the audi0nce will be satisfied that a proper balance is achieved tn the 
long term (/\BC 1981c: 101. 
f·Jevertheiess. bias Is in the eye of the beholder and many of the 
:;omp1a1nts rece~ved from poli1!cians ai!ege a laci\ cf balance in particular 
programs. ':Vhen the i'Jilnister for i-~ousing, Senator Sir \f\Jiliiam Spooner, 
demanded a nght of reply to a Four Corners program In May l963. he did 
so c10imir9 thcit the government's policy had not boon fairly represented ~ 
evon though ho had Bar!ier declined an invitation to appear on the 
program (Inglis 1983a: 218). Alter being pressured by the Minister at a 
Canberra 
rhan risk 
cocktail party, 
govc;rnmont 
!1BC Chairman Darling 
accusations of bias. 
gave him airtime rather 
Brian White notes that 
!ilc1ans attacked AB(: prograrns for 'lack of bafance' yet this ignores 
"the contrlo:Jt1on ministers,,, irequently made to 'imbalance' by refusing all 
invit;:rucn:::: t::: ,nppoar on orogramz i:o discuss allegations against them" 
( 1f'Jni:0 1Ci?5: 21). VVhon politicians complained that their refusa! to appear 
v1as being rcportfJC'i, ;\BC rnan0gon10nt obliged at one stage by forbidding 
"c::urrr.:r-t r,dfu\r::. prvg-rarr:-s fron1 saying that sornoone had refused to 
1t is v<ary dtHicuit for i\8C rnanagors to disprove accusations oi iack of 
due objectivity, im :ny and balance. As Semmler observes, 
"pragma.tlc meac:uromon:::; c-t equal tln10, right ci reply, baiance and th(-?! 
rest of i1, can. ~vlth ~:;omc; difficulty, bo appllf-:;d !O 'hard·" ne'fvs bulletins, 
!n probing und effect1v0 public affairs prograrris such methods aro 
hopeless" (1981:100), 
Taibol Duckmanto;; has 0rguod rnat the constant i2tter and phono 
re:sponse to /i..BC programs th.::it "broadc2st:ng has w tendency 10 
co nil rm people in the vio'.vs the::y <:dready hold. and this 1s p;:(rticularly ti"ue 
ot c1Jrr01nt iJ.ff;:lirs program~. on !Glovision'' ( 1977: 0). Thi:: t0ndency to read 
programs according to pr8'"Cstab!lshod venues rnakes it difficult to produce 
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a progrnm \Vhlch sorr.e segment of the con1muni1y \ttili not fird biasefJ, 
The /\BC's only defence can bG a balance of different program::-, to givo 
vif:!'t1ers a range of opinions, The Dix Committee endorsed th11 vievv that 
bz.i!ance has to be achieved over a range of programs rathor tha11 
atiemp1ing lo provide balance within each program. Yot tho Committee , 
also said that it was "unimpressed by arguments ihat prograrns giving 
prominence to committed left-leaning vie'.vs such as those "Talks and 
Occuinentaries sometimes produce are balanced by others produced in 
ether areas such as the Rural Oepartmont. which are som0times alleged to 
have a bias Hie other way'' (\JoL 2: 191), 
The question of party political bias in /\BG programs was net a cen1rai 
concarn o'f the Dix Comn1Htea. Nevertheless ihe Cernrnittee reponec an 
f\f'-j()P stJrvey finding that "by a factor of some three to one. the 1\BC is 
:;een to be quite independent in its poHtical corrHnent" ano that 6 ·; o/v of 
,t~ustr;-:iilar.;, are "convincec of the ABC's indEJpendcnce, with litt!o ;:;pparon~ 
cEffcrcnct::J t:Gtv1een L/f\JCP ancl Labor voters" ('VoL :J: 92~93), Th~1 Dix 
C'.:011'\ffiittt.:B .09p9ars rnischiOVOUS int0rproting lhls fGSUit 21$ ;J D!JL)iiC 
programs of ;oporling. 
/\ bert01r reHoct!on of the eh::·)Ctorate':::, evaluation of /\BC party 
bias is four:\1 in rhe survoy conducted in l G79 for tho second (;Gition of 
This ooH founc nn 
av0rage 1h0t only Q~lo or respondents co:n:;,1dered AB(:: radio and toic:vis~on 
'unfair' to either thr; L1 f'~(~P Coalition or tho /A.LP, cornparca Vilth 13~10 who 
detect0d bias in c()mm0rci2I radio and television and 52~/;; vvho thought tha 
press bias \ l D83: 62) 1\ v;!dely publici5od 197G poll found that 66o/o 
of those interviev;ed thought tho f\GC v.ras accurate ~n its roportlng of new~:; 
biased, compared v/\th 58Slo ;,vho detected bias in tho coinmerciu:I press 
<Duckmanton Hl77: D\. 
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The ,/.\BC:::'s policy guidelines. training and internal literature emphasis tho 
nc:ed for 'objectivity. lmpartiaiity und balance 1 , These guidelines cut both 
vvays. Production stall must work within !he crms1raint of policy but they 
wil1 al~,o juoge any Board or managGmont directive according to these 
crltaria. /\ management ordGr on program content which apparently does 
not match the policies expected ot staff ts like1y to be challenged 
personally. bv reierral to the Board and by exposure in the commercial 
rnedia. Those v1ho \Nork in production units are largely sheltered from 
direct contac1 with management and imbibe the production unit suspicion of 
any management attempt to extend an administrative/support function into 
an edHoria! ro1e. 
/\BC noy;-corners quickly learn tne lrnportance ot appealing to tne wider 
rosponsiblti1les impor:.ed by poHcy in this ruie·-governed insti\ution. They 
ln0rn to use rnemoranda, j:19pcals to precedent and Corporntion: policy 2s 
\Vays of prGsorvl:l-g their of responsibility. 'fhey can be assistod by 
thr-3 lz1ck of communic;Jt1on 1,,vithin the orgcrnisation, Many producers toll 
progr0rns flnd gone to 21r u1 case 1h8 rnc.:ino ccntt:lined in::;1rucnons noout 
corn:ern, : ;ic; ;\BC hes to roly on ths p:orosr:,;on21 
pro9r2rr1-maker~. f\2" Torrner Gonerc::n f\ilwnagur Taibot Ouckn1;Jnto11 noted 
", Gn opor.::nion as cHverso in lts output as a nutlona1 
broadcasting service, the? only :-.ure 1,vay of oxerc!slng control is to 
proceed oersuasion Llnd convict!on . by encouraging tho staff 
lrnm0diateiy respcnsiblo to applv thelr judgernen1s to particular 
prograrns in a lramevitork of genern! gu\dcnce n frnrne-work 
v-Jhich stE;ms from tno continuing discussion ot progrnrr. output by 
the production stat! th•'?mso!ves. by thGir seniors and hy tho 
Commission itsolL You mu':)t apprGciate that in broaacas1ing. ihc; 
matter of con-::ro1 is rnado difficult by the faci that you otton con t 
even have a script; thero arP, no ga!loy proots as you h,ry_ve 'Nith 11 
newspaper for ('Xample, fv1uch of the material has to go to atr 
'live'. Judgernents wre mainly made ex post facto, and in this 
situation one can ','/Or!-< only by general guidance and tho 
creation ot an otmosphoro of 'house style' if ! may pvt lt that 
way. (1977:10~11) 
1\bovP ail it ls the corrunitment to the 'Jalues and ideology of 
!i:;m' t.ivhich makes ABC producers. 
it is sometirnes 
ied thut "self-censorship" occurs, that ;\BC prCJgram-rnakor::, ~void 
(.:onv!nc!ng rnotive for progrz:m-n1akers to exercise such rGstraint ha;:; evor 
off0r00. Production staff are generally not intimidated by 
r;-:an0gemHnt or ::Gnsitive to rr1anagemnnt concerns about the image of the 
organisation The ·~-vork environment ethos of professlonal broadcasting. 
and the kudos which flows fro:n producing provocatlve reports \Vhich inltla1e 
cornmunlty discussion, against 'self-censorship'. l<eeping within 
the t\BC policy guidelines imposes some restrictions, so productlon units 
have never had total freedorrf of action, but the professional broadcast!ng 
aims of objectivity, ~mpartiality and balonce produce an atrnosphore in 
1Nhich outside er internal demands ior parth:.nn reporting v..·\!l not be 
favotiran\y received, 
ence "rr.ost prograrn nato t1t tne 
cxec:1uvn 1-cvu\~:. ·- controllers. diroctors of outpo::it dopar1monts, hec.HJG ot 
produc11on sections 3nd -::;c; on_, ( 1983: 43), -rcnight. iar 
exa:np1e, 'Nas largely spon0oreci by tho /;,BC..~'~ FcdGrai Dirc:c10r of Te!ovis1on 
rr'-s, Ken VVatts. ba£.ed on the BBC's popular cur:--ent affcdr:.:> prograr11 
Tonight llng!is 1983c: ::'.66), Once an idea is floated it rr1ay be discus~,eo 
at many ievels ".vithin the organisation before prouucer-:; .:::i.r.d d:roc1ors f101n 
the relevant departmt?-nt'.3 prepare a detalied submi:::s1on on 1h0 
ram. l\ typical suom\ssion vvill map out the intoncnd forrnt::!t, rnediurn 
nnc purpose oi tho pr::::pos.eo program nnd address quostions of rosourccs, 
ovi:~r \-Vithin :nc f\BC hut fpw rcuch the r.ubmisslon o, 
Submissions are considerPd oy :;<::Hiio-r rnanagetr1nnt tu1;j, if they appoar 
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promising, may be roierred to the Board, though it is management's 
prerogatlve to decide which new program ideas :;hou!d bo presenied :o the 
Director;::,. For rnajor ne'N projocts a pilot episode will be produced, Thus 
the Board wa~; ablo to view in mid-1984 a pilot of The f\Jationai. a one 
hour r10VV$ t:Jnd bael<:ground current affairs program to h0gin on i18C 
television in lV:arch 1985. Boara membern showed the;r aoproval of the 
concnpt by the pi!ot episode a standing ovation ( Boynr 1984) This 
~;election process insure:-, that ABC Directors and executives are aware of 
the subject area. the required commitment of resources and the b1o 
returns in controversy a new program might bring. Assessing submisc;lons 
glv@s the Board and rTtanagement a chance to maintain or extend the 
boundaries c;i A8C aciivity. Thus Ken VVatts had dlif1cu\ty 
pcrsu,:irjing his follow rnanagers to support his submission to begin tho 
C>xpen!;:-ivc~ and potentially controversial Thia Day To:11gt1t. Some !-:o.vG 
SfJGCUil.l!8G rhat /\BC Chairman Sir James Darling was aiso a good doa! 
!nss than 00:husiastic about ttle propo5a!, f·~evertheless VVatt' s f orcctui 
::irgumon:::: ,1nd the support of key producers and managers finaily provailoo 
the 1\8(; to Cl nighHy eurrent atialrs program, 
CJncP ;~ ::;rogr:1n1 subrni0zicn and pliot are approvea, ~he rnanagers wnh 
!ine rcsponsihHny 1or the new service drav1 up a 'progrem bric:!' in much 
the same term as tho origlnal submiss~on, Thls progrGm briet 8Stab!ishc~;; 
the iormnt. charactor, boundaries :Jnd budget for the nevv sorv1c0. 
case oi n0v--1s nnd current atfalrs proposals, the brief rn.':1y rom;nd 
oroducer;:. of the /\B;:'s cornmitn1ent to objectivity, impart1a!lty and bo.iance 
by draviflng a:tentlon ~c tho ABC''.'$ program po!icic:s and pr;;ictics·s. Tho 
program brief ~-s a dor;urncnt for reference in c.:1se of ~nt8r 0i:::puto anout 
the purpose. procedure or !\nos of authority about the progra1r1. 
1\ brfef, re$ourcos and tirn0tobl0 are then assigned to ,::n1 f\fJ(~ 
d(;!partment vvhich is givon rosponsibiiity for producing tho pragrun1, ·rnat 
donartment v-.iill appoint an nxocutive producer 1o oversee ttie project. 
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There 1Nlll inevitably be c:xtenslvo consuitation cot\vee-n tho exocutlvo 
Droducer 8nd lino m;magement during program prnpurntion, The 
lnfioxibiiily ot the f\BC's centrai budgeting system ensures a long 
correspondence as the executive producer dis.covers that scme ot the· 
rc;:;i:;:.1rr.:os required are not those ~specified ln ihe program briof and !1::is 10 
negotla.te for euch varla1Jon, The dlvislonat rivo!ry vnd tr-ie lack ot 01fecr1va 
.:;ommunicntion between diffarc1nt departments may prevent tho full u::,o ot 
J~\ 21YiJilGD~G 1\.BC talent for the nMw program, The Dix Committee citnd tho 
historic iack of liaison betv1een Public Affairs prograrnmers and the ~Jev1s 
Divi0.ion vvhir;h "means that sornB vveli-acXncw!edged experts on particular 
subiec:i::::, in either grouping are not consulted by the othor 1n tf"!o 
or«3oaration of programs" ( VoL 2: 190) 
-:--'Jr:;,rjucti:Jn tlrne for ABC nev1s and currc:nt affairs prograrns rungos from 
,-;:r;ry•-ri:: o'f \tJorl<: ':1nd consultation for a /=our Corners in-depth investiqati\'f.! 
:E~lt:vi"_;ion rnoort 10 oniy a few hours oi hasty compilation for /.\£:,C n01ion23i 
program_ 
changes ;n 
Ciiroctors varies groat!y according t() the ncv ot 
i\110:,:.1 oxGcut1v0 producors insist, hcvvcver, thut once a 
L!ne munEJgoment rnonitor0 the progres:::. of :.:ie 
fvian;;:1gers may nn3ue about production details or apparent 
sls but daily re$ponsibility to conform with the progrvrn 
brief re:T:t"1!ns \i/lth tn2 G:<c.:i.cutivo producc..;r, 
Oo-1ly in oxtremr: c21ses 'Nill ;nnn;:190rn0nt i:~suo a directive instruct\ng tno 
executive prcducr:r or oepurtrn\0nt hend to change prograrn prac-:ice. Tho 
Corporation ;\ct ( 1 <JB~'.) 
rds, a diroctlon given by a per::,on h:Jving 
authority to give tne <;1rect1on, C:oing ;:i directive with •Nhlch it is his duty 
as an cificor to comply" (;:, _ 6/f, 1 Q3) . /\n offic:or couid appoai nst 
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any ruiing of misconduct. Though charges of misconduct have been 
threatenBd at t!rTI8$ (as in the 1076 dtspute over 1he Boyer lectures) . 
there is no ev1dencEJ of a ch:2rge ever being brought f.lgalnst a prodt..tcer 
over a di:-:.puted program judgernent. The likely rosult of an attempted 
chGlrge v-Jou!d be a national strike by AB(; staif, 
In fact the 'Norking rolationsh;p between managers and production units 
(iepends on mutual respect for spheres oi responsibility. 
between ABC~ radio executive producer John Beeston 
management is an example. Beginning in the ABC 
The relationship 
and ABC radio 
delivering mail. 
Beeston taught himself radio production skills and while in his mid-20s 
became producor of tho 3LO radio program Melbourne Thie; Morning, 
hosted by Terry Lane, Before tVfelbourne This Morning. Lane had been 
lnvoived In ~,everal controversial programs and t1ad been rernovc:d from air 
ln l ;J77 'Nh~;n he v1a3 t1lghiy critical of the Queensland government's ''rough 
handiing of anti-uraniurn demonstrators in Brisbane" (tiarding 1979: 106}. 
In i 982 L;:ine -.,vas back on the t\BC. with a program frequen'Uy dealing \Vi th 
state an;:; fodora! politics, /\s pro,jucer Beeston received phcne calls from 
usua!!y .'.]sking for tirne to reply to a reDorI er 
EV(-7n as a young ,:1nd inexperienced producor e,00:;:.;ton \V3S nor 
requireo ~o refnr these to mnnagorrient; he v1as encouraged to 
use hls 'progr0m jadgernent' by consulting wHh Lane und making his O'.Vn 
decision on access, \iVhen irttervlevvcd Beeston talked oi managemen1 as 
"distant people most oi \-vhom he did not Kno•..r and ccuid ignore. Ho 
could not remernb-c:rr Gver recolving a directive from management to change 
h\s style or program content ( Bees~on 1982). VV!thin 1ha 1\BC E\ees1on 
acquired a forrnidablv rapu1at1on fer his ;ndependent judgomont and refusui 
to bow 10 unsubtle dcrr1ands Trom aggrl0ved Victorian poiitlc'.ans; yet /\BC 
management upparent!y had no hesit.Jtion in .:::ippointtng Boenton C::xecu11ve 
Producer of the nationai doily r::id\o current aftairG radio program_ Ptv1 
during 1984, 
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\!Vhen watching Bees ton and the Pf\-1 team at \York, tho ditflculHes of 
rnanagernent involvement in program decisions bocorne apparer:\, 1\:Vi CJ:nd 
P1\'l are "distinguished by an advanced degree oi proiGssionatism, ur:d 
exploiting particularly 1he ability of modern radio to inject an~the-spot 
intr:?rviews nnd commGntar!es from distant parts of the world d1rec·dy ir.to 
th8 program" {Sernm!er 1981: 99), Preparation by the staff an exocut!vo 
producor, announcer, 1echnlr;ian and several reporters ins a few 
f;ours bBfore F1fv1 goes on air at 6: 05 pm, \!Vhlie the generai shnpe of thr:"! 
program has emerged before transmission. and somo items have already 
been edited and transferred to tape, many of the stories, particularly tho so 
from the ABC's Parliament ~!ouse bureau. go to air live_ Once 
broancasting begins the oxecutivo producGr co-·crdinatos reports and 
p1tJpares ne\v items \VhUe the program's compere uses his or ner 
n1rit:n1 on the length of interviews, adding or deleting ~tor1ns nnd 
cYi:.-;:--i91ng the shape of the program as issu-EJS deve1op, The prnouction o; 
,',:~'" r~;uu1re0 rupld de-cision-making w\th no time for r;onsu112t\on v,iiti1 
i'Y1onagers listen and corr,ment at10'r 1ho 
;-:;cht:!Q<;c::s and g2nera! program policy nnd prac1lc2s, 
c:i.ov1r:::,. c:n ;~: ;Jcrsistcnt problem 'Nith tho prograrn. Sut 9\v0n that '.io 1nucn 
of ,,~;,\A ;;vf_:.llv0~;; v1hila the program ls 011 air. the sen so ot J\)!!dnrny of lhe 
P:"v! ~;c,tJm 0nd the '/1ay issues often emerge in tl1G frantic r"7Jinutos tH0foro-
urH1 dur:r;g tra.:i:::rnis:.1011. lt would be very difficult lndood for 0 rnanagor ic: 
be aiertcd u_; nn lmpending i-:em or issue D directive in tirno to provern_ its 
inclusion ir1 ;:he progr:im. 
A minor r:xun1p10 cf tho ::;peod at vvhich decisions rnust tH?1 rnado for 
iive-to~3\r f3dio currc:ni atfa!rs programs was observed on 21 Soptornbor 
1082, {)n !hilt d;:;y Prirr,e ~·/llrdster fvlalcolm Fraser refused to uccept the 
resignation of Prl;r-1ary i;,cu-stry N1inister Poter f\iixon fol!o..,ving tho tabliqg of 
a Royr.:i:! Coi·nmlssion rooor1 critical ot the Minister, 
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and oroadctisi irorn Sydney but much of its political commentary comes live 
frcm the /\BC ~_,tuc!o in ParHarnent House, Canberra, /\s Pt\i! via::. 
preparing to go to air en this evening, /-\LP Opposition feader Bill Haydon 
and academic P::itr:ck Woller were silting in the Pnrlian1ent House $tudio 
with A.BC reporter Stophen ~viil!s, vvaiting to comment on the political 
cri;-:ds, 
J\t 13. 02 pm one of the Prime Minister's press secretaries racod inta the 
/\BC studio to announce that the Prime Minister was prepared to go on air 
and defend t~ixon. This news was relayed to Hvw Evans, !he PM compere 
in Sydney, who suggested that Mills interview Fraser, The press secretary 
that Fr3ser v1ould only speak with Evans and 10ft, P~A bBgan :Jt 
6: OS pm v1ith t1xcerpts from the Prime iviinister's earlier pross conference, 
V\/hi!n :f!G tcipe v1as runn\ng tho prass officer retLlrned to say that Fr::iser 
had .:t9roed to spr~aK with Mills. Evans was conzuited in Sydney and tn'.s 
timo he immeair.u:eiy declined aitogether to have Fraser speak on :he 
program, instond he interviewed t-layden and Weller on tho crisis. th2:1 
moved to other issue& (Weller 1983). 
1Jt·/! corr:oero ~18\N Evans and his o:r:ocutive producer thus ::ihov1ed they 
cou!o exercise thf;lr program judgement and retuse alr t!mG to the Prime 
MinistGr o1 !\US1ra!io vvlttiout having to consult senior managoment, The 
ABC nad come a long way from the practice of 1he early 1960;:; whon no 
producer could invi1c a politician to speak on the /.\BC v;!thout permission 
from the Generai fvianager. \t\lhi!o Fraser apparf0ntly accepted as legitirnnte 
the program decision rnade by PM compere and exocutivo prooucer, 2nd 
while that comper0 and producer felt they cou!d rriake such a decision 
v;ithout repercus-:;.ionc from management. it is perhap;:: \;;orth noting thnt 
much of the nnxt day's ndltion of f?M was devoted to a detailed in~ervie'N 
vvi1h Fraser, 
This ,0 M incident indlcatHs the clo~e working relationship oc-tvveCJn 
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poHHclans and the media in Parliament l4ouse. .i\8(:. journalists ;,vork1 ng in 
the press gallery are in constant contact with po!lttc1ans and their staft. 
many of whom are ex-journalists. The atmosphere ls competitive but ony 
nt:>.WS- CJr rumour rapidly becomes comn1an Knovvledge around the House, It 
is dlfflcult for a politician to suppress a 5tory once rumours begin, or for 
the management of n media organiszroon to ignore nev1s being given 
prominent coverage by competitors. The 1\BC's Parliciment House bureau 
ls so vvsH-integrated into the press gallery that "any direct interference by 
management or politicians would be likely to be covered by the rest of the 
gallery" {Creed 1982l , 
and avoiding contact 
The bureau has a reputation for being very 'bol\y' 
with management; the cramped conditions of the 
ABC's Parliament t1ouse offices and the tremendous work pressure, enable 
s1aff to iranscend the division between Public Affairs and News staff 
e!;:.e\Nhore In the crganisation. ABC Parliament House journalists are oroud 
of th0 autonorny oi their bureau and pofnt to the imrnediacy or their 
!ivc1 -tc-,C'1ir r:::Jports, their ioentificaHon with press gallery peers rather tnan 
nth..:::r 1\BC staff und their r0moteness frorn the rest of the organlsatiCHl as 
factor:', vvn1ch help th2m maintain this independence. 
1\::-. 'N(d! a::. ns1£~nt.J;ncous r>Jdio rnalerial, the Parliament l-{ouse buroau 
There is an ABC studio in 
the press offlcos :Jnd a rnobl!e camera crew to cover events in and around 
the building, Though Gome television items will go to air Hve. rno~t arc 
pre-recorded and cdliod before transmlssion, For ilfJC~ TV's popui;:ir 
current atfairs progr.srn t\!ation\.vido considerably more planning, resources 
and personnel are roquircd than for r1!Vi, 
f\Jationwide replaced Thi0 Day Tonight :n 1079 nnd o.ppearnd each 
\veeKn\ght until its dcmir;.o at thn s·na of 1081]., Giver: its later tlrne :;iot 
and program brief for f2v1er :Jnct rncro topic21.I items, f\Jation\.v1de, ::;:aid one 
ABC manager, ''v:ou!d 0DvL::i10 tne criticism tllat <ic.diy curront .uff;::urs 
trivialises oH that 1t touc1100'' ( ing\is 1983a: 352) . 
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co-ordinated from Sydney, with local comperes for the eo1tions :;een in 
l\lf::)\1\l, Victoria, South Australia. Queensland, Tasmania and \!Vestern 
/>.ustraiia, 
Canberra, 
Ail used material from the Parliament f-louse s1udio in 
f\/ationvvfde could run as a single natlonul program !or 
lmportani segments or be divided into states for more local issues, Tho 
decision was taken by the program's executive producer in Sydney, nf1er 
consultation with state producers. 
Bocaute television is a tin10 and labour intensive medium, 1hero is less 
5ccpe than in radio for sudden a:terations to a program, For Nationwide, 
daily telephone conference,; between state and executive producers al 9: 30 
am and 5: 30 pm established program content and the mix between 
national and local stories. In case of a dispute or a new item sucoenly 
becoming available, the executive producer in Sydney had a right to crdGr 
ttiat the i1em bo included in a state edition, At times f'>Jation~vide v,;as 
produced 'on ::;ite', During the 1984 /,LP National Conference, tor 
exarr,ph-:-:. tho progrnm -.vent 'live' from 1,.:anbt:!rra's Lakeside l-iote!, Thn 
scone was chaos- f\s politicians were moved in and out oi mo 
1ntervi01wing chair :Jny n1anagoriai control was \mposs.ibie as ov~n rrie 
executive pro:iucnrs v.;ere not certain from minute to minute who \vouid be 
availcbi0 for !nt0rvii:.:v; /.\t iess he-ct!c times, howev .. 1r. the reiatlvely long 
preparation period and the large number of personne! and resources 
involved ln making 1\laUon'>vide. gave some scope for n1anagem0nt to 
become lr:voived in deci$lon-maKing about the program and to be ciwaro fd 
1tems betore they vvent to air. 1f. for example, fVationwide film01j an 
interview but th0 intGrv1evvee Y1ithdrew permission for it to ba sho.,,,;n (a 
common occurrence 'Nhen people reflect on what they have 0aid nnU 
decide they don't want :o ~ee it on national television), the ABC Program 
Policy and Practice For ABC fladio end Teievision document specificaliy 
required that the deci::;ion be roforrod directly to senior management ( l\BC 
Hl8lc:21l. 
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f\Jnverih0iess. executive producers took their rosponsibi!ities very se:;riously 
nnd few \Vere Hl<oly to accept ;,.vith equanimity a management directive on 
program content. 
tVationtvide mostly escaped the constant potitica! controversy v-1hich 
surrounded Thi11 Day Tonight. This was partly due to the wider acceptance 
cl current affairs reporting by politicians and public; it may also have 
reilectcd the fairly staid human interest/consumer affairs emphasis of 
fVotionwide over the more directly politlcal subject mat1er of This Day 
Tonight. Nationwide also had fewer opportunities to cause controversy 
because the aggressive interviewing style of long-time Nationwide political 
correspondent Richard Carlton led some politicians to avoid appearing on 
the program. Media reports ln July 1983 suggested that while there had 
"certr:linly not" been a policy decision by Prime Minister Hawke and hls 
t~,sihinc~t to boycott f\Jationwide, government ministers had never1hGles0 
oe;;11nea "40 or 50" ln•1itations to appear on f\Jationv1ide since winning cffico 
tnrne months previously (The Australian 30 July 1983: SJ. 
·r::.i!l~~; c1nd commentarie:s, the traditional controversial actvltv er -~\BC 
radio, ,-_:dso have a rcintively iong preparation period and so can bo vetted 
by i11nn2gr::ment. ABC policy requires that a script of any cornmernary be 
avai!abl8 for checking before transmission, because many of tho acacomics 
and spe:cirdistt. invlled to cornmont have neither the broadcasting expertise 
nor legai skills to understand Australia'$ tortuous libel und dufarnatioo 
!.3v1s. Though tho 1\BC has an undorstandable in1erest ln avoiding iogai 
actions, the monitoring function has nevertheless been used ta ccn::.or 
rnater:a! v1hich an /'>8C manager feared might cause controversy. 
quotes Leicoster V\/ebh" Profossor of Political Scio nee <Jt the Af'J 1J, 'Nriting 
to ABC t~hairrnan Darting in l 962 to complain that tnree tirr;fJs ho hnd 
refrained frorn di;:.cussing the government's cornmunication poiicy during 
/i.Bt'".:: prograrns ". , . in respor1:"e !iJ personal appoa!s from the top levels of 
the i1BC. " Webb lold Darling ne was unhappy about personal persuasion 
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being used to prevent a topic being discussed; this, noted V'Jebb, could 
al! too easily !Rad to prP-ferenco for commentators v1ho can be relied on 10 
be 'reascnab!e' { !ngii:::. l !'383a; 237}. 
ln pract1cR scripts ure rarely requested or suppfied for the NewtJ 
r:ornrnentary :Jnd B~cfrqround Briefing talks recorded for ABC 
radio. !ar current affairs programs have taken over the need for 
'objective. irnp.~r\iai 21nd balanced' background discussions. so these talks 
c2u1 no<vv c-e oresentc~d as the personal opinion of the specialist rather than 
as ob.iective analysis. 
i\Joverth~lffSS ctitempts to assert management's right of veto over talks cun 
;:,till occ'Jr, Eminent /.\ustralian historian Professor Manning Clark v1as 
irwitca by the t1BC to g1vG its October 1975 Boyer Lectures. Clark was a 
prciminv;n1 critic ot the actions of the Governor-·(3onernl, Sir John Kerr, \n 
GBcr:.:ng the \/i/hit!am government ~n l\Jovember 197,5: as the date for the 
first lecture c:tpproached several L/ \\JCP backbenchers expressed doubt~ 
,:;ibo~1t '-'li:<:tnc·:r Clz.irk v1as a fit person to be gtven airtime on the ;\BC, 
£0,J.sn :\;:,hbc_,\t v.r::is then f-lead of the Radio Speciul Pro~ects Depar1rnent, 
';;ith 1;:spon::ibil1ty for producing the Boyer Lectures, On 24 Scplember ho 
receivec irom the ABC's Assistant Genoral Manager for rudlc, \-\8i1h 
l\~ackr1eil, w !~.::tter reques1ing advance copies ol Clark's lectures, Maci<riell 
based hls rBquost on difficulties posed by the "crfticisn1 of Professor 
Manning Clark by Senator Carrick" (Inglis 1983a: 3981. /1shboi1 interpretea 
this order as Mackrioil claiming the right to edit the work of his former 
history professor. Ashboit refused to comply. accuslng fVlacKri01i of 
wantlng to 0xorci5g "blatant politica! censorship,., plainly linked to 
governmental pressures'', f\shbo!t requested a Commission ruling on the 
legltirnacy of fvlackrieli's in::;tructions lHarding 1979: 74). The 
corresponoonce was leaked tc the commercial media and appeared 
verbatim in the Sydney Morning i1e>rald ol 6 October 1976. 
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Mackriell. now supported by ABC Chairman Sir Henry Bland, issued a 
fur1her ordE:·r to 1".\shbolt that his department supply advance notice of 
programs produced by tho Special Projec1s Department in general and 
scripts of the Boyer Lectures in particular, Mackriell' s memo concluded 
that "a most serious view wiii be taken of any faiiurn by you to comply with 
this direct order" (Inglis 1983a: 398) 
A public controversy erupted Academics wrc1e letters 10 nev,ispapors 
protas1ing at what they perceivHd as censorship. ABC radio producers met 
to express no confidence in Mackrieil. Elsewhere, the ABC Senior Officers' 
/'.ss.ocialion endorsed MackriRli's right to decide what went to air. An 
articlR in Quadrant argued 
Nothing should go to air on tho ABC until an ABC offic0r has 
road it, nothing whatsoever, Thl$ is not censorship, just sense, 
it shouid b0 applicable 10 everyone whether the Governor-Genorai 
or :rn 0minen1 historian or an ordinary academic writing a news 
commentary. The ABC has an obligaiion not to allow treason, 
onscon1ty. or a cDll tor bloody revolution to go through it:; 
channels, CFrasor 1976: 17) 
\;\ihr:;n tho Cornrn:::.slon mo1 on 12 October 1076. "opinion around the 
1983a'. 399), c;.ir t1enry aiand ro!d rne Cornrnissioners. th01 "tht1 rnwtter v1as 
essentially a munagemont affair'' but some Con1ml3sioners v1ere not to be 
put off. arguing that the text oi ~liackr!el(s rnemo "could only be read us 
giving rise to r:,usplcions that political conslderationo. hud \ntrud1::id :n 
relation to tht:i fvlanning Clark lectures" ( Cornmis~lon iv1inutes: 1t i , 
lengthy niscussion, and disagreements ovGr araftlng, lhe Cornrniscion 
issued a statement to the vvaiting pre$s 
The invitation to ProfeGsor M21nning Clark to dc!ivor the 8oyor 
Lectures rested on hfs distinction iJS an historian. They wih bo 
broadcast as ho has \vritten and recorded them, They viii! noi bo 
subject to review. 
It has been the proud record of the ABC that it has not 
permitted its program::; to be subjected to any political influence, 
This wHl continue 
fustification for 
imerforence that 
to bo 
anyone 
:horo 
Commission's stand. 
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the ABC's stance, 
drawing 
hari been 
from 
some 
There 's thus no 
recent events nny 
deviation from tho 
;j any balance were needed to any Lectures or any other 
program. the f\BC would attempt 10 achieve it in the course ci its 
normal practice of programming to accomodate di!ierent altitudes, 
political or otherwise, 
Senior responsible staff are clearly entitled, if they choose, to 
require from program makers details of proposed programs, For 
the most part. ihe standards and procedures laid down in the 
Program Standards guideiines adoprnd by the Commission in 
September 1975,., whose implementation rests heavily on the 
cio$e co-operation of program mal<ors and senior f1BC staf!. meet 
the general run of situations, The fac1 that the guidelines provide 
a referral procedure - in the !cist resort to the Commission itself 
- enabling problems confronting program makers to be reviewed, 
does no1 derogate from the overall re;;ponsibiiities of S\'.}nior 
management staf1 to the Commission. 
lvlacKrio!l offered his r-csignation but this v1as not uccepted, in Canberra 
the Prime fvi'ln!ster's pross secretarv "expre;;.sed the govornmont·s 
embarrassment CJnd annoyance at the i,vhole 1r.cidon1: 0na Fraser himself, 
in conversation 'Nith on1or CoffH11Js~;ioners. v-1ent cu1 of h1s v;ay to stress 
that Giana had not he-en nc11ng on nis ins:trucuons·· { Tii'.1ff1 197D: 75). 
The Boyer Lecture incldent indicates t:ie oilen1ma iacing ABC managers, 
They are sufiiciently removed from the production process that rney cannot 
kno'H in advance all the activities of the VDrious proouction units. :1 i-:J 
difflcuH for managors to anticipate v-1hen and 'Hf1ere programs uro hning 
1nade '.vhich might damage tho organisation, Through 
responsibility for such productions, managers cannot o;;.;si~v assert that 
authority; production units do not willingly r,urrenoor the right to rr1ake 
progr,Jm }udgements <Jnd the sheer voiume of output rnoans rniJnagemont 
Can often do little iTI01'8 th:J:n monitor programs to Ch8C~Z that (:::::1rporation 
guidelines on program poiicy and practice are being observea :'vlan;:;igers 
may not even be a¥-1ure of program content until a politica! controvor::.y 
erupts. In 1964 S(0nfor manager Clement Semmler banned an !tom on 
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capital punishment due to be broadcast by f=our Corners on the eve oi an 
execution \n V'Jestern f\ustra!ia. Semmler claimed 10 havr: acted from 
professionaf }udgornent, not from po1iticnl pressure, but as ingils note~ "it 
is unllkeiy that he v1ould have had the er.a.nee to make that judgement if 
the poi!tlc:ians. in P8rth had not $pOken up. for until they did so he had 
:cot known that tho itom was being made" ( 1983a: 2231, 
!n thfJ later 1970::; suspicion aro0e YJithin the organisation ihat ;\BG 
rnanA:gemorYt v-11,is trying to tone dovvn the 
programs to avoid iurther arnagonising 
content und ::;cooe 
the government. 
of /'.\BC 
/\BC 
management, it was claimed, used the excuse ol budget cuts to run rJown 
the resources Bvailabie for news and current Gfta1rs progrnrns.. 
refused to endorse new programs which rnight prove 
contrnversio.l. /\lan Ashboh specu!atod that program$ with a radical tinge 
'uouid bn aHoc::rtod to tate-night or io\v audience spots, tl'1'1t a f11ghcr 
pcrcernaga of conservative than radical analy$lS would be u:.oo ~n nev-1s 
ccmrnBntor1vs vnd th;:it budget mon~y \.Vould be "he!d back from production 
\O of·fcnd consensual views" { 1G75: 192). 
tim'.d n1anPJgem0nt \vas inadverttJnt!y serving the intere2.t::; oi ·.1 ho:;tii0 
g:ov121rnm0n1 'h'as bo110v0d from production units to \l".e top cf tho i\BC; 
C;ornm!ss1oner Richard t·tardlng 'Nrote thnt the Fraser ,;;ovornrnent naa: 
"recognised t;--;nt. it there v1ns still a need to c;ontrol 1he t\BC. lt ccuid be 
best done by !ctting managerncnt run it. The naturai consorvati'.:lm of ,1 
Public Servi~e orientated organisation vJould tEJnd to r1old radicwl~srn and 
dissen1 :n check" ( i4arding 1979'. 97), 
Cf::rtainly the GVidoncc ::-,ugges.is ihat management v1us deepiy concornod 
about causing conirovr:r::.;,y. Former Doputy Gcnerai iv1anoger Clornont 
Semmler''.':l rnemoirs oi hi'.:':, t:mo in the .L\BC reveal nis acuto sons!tivity to 
the risKs of clfendlng poiit\ctans. i-!o remembers vJatci11ng Ll: sati•o on ;::: 
politician s 0p0ech nnd "w.::liting for the trumpet to :-.ound frorn C:inborra 
and the walls of the A.BC to crumble" ( 1981: 102). Semmler a:>sor1s 
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{ibid: 36) the frequent expc:dient of censorship in .::inticipation of n hostile 
government reaction. but later zipparently contradicts himsei! when he 
notes from experience the difficulty oi a manager wanting to intervene in 
lhe content of a current affairs program : 
if an item is queried. or an attempt is made to forbid it. 
there nre loud cries of censorship and even threats of Industrial 
aciion with the possibility of the ABC going off air. Compromise 
ls too often tho result, ·.vith the broadcasters v1inning hands 
oo·t1n, t 1981: llOl 
The hostility of staff toward any management intervention in program 
matters. is evident in submissions to 1he Dlx Committee. The NSW branch 
of the f.\BC Staff Association. for exzimple. "took the view that the very 
existence of a management hierarchy possessing an cditorla! role (as 
distinct frorn 'manngen18nt' in terms cf resource allocation) comprised n 
form of interference (Vol. 2: 1 G2) . 
It mav bo true thnt managem<::nt ;n the later 1970s sho'NGd less 
crr!:hu:;L:::ism thnn previous GxEcutives for r:ov-1 program propo:::;uis, out there 
Bc:-vcr:c the: nxternaHy 
the thesis thvt a c!oc:inG in tne on:J.lyticz.d capac;ty ot ::10 :\3C 1,-vas 
deliberate management policy to appease f::Oiiticians, 
In the first place tnere v1ns no signiflc.:i:nr c n1 ~he re::::.ources 
allocated by management to news and current .J.ft2lrs prograrns 1n t:1e 
period betwonn 1975 and 1980, Flgur8s presen18d tc the L)ix Cornmittee 
show that dlrcct r ... ac expend~ture on puhlic aHairs and novv:::. progrnn1s rose 
by an average o! 11 % pa between 1976177 and l Cl7G/E>O (Vol. 2: 200l. 
Vl/hite double digit infla1ion m.ade this a budget cut in rr:nl terms. ths nev.i:> 
and public aftnirr,. figurGs ore Gi:\H bottar than the wvcrage .nnnu<:il rate of 
increase for thn overall org-1.nisation over the sume poriod. 'Nhi811 was 
9, 18°10 (ABC Annual Report 1901/82: 12-13), 
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Evon v~·ith reduced recourco0, the range of news and current affairs 
programs remnined consiant on ABC radio llnd declined only slightly on 
f.;.81.,: television, VVhl!e there w1~re ::>ignificant changes in prograrns 
Doubi•?take r<e:cplacod Broadband and Latolino on ABC radio iJnd Nationwide 
::;uppianted This Oay Tonight on 1\BC television -· the overall airtime devoied 
to nev;r,, 21nd current 0.ffnirs on tne ABC did not t.lgnificuntly change during 
the difficult yr1ars betv.ieen 1976 and the abolition of the Commission in 
10[13 'n 1076 ABC radio devoted 11, 63% oi total airiime to spoken word 
featurcn. inc!urtlng talks. documen1aries and nev1s commentaries, J\ 
further 9, 76% o1 total /\BC radio airtime was devoted to news broadcasts, 
f\BC: t~levisicn devoted 15. 93°/o of total transmission time to "public 
in1err;;st" material and a iurther 6. 68o/" to nO\.VS broadcasis <Annual Report 
1Ct76177: 52-52}. in 1981/82. the seventh consecutive year of budget culs 
a:nd =~t:1tf cei!ing'.3. 1\8C radio had incroast:d its avorage to 13'1~ of 1otal 
v;ord features and 9. 7% to news broadcasts, /\BC 
r_,3lovision n1:-tlme devoted to 'public interest' programs had doclinod ~!igh1ly 
ro 11 .5S~;o v:!th nevv~ bro,::tdca0ts remiJining cons1ant at 6. 72''Yn (;\nnuui 
t= do not measure quruiity; standards may nave deciinud vvith tho 
reduction !n rot.ourcor.. and thB- exodus ot talent from the 1\81...: iO thG 
commercial rnedla. The quantitutive evidence. however. both financial 2u1d 
in. transmission hours, ::.uggests no lessening oi ;"'.;8C commitment to 
provide a comorohensivFJ nG\Vt. and current ;:Jffairs :;ervicos, 
The second important point abour a!leged rnanngernerit censorship to 
avoid antagonising :he paym_-J~ler ls th;:n :iny such ::;trategy - if !t existed ~ 
failed. Tllo /\BC's budgo1 ~,tcadi!y declinod in real tc:rms fr{:;1n 1D76 to 
1002 - a decline that :>EH)n1s nnrelatod to specific 1\BC progr<1ms, 
Harding suggests that Prirne i\~in!'.:';ier Fraser per;;onnl!y dB!:>igned w. 
long-term strategy to "tu me thEJ 1\BC~". u proc0ss comple1ed ··.vith the 
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chairm.::tnship of ,John f\iorgard from 1977 (Harding 1979; 119), The 
accusation that mZJnagemont behaved on cue, that it he!ped Fraser 'tame' 
the ;\BC is too simplistic to be acceptable, The decline of the A3C from 
1976 as on innovative force in Australian news and currGnt affairs 
broadcasting has more complex causet; than occasional {and of1C?n 
unsuccer,sfuD 0ttcmpts at censorship from a timid management performing 
the difflcuit <Jnd unpopular task ot presld\ng over a shrinking budget and 
:Brious 1mpasttfons on the ABC~'s administrative independence, ABC nev1s 
and current aifairs programs declined in quali\y \\hough not in quantity) 
because of thG overall squeeze on resources. the shortage of talented 
trained ::taff nnd the cumbercome structure of the organisation wn1cn 
inhibirr,d initiative rind tied up production stail in administrative tasks, 
Demarcation disputes ever nc1w tochnology denied ABC production ur.lts the 
advantages of etectron1c news gathering cameras, disputes between J\BC 
deoar1morns resultGd 1n duplicated services and there was a tack of 
!e,:Jdershio caused by the rapid turnover of Commissioners. The 
comml1rnent to a professionalism did not v1aver: but the nbility ~o r.;0 
profcss10na! - through trainlng and 2aequate support - dimin1sned, 
There are some politically sensitive areas ~n which management ano the 
Board, rather tnan production units. are required to make }udgements, 
These include elections, addresses to the nation by the Prirne Minister and 
1he Opposition's right \o rnpiy on ABC airtimrL 
\ti/hen a state or foderai eiect!cn is announced, time is set aside~ in the 
A.BC schedules for party political broadcasts. Available airtime 1s divided 
lnto five rnlnute block3 then distributed to the political parties Recording to 
their ~measure of s!gniflcant public support" CABC 1981c: 28). This tigurc 
is determined by a formula oi 0ggrngate votes at the previous election. A 
report on the d\str1but1on of alrtirne is prepared by management and 
approved or altered by the Board. 
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Cornplairrts trom political parties nbout thi$ arrangement have u;:;ually 
beon nrguments about the formula for dintribution ot air time raiher 1hcin 
dccusntlons that the ABC is exhibiting i<lvouritism or bias, The dlfflcui!ie::?: 
of d!stributing alrtimo were most acute during the election of 1949. ln 
tr1Bt ysar ihe Commission decided that political par1ies which contested 15% 
ol seats and nominated candidates In at least three states wouid be 
c:ilgible for a!rt!mo, Labor and LlbBrrtf politicians complained when they 
raahsed this formula would givA ziirtime to the Communist Ptlrty of 
f\u::;tralta. The Co1nmisston held n special meeting after complaints from 
\he; Chiiiey government and decided to add a new criterion : to be given 
ai:"1im(;; political parties must be able to demonstrato "sufficient s1gn1ficunt 
pubHc support'' at the previous election. which was defined as either 
having n memner elected or wlnn~ng 5~'o oi tho vote \ ln9Hs 
1G83u: 17-t-172}. To appease the consensus v1iihin Parliament, 1hn 
Comrnuni::.ts 't1ere excluded from 1\BC airtime. 
Tho oniy recent accusations of political interference in the distribution of 
r:doction t)ro~dcnst$ came in October 1983, v;hen the QueensL::;nd l"Ja1ional 
:::::rt<: government accur:>Gd the ivilnlster tor Cornmunlcotlons ot ieanlng 
on the ;\_f:3G to give more party political bronccast timo to tht? 1\LF} durlng ;:i 
sir.rte e!Oction campaign. The fvHnister. i1Aichae! Dutfy, rejectod any 
:sugg2s1lor·, of inff::rterence In the independence of the 1\BC, c;:d!ing \no 
aiiegatlon u "barie!e:::.n and disgraceful lie'· (C,no Vo1. :32 1i3 t)c1ober 
1983:1815). Duffy passed on information, ~~upplied by thr.:: /J.8C;. o'f n 
Board der.ision to grzint the L.::bor. f"jatfcnal and Libera! partie;:, 60, 40 .Jnd 
40 minuter, rt?spf1ctlv0iy each ot free time for e~ocrio:i. unnouncamc:ints. 
ABC policy, reported Duffy, is that the ABC news cover ago v1ould refloct 
the Board's a!iocaHon 0f tree Hn1e: "that 1::;. that tho duration ot nows 
coverage be. as c!oso ;:is ls practicable, in i1 riJtlo of 3: 2: 2 for the 
respective parties· (ibid: 1815). Duffy concluded by noting '.hat ho rrnd 
instructed his soiici1or0 to ::;uo for libel tho0G in tho ()ueons!c:nd \\lutional 
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Pvrty 1Nho had mnde allogations of improper interference 1n ;:\BC 
decislon-·rnai<lng, 
The Dix Committee noted a submission from the Australian Journalists 
Association expros5ing concern about some management deci3lons tn 
a\locating time for party poiiticul broadcnsts and maintaining balance 1n 
election reporting, Complaints about news reports are inevitable, und 
under~ino the ''need for unequtvocai rules und also the time-consun1ing and 
diflicuit procP-ss of making detailed records" noted the Committee report 
CVoL 2: 193), 
BrJcause :::i.ustra\ian eiectinn campaigning is conducted through exoens1vo 
advertising camoaigns !n the commercial media, political parties anach 
relat!ve!y i!ttirJ importance on nccess to the smaH audiences of 1a1e~niant 
AE'.(: party poiltical bro.,dcast:;;, Politicians, however. frequentiy oxcress 
concern aboi:t pprceived bL3s in /c\BC nev1s and current affairs coverago 
Tho ,A.BC has prepared detailed guides for nt::tws and 
curreni affairs staff on hov1 10 handle election issues; program deci:;;1cn:'1 
should oe b2sod on the assumptions of "free speech, bv!ancea reporting 
Jnd imp::Jrti2iity" fABC 1981c: 2Q). An Eiectlon Co-ordinatlng Ofticcr is 
L:!ppointecJ during carnpaigns to oversee the program of party po~\ticul 
broadcnstr. ~nd eicction coverage and to field the !nev1tabiG c:1r.lpia1nts 
from politicians.. For the 1984 federal efection, ABC ~vianaging Director 
Gooffrcy VVhltehead appointed a ''\vatch dog cornmittee" chair.::;d ny former 
Age tv'lanaging Editor Rana Id MacDonaid. f~n:::werfng critici;::;r; tn11t 1Yie 
etttab!ishment cf such a cornmittoe showed a lack of faith 1n rn0 ;~BC'~ 
executive producers and reporter::;. Whileheaa replied 
politico I -.,_ conductor so they can go about their job of ro 
and analysing the campaign without feeling ;:;omebody v1iil phone 'Nith 
complaints that might distrac1 frorn their job" ( ;'\JUtionaf Time:; l Cl {)ctobor 
1904:6), 
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Thn right of Prime~ i'Ainisters to address the nation through the /\E?,1:; has 
been another cause of d!sputo. ABC policy requires ihat in the <:lb::ence 
o! a formal ministerial directive ordering the ABC to ~uop\y alrtin10 to the 
Prima iVHnister, any r1~quest for airtime must be forv1arded to 1hr: /\BC 
Chairman or fvlanaging Director through the officf; of 1h2 fviin1ster for 
Comrr: ur. ;cations, The request is considered by the Board ::Jnd a decision 
rnade: 00 request nas ever bosn denied, Once airtime is grantcid, thB 
f;,.8(; "r0serves tt1e right to offer the Leader of the Oppo::>ition time tor rnply 
urH1(:r cornparabie circumstances, The Prime Minister's office r~hou!d be 
made awar'1 of this principle at the time of the request". The Opposition 
Leader has three days from the Prime Minister's broodcast to request t;rne 
to rr,"'p!y and the ropiy must be broadcast within a vveeK of tha Prime 
However. no rig hi of reply will be g1von !! tho Prim<'! 
~A1nister's bro0dcast wa~ -~not of a party political nature" (ABC 198lc: 30). 
f\ iudgom0nt about v1hat ls and what is not "party poiihcai" -nus1 te mnc.ie 
by m,;)nJgGment and the Board of Director:;, 
contentiou::;. A'"' ()pp-osition spo~esman on Communicotions, :-:>on:J:1or ,Jonn 
'.:lo Cor.1n1iz.slon has seen fit to deny the L-e3Cor 01 
rhn ()pccsltion equaf time to answer blatan1 political broJOCdSTS bv 
thG incumbent Prime \\11inister, The Commission's expL3na~ions 
navo been T!ims'y and quite unsatisfactory. 
The question of a right of reply. however. !:::, only ;=-a rt 01 a 
much iargor probiern of 11ccoss for political partles, \r 'ticuia bo 
incun1bent upon a nevi Commission to v;ork out ruler; for thi•:;, 
taking into i1CCount not oniy the tvvo major polltlc;:it grc;upins::;,, but 
also sma!!or p.:irth')'.'.I ;:,uch as the f-\ustr;:liian [)emocrat'.'.J, 
( 1982: :33} 
The Dix Committee rocommonded that nn automaric right of roply bt~ 
wvai!abie to the Loader of ihBi Opposition ('JoL 2« 19:.\). 
however. 'nos 'Nritten into the /\u5trnfian Broc:idcDsting 
c;orporation Act ( 1983) ond ::-.o the right of ucces.s ancj reply remains n 
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decision ot the A8C Board, with each request considered on its merits. 
Tho p<Jtent:ui for accusations of partisan decisions remains. 
l'hP. rvtav 198~t Four rorners c:ontroversy 
in Aoril and May 1984 an ABC reporler and his film crew spe'lt three 
\\'Heks in f'dpUa New Guinea ( PNG) making a program tor the f\8C:''.'.; 
1c;\avision current affairs series Four Corners, Journalist Alian Hogrrn 
·vvctr.tGd to investigate tension betw0en Pt\lG and Indonesia over their mutu:i! 
bnrder 
On 15 May the Australian media carried reports that the PNG Foreign 
l\hinis1ry hod expressed concern to Australia's High Commissioner in Port 
Moresby, 8.obnrt Biren. about the Four Corner3 team. The Pl\fG 
r;nvernment ciaimed that the ABC reporter had enticed a rebel i'3atior 
:1.cro:.s th£? border onto Pf\JG 50il for un intervie\v. The rebel in qunst1on 
·:;<Js ,J;1ines f\\y2ro, tho neH~proclaimed leader of th!f:} 'Free Papua Group 
l C:PiviJ . :i motley collection of largely unarmed Papuans ::;eeking 10 ori-,.10 
tY1n \nuones:zins from \!Vest lrian. 
:ne r:omp1ox :nf;uonces on /\BC functional independence. 
study. 1qnts the limited role of management in imposing prograin 
juagerr\ents ;::nc 1he abiiity ot the staff to challenge those dec1::;ion;:-, <JS 
incornoat;bie Viith program policy and practice guldti!ines. Tho con1rover~.y 
promotod ::he re'!JCtant intervention of the- Board in a progr.J:m mattor, 
foi!ov1ing t!-10 rc·12 or the commercial media in focusing public utt0ntion on 
the f\BC and 't 10 \ivo up to its commitmont to independence, The 
f--\U!ltra!in.n g0ver'.lment ox;Jrossed concorn about the diplomatic 1mplicc.rtions 
of the program. but tho~e is no Bvidence of direct political lntervontlon. 
Rather it appears thnt a senior /\BC~· manager performed a pre~omptivo 
buckle in the expeciation cf government displeasure, 
in protesting about the progr~rn. ~he Pf\JG government stressed 
clcllmed lhat Hogan had broken ,;ensitivity of the border region 
underlaking with the PNG Police 
,:ind 
Corrimissioner 
encourage OPM members to cro~s !n10 Pf,JCi, 
not to cross the border or 
t-Hgh Commissioner Birch 
passed the Pf\IG government's rnesswg0 on to the DcpartmBnt ot Foreign 
t~ffnirs in Canberra. ·rhe Depurtmant rclGasnd a statement saying that the 
Australian government viewed the incidnn: 11s "u matter purely oetv1een the 
Pi\iG government and the ABC" <ConbP.rrri Tfrn(f:J 15 Nlay 1884), 
Further inquiries by reporters revea!od th3t ..t\ustra!ia's Department of 
Forf)ign Affairs had been in touch •.i.tith senior 1\BC mur.agers to point out 
th;:tt "soma allegation;:; concerning a Four f::orn0r:; interview wiih lrlan ~Juyn 
indopendence leader James i\lyaro would bG cau:.e for concern if thev wore 
correct" ( c:::inberra Times 17 ~Aay 19B4}. The foderi1l Secrct.Jry o~ the 
;\8('; ~3tDff lA.ssociation noted ''this does not rr18Dn t~;;it the t\u:,7.tra\ian 
~~ovfJrnrr1.1::nt v;as "ieaning" on the /\BC. In fact CJil that ·uas pul to 
th,-;; :\BC; v;us a diplom<Jt\c rGquest. a fact which we can only assun1e 
failed to porce1vo" CCollls George lGB4: lJ, Thn ABC: rndio 
CUf'.'fJ:lt ;:;fiairr.; program flft;f a!i0ged that tho- PJ\~G gcvernrner.t n<J.d :::nnt 2 
t-t'll0x 'i/h1ch also put prassure on /..\BC managen1z::>nt to :.;.rop \t1e irTtorv\ov; 
going to a!r. :;s schr::duled, on Saturday, ~!lay 26, 
Media reports o~.,.er the next few days confirmed that f.i,ustraH3n Foreign 
lv'iinister 8iil t-iayden hud roceiv0d a forrnal \Nrltten complqirt from Pi\JG 
about the a!~r;ged t:J.ctivitie$ of the television team near the P{\jt.J-lndoncsiun 
border, Speaking from P;::ir!s during an tour oi Europe, Hayden r0plied 
that he understood the Pf\JG':. ~ensitivity about the border region out th,::it 
"the matter ::>hoiJid bo sorted out bctv1een the Pf\JG government and iho 
ABC" (Daily Telegraph 19 ivlay 1984), 
Pf\JG Foreign fviinistf)r nabbie hlumiJft:J responded w1th throu1s of rota!iation 
against the f\BC if tho !ntorview vvith f\!yaro went to air; there were hints 
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that reporters from ,c:our z~orners and perhaps even permanent t\8C 
corre~,ponae:it Sean Dorney wculd be banned from \Vorking in PNG, 
ternporary measure, f\8C correspondents utationed in Port ~-1oresby ~v9r0 
!'.OW reouireo to apply for a permit from the PNG foreign ministry before 
they couid ioave the capital. in an interview with the Sydnoy fV!orning 
fioraid Foreign !v'linister f\lamal!v said : 
The threat \Vas made quite clear in my totter to the f-\ustral!an 
government, 
In It I said that. unless ! received sa1isfactory ~ssurances that 
!he interview was cut. the Government will have no choice but to 
review the continued presence of the ABC representative in PNG. 
/,s~.ed what he meant by 'revinw' Namal,·J said 
i mean the 8nd of the ABC's operations in PNG. If the l~yaro 
'.r;1c:rvicw is restored, after we have been assured \t will be cut, 
:hr:-1rG is nothing else we can do. 
! \Ni'.i.nt to make several things clear in l\ustra!:a, t\t no time 
r:irl \vc object to tho /-\BC interviewing James !\!yaro. That is tho 
1\dC~':; bu~iness. But nt a time ot grGiat sensitivity in our noraer 
:·2:atH1n·:; vvlth Indonesia we v1ou!d not tolerate. and made rr;aL1t: 
'JUiTr~ c!ear to fvir, f-logan at the lime. his Four Cornerc toaiT: 
:;·q~:"rviewfnq f'~yaro. an Indonesian citizen, a rebel leadr:r ana 
::~G'Ji-:tl irnmigrant, on F'f\JG soil. 
Nlr, 1-logan obviouDly enticed i\tlr, Nyuro across the boroor, 
'.vnich is nn indictable crime, (24 fvlay 1984) 
!-iogan ?1ou!d !ator tr.::li his national tolevision audionc0 1h0.t he nad no 
v1ay cf kno'Ning v.'hich c:.ide of tho border he wus on v-1hen tho intorvio1,v vvas 
conducted. The border is not distinct. but twists through vai!eys ilnd over 
mountain ranges, !n most places it ls not marked and rherc aro no 
border guard::; or po:,ts. f'iogan could not be sure which country he v1as 
ln. He also denied having given the PNG Police Commir;cioner o.ssurancos 
he v1ou!d not cross 1he border or entice f\Jyaro to cro::.s, Thi3 
'as::.uranco', sn1d tTlogan, ninountod to the Po!!ce Commissioner saying 
during an informal convnrcotion in a hotoi at 11 o'clock at night ·that it 
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would be ernoarras::>ing it the interview \Vas held on Pf\lG :::oil' <Canberra 
Tirnes 25 f/12.y 1084}, 
i'>Jovertheto::,:;, Pf\JG Foreign Mini$ter N;;.1mal had been promised by 1\BC; 
manr;gomonr that tn0 interview v1ould be cut out of the final progrZJm beforn 
The Melbourne Age reported that "ABC rnana901rnenl is 
beliovnd to i"ZlVe sent a \-Vrltten instruction yesterdj~y to thG Executive 
Produr:0r of t'Cour Cornertj. Jonathon Holmes, advising him no1 to broaacast 
thA intorviow \Vitll the rebel leader James Nyaro'' ( 19 May 1984), The 
rnanagomont instruction vvas Issued by Deputy Nlanaglng Director Stuart 
Rev\!!, v1hO$O action 1Nas $aid to have followed "representations irom tho 
Pi·-JC1 gnvr-:rnment nnd the Department of Foreign .A.ff airs" ( Br1.sbane 
Tolc:graJJ,'7 17 1984), Formor ABC journa!ist ~v'lichael Carlton ncted 
Tho .:-1stoni:::.hing Thing,,, about the ban on the Four Corners 
F'f·-1G intervi"JW ie:; tt·iat the /-\BC censoru djdn't even se8 it beforG 
nc1.iri:::;.hed the o:xe. 
fou n1ig'.1t havo thought that the ne\v guard h<Jd changed al! 
this but. no-, not a trarnG of film nor a word of dialogue- passed 
bt:tvvor.Ht tnon1. In tho grand old trnditlon of /\SC managemGnt, it 
'Nr1:·; ·;.u;ficic·nt to know that tno Dspartment oi Foraign Affairs 'l,;u::; 
d;sph:;;:::;,co . 
. '.:; c,;iort or-:Jar u departmental message of almos1 orien1a1 
po1itr:?noss had found its v;ay to the dosk of an ABC !\ssisttint 
Gi:;ner;}( iYL:inagGr, \\Ar. Stunrt RevlH. 
Ht:: in turn c<Jnsu!ted the immaculately tnHorz::d Controiler of 
Tr::!ovis~inn rams, lvir. James Fitzmaurice., 21nd - tH::forG you 
coula -:,_ay ~poiitlc:Ji in1erforence" - the interviev,,i vvas bCJnn0d. 
~tly scurr;es say thGro "t1as absolutely no prior consultation -.v1n1 
f\Hnn l-logun and only brio'f discussion::. v1ith the Executive Producor 
oi Four c-orner.:;. Mr, Jonathon tiolmes: the ecict v;as simp!y 
handed do·.vn through th0 r\c1ing l:-toad of Current f;tf;:;\rs. 1\'ir,, ~<en 
Cho'Hn. (Sydney i'v1orning Harald 23 May 1984: 10) 
On 23 May f\8(: Ch<Jirman }<on iv1yer entered tlle controvorcy v;itfi 
comrnents that l'.u:.trnlian corrnspondonts abroad hud to piny the game 
0.Ccordlng to the rulos of their host country, Speaking on tho 1\BC 
302 
progr.::;_m f'fv1, iVlyer explained that vvhen three vveeks (:;arl1er ho ~-:ad said 
that "ihe ABC v.iHI not be stood over by anyone \Vhite I'm Chalrman" he 
v1as referring to domestic. not international affairs, The f.\BC's job abroad 
v1as to cover intc:rnational news us elfectivety as ii: could and this wou!d 
not be ooss1bie if its reporters vvere excluded from foreign nations, 
,48C corr0spond0nts -.vorking abroad had to soe their role "in the light of 
f\ustrn!lnn foreign pol\cy", and not produco reports which prejudiced uccess 
~1,yer's views caused consternation \Nithin and outside the /\BC. 28 
S(}n1or 1\BC iournali~.ts sont a telex to tho ABC Managing Director. GeoHrny 
Wh11.oneari. urging that the ban on the intorview bo lifted. The s1aff 
independence: of the ;\BC':; news and public afinirs progr;:irns 
is tht:; mc:::-,t vit2i principle vie stand tor, 
\:\tr: :trA therefore deeply shocked that Stuart Revill appcwrs '30 
ln this c:.1::>i?. to havo cornprom!sed this prlnciple and to hnvtJ 
ah2ndoned yt1ars of ht.!rd-v1on independence. 
/~ pr0c0cont ~-~c;f)m;:, aholit to be creat0d by v,;nicn ior<s-1gn 
90"1crn1T1cnt:::. c:::n nogotroto v-.;ith senior managemen1 aooui what 1:::; 
!ncl~1dcd jn o:Jr :-18\V:S wnd public affairs programs-
-rhero is still tl1TIG to avoid the disaster ot compromising our 
independr,:ncn, VVo c21nnct atford a loss of pubt!c crodibillty nor 
of 1nterna! morale. 
VVe 0sl< 
and allov1 
proceed. 
and producers, 
;hat you revHrGe the decision to de!ete inc :ntervlo'N 
normal journailstic and production iuagorncnt:::; to 
many of the lA.BC's rnost rGspectGd journalists 
lnc!uding Geraldine Dogue, Mary Doiahunty. Peter 
Couchman and eight rnernbor~ of the (\jatfonwirie staif, JiJn0 Singleton {City 
Extra}. Jim Dov1nes cc::ountryv1id0}. Paul tllurphy (Pf.If}. i'viark Co!vin C7~h0 
VVorfd ·radayJ Jennie Brr::ick!o. Chris Masters. Peter };1anning, .t\Han !--logan 
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;::.nd David de Voss (Four Corners.) and Geoff Hughes and Pr~ikash 
\:),':JrcY:andoni (f\Jtiws) ($ydney tViorning 1-far:vd 23 f1,iJay 1984: 1 J. 1n 
/o,detalde 1:i.sc: journaHstu met to cali for the resignation of :\~yer <':ind 
oxoresc; 'no confldenco' in the ability of rnanagemGni to 'Hrthstnnd pril!ticai 
pressure. !'lick Collis-George. Federnl Secretary of tho i\l3C Si::iff 
/\s.soclntlon. :;aid staff v1ere "appalled" by Pviyer's appciront support for tnn 
0.;1n "VVe think it poses great danger to the ABC in thut the organisation 
con bs seen as abie to be pushed around and sc::nt ::;currying avv;iy just ny 
a note frorn <:n overr;eas government" <The J\ustraiian 25 fv\ay 1GQt,}. r~our 
C~ornor::.; Executive Producer Jonathon Holmos revealed in an irnerview vvith 
f'l\ri ~hat he had informod ABC manag0m0nt four timos in tilt:? i0s1 fortnight 
th;;t 110 considered it "wrong and scandiJ!ous" th<Jt thF: <,,~orpor::tion ~rad 
LJi\.f}il '".J octicn to support journallst Allan t·logan :::;1nco tno ~Yff0ir iJn. 
;'1iorning r1erald reported a major ;::;plit ln rnar:agomBnt r;Jnk~~, 
-'.)Vr-?r tn0 i:~::ue and news that Stuart Revill had discounted advlc8 from tt'H:: 
r\t;J'':" i'0r1 ;,::oresby representative, Sean Dorney. th cit tnc Phi C) g;;v0rnrnnn1 
?:r"J;:''-J ;;r;: c;;-:irry out its threat (23 ~.1ay 1984: l). 
(!ii r::n ~r-::irni~g of Fridny 25 fvlay. as tho Board pre-parO{j to n12nt in 
0«1Qir:;01~rn<:) 1h<> ~::yctnay /\Aorning f-!orafd published ln fuii z.i rr:::in 1:::cript of ths 
<'NO m~nu10 :n:r:rv!ov; ny 1\llan i-!ogan of James i-Jyaro. unaer 1hc r10adi:no 
"Thn ;n12rv1nvv Tne f\BC Dooor1't \JVan1 To Shcv,1" \;Vondv i·AcC~arthy 
de:';;cribB::. rccv1 th~ crisis forced /\8C Directors to arb:tratn betvJCH'..ln dearly 
th-e respons;o11 
"the rosponsibiHty of boards to ;:;upport rr";1nagernont iJnd 
of the /i,8C Board in particular io maintain und assert tho 
indopendence of :ne ;\[3(:-;.·· ( 1984: 9). The Board overwhcdmingly decided 
to reverse rnanagerncnr'0 decision, journa!is\ Poter Smark dGscrihod 1ho 
scene ··;<en Myer 'Nils comprehonsivety humliiated. The Bonrtj ignored. 
his support for the mant:igemGnt':.~ ban .. VVhltehead, nrrlving hack frorn 
holidays, found a declsion t;Jf.i:Gn by his doputy, Stuart Rev ill. \!Vhitehead 
nnd Myer supported tlc~vilL v1ith :armor Liberal Senator and J>..BC 8oart1 
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memoer Neville Bonner the only omer ally" ("Good Weekend" Syoney 
Morning l-ieraid 24 r·Jovember 1984: 10). In a press statement released 
after tho meeting, the Board nnnounced 
The independence of the /1,BC would be compromised if It 
yielded or \Vas $C0n to yield to pressure on tho content of :is 
progrnmc. 
The Soard recognises and 
nxecutive::. to exercise editorial 
information avai!abln to thern. 
program makerB, 
supports the right of its 0enior 
responsibility in the light of 1ho 
particularly advice received from 
The Board accepts that the decision taken by management in 
tho tlrst instance was ii\ the best long-term interests of 1he 
Gorpor a ti on, 
f-1ovvover, the statement on May 24 by Prime Minister Mr. 
~Jlichael :"3omare has elevated the original issue into a rnatter of 
r:;rincipin vvhich. in the Board's view, concerns tho lndapenoenr;e 
oi tho 1\BC. 
\!Vhi!;;; the Board sympathises with the Pl'JG government's 
~nn~iciHvity over its relations with Indonesia, it defends 1no 
l1irr1a10 rlgl1t oi its staff to report events cf signiHcanco 10 
1\u-:/tr"aiia, 
IVir:?r0ting0 of /'°'BC journalists in Syoncy and \'ilo!bour ne congr;;tuiuted 1he 
802.trCT en :ts decision but again called on ivlyer to rr;SHJn lf he• did not 
retract his :itatements about the role of th.::~ 1\us.truHan corrGspond8nt:. In 
overseas poutlngs: "unless he does so vie could not 
suitanlo person to defend the lntogrity nnd indeponder:co oi the: t\8C:" 
<Canbcrr;;i Tirnes 26 i\.~uy 1984), f\s ho loft tho Bourd meeting 'N3$ 
greeted by Journalists anxious to knovv whether ho \vou!d given his 
defeat, "I have not resigned as Chvlrman" suld Myer. "Got out of n1y \Nay 
nnd don't b8 so bloody rude, am not making w.ny s;utemHnt Jt all". 
Asked if thorn had bGen a vcte Myor replied "The Board had mi:lde a 
st.:::1tement. You can use your own judgement" (Tho \tv'ost l\ustro_jion 26 
May 1984), Myer rofu~ea to appear on tho ABC program Nationwice that 
evening. He npparont!y was angry that other Directors had ~oo~on betorn 
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the meeting to journalists ubout their opposition to the b;m. He shouted 
ci~; he was ieaving "You only have to ask Graham \JiJil\iams (a Horafd 
journaiistl about the ABC's confidential decisions. He knows them a!! ir. 
ndvance. 
1984). 
Don't corno to me any more" (Sydney Morning Heraid 26 1Vli:1y 
i.\BC Managing Director Whitehead evaded reporters by 1eaving 
through a back entranco to ihe building. 
Mver later released a m0dia statement claiming that ::;orne of his 
comments during the affair had been "misinterpreted or misund0rstood" 
"the ceniral issue is net whether events should be reported or anaiysed -
that is tnf;en for granted - but how they should be bandied" C Canberra 
Times 28 May 1984i . 
Tho program. complote wiih tho Nyaro intorview. went to air ori Saturany 
26 1984 as scheduled, Faur Corners Executive Producer Hoimes nad 
becauso it contained nothing oi reaJ interentM (Daily {\Jews 25 tvlay 19841. 
l'-Jyaro'r, Eng!lsh v.;as very bad, though the ABC solved the pro'.J\em o! his 
idiosyncratic pronunc1rition with subtitles. A5 the transcript puo\ished in 
rno:.:it ncv1spapors inade clear, l\1yaro had nothing surprising or i"dorrnative 
to say. 
Following ttio progrJm, PNG Foreign Minister l\lamai nr:nounced thwt 
Cablnot v1ould now consider the fate of ABC correspondnnt Se2n Dorney 
They (the? ABC) gave us an undertaking ln the weei~ 1h8t tht:y 
would take it oft and now they have put it back on, 
l think the darnuge had be0n done 
took place. That'~ 'Nhw1 m0ttered, 
(C·unberra Tim0:; 25 \Vlny 1984) 
when tho intervievv ·:·tctuo!!y 
It took place on our ::.oil. 
The following •.veek tho Pf\!(} g0vornment announced that /\J1C~ Journalist~ 
would no longer be weicome 111 PNG and ttiat ABC correspondent Sean 
Oornoy v1ould have his work perrnit rovoked as from September :.?1 l Q84, 
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Almost immediately the i\ustralian Deputy Prime Minister. Li or.el Bowen, 
announced that the ,U,uc;trallan government was anxious to 'Goe tho decision 
rever-:;ed. Though Dorney ceased work on 21 September. negotiations 
botwe,1n tho 1\BC and the PNG government continued. Prir;ie W1inistcr 
Somars icsued a personal invitation to ABC Chairman Ken fv1yer to attend 
the oHic!;;d opening of tho nf<JW PNG Parliamont House on 7 August 1984, 
::.aylng he v1ns "keen to see the dispute with the ABC renofved'" (Scan g 
July 1984: 14). 
Speaking several months after the incident, Managing Director Geoffrey 
Whiteh8'1d said : 
1 regret the way it was perceived and portrayed lo the public 
bi?ct:HiSG the question never was whether \VO should cover that 
is:.ue. but hov1 it r.hould be covered, 
!':-;·1 !n1orentod to note that i\.1r. Hogan has since privately n1ndo 
t1!s 0 1Nn apology to come of the poltt1cians in Pf\lG which ho did, 
:,o f:tr as I know, without consulting senior executives, , , 
lt 'NdS 2n important issue, in that it 111/as an early v1drning bctf1 
~o prcgrarn producers and myselt that V-./C.j had to re-cicf1ne ana 
re,. ·:-.1;::;to for oursetves the- whoic rG.rforonco-up µroco~>s. < f'J2tionat 
·•itf.'<.'i,·~ 19 f)ctobc::r 1984: 6·w7) 
fv~any cri11c-s confidently assert i:he occurrence ot regular dtt"1rnpts wt 
outside \r:terforencv in t\BC program decisions ( o. g. Semmler i 08 l: 28. 
~,1ic()u,3on l 977: 120-122) , This largely unsub:::.tnntiated opinion hus bocomo 
conventionn\ w·!sdom, fuelled by regular public controv0rsy ubcut pur1icuiar 
ABC progr:Jrns. ·rho :1ssertlon that politiclans can inf\uGnce rho content of 
Corporation programs is not. hov¥cver, convincing in light oi the actu<ll 
operation of program decision ·-ma\dng. The problern for u pclit~ci;:;n keen 
to prevent a ;:-,tory going to air .,,vou!d be finding a point v.ihere pre::Jsure 
woutd be trans1at0d Into action rnthor than public exposure. 
case r;tudy sugge:.;ts, tho Soaro !s reluctant to become involved !n progr2m 
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decisions. Covert pressure on Direciors may work - as it did in 1963 
when Sir William Spoonm squeezed a commitment from the ABC Chairman 
over cocktails ~ but it is moro likely thai the Board would only be prepared 
to intervene on an is"::ue referred to it by management or staff. By that 
stage the program fn quo!'.:>tion has usually become a pubiic sensation and 
the options of t~e 8oarn aro somewhat iimited. 
i\ politician vvho 1nstead tried to pressure /\BC n1anagernent would 
discover thtit though rnanagement have a right of veto over program 
content, managers must conform to the same poiici00 and practices. to 
the same 8xpectations of objectivity, lmpartia!ity and balance ·~vhlch 
constroin program-makers and set the decision-making environrr1ont \vithin 
the /\BC, i'Aanagement's: power is expressed not through prograrn content 
judgements, but ln the\r prerogative to set the boundaries of programs by 
'.uriting pr0gran1 brlefs, by beginning and tormlnat\ng programs and by 
isf::u:ng rJir0ct1vos to executive producers and department hands. 
, h8 ~-11qh:y burcaucrutlc chnracter of the ABC, 1he importance placed on 
observ;::rr10n of ;,.\1 rittan ruins and guidGS and -the threat of media exposure of 
or unjustified intervention all v;ork .;1gainst urbitrary 
rnanag.Hmcnt intertercnce in f\BC programs. l\.1anagornent directives nave 
to be oboyed but they cun bGJ cc-ntestod and publicised by a staif 
suspicious of any m;J.nu.gnment move l"Jhlch rnlghi constitute lntorference in 
the resoonsibil\UGs of program-makers. V~en Inglis, in an irnorviev; on 
f\BC radlo. nott!d ttH: rGstriction$ on ou1side interference und on urbitrary 
rnanagorrH'?nt cict!on in prograrn matters : 
have the in1prnssion frorn v1ithln the ABC that $lnco the 
mid·~60s no1 much in ihe way of poiitical interference ha5 
happened \.Vitnout bc~1ng tc:aked to newspapers.,, !'iince the mld--60::; 
there huve been tv10 things present v.ihich v1eren't present before 
one is a different nttltudG to institu1ional ethics on the part of 
people within the orgilnw.at1on. People ... no longer felt that their 
f1r!jt loyaity was ;n the ABC ;1nd confidontiallty, .. poopl0 fe!t 
morally permi1tcd - and even obitged - to break confidence and 
report what seemed to them bad things ... 
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The s~.:cond thing is 1he photocopier which made it easier th0n 
it had been before to reveal anything on paper ... io 
journalists,,. co much so that I romomber one old /\BC hand 
saying he would never put anything on paper uniess ho v1::.intod 10 
read it in the Sydney lvioming Herald lo morrow. ( Ooubletilko 23 
~Juno 1983) 
Trio device 0f a stntutary corporation und the public Gxpectation of 
prog rnms made without political lntmferonce protect the short-term 
tuncttor:at ind0pendence cf the ABC, Politicians ci"ln change the shape 
and go.<1\s of the /\BC through iegisiaticn, budgets. bureaucratic 
requirements and inquiries. They can set the boundaries for ABC activity. 
But they cannot easily impose their will on particular ABC programs. 
Politicians am restrained by the legislative protection given to ABC 
ernp!oyoes;, by the public acceptance of a legitimate ABC role in providing 
nn1/JS nnd commentary and by the pol\t1ca! co;::.ts of being s0en to \n1erfere 
'Nl'tr, the /\Bl:-:/;:; independence. Some politicians v11H neverthe!oss tr:/ to 
1n1i:~;-fere tor political advani:Bge; the publlc record suggests that few will 
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3, 2 THE POLITICAL CONTROL OF ABC RESOURCES 
Polilicians. ii has been argued. create and maintain the ABC - but they 
cannot easily influence the oontent of specific programs. The ABC 
continues to enioy considerable functional independence. Yet. perhaps far 
more serious for the ABC than the occasional inept attempt by a politician 
to suppress a story. is the way governments use their control over 
resources to set the shape and boundaries of the organisation. In the 
long term. restrictions on a statutory corporation's administrative 
independence are certain to narrow the scope for functional independence. 
The ABC has no control over its own level of resources. The 
government of the day. rather than the Corporation or marketplace, 
decides what resources will be available in any given year. Though the 
ABC's budget allocation is normally incremental and so predictable. there 
is no guarantee this will be so at any particular time. 
Governments do not make resource decisions in a vacuum, ABC funding 
is a political decision. taken after consultation with the Corporation and in 
the wider context of government budget planning. Earlier sections on 
finance described the regular process of ABC bidding for funds. while the 
section on planning noted an established procedure for presenting. through 
the National Broadcasting Service Planning Committee, proposals for new 
services to the government. Through formal and informal channels. the 
Corporation and government constantly communicate, negotiating priorities. 
floating proposals and establishing precedents. There are risks - the 
danger the ABC will flatter a government to secure approval for a favoured 
project. the possibility that a government will use its statutory control over 
resources to take the ABC out of a particular field. Governments can use 
the estimates process to control. at least in outline. the ABC's internal 
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allocation of resources. These impositions on lhe ABC's administrative 
independence set the boundaries of ABC functional activity. 
A case in point of a government re-defining the scope of the ABC was 
the establishment of an independent ABC news service. Until 1946. ABC 
radio news was taken from newspapers under an agreement negotiated 
between !he ABC and newspaper proprietors, approved by the Minister and 
supported by then ABC Chairman Boyer and General Manager Moses. In 
mid-1946. however, Prime Minister Chifley proposed an amendment to !he 
Broadcasting Act obliging the ABC to use ·no other source than its own 
staff for Australian news· (Inglis 1983a: 129>. Inglis argues that an 
independent news service was "forced on a reluctant Commission and 
management by a labor government which was determined to have a 
source of news utterly untainted by the capitalist press. and which got its 
way by having the Minister refuse. as the Act empowered him to do 
because it involved more than 500 000 pounds. to authorise the renewal of 
an agreement between the ABC and Australian Associated Press for the 
supply oi local and overseas news" ( 1980a: 25). In this important 
precedent, the government used the budget process to alter the role of 
the ABC. It Is perhaps ironic that an organisation subsequently iamous for 
its independent news was forced by political intervention lo institute that 
service. 
The ABC's 1979 "Ain't We Got Fun· campaign was an attempt to attract 
government interesl. After three years of funding reductions and murmurs 
from conservative politicians that the ABC was increasingly irrelevant and 
should "get into the marketplace". the Commission authorised a television 
campaign promoling entertainment as a primary ABC goal. "Ain't We Got 
Fun" was the awkward slogan of rather half-hearted ABC advertisements. 
In order to demonstrate its continuing relevance as an argument lor 
funding increases. the ABC tried to attract a larger audience with "more 
popular programming which was acceptable to the government" (Chown 
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1982). The campaign failed - ratings did not improve and funding 
continued to fall. 
A good example of the ABC's fluctuations in fortune resulting from the 
control by Parliament of resources arose during the Commission meeting of 
10-1 l November 1975. On November 10 the Labor Government's Minister 
for the Media. Or. Moss Cass. visited the Commission and during an 
"hour's cosy chat" told of Labor's plans for !he Commission for the next 
six years. "He painted a very rosy picture" (Hackett 1982). The day 
after promising the ABC massive expansion. the government fell and those 
who had been attacking the ABC as biased and inefficient were placed in 
power. Instead of expansion. the ABC faced years of sharp contraction 
(Hackett 1982) . 
The two case studies in this chapter explore in detail the power of 
governments to set boundaries for the ABC through control over resources. 
As dramatic examples of government intervention, these cases highlight 
issues in which politicians decide ABC priorities. Though both examples 
are drawn from Commission days (for reasons ol access to evidence). 
none of the assumptions, legislative roles or statutory powers of the 
participants have changed in a way which could make similar events less 
likely under the reformed Corporation. 
In the case of 2JJ. a Labor government wanted the ABC to become 
involved in broadcasting rock music. The resource offered was an 
experimental radio licence in Sydney. The ABC accepted, sensing an 
opportunity to demonstrate its ability to lit in with the government's 
ambitious long-term plans fer expanding the broadcasting system. The 
record suggests extensive informal negotiation between the ABC and the 
government. with the ABC implicitly agreeing to the government's terms 
before the licence was issued. 
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The second study focuses on the closure of ABC Melbourne radio station 
3ZZ in 1977. in this instance a Llberal/NCP government used the statutory 
requirement for ministerial approval of budget estimates to close an ABC 
service of which it did not approve. 
The 2JJ Ca§e 
The 1969 conference of the ALP committed a future Labor 
government to introduce FM radio as soon as possible. Australia at that 
time had only mono AM radio. broadcast by a limited number of ABC and 
commercial stations. Party delegates used the platform to express their 
dissatisfaction with Australia's dual broadcasting system and offer the hope 
of reform. 
When the ALP was elected to government in 1972 the new Minister for 
!he Media. Senator Douglas McClelland. sought to introduce stereo FM 
radio. He encountered numerous obstructions. Experts could not agree 
on technical specifications for the new medium. an issue which eventually 
had to be setlled by an independent Inquiry. Alter a delay of 18 months 
while technical issues were resolved. McClelland's department developed a 
long-term plan for the future of FM radio In Australia, only to have it 
rejected by Cabinet because of the anticipated high cost, 
By mid-1974 McClelland was in political dilficulty over the Issue o! 
broadcasting. He had committed the Labor government to introduce FM 
radio. only to suHer the embarrassment of seemingly endless technical and 
bureaucratic delays. To McClelland's critics he appeared lo be doing 
nothing; even his supporters noted disquiet within the government about 
the apparent lack of progress. As a McClelland advisor put It : ·11 was 
still somewhat the heady days of the Whillam government - it was a case 
of when you've got the opportunity to go. go. And they wanted to 
allocate some licences very quickly and say that they were the people who 
started FM in Australia" (Martin 1981 l. 
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To reduce ALP faction fighiing over media policy. Prime Minister Whitlam 
informally spoke to government advisors about possible short-term 
broadcasting initiatives. The economic downturn had made Cabinet wary of 
committing funds to McClelland's extensive plan for a national network of 
FM stations <McClelland 1981). Whitlam was looking for some 'low cost' 
options to satisfy pressure groups lobbying for media reform. Following 
this discussion. Whitlam reputedly said to Doug McClelland : 'Never mind 
this grandiose thing. come up with plans of what we can start tomorrow. 
let's get some stations going'. People within the ALP had stepped up 
their criticism of the Minister's supposed Inactivity; now Whitlam wanted to 
get moving. but needed something 'cheap and quick' (Martin 1981l , 
Government advisors told Whitlam of their idea for temporary AM stations 
as stopgaps until full FM services were available. A loose network in and 
around the government had been throwing around suggestions for new 
radio stations for some months. Discussants included Jim Spigelman. 
Peter Wilenski and David White from Whitlam's stall, Max Bourke and John 
Woodward from the Mosman branch of the ALP, government staffers such 
as Peter Martin. Richard Hall. politicians such as James McClelland. Mick 
Young and Moss Cass and interested outsiders such as Alan Ashbolt. 
Sydney ABC radio producers. Craig McGregor. Tom Zelinka and ethnic 
community groups in Melbourne. 
From somewhere within this group came the idea for a 
government-funded AM rock music stalion in Sydney and an access/ ethnic 
channel in Melbourne. The notion gained currency in political circles in 
mld-1974 when Spigelman discovered that the ABC possessed standby 
transmitters in Sydney and Melbourne which could be used to broadcast 
experimental AM programming, if the government was willing to issue 
licences. Spigelman claims he heard about these transmitters. 
unofficially. from the Department of the Media. The information reached 
the department. also unofficially, from ABC executives (Spigelman 1981), 
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The Commission was about to become an active participant in government 
policy-making. 
The Minister. Doug McClelland, was advised of these suggestions lor 
temporary AM radio stations. He authorised Peter Martin to sound out 
informally ABC officials about the possibility of new licences. Martin found 
ABC executives aware of discussion within the government about possible 
temporary AM stations and prepared to negotiate to capture these licences 
tor the ABC. Ray Newell from the Department ol the Media also found 
that ABC officials were Interested. He took news of ABC support back to 
his department while Martin told the Minister of the ABC's interest. The 
ABC's position became part of government thinking about broadcasting 
policy options {McClelland. Martin. Wyndham 1981 l • 
Once word reached Commission managers about the possibility of new 
stations. the ABC began preparing its case. Arthur Wyndham. Acting 
Controller of ABC radio network 1, prepared a paper for Iha Commission 
on "Young Style' radio. His brief asserted that the ABC was incapable o! 
attracting !he young without more stations: new stations would give the 
ABC an opportunity to compete for younger audiences and lo experiment 
with new forms of presentation and music beyond \he scope of traditional 
ABC programming (Wyndham 1981>. Wyndham's paper was carefully and 
cleverly worded lo reflect the interest of the government in new types of 
radio services. The Commission accepted Wyndham's comments which 
were passed on. at least in substance. to the Minister. ABC executives 
were keeping informed about government thinking and framing !heir case 
accordingly. As Concetta Benn. an ABC commissioner. noted 
No direct instruction was given to the ABC. 
say that the managers of institutions tend to 
those in power. <Dugdale 1979: ix) 
It is suflicient lo 
curry favour with 
Martin and Spigelman met at Prime Minister Whitlam's suggestion in 
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August 1974 to discuss 'low cost' broadcasting options (Spigelman 1981). 
Before them were the idea of temporary AM rock music and access/ethnic 
stations, information about the ABC's standby transmitters and an 
awareness that the ABC was keen to experiment with new formats. Peter 
Marlin laler said : "With no money to spend. it turned out that the 
easiest and cheapest thing to do was to say to the ABC : You can have a 
new station but you can only have it on condition that il is going to be in 
Sydney a station for young people and in Melbourne it will be an ethnic 
community station· C 1981>, 
Martin and Spigelman recommended that the government issue licences 
to the ABC for AM stations using the ABC's standby transmitters. Once 
the stations were established. they suggested, the government could hunt 
for funds to transfer them to FM. The recommendation was supported by 
Prime Minister Whltlam. Senator Doug McClelland's feelings about the 
proposal did not seem to concern anyone: the decision had been taken 
out of his hands. 
There had been no formal request from the Commission lor new outleis. 
On the available evidence. it appears that the Commission had not 
oilicially discussed such a proposal. Yet clearly the attitude of the ABC 
played an important role in government decisions about broadcasUng. 
In September 1974 the Department of the Media approached the 
Commission and invited it to consider broadcasting on two new AM 
frequencies. bearing in mind that no extra funds were available. 
However. the PMG {now restructured as Telecom) , which controlled the 
ABC's transmitters, produced an adverse report on use of standby 
transmitters and the whole issue went back to Cabinet. 
On 24 September 1974 Cabinet re-considered broadcasting. As a long 
term measure. it authorized planning to proceed for 14 new FM and 14 
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new AM radio stations. For the short-term. Cabinet considered the 
proposal for 'experimental' ABC stations. The Telecom report that the 
standby transmitters were not suitable was submitted and. according to Dr. 
Moss Cass. did "not go down weir ( 1981). Cabinet accepted the ABC 
temporary AM stations proposal. 
directive that Telecom was to 
According to Cass, 'Cabinet issued a 
provide the transmitters for the two 
stations •.. we didn't discuss it in any more detail than to agree that that's 
what should happen and we directed both authorities - Telecom and the 
ABC - to get on with it: Telecom to make the transmitters available and 
the ABC lo set up the stations and start broadcasting as soon as possible" 
<Cass l981l. 
Despite the enthusiasm of Cass and others. some Cabinet members were 
wary ol the proposal: as Senator Doug McClelland noted " ... some people 
thought that there was a tendency to be rushing into ii without eHective 
planning". Not all liked the idea of the ABC running a rock music 
station: McClelland remembers ·one of my colleagues from Melbourne 
expressing disgust at such a proposal". Nevertheless. apart from some 
concern that the matter was being done hastily. ·1 don't think there was 
any objection" (McClelland 1981). To observe the propriety of ABC 
independence, the Commission would be oifered two extra frequencies and 
was. of course. under no obligation to accept them. Bui as Peter Martin 
has remarked. "Cabinet was offering the ABC a choice: they could knock 
it back - but it was made plain that it was the only oiler they were 
ge!ting· ( 1981 l. 
Cabinet accepted the submission of the Minister for the Media. recorded 
as decision 2729. The creation of stations which became 2JJ in Sydney 
and 3ZZ in Melbourne !41 ~~ authorised by decision 2729 paragraphs 2<ivl 
and 2 ( vl respectively. 
To establish and run the new Sydney rock music station, ABC executives 
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recruited young ABC radio producers. who had risen to prominence within 
the organisation through the NSW ABC Staff Association and through the 
Radio Action Movement (RAM) - an informal group keen to experiment with 
new radio formats. RAM activists had strong contacts with the ALP. and 
had probably participated in the general vague discussions within the Party 
which led lo the original idea for experimental ABC stations <Webb. 
Martin. Winter. Wyndham and Zelinka 1981). Now the RAM producers 
were given an opportunity to establish a very different type of ABC unit. 
rejecting the traditional ABC hierarchical structure in favour of staff 
participation in decision-making and elected station co-ordinators. The 
choice was a shrewd one by ABC management. for it signalled to the 
government that ABC 'radicals' would be given their chance to be heard. 
and demonstrated that the ABC was capable of sympathetic. modern 
management. 
When it went to air on 19 January 1975. less than four months after the 
Cabinet decision. 2JJ became Sydney's lirnt new radio station in 43 years. 
and the ABC's first venture into sustained programming for an audience of 
18-25 year olds. Despite reception problems. 2,J,J quickly captured a 
large slice ol its target audience - a new experience for the ABC. 2JJ's 
innovative. brash. lively and sometimes offensive format challenged the 
predictable and staid programming of commercial radio. There were 
urgent pleas that 2JJ's licence be revoked from FARB. the B & T Weekly 
(an advertising joumall and publications of the Catholic Church, 
Senator Doug McClelland became proud of the ABC's "enfant terrible" 
and supported it from attacks by commercial broadcasters. From July 
1975 2JJ found a champion in the new Minister for the Media. Dr Moss 
Cass. For Cass. 
of broadcasting. 
2JJ symbolised what Labor should be doing in the field 
H•f f"'V S"'"'"~, f/e.;r; ~os.,,4~1 
claimed that the station "put people in touch with 
their emotions: it can free them from an automatic acceptance of the 
artificial rhythms of urban and suburban life. In a very real sense. 2JJ is 
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a deconditioning agent" (Inglis 1983a: 375-376). Cass 
defended 2JJ in Parliament and supported the station in the lace of strong 
press criticism of its more controversial programming. Cass wanted every 
Australian capital city to have access radio. ethnic radio and a station like 
2JJ. He authorised a landline to Melbourne lo begin relay broadcasting of 
2JJ in December 1975 - a decision not honoured by the caretaker Fraser 
government (Cass 1981. Rosenbloom 1978:82). 2JJ. however, survived 
tha change of government and became an established part of Iha ABC. 
Its twin station. Melbourne's 3ZZ. was not so lucky. 
The creation of 2JJ was a political decision by a Minister floundering in 
a difficult portfolio. When in Opposition. McClelland found it easy to 
criticise the iack o! diversity in the Australian broadcasting system. But as 
Minister he discovered the difllculties facing a reformer who does not fully 
understand the system he wants to alter. It is ironic that 2JJ. a 
short-term expedient to mark time while the government sorted out policy 
problems. would become a symbol of a radical government. 
Des Foster. !he Federal Director of FARB. alleged in an Advertising 
News article that "there is a stench about the whole of the 2JJ episode. 
ii reeks of secret deals. patronage and par!isanship" ( 19 March 1976): 
Foster argued that the Labor government pushed 2JJ and 3ZZ onto an 
unwilling ABC ( 1976: 157-8). The evidence suggests. however. that far 
from being unwilling, !he Commission was delighted with its new AM 
stations and used the opportunity to show the government that it could 
provide new services in a cheap. effective and innovative way. Wi!h 2JJ, 
and later 3ZZ. the ABC staked a claim to be a beneficiary ol the media 
reforms many expected from a Labor government. 
During 1974 the ABC unofficially lobbied the government for more radio 
outlets. 2JJ and 3ZZ were the first tangible results oi these 
representations. Though Semmler talks of the ABC accepting 'what was 
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tantamount to political direction without demur· ( 1981: 33) • in lact ABC 
executives embraced the offer of new licences with unabashed relish. The 
negotiations and establishment of new stations gave several recently 
appointed senior ABC managers an opportunity to enhance their reputations 
as administrators in tune with the times. By efficiently launching 2JJ and 
later 3ZZ. the ABC demonstrated its ability to faithfully mirror the intentions 
of the government's media policy. This success indicates the extent of 
informal contact and information flow between the government and the 
Commission, The ABC. though a statutory body. had become part of the 
complex political web of decision-makers. 
Not all ABC executives ware pleased with the acquisition, however. 
General Manager Talbot Duckmanton felt that acceptance of these 
temporary AM !icanoes could be seen as 'infringing on the ABC's 
independence. breaching the tradition by which governments provided 
transmilters and the Commission decided what went oul on them' (Inglis 
1983a: 378-379) . Professor Richard Downing, Chairman of the ABC. did 
not agree that ABC independence might be compromised, He preferred to 
emphasis the formal offer rather than the informal arrangement reached 
between the government and Commission : 
As a matter of record I think you' II find the Cabinet decision 
merely gives us two stations without any invitation or decision at 
all: it would be very doubtful in any case whether the government 
without legislation could direct us to do any such thing. I would 
have thought that this Is the kind of thing that evolves in 
discussion with ministers, general managers. chairmen and so 
on. but in the end it was definitely an autonomous decision of the 
Commission .. , But does it matter terribly much how it came 
about? \Dugdale 1979: 3) 
Dugdale disagrees with Downing. arguing it matters very much how 
decisions are taken because they provide precedents. In June 1977 the 
Fraser government instructed the ABC to close 3ZZ. The Minister for 
Posts and Telecommunications defended his government,, decision by 
arguing that "since the previous Labor government had directed the ABC lo 
320 
establish the station it was his government's undoubted political right to 
close it. • Neither the Commission nor ABC management disputed the 
Minister's logic (Dugdale 1979: 3). 
The 3ZZ Case. 
At the time 2JJ was established. the Labor government also issued an 
experimental licence to the ABC lo begin 3ZZ in Melbourne. an 
access/ ethnic community station. 
3ZZ enabled ethnic. political. social and cultural groups to broadcast a 
wide range of viewpoints. The station was frequently attacked by some 
politicians and sections of the media; there were claims that the station 
was dominaled by 'lef!-wingers'. that pro-terrorist views were being 
expressed on air. Rosenbloom notes that ·as it happened. many of the 
ethnic representatives on 3ZZ had left-wing views; these people were 
genuine representatives o1 their communities, and !hey ensured that 
competing or conllicting views were not suppressed" ( 1978: 140l. Given 
that 3ZZ broadcast in 28 dilferenl languages. it is unlikely that even its 
moat persistent critics lrom Quadrant and the National Civil Council's 
Newsweekly really knew whaf went to air for more than a fraction o1 total 
broadcasting time. 
In September 1976 !he Fraser government 'invited' the ABC to assume 
overall responsibiiity for ethnic radio in Australia. announcing that "the 
decision would give the ABC the opportunity to ralionaiise ethnic language 
services" (Dugdale 1979: 142). The 24 ABC stall members working at 3ZZ 
correctly interpreted the announcement as the government signalling ils 
desire to discontinue 3ZZ and replace it with more conservative. less 
political ethnic radio - a reading shared by ABC management. which noted 
in a briefing paper that "Cabinet's clear intention is that 3ZZ should be 
closed down" <ibid: 144). 
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Documents leaked from ABC management suggest that ABC Chairman Sir 
Henry Bland was privately negotiating with government ministers to replace 
3ZZ with an ethnic station advised by a committee but without public 
access. Other Commissioners apparently ware unaware of this 
correspondence Ubid: 146-147). 
On 9 December 1976 the Commission announced its willingness to accept 
responsibility for ethnic broadcasting in Australia. There were. however. 
difficulties over finance and stall matters yet to be resolved. When Bland 
resigned as Chairman. negotiations were taken up by his successor. J. D. 
Norgard. Media reports. meanwhile, picked up the suggestion !hat Iha 
government intended to use the establishment of new ABC ethnic stations 
to close down controversial station 3ZZ. particularly after complaints from 
some sections of Melbourne's Jewish community about certain 3ZZ 
programs. Questions were asked in Parliament about the government's 
intentions for the station: the Minister. predictably. responded by noting 
that the ABC was independent and 3ZZ was under its jurisdiction. but his 
answers were "frequently qualified in the press by casting grave doubts on 
the responsibility of the station's broadcasts in sensitive areas· <ibid: lSSl. 
The Age ol 9 June 1977 reported that the ABC had estimated a cost of 
$2. Sm per year to run the ethnic stations. The government. however. 
oflered only $1 m and suggested the ABC reallocate $500 QOO toward ihe 
cost by closing down access station 3ZZ. A week later the government 
rejected the ABC's request for $2. Sm and let the ABC know that ii was 
considering withdrawing the 'offer' of ethnic radio licences. 
On 30 June 1977 Cabinet announced that it had decided to establish a 
new independent authority. the Special Broadcasting Service. to provide an 
ethnic broadcasting service. The oHer to the ABC was withdrawn. 
Furthermore, as new ethnic stations might provide services already 
available on 3ZZ the government had "reviewed the role of 3ZZ ... the 
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government saw no point in duplication and has therefore decided that 
funds should not be provided to the ABC to continue the 3ZZ experiment in 
1977-78" <Cabinet press release. quoted in Dugdale 1979: 164). 
Thus the government used the statutory provision requiring the Minister to 
approve ABC estimates to close down an ABC radio station. Because 3ZZ 
operated on an experimental licence, its budget was not absorbed into a 
general estimates item such as 'radio programs'. but listed separately in 
the ABC's budget papers. The Minister approved all ABC estimates except 
the 3ZZ item. 
1977. from 
Commission documents show that a letter dated 20 June 
the Secretary of the Department of Posts and 
Telecommunications. conveyed to the Commission a Cabinet decision of 14 
June that funds would "not be provided to the ABC for continuation of the 
experimental access radio station 3ZZ. Melbourne" (Minutes. Commission 
meeting No. 509: 2J. 
At its regular meeting on 1 July 1977 the Commission discussed the 
wl!hdrawal of the offer of licences !or ABC ethnic radio stations and the 
government's order to close down station 3ZZ. ABC General Manager 
Talbot Ouckmanton noted that although the Cabinet decision meant that the 
ABC could not spend any more money on 3ZZ from that day. he had 
"received verbal advice from the Minister for Posts and Telecommunications 
that a reasonable 'running-down' period would be allowed prior to the 
closing ol the station" (minutes: 5). 
The Commissioners had to respond. Numerous messages from 3ZZ 
stall. supporters and unions urged the Commission ta "reverse decision". 
as a telegram from Actors' Equity put it. 3ZZ staff waiting outside the 
board room argued that the Commission had a duty lo defend "not only 
3ZZ but its own integrity" <Dugdale 1979: 167l. A lengthy debate ensued. 
with some Commissioners "close to tears of rage" with frustration 
<ibid: 167l. While all ABC Commissioners opposed government intervention 
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in ABC policy decisions. they were divided on how to react. West 
Australian lawyer Richard Harding argued that lhe government had no right 
to tell the ABC it could not spend $320 000 on 3ZZ. He put the case !or 
the Commission to "make internal savings from its total appropriation and 
allocate funds to the operations of 3ZZ" (Harding 1979: n 1 l . Other 
commissioners felt differently. Professor Leonie Kramer argued that !he 
government action in closing down 3ZZ was "proper" because 3ZZ had 
"broken Commission guidelines and was editorialising". Kramer accepted 
lhe government's right to use the budget system in this way. though she 
acknowledged that lt is •a dangerous power to exercise· (Kramer 1984). 
Aller a lengthy debate the majority of commissioners agreed to abide by 
the Broadcasting and Television Act, which provided that the ABC could not 
spend money other than in accordance with estimates approved by the 
Minister. The Commission recorded the loliowing statement for release to 
the press that day : 
lit its meeting in Sydney today, the Commission oonsidered the 
government's decisions. announced yesterday. to withdraw its 
invitation to the ABC to provide an ethnic broadcasting service. 
and to confirm its earlier decision not to provide funds to the 
ABC for the continuation of station 3ZZ. 
The Commission wishes to make it clear that the proposals it 
submi1!ed relative to ethnic broadcasting were not accepted by the 
government. These proposals essentially concerned the funding 
and staifing requirements the Commission believed necessary to 
provide. as requested by the government, a broadcasting service 
al a professional standard. 
The Commission has decided with regret that it has no 
alternative but to accept the government's decision with regard to 
3ZZ. That decision is not related to the matter of the 
Commission's independence. The Commission's independence is 
a qualified independence. confined to the formulation of program 
policy. 
The Commission cannot continue the operation of 3ZZ without 
the provision of funds. Consequently. steps are being taken to 
close the station as soon as practicable. But. in the meantime. 
the Commission is making urgent recommendations to the Minister 
for Posts and Telecommunications to have the government's 
decision not to provide funds reconsidered. (Minutes Commission 
meeting 509 item 188280l 
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The government declined to 'reconsider' a decision which. according lo 
Rosenbloom. "effectively stifled" the ABC "as lhe voice of a pluralistic 
society" <1978: 141). Surveying Cabinet's use of the estimates process to 
shut down 3ZZ. historian Ken Inglis noted : 
This seems to me lo have been quite an extraordinary ground 
to have chosen. That passage had been in the Act for a long 
time but I don't know that anyone had talked about it or "~voked 
it. We've never heard ol it since, It was simply envoked at that 
one moment for justifying the ABC's "·"'·""'"·· in a government 
decision about how it should spend its money, ( Doubletake 
interview 23 June 1983) 
Inglis believes that many Commissioners accepted the government's right 
to cut the ABC's grant by $300 000 but felt it was not proper for the 
government to say that any cut "has to be applied to 3ZZ" Ubid) . Those 
Commissioners such as Richard Harding. Marius Webb, Kevin Jacotisen 
and Concetta Benn who opposed the ABC's acquiesence wanted Iha 
Commission to repeat the ABC's performance of 1970 in standing up to the 
government. Then a government threat to cut the ABC's television current 
aifairs budget had been successfully resisted. The situations wera not 
perfectly analogous, however. In 1970 the ABC was dealing with a 
government attempt lo cut overall estimates but to direct the ABC how to 
achieve savings. In 1977, the government refused to accept a a speciiic 
estimate: this lime there could be no doubt of the government's legal right 
lo make that decision for the ABC. So in 1977 the Commission accepted 
its new role of 'qualified independence' and spared the government !he 
embarrassment of "introducing an Appropriation Act framed specifically to 
deny funds for 3ZZ. rejecting the post-budget estimates in terms directed 
against 3ZZ. or using ils planning and technical powers to close Iha 
station· (Armstrong 1982: 107l. 3ZZ ceased transmission at 10: 55 pm on 
15 July 1977. The next day the 3ZZ premises were closed. with the help 
ol plainclothes Commonwealth police. to prevent staff carrying out a threat 
to broadcast illegally. On the 17th Telecom engineers shut down the 
transmitter <Harding 1979: 113). 
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Summary : The Political Control of ABC Resources 
Academic David Griffiths has criticised opponents of the closure of 3ZZ. 
noling that 3ZZ and 2JJ came into existence at the Initiative of 
government. not the ABC : 
Is it that you agree with one and disagree with the other? If 
it is accepted that the Labor government had a right to interfere 
with the independence of the ABC. why is it not accepted that the 
present government also has a right to interfere with the ABC? 
(quoted in Inglis 1983a: 409l 
There is. however, a small but significant difference. In 1977 the ABC 
was instructed to close down a station. In 1975 the ABC was offered 
licences. It could have turned down the offer, though to do so have 
deprived the ABC of a chance to impress the governmen1 with its 
eagerness to get involved in changes to the media system. In both cases 
governments used control over resources to change the ABC: though 
politicians established the character al the new stations. there ls no 
evidence that politicians attempted to influence individual programs. 
The political circumstances which created 2JJ and closed down 3ZZ have 
changed but the relevant legislation has not. Though planning for new 
stations is now more regulated through a National Broadcasting Service 
Planning Committee. the final responsibility tor issuing licences remains 
with the Minister. The Minister also controls the form and approval of 
ABC estimates. Though ABC and government officials stress that !he 
extraordinary events in closing down 3ZZ are unlikely lo be repeated. there 
is no legislative bar lo a future government following the 1977 precedent. 
3ZZ may have been unusual in appearing as a separate item because of 
its experimental status. but its demise creates a precedent. Governments 
can request ABC estimates In any level of detail they require. A Minister 
could demand that the cost of individual ABC programs be included as 
separate estimates items requiring ministerial approval. 
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The normal planning procedures and the statutory responsibility of the 
Minister to design the Australian broadcasting system make the provision of 
new services always a political decision: the 3ZZ case suggests that 
government involvement can extend to deciding which services will be 
allowed to continue operations. Government control over resources -
financial and In the form of licences and through statutory control over the 
development oi the broadcasting system - allows politicians and not the 
ABC to determine what form of services the national broadcasting 
organisation should offer. 
Chapter 4 
THE POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE ABC 
4: 1 CONCLUSIONS THE POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE ABC 
In 1932 W H. Holman lec1ured the House of Representatives on the 
reasons for crea1ing a statutory corpora1lon. By taking a contentious 
operation out o1 the hands of politicians and giving it to an independent 
commission, he said, Parliament would ensure that its function became 
non-partisan 
The purnose ol appointing a railway, a broadcasting or any 
other commission is to ensure that the policy dominating the 
enterprise affected shall be consistent and coherent over a long 
period and protected from the pressure of members of Parliament 
or member's constituents with axes lo grind, exercising its best 
iudgement in the interests of the enterprise entrusted lo it. 
(quoted in Rytlon 1952a: 17) 
The debate eventually concluded when Parliament established the 
/\ustra!ian Broadcasting Commission as a statutory corporation. Parliament 
wamed a reliable, authoritative and impartial national broadcasting service 
frr:;e ~rorn political Interference. As a statutory corporation, 1t was hoped 
the .£18C would remain accountable lo the politicians for its administration 
but indcpe:ident in its program policy. As a broadcaster, it was hoped. 
the 1\BC would provide a service essential to democracy 
Commercial stations can expose wrong-doing and ventilate 
pubiic issues as well as entertaining. but they are limited by the 
imerests of people like shareholders and advertisers. Public 
broadcasting stations may also be influenced by their shareholders 
or sponsors. Only the ABC can be expected as a matter of 
principle always to publish the truth without fear or tavour, to 
broadcast material which may offend the artistic, commercial or 
political establishment of the day, (Armstrong 1982: lO 1l 
In the half-century since Holman spoke, the issue of ABC independence 
has rarely strayed from the political agenda, Sometimes supporters of the 
nalional broadcasting system have asserted confidently that the ABC can 
operate without fear or favour. For others, ABC independence has 
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seemed tenuous and perishable. To Earle HackeH. tor example. the ABC 
seemed "as important to the smoolh functioning of Australian democracy as 
is an independent judiciary or an elected Parliament". yet he could see 
nothing protecting the organisation except the goodwill and determination of 
a few individuals meeting at odd times and in odd places" (Inglis 
1980a: 28l. 
In 1932 politicians created an ABC with independence guaranteed by 
legal and institutional arrangements. Holman's argument. accepted by all 
parties. called for Parliament to set the boundaries of activity for the 
statutory corporation. finance the organisation and monitor compliance with 
its Act but not to determine Commission policy or allow politicians lo get 
involved in the ABC's day to day management. When the ABC was 
reconstituted as a Corporation in 1983. Hansard recorded speeches filled 
with hope that the new legislation. the conventions of statutory 
corporations. the traditions of public service broadcasting and public 
expectations would continue to ensure in practice the independence granted 
to the ABC by legislative theory. 
This question oi independence, played out in the context oi complex 
interaction beiween Parliament. the state and the Corporation. has been 
the central focus oi this Institutional study. Through examination of the 
macro settings and the organisation itseil. this work has investigated 
whether the rhetoric of an independent but accountable ABC is realised. or 
whether the Corporation is part of the general machinery of governmenL 
with its independence a convenient Hction. 
The Debate Over Institutional Independence 
In the December 1952 
Administration Joan Rydon. 
edition of the Australian journal Public 
a research officer from the University of 
Sydney. assessed the independence of the Australian Broadcasting 
Commission. She found that independence granted to the ABC in 1932 
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had been "gradually lessened in every sphere" with the ABC being subject 
to "ever-increasing government control", Rye on conciu ded th at the 
experience of the ABC "illustrates the weakness of any notion of 
independence for government instrumentalities" ( 1952b: 204l. 
When ABC Chairman Richard Boyer decided to reply in print. a debate 
ensued which touched upon many issues involved in the ABC's role as a 
statutory corporation, Boyer found Rydon's conclusions "too sweeping" 
< 1D53a: 56): he argued for a distinction between admrn1strative 
arrangements - in which the ABC was undoubtedly closely linked with the 
government bureaucracy and the reality of the ABC's functional 
independence to produce impartial programs, Boyer criticised Rydon' s 
"absorption in the administrative framework as being an absolute touchstone 
on tho issue of independence" and instead suggested that successive 
Parliaments had actually strengthened the Commission's power to make its 
program choices mthout ministerial involvement Ubid: 57-58l, 
Ryden did not accept the administrative/functional distinction drawn by 
Boyer, She insisted that the ABC could not be considered independent 
while Parliament controlled ABC finances and appointments to the Board 
The position is that pressures, both formal and informal, are 
bound to prevent the ABC from asserting any potential 
1noependence it may have, Only so long as the ABC does not 
make use of its potential independence can it retain iL If the 
Commission should at any time attempt to oppose the governmenL 
it is obvious that the outcome of any struggle must be victory for 
the government. ( Rydon 1953a: 62) 
This claim did not please Boyer, who again charged that Ryden had not 
grasped Parliament's intention in creating a Commission, Rydon \Vas 
judging the ABC by absolute standards rather than in the context of its 
functions as a statutory corporation, performing tasks specified by 
Parliament and remaining accountable for its actions. Boyer speil out his 
notion of a limited ABC independence bound by the interests of 
Parliament. The ABC. said Boyer. does not have 
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. , , the sort of independence which is exercised, for example, 
by the newspapers who feel free to espouse this cause or that, 
or to attack governmental or opposition policies as they think !i1. 
The ABC has never claimed and indeed should never be clothed 
wilh. independence of this character, II would be quite 
oulrageous for Parliament to set up a body al public expsnse and 
to arm it with the vast propaganda potentialities of the national 
radio system. to conduct campaigns for causes of its own choice. 
( 1953b: 114) 
Boyer went on to define what he saw as the essential charactenstics of 
ABC independence. Firstly. he said, the ABC must ensure that a national 
broadcasting service is not used for campaigns - political. religious or 
ideological. Secondly, the ABC must ensure that adequate debates on 
issues of importance take place and thai reasonable facilities are provided 
!or opposing points of view to aid the community in its judgemenl. In his 
opinion Parliament had given the ABC adequate functional independence to 
perform these tasks without political involvement. 
In response Rydon once more declared that any ABC autonomy !lows 
'merely by the grace of the government. or of particular ministers. for its 
'potential' independence has been limited" (l953b: 114-115), W1t11 this 
impasse the editor of Public Administration declared the debate closed. 
The Ryden-Boyer debate canvassed some essential issues of 
independence for a statutory corporation. Unfortunalely the protagonists 
argued at cross purposes because they could not agree on a defin11ion of 
'independence', For Rydon independence appeared primarily a question of 
mechan•cs. II ihe ABC controls its own funding, if appointment to the 
board is not blatantly par1isan but represems a spectrum of opinions and 
experience. and il government departments do not intervene in ABC 
administrative matters, then - for Rydon - the ABC could be considered 
independent. Her approach anticipates David Corbett's discussion of using 
an Ideal model to highlight the essential attributes of an independent 
statutory corporation ( 1965: 187-188). By Corbett's criteria, the ABC 
332 
indeed fails to exhibit many requirements of an autonomous public 
corporation; it is dependent on the government for funds, it does not have 
complete control over its stafi arrangements and it is not free from 
detailed continuous scrutiny of its administration, 
Corbett's own work on public aviation corporations, however, moves 
beyond a static modei to explore the context. purpose. goals and daily 
operations ol a statutory corporation. This was the approach favoured by 
Boyer, who looked for the reality behind the form, He felt that the focus 
ol discussion should be on results. intended and unintended. from the 
parameters within which the ABC must work. rather than on the formal 
structure of the organisation. Whereas Rydon stressed the mechanical 
details ol ABC legislation, Boyer pointed to the intention of Parliament in 
selling up ihe ABC as a statutory corporation accoun1able for its 
administration but retaining independence in program decision-making. 
Boyer emphasised the 1doology and traditions al public service broadcasting 
which constrain blatant political interference. He concluded that although 
the ABC does not meet the adminiscrative criteria set down by Joan Ryden. 
it nevertheless enjoys s1gniiicant autonomy. Though logically argueo. 
Rydon's conclusion relies on a mechan>cal definition of 'independence· 
which is simply too narrow to realistically assess the performance o! the 
ABC. Boyer's arguments. on the other hand. point 10 the wider context 
in which ABC Independence should be judged. 
The distinction between administrative and functional issues introduced by 
Boyer is an important qualification to discussion about the !'BC. for it 
establishes the different forms al Independence. It is a distinction which 
rel!ects the inherent contradiction in the nature oi a statutory corporation -
that ii should be responsible to a minister yet also independent. The 
distinction between administration and function helps Parliament resolve the 
tensions between accountability and autonomy. It allows governments to 
!uliill a responsibility to ensure that resources are being used effectively 
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and honestly without having to bear responsibility for Corporation program 
decisions. In this schema government intervention in administration cannot 
be equated with political interference ln program decisions. 
As Rydon points out and Boyer implicitly acknowledges. ABC 
administration is not free from outside interierence. This was true ior the 
Commission when Rydon wrote and remains so for the Corporation. There 
are a large number of political and administrative checKs on the 
Corporation. The ABC must present detailed accounts to Parliament and 
negotiate for finance with a minister. The ABC must deal with a host of 
government agencies to arrange everything from accommodation to 
transmitters. In the name of accountability, the Corporation is enmeshed 
in a web of bureaucratic requirements and must live under the scrul\ny of 
parliamentary committees and inquiries. Such requirements force the ABC 
to justify administrative decisions to external monitors: they are a 
significant drain on the ABC's resources and an impediment to efficiency 
as the ABC must constantly explain and justify its use of public money. 
Though not (as Rydon assertedl conclusively iatal to ABC autonomy. 
these administrative arrangements pose considerable dangers 10 .L\BC 
functional independence. Through lhe budget process governments control 
the overall resources available to the ABC: governments can use 
bureaucratic instruments to reduce the scope of the ABC through financial 
impositions, staff ceilings. new obligations on ABC resources or even 
restrictions on international travel. Government power over transmi1ting 
stations, the planning of new services and appointments to the ABC's 
Board of Directors give politicians considerable influence over the scope 
and direction of the organisation. Legislation may also give other bodies. 
such as the Department of Communications, Commonwealth Ombudsman or 
the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal, jurisdiction over certain ABC 
administrative procedures. Through administrative means governments can 
set the boundaries within which ABC functional independence must operate. 
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Nevertheless. the legislative intention of Parliament was to create and 
fund an organisation with sufficient independence to make impartial, 
objective and balanced broadcasting programs. This independence is 
premised on a multi-party Parliament with all sides having a vested interest 
in maintaining the neutrality of the national broadcasting service. Imbued 
with the BBC ideology of public service broadcasting. Parliament gave the 
ABC its form in a statutory corporation which allowed accountability for 
administration but independence in function. Into this statutory corporation 
Parliament built a mechanism for direct ministerial intervention - 'in the 
national interest' - on the assumption that at other times the responsible 
minister would have no role in ABC program decision-making. 
For despite administrative restrictions. there remain strong pressures on 
the ABC to produce its political news and current affairs programs without 
fear or favour. There is the legislative requirement on Directors, 
contained in the Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act ( l 983l . to ensure 
the integrity and independence of the Corporalion. There is critical 
comment from Parliament. media and public if the [,BC appears in any 
w,1y to compromise its function. There are also pressures within the 
organisation from staff and managers committed to the ethos of 
professionalism and suspicious of any attempt at of editorial censorship. 
Internal pressure to maintain functional independence is sometimes 
reinforced by the commercial media. which has proved willing to reproduce 
leaked documents and has played a conspicuous part in public 
controversies about the integrity of the ABC. 
There has been a fundamental change \n the organisation since its early 
years when it avoided controversy and was. in the words of Ai an Thomas. 
"a compliant institution" ( 1980: 91l. Since the commitment to information 
programs in the 1960s. public expeclalion of an impartial ABC has 
constrained political interference and pressured the ABC to live up lo its 
purpose. ABC programs decisions are now made within a complex and 
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fluid structure. The constant tension between management and produciion 
units. !he distance of the Board of Directors from production decisions and 
the adverse political consequences of exposed attempted interference all 
make it difficult for politicians lo interfere in specific program matters. 
Because the ABC is a highly centralised organisation. it Is dillicult for 
stale politicians, or interest groups. to influence programming which is 
determined by Head Office in Sydney. Influencing ABC decision-making is 
not much easier for a political or interest group with a federal grievance. 
The difiiculty !or an outsider is finding a point at which pressure can be 
brought to bear on the Corporation without the risk of exposure. 
Anyone attempting to persuade the Board of Directors to reach a 
favourable decision about a specific ABC program would discover that the 
Board is reluctant to become involved in program matters and generally 
only comments on items referred to it by management. The convention is 
ftrmly established that members o1 the Board set down general policy 
guidelines but do no1 in1ervene in program decisions unless an opinion is 
specifically requested, 
ABC management usually has final responsibility for deciding which 
programs go to air. This makes managers a logical target for political 
pressure. The first problem. however. is finding the manager with line 
responsibility, The confused lines of authority resulting irom the f.\8C's 
long and incomplete transition to media management. and the sheer 
complexity oi the ABC's structure. make it difficult for an outsider to 
identify the appropriate decision-maker. Even if the right person is found. 
a politician would learn that ABC managers are far from keen on arbitrary 
censorship: since current affairs programming was established in the 
1960s. ABC management has played a monitoring rather than direct 
supervisory role, Primary responsibility for program content no longer 
rests with managers who read every script and vet every interview; sheer 
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pressure of work and the industrial power of creative 
deiegation of most day to day program decisions 
staff has forced 
to professional 
broadcasters. albeit within policy guidelines set by the Board and program 
briefs approved by managemen1. 
Thus management acts as a system of referral and is reluctant to 
assume an editorial role. Although senior managers have power to issue 
editorial directives, such orders must correlate with the ABC's stated policy 
aims of objective, Impartial and balanced programs, Judgements which 
could be portrayed as censorship are likely to spark political controversy. 
The public humiliation of Assistant General Manager (Radio) Keith Mackriell 
in 1976 over the Boyer lectures, and of Assistant Managing Director Stuart 
Revill in 1984 over his order suppressing a Four Corners interview, are 
constant reminders to managers not to get involved in specific program 
matters unless they can make a strong case !or intervention. 
Finally. a politician applying pressure directly on an ABC production unit 
about a speciiic program runs the consiaerable risk of being exposed on 
air for attempted interference. Beyond refusing interviews. there are few 
sanctions a politician can voke against ABC employees to obtain 
favourable treatment. ABC staff have tenure and their careers are 
protected from outside interference by the legislative provisions of the 
statutory corporation. They work wllhin an environment with a pervasive 
ethos of professionalism. The same policy aims of objective. impartial 
and balanced programs which constrain managers from arbitrary censorship 
also deter staff from partisan broadcasting. While 11 may be difficult for 
management to intervene in the case of a single biased program. any 
broadcasting ollicer considered a persistent offender is likely 10 bo 
redeployed. The public expectation of ABC independence which restrains 
politicians also maintains the commitment within the organisation to 
impar1ial public service broadcasting. 
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Threats to Functional Independence 
The device of a statutory corporation and the traditions of public service 
broadcasting have given the ABC a significant measure of functional 
independence. Despite government opposition in the 1960s. the ABC was 
able to expand its news and current affairs programming. The 
commitment to political information and analysis survived the difficulties of 
the later 1970s and is now incorporated in ABC legislation. Though 
poiitical programs have meant frequent and inevitable clashes with 
successive governments. the ABC has largely maintained its integrity in 
functional matters: only in administration does the ABC's autonomy remain 
curtailed. Beyond the dangers of increased administrative impositions on 
the organisation. however. there are several serious risks io continued 
ABC f1Jnctlonal independence. 
The lirst is Parliament's control over the level of ABC resources. The 
system of annual direct grants Is often cited as detrimental to ABC 
autonomy. History is inconclusive on this point. suggesting only a 
potential !or political interference inherent in the budget process. The 
need to present an annual case to the government for continued funding 
may lead to a confusion of roles : as a broadcaster. the ABC is expected 
to be neutral but as an organisation the Corporation must lobby 
governments and protect its own interests. The annual budgeting process 
forces the ABC to become a politlcal actor: there is a risk that ABC 
executives might let financial considerations Influence judgements about 
functional issues. 
There is a further danger in the financial process. The es1imates 
clauses in the 1983 ABC legislation specify that once Cabinet has approved 
a budget for the ABC. this money can only be spent in accordance with 
estimates approved by the Minister. These budget estimates must be in 
whatever detail 1he government requires ( 1983 legislation. section 69, 1 & 
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2l, Though normally presented by the ABC in functional categories, the 
minister could request estima1es submitted in the form of program budgets, 
and then use the esi!mates provisions to refuse funding for specific ABC 
ac1ivities. The estimates clauses were used in 1977 to close down ABC 
radio station 3ZZ. No matter how often politicians may promise not to use 
this process in this way again, while 1he estimates clauses provisions 
remain part ot !he ABC's enabling legislation they are a potential threat to 
the Corporation's right to determine its own internal allocation of 
resources. 
The ABC has long argued that it should be free of the bureaucratic and 
political manoeuvring necessitated by annual direct grants from Parliament. 
The problem has been finding an alternative which guarantees a minimum 
level of income while keeping the ABC financially accountable to 
Parliament. 
regressive. 
A licence fee similar to that which funds the BBC would be 
expensive and politically unpopular in Australia, 
given the scattered population and high operating costs for a national 
broadcasting organisation. In any case a licence fee level set by the 
government does not reduce politicians' power of the purse. The other 
frequently suggested method of funding - corporate advertising - has so 
far been rejected by Parliament as incompatible with the ABC's public 
service broadcasting role, 
The only realistic alternative to annual budgeting is triennial iunding for 
the ABC, similar to that used during the early 1970s tor Australia's 
universities. Each three years the ABC would submit a budget bid. Once 
a sum was granted the ABC would have discretion in allocating its money 
over the triennium. Though such funding would not be inflation proof, it 
would enhance the ABC's independence by providing an assured minimum 
income. While the ABC is funded by Parliament, the involvement of 
governments in the tinancial process can never be entirely eliminated, but 
triennial rather than annual budgets would distance government and 
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Corporation. so discouraging Cabinet from making •• • cuts to an ABC 
In temporary disfavour and removing the incentive for Corporation 
executives to constanily lobby governments to maintain and extend funding. 
The current mechanisms !or accountability would ensure that Pariiament 
remamed informed of how lhe ABC used these resources. 
The second threat to the Corporation's functional independence concerns 
the claims of the Commonwealth Ombudsman and the Australian 
8roadcas1ing Tribunal for jurisdiction over some ABC program matters. 
These claims are more than purely administrative disputes. because !hey 
touch on the ABC's mandate for independence. The Commonwealth 
Ombudsman asserts a duty to investigate complaints about ABC programs. 
The i\BT implies a legislative right to Impose program guidelines on the 
ABC. Both claims are based on important legal principles which clash 
with the established principle of ABC program Independence. It may be 
that Parliament wiil one day uphold the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman and 1he ABT. but this should not be allowed to happen by 
steath. if other principles are to prevail over that of ABC functional 
Independence. this must be through an explicit decision by Parliament or 
the law courts and not the outcome of bureaucratic power plays. 
The third area of concern about ABC independence moves from the 
macro setting to the organisation itself. ABC Directors and managers have 
a dual responsibility. They support and supervise program makers but 
they must also protect the interests of the organisation. There is a risk 
that resource and new proiect decisions will be made with an eye to the 
political and bureaucratic advantages for the organisation. The aitraction 
of the strategic buckle remains. The ABC has traditionally used an 
organisational structure which places too much responsibility on too IGw 
senior managers. This inappropriate structure has frustrated many capable 
managers and given rise to an often unfair stereotype of ABC management 
as conservative, timid and sometimes incompetent: yet with so heavy a 
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workload even the most talented of managers might be tempted to make 
life easier by not approving projects which could antagonise politicians. In 
the final analysis, no legislation and no organisational structure can 
guarantee that personnel in key positions make decisions with the right 
motives: all structures are only as strong as the people who work within 
them. Nevertheless. more stringent selection and training procedures ior 
managers, a clearer statement ol organisational goals from the Board and 
a decentral!sed structure may reduce the vulnerability of the ABC to 
Internal decisions made on politically expedient rather than functional 
criteria. There are trade-offs in any structural change to the ABC. 
however. A decentralised structure would reduce the influence of key 
Head O!lice managers but may increase tho vulnerab!lity of branch 
managers to state and iocal pressures. 
Overseeing the activities of managemenl is a Board of Dirsclors 
appointed by governmen1. Though the Board has limited iniluence within 
the ABC and rarely makes decisions about specific political programs, 
Directors do have an important role in decicing the long~rnrm direction of 
the Corporation: however imperfectly and tenuously, Direcwrs represent the 
interests of the public in ABC affairs. 
an April 1945 speech : 
As Prime Minister Curtin noted in 
, .. in the last resort. the healthy and beneficial function of 
national broadcasting and the maintenance of public confidence in 
the system must rest in all matters touching their values (moral. 
religious. aesthetic and political) solely on the integri1y and 
independent judgement of the persons chosen to determine and 
administer its policy and not on either review by or pressure from 
any sources outside It. political or non-political. (quoted in 
Rydon 1952b: l99l 
The Directors are ultimately responsible for the performance. 
independence and integrity of the ABC. They have to reconcile the vague 
and contradictory aims contained in the ABC Charter while ensuring 
efficient. comprehensive broadcasting services for the "maximum benefit of 
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the Australian people", Despite a clause in the 1983 legisialion requiring 
the appointment ol Directors with revelant skills, there has been no 
significant change to the procedure for Board appointments. Directors are 
still chosen by governments. after consultation with other politicians. The 
ALP government elected in 1983 reneged on its March 1982 commitment to 
establish a formal. public committee mechanism for interviewing and 
selecting ABC Directors: the past practice of partisan appointment of 
unqualified people may continue. 
Directors often lack the time, expertise or competence to fully understand 
their role on the organisation. Many have commented on how powerless 
they felt with ABC management controlling the Board agenda and providing 
the only available expert advice on policy options. With notable 
exceptions. the general ability of Board members to provide coherent 
policies for the organisation has not been impressive, Yet the selection 
process for Directors has not been substantially changed and the 
introduction of a Secretariat has failed to provide the expected independent 
wide-ranging advice lo the Board. Ii Directors continue to be chosen tor 
their political allegiances rather than their expertise. Boards may find it 
dillicult to wrestle back control of Corporalion decision-making from a 
management grown used to inexperienced leadership: such Boards abdicate 
their responsibility to represent the public interest within the ABC. 
!he final area o1 concern about the continuing statutory independence of 
the ABC is the issue ol organisational goals and purpose. Parliament 
created the ABC in 1932 in the image of the BBC: polltical and public 
expectations of the ABC have been based on an ideology of public service 
broadcasting derived from a different cultural setting. As a transplanted 
organisation the ABC has never enjoyed the BBC's clarity oi role. With 
great insight and sympathy. long-time ABC employee John Temple surveyed 
the ABC's social context : 
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... it is part of the mandate of the ABC lo provide 
'comprehensive' programs. which has been understood to include 
catering lor the interests of minority groups. The ABC has done 
this. in some respects notably well. And yet the ABC. too. is 
defined by its social context. Its Gxecutive and program workers 
are nurtured in and subject to the pressures of a society 
dominated by the mass concept and without a confidenl elite 
carrying a tradition of high culture. It provides regional services 
in a country which. unlike older r>atlons. has no deep springs of 
regional culture It provides a national service in a country too 
big. and with a population too dispersed. to have developed a 
culturally-powerful sense ot national community. It provides 
extensive news and documentarv services for a society in which 
articulateness. controversy and :ntellectual independence are still 
often regarded as pesky, ii not downright disloyal. It operates 
within an industry which almost as a marital reflex equates quality 
with minority. or dullness. or both. It is a centralised. 
hierarchical. bureaucratic structure which in the nature of such 
organisations produces an amount of time-serving and timidity. It 
is. in short. subject to a range 
mutually-reinforcing pressures which are 
than the occasional atlempt by politicians 
hard word on its executives. ( 1975: Bl 
at complicated and 
much more important 
and others to put the 
~rem pie points to 1he pressure on ~he Corporation, The ABC. working 
from British notions of monopoly public service broadcasting. has never 
comfortably filled into tho local competit:ve broadcasting system: the ABC's 
traditional emphasis on cultural normative programming, copied from the 
BBC. condemns it to srnall ratings and crii1cism as elitist. The 
organisation has lo contend with commercial rivals lobbying governments to 
restrict the activities of the national broadcaster. and with politicians and 
interest groups who apply pressure to see their own view al \he world 
reflected in ABC programming. 
With guidance from only a vague and contradictory Cl1arter there is a 
considerable risk that the ABC will lose sight of its purpose. An ABC 
which abandons lis lonely \ask oi public service broadcasting and instead 
seeks justification through popularity risks becoming an Irrelevant copy of 
the commercial media. The ABC's mandate from Parliament is to provide 
a comprehensive. innovative service for all Australians. The ABC should 
point out lhe confused demands ot its legislation, the pressures from its 
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competitors, the dlfliculties of providing comprehensive serviCGS with a 
limited number of outlets, Through public debate and Board papers on 
philosophy it slrnuld ask politicians to clarify the role and Junctions they 
expect from the organisation. But the ABC cannot afford to forgo1 that. in 
the long run, Parliament will only continue to support and fund an ABC 
which attempts the difficult. perhaps impossible, task of Australian public 
service broadcast! ng. 
The Political Independence ot the ABC 
There is substance behind the form, a reality behind the rhetoric of ABC 
independence. As the Commissioners noted in their statement of 'qualified 
independence' following the closure of 3ZZ, ABC independence may be 
limited to functional issues within broad boundaries drawn by Parliament, 
but the ABC is more than an appendage of government. Most ol its 
resources are allocated to non-controversial areas and so receive little 
public atteniton. But in its political programming, the act1v1\y which 
receives the constant attention of worried politicians and their constituents. 
the Corporation is not subiect to Ministerial policy in the same way as a 
government department: the ABC has considerable freedom to exercise its 
own judgement on functional matters, 
It is hardiy surprising that \he Direclors, management and stall of the 
ABC will choose programs which reflect the dominant values, norms and 
beliefs oi their society. Ashbolt points out thal the ABC is not 
"independent of the cultural mainstream" ( 1975: 193), In this sense the 
ABC is not obiective. but a reflection of the prevailing political culture and 
social power structure, But this does not mean, as some imply, that the 
ABC is incapable of pursuing its aims of impartial, obiective and balanced 
reporting. The folk wisdom of easy and regular political interference in 
ABC programs does not stand up against an examination of the actual 
operations of Corporation program decision-making. Certainly there have 
been of ABC independence, but usually these t1ave been 
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individuals buckling 10 personal pressure rather than a systematic problem. 
Politicians create the context of ABC activities but, given a determined ABC 
Board. management and stall. politicians should not be able to influence 
the content oi specific ABC programs. 
Nevertheless. media reports and critical articles often claim that the 
Corporation has no real independence. Svensson briefly and superficially 
examined the ABC's social setting and pronounced that "any concep1 oi an 
independent ABC in any historical, technical, or literal sense is mythical" 
( 1978: 13). Former Deputy General manager Clement Semmler asserted 
that Australian politicians "regard the ABC as a medium for their own 
particular purposes". He attributed this to a "colonial heritage" : 
. , . since alter only lwo hundred years or so, one could hardly 
expect Australian legislators to have the sophislicated and 
informed attitude to 1heir pubiic institutions al their counterparts in 
countries with much longer and more established traditions. 
(1981:26) 
This common critical response ignores history. legislative theory and 
Corporation experience. Australia was amongst the firsl nations 10 develop 
the legislative form oi the statutory corporation. Since the 1880s 
Au$tra1ian politicians have experimented with leg lsiative forms to bestow on 
certain projects an independence from the state previously enjoyed only by 
the iudiciary. Holman's speech during the ABC debate of 1 G32 
demonstrates that politicians were conversant with the theoretical basis cl 
statutory corporations and with designing legislation to achieve a balance 
between accountability and responsibility. The sophisticated device al lhe 
statutory corporation has remained successful in giving tt-.e ABC sufficient 
scope to perform Its functions without systematic political interference - a 
tribute to the skill of Australian legislators. The ABC remains independent 
oi government directive. though not of Parliament, which has a right lo 
use legislation or control over resources to re-define the ABC's role. 
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The ABC's success in maintaining its functional independence should not 
be undermined by unsupported sweeping claims from embittered critics, by 
judgement against impossible ideal criteria or by spurious comparisons with 
the BBC, which performs a different function in a different culture. Rather 
the legislative device of a statutory corporation should be judged 
appropriate and successful for the ABC. The device of a statutory 
corporation has limited the involvement of politicians in ABC matters to 
setting boundaries through resource allocation and monitoring Corporation 
administration. When the ABC has tailed to maintain its funclional 
independence against outside pressure, it has been because of weak 
individual managers rather than any inherent !laws in the legislative basis 
of the organisation. The ABC as an institution has in theory - and in 
practice - a functional independence which it might sometimes lack the 
nerve lo assert. 
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APPENDIX 
An ABC Philosophy? 
In the las1 months of writing this thesis. I unexpectedly became Involved 
in ABC decision-making. The material from this experience was not 
included In the main body of the thesis because the process was not 
complete by December 1984, and because its manner of collection was 
different, and rather more subjective. than for other evidence quoted In 
the work. 
Nevertheless, this appendix Is Included because my observations 
supported findings about the operations of ABC decision maxing - the 
distance between the Board and management. the ad hoc manner of major 
policy decisions, the continuing dissension and rivalry within the 
organisation, and the difficulty for the ABC in defining its objectives and 
justifying its existence to Parliament. 
!n mid~ 1984 I Interviewed ABC Director Richard Boyer and, in the course 
of discussions, he asked if I would read a paper he was writing !or his 
fellow Directors. 11 turned out to be a first draft of an 'ABC Philosophy', 
Boyer felt the organisation was floundering, Without a clear statement of 
philosophy, he argued, the ABC would continue 10 make ad hoc decisions 
about important issues. The Board, In his opinion, should establish a sot 
of principles to guide resource allocation and give confidence to both staff 
and public that the ABC knows "what it is on about", 
I read the paper, and restated arguments already developed for the 
thesis. I emphasised that it would be difficult to provide an uncontested 
set of aims and objec1ivos !or an organisation as complex and diffuse as 
the ABC. Because the ABC Charter requires the Corporation to be 
'comprehensive' and sets out contradictory requirements, It Is likely that 
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only 'parenthood' goals could be agreed. ! also indicated the advantages 
for the organisation in not adopting a too rigid statement of policy - a 
vague Charter provides scope for flexibility and unobtrusive escape from 
unsuccessful policies. 
Nevertheless. Boyer persuaded me to assist in 
phiiosophy'. Despite my objections to the concept. 
writing an 'ABC 
found myself busily 
redrafting his paper in my spare time. On the basis of this contribution I 
was co-opted onto an informal committee of ABC managers. which 
travelled around the country visiting ABC Advisory Councils and discussing 
this draft philosophy paper with all levels of the organisation. 
In March 1985 I was invited to attend a meeting of the ABC Board of 
Directors. For three years I had been writing about decision-making 
within the organisation. and at this point I found myself drawn into the 
process. an observer who had unintentionally become a participant. The 
meeting was an intense if unfocused two hour discussion of the paper and 
its implications. The Board was enthusiastic about the Boyer initiative. not 
least because it saw the paper as a way of answering increasing public 
criticism that it had lost its way following the poor public reaction to the 
new ABC news program The National, The senior ABC managers present. 
on the other hand. were rather hostile to the prospect of a Board 
philosophy paper. They perceived - quite rightly - that some Board 
members intended lo use the paper, and the principles it contains. to 
reassert their authority over management. 
The Board meeting endorsed the contents of the paper but. al the urging 
of management, agreed on a rewrite to make it less academic and more 
accessible to its intended audience politicians and public opinion 
leaders. There was a quite heated dispute over who should rework the 
material. Managing Director Geoffrey Whitehead felt that the paper should 
be given to the internal Secretariat to rewrite. Some Board members. 
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however. fearing that the Secretariat might be too sympathetic to the 
concerns of management. argued that the reworking should be done 
outside the organisation. In the end it was agreed on two rewritings -
one from within the Secretariat. the other by a Melbourne academic. 
Boyer will then draw on both in compiling a final paper. 
Attached is the version which was accepted unanimously by the Board 
meeting of 27 March 1985. Once stylistic changes are incorporated. the 
paper will be published as Board policy in June-July 1985. The intenlion 
is to convince Parliament that the ABC Board has. at last. sorted out its 
policy problems. There is talk of seminars. or even a television 
documentary, to sell the philosophy to the public. 
Many people have contributed to this paper. and it is no longer possible 
to distinguish clearly my early redrafting from later revision. Nevertheless, 
the mission statement. the overview, the definil!on of national 
broadcasting. the section on ABC role determinants. some of the material 
on information and analysis, and the principles which conclude the paper 
are all at least par!ly based on my original reworking of Boyer's paper. 
Boyer and I have always disagreed on the ABC"s role in setting community 
values <rnd ethics, and on ratings and standards. and sections on these 
issues reflect his opinions. 
This philosophy paper provided an unexpected opportunily to observe the 
ABC policy formulation at first hand. The process was fascinating, though 
I did not revise my original position that any statement of philosophy for an 
amorphous multi-functional organisation is likely to be so vague as to be 
of little practical application, Evidence gathered for the thesis pointed to 
the 'information overload' on Board members. where directors lacking 
sufficient time or information to explore all issues end up endorsing policy 
proposals put by managers or Board members whose expertise in particular 
field is recognised, The Board debate about the philosophy paper, though 
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long-winded. did not suggest that all Board members understood the 
implications of the paper they endorsed. ABC management. however. 
clearly recognised that this paper might affect their sphere of 
responsibilities, but framed their objectives in terms of style or publication 
details. Given the ad hoc decision-making which has produced this draft. 
il would not be surprising if the final version of a philosophy paper 
intended to rationalise decision-making and end internal rivalry between the 
Board and management should itself become a political issue within the 
ABC. 
FOREWORD 
Public service broadcasting faces considerable uncertainties 
about its future in most western democracies. 
As technology multiplies the frequencies that can be used, as 
satellites extend broadcast coverage, and as commercial and 
other broadcasters have increased in number and proficiency, the 
justification for public expenditure on 'national services' is 
no longer being taken for granted. Adding to this concern is the 
large cost of television. Even the BBC, on which most of these 
national broadcasting services were originally patterned, now 
faces serious questions about its viability. Questioning of 
the worth and thus the future of the ABC is therefore to be 
expected. 
Much of this questioning focuses on a belief that the ABC is not 
functioning as efficiently as it should. This is undoubtedly a 
factor. But the issues are more basic than any administrative 
deficiencies; deficiencies which are themselves importantly the 
consequence of the more fundamental - if less obvious -
challenges to national broadcasting which technological and 
other changes have wrought. 
The essential question is thus whether there is now a role for a 
public broadcasting system such as the ABC which justifies the 
cost involved. If there is such a role it is important that it be 
identified in a publicly stated philosophy. 
With a clearly enunciated philosophy Parliament and the 
community generally would know what to expect of the ABC and be 
better placed to judge its worth. ABC performance - how its 
programs' live up to' the principles and policies inherent in its 
philosophy - could be more effectively monitored. 
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Perhaps more importantly such a philosophy would facilitate 
informed criticism of, and comment about, the organisation. 
The Corporation could then respond more effectively to changing 
community needs. With a clearer sense of purpose and worth, ABC 
staff and management would derive more personal satisfaction 
from their pursuits and perform more efficiently. 
In the complex and competitive Australian media environment, the 
worth of public service broadcasting 1 ies essentially in those 
areas and dimensions to which it can contribute where others 
generally can't or won't. 
Some of these functions, such as being innovative and 
contributing to culture, education and a sense of national 
identity, are laid down in the ABC's Charter. So too is the 
pursuit of professional standards in the gathering and 
interpretation of news and other programming. However, many of 
these legislative requirements are necessarily quite general 
and thus open to a variety of (possibly inconsistent) 
interpretations in the absence of an appropriate corporate 
philosophy. 
Such guidance is also required if the often new and unique 
contributions which the ABC can make to enriching the lives of 
individual Australians, and to their culture, society and 
economy, are to be fully i:ealised. Centi:al to such endeavours 
are the values the organisation holds. These will determine, 
among other things, the responsibilities the ABC accepts towards 
informing the community and furnishing its ideas and attitudes: 
a critically important role it is particularly well placed to 
play as the only independent and truly national broadcaster. A 
statement of philosophy will help guide the ABC's Board in the 
important judgements about values and standards which must be 
made by a broadcasting organisation. 
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The standing and esteem the ABC has enjoyed over many years 
derives largely from its contributions to community services. 
New opportunities are emerging for the ABC to provide further 
unique and worthwhile services and new needs are emerging in the 
community for it to do so. Among these are the roles national 
broadcasting can play in reflecting, and helping the nation to 
benefit more from, its increasing pluralism. The ABC can also 
contribute to accommodating the com.'llunity's desire for greater 
equity and education and its growing cone er n to better recognise 
ana assist minority and disadvantaged groups. There is a wide 
spectrum of valuable services which the ABC can alone pursue 
simply because it operates nationally and exists to serve the 
community rather than shai:eholders or specific groups. 
This philosophy is a recognition of the need for the ABC to 
redefine its role as "part of the Australian broadcasting and 
television system". The Board is convinced that if such a 
'statement of purpose' reflects coimnunity aspirations for the 
ABC, and is effectively implemented, it will ensure that the 
organisation continues to make a vital contribution to the 
health and welfare of our democratic society, 
P.sTABLISHIR:: AN ABC PHILOSOPHY 
R. Boyer 
Mission Statement 
The ABC is Australia's national broadcasting organisation. It 
is publicly funded, and free from commercial market forces. The 
ABC's reach across Australia gives the Corporation unique 
opportunities and responsibilities. Its Charter calls for 
programs which are innovative, comprehensive, contribute to a 
sense of national identity, inform, entertain and reflect the 
cultural diversity of the Australian community. The Charter 
also requires the ABC to be independent, authoritative, 
responsible, objective and impartial, Through providing 
information and a range of quality services the ABC serves 
Australians as a source of information and entertainment and as a 
forum for public debate on the questions facing the community. 
While other broadcasters serve their sectional interests, the 
ABC serves the nation. 
Overview 
A philosophy is a statement of purpose from which an organisation 
derives its goals and objectives. The ABC's philosophy will be 
interpreted by its Board of Directors for implementation within 
the organisation. 
The ABC was created by Parliament. lts philosophies are derived 
from its Parliamentary mandate as expressed in legislation, from 
the broadcasting environment in which it operates, and from the 
Corporation's Charter responsibilities as the national 
broadcaster. It must also respect certain community 
expectations that derive from the traditions of national 
broadcasting in Australia. 
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Moreover, the ABC does not exist in a vacuum and cannot 
arbitrarily create a philosophy. Its existence is shaped by 
determinants beyond its control and its philosophies must be 
receptive to the ever-changing social and technological 
environment in which it functions: they cannot be 'set in 
stone'. The ABC's philosophy will thus be periodically revised 
and redefined in the light of public debate. 
The Board has already given a broad interpretation of the role of 
the Corporation through the goals announced in September 1984: 
to extend the range of ideas and experiences available 
to Australians; and 
to contribute to the development of values within the 
community and a sense of national purpose and identity. 
Australia is a new society, still in the process of formation, 
We are still imagining ourselves into existence, a process 
complicated by the fact that each generation sees a new wave of 
migrants from cultures different from our own. In this 
situation the national broadcaster has a special obligation to 
assist in the formation of national identity and to help set the 
agenda for national discussion. In doing so the ABC should 
place more emphasis on the diversity of Australians so that the 
Coq:xnation, like the nation, accepts the influence of Asian anci 
south American cultures as well as the new interest in our 
national heritage of Aboriginal culture. 
Part I of this paper considers the factors determining the role 
of the ABC- the foundations of its philosophy - and considers two 
popular but sirnpl i stic and misleading formulations of the issues 
involved. Part II discusses the most central philosophic 
aspects of national broadcasting in a competitive environment. 
It concludes with a series of principles for guiding its 
activities. A summary of the paper then follows. 
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There are inherent difficulties in defining a corporate 
philosophy for the ABC- an organisation of manifest complexity. 
No single statement of purpose could hope to encapsulate all the 
various levels of philosophy reguiredby such amulti-functional 
organisation. Nevertheless the context within which the ABC 
operates requires a philosophy to help ensure consistency in 
corporate strategies for operational areas. And to do this it 
must be sufficiently firm to give focus, direction, guidance, 
confidence and support. 
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PART I : THE FOONDATIONS OF A PHILOSOPHY 
1. A Definition of National Broadcasting 
1.1 The ABC was established as a statutory broadcasting 
authority because Parliament recognised the nation-building 
potential of the electronic media and felt the need for a 
reliable, authoritative and impartial national information 
service. Parliament also had many other reasons for creating an 
ABC. Among these was a recognition that commercial 
broadcasting could not afford to serve isolated rural 
communities, that national broadcasting could contribute to 
national cohesion (a sense of national identity), and the hope 
that it would set high pi::ogram standards, assist education and be 
a vehicle for cultural development. 
1.2 Many of these reasons remain cogent, while others have 
diminished in importance in the light of developing technologies 
and changed and changing community requirements. The 1983 
legislation gave the ABC, for the first time, a Charter of 
responsibilities. To understand the implications of this 
Charter, ana to redefine the continuing but changed role of the 
ABC, a fresh look at, and publication of its philosophy - which 
has never previously been articulated in a coherent manner - is 
required, Many aspects of that philosophy which are not - and 
often cannot - be established in legislation also need to be 
articulated if the organisation is to be properly accountable, 
1.3 The ABC, as a statutory corporation, must be independent 
of government, but it cannot be independent of Parliament, It 
exists to serve the public, and is accountable to the public for 
its actions through the Parliament. The effective functioning 
of a democratic society can be greatly assisted by an independent 
national information service. This is one of the central roles 
of the ABC, an institution which complements Parliament by 
helping inform the electorate through its news and information 
services and by providing a forum for debate about community 
issues. 
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1.4 Par:liament' s expectations of the Corporation are 
outlined by the ABC's Charter. The ABC must provide innovative 
and comprehensive radio and television services of a high 
standard. These services should contribute to a sense of 
national identity, inform and entertain, and reflect the 
cultural diversity of the Australian community. The ABC also 
has special responsibilities in education, and in broadcasting 
abroad Australian information, news and programs of cultural 
enrichment. Added to these are certain non-program functions. 
The ABC must encourage the musical, dramatic and other 
performing arts in Australia. And it has an explicit duty to 
maintain its independence and integrity, to broadcast and 
televise daily sessions of news and information and to ensure 
that the gathering and presentation by the Corporation of news 
and information is accurate and impartial according to the 
recognised standards of objective journalism. 
1.5 The responsibility for interpreting this Charter rests 
witn the ABC's Board of Directors. They must achieve all these 
objectives inan efficient manner for the 'maximum benefit to the 
people of Australia'. The Board must ensure that the ABC serves 
the public, a critical difference between it and commercial 
broadcasterswhich operate inthe service of their shareholders. 
Except for ministerial directives issued in the national 
interest, the Coq)orati on is not subject to direction from, oi: on 
behalf of, the Government. The Corporation must make its own 
decisions and account for these to Parliament, 
1.6 National broadcasting traditions and conventions, 
established through 50 years of practice, contributed 
significantly to the legal responsibilities embodied in the ABC 
Charter. Many of these traditions began with the BBC and were 
imported to Australia when the ABC was established in 1932, In 
Britain the activities of the national broadcaster, like the 
arts and science, were at that time seen as justified for their 
own sake. Having a vigorous national broadcaster was part of 
being a civilised community. When the Australian Parliament 
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adopted the BBC model it understood public service broadcasting 
to have two primary attributes: 
a commitment to creating a well-informed public by 
broadcasting accurate, wide-ranging, non-partisan 
information. To ensure the continuing objectivity of 
its programs the organisation must remain independent 
of the government of the day but accountable to 
Parliament for its actions; 
a comrni tment to acknowledged standards of excellence -
in content, in scope and in technique. The public 
service broadcaster should offer the public a chance to 
experience the best the nation's culture has to offer. 
In Lord Reith's formulation, the organisation should 
not aim for popularity for its own sake, but should offer 
programs which educate, enlighten and entertain, 
1.7 The BBC was able to develop its distinctive brand of 
national broadcasting without competition fi:om other 
broadcasters. The ABC was originally expected to provide the 
same sort of services as the BBC, even though the ABC (unlike its 
British inspiration} has always operated in a competitive 
broadcasting system and faced unique problems of geographical 
dispersion. Though the ABC might never have enjoyed the same 
primacy and clarity of role as the centralised BBC monopoly, it 
nevertheless adapted to local conditions and began a proud 
record of achievement. It has grown from under the shadow of the 
BBC and developed its own priorities and identity. 
2. The ABC's Role Determinants 
2 .1 ABC legislation states that the organisation exists to 
serve all Australians. It does not exist solely - as its 
competitors and audience sometimes insist - to serve only 
minorities or special interest groups at the expense of the wider 
community. 
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2.2 Since 1932, legislation has required the organisation 
to provide 'comprehensive services, within the wider framework 
of the overall Australian broadcasting system. This 
requirement for a comprehensive service means that the ABC must 
be more than a news and information service; the organisation 
must also undertake a wide range of cultural, entertainment and 
educational functions. 
2 .3 It is, however, not possible, with the financial 
restrictions inevitably imposed on a public instrumentality 
witn a limited number of outlets, to serve simultaneously a large 
and diverse audience collectively possessing a broad range of 
interests. Priorities have to be determined. And it is these 
priorities (and the content of the programs that result) for 
which the Board of Directors is responsible and accountable. 
That accountability in turn requires the establishment of 
appropriate philosophies from which operating principles can be 
derived. But the determination of these philosophies and 
principles involves the ABC Board of Directors in making certain 
value judgements. They must decide which ABC services will best 
meet the needs and aspirations of Australians. 
2 .4 Making such value judgements may seem inconsistent with 
the proper role of a public instrumentality working in a 
democracy. However, given the need to provide the best possible 
service with limited resources the Board must make decisions on 
behalf of the community. Some value judgements cannot be 
avoided; and the Board has an obligation to articulate its 
philosophy so that these judgements are explicit and consistent. 
In the absence of a corporate philosophy, individual judgements 
will prevail. 
2 .5 There are a number of too easy answers often advanced to 
explain the 'proper' role of the ABC. Though superficially 
attractive, these assertions do not stand up to close 
inspection. Debates about the ABC often focus, for example, on 
whether the organisation should complement or compete with other 
broadcasters including particularly the major commercials. In 
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the context involved this is a largely meaningless proposition. 
While the ABC exists it cannot help competing for audiences. 
Whatever the nature of its pi:ograms it will be 'competing' with 
other broadcasters so long as it attracts some who would be 
viewing or listening in its absence. 
2 .6 Nor can the ABC be entirely complementary in program 
terms. Its legislation strongly implies a complementary role 
because it must operate "as part of the Australian broadcasting 
and television system", provide specialist services in such 
areas as education, news and the performing arts, "take account 
of the services" of other broadcasters and be innovative. 
However, the ABC is at the same time enjoined to provide 
"comprehensive .•. services"; a requirement carried over from the 
BBC's charter that also appears in the legislation controlling 
commercial broadcasters. 
2.7 In practical terms it is also often a moot point as to 
whether a particular program is, or is not, complementary to 
others because the differences between programs can exist in a 
variety of dimensions and their significance is frequently a 
matter of personal values and judgement. Moreover, though the 
rationale of national broadcasting must rest mainly on the 
uniqueness of its services - there being little justification 
for public expenditure that merely duplicates the commercial and 
public sectors - the worth of the ABC's con tr ibuti ons will of ten 
lie in the quality of its programs rather than in the extent to 
which they differ in content from those of others. While 
striving to be usefully different from other broadcasting 
services the ABC cannot let them define the limits of its 
activities. 
2 .8 Somewhat similar considerations apply with endeavours 
to determine the role of the ABC in terms of whether or not it 
should' chase ratings'. Commercial broadcasters measure their 
'success' (and profit potential) mainly by the ratings they 
achieve: usually the share of the audience they attract. 
Public awareness of this simple quantitative criterion, coupled 
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with the difficulties of measuring and understanding the worth 
of programs in qualitative terms, can raise' ratings chasing' as 
a possible role for the ABC even though national broadcasting 
exists to serve different ends. 
2 .9 Alternatively, because the ABC is required (and 
expected) to pursue quality, provide specialist services and 
programs, and operate as part of the Australian broadcasting 
system by taking account of the activities of others, its role 
may be seen as one in which ratings are of little relevance. 
Role casting in terms of such alternatives is, however, also 
meaningless and misleading. 
2.10 While the ABC's services must differ in important 
respects from those of commercial and most other broadcasters if 
it is to justify taxpayers' support, it cannot ignore audience 
responses. Apart from the futility of broadcasting to few, if 
any, people, one of its central purposes is to increase the range 
of ideas, interests and experience available to the whole 
community. This pluralism of experience is essential to the 
working of a heal thy democracy, and reflects the important 
mandate given to the ABC by Parliament. Taken in total, ABC 
services must therefore have the potential to interest and 
attract all listeners and viewers at least some of the time. The 
1981 ANOP survey which showed that 93% of Australians use the ABC 
at some stage each week indicates the ABC's capacity to realise 
this potential. 
2.11 This measure of audience response - known usually as 
'reach' rather than •share' - is thus relevant to an important 
aspect of the organisation's activities. Audience share can 
also be a useful indicator of viewers' and listeners' reactions 
to some programs such as those designed for large "target 
audiences". As the logic of national broadcasting implies, 
ratings must not become ends in themselves as they are in the 
commercial sector. 
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2 .12 Among other things, if the ABC is to 
innovative and take creative risks it cannot 
be different and 
be guided by the 
•snapshots of the past' which ratings provide. Nor can it be 
afraid of sometimes serving special interests or, equally, of 
px:oducing programs which, while are consistent with its central 
purposes, attract large audiences because of their intrinsic 
worth, ABC programmers must see ratings as merely measures of 
one aspect of their activities and never as goals. 
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PART II : ROLES AND PRINCIPLES 
3. Information, Analysis and Colllllluni ty Values 
3.1 The Corporation has a mandate to convey information and 
reasoned analysis (commentary, debate, etc) to help Australians 
understand themselves, their country, society and economy and 
the world. These functions were an irnJ?Ortant reason for 
originally establishing a national broadcasting sy stern and 
their inclusion in the ABC's 1983 Act manifests Parliament's 
belief in their continuing importance. 
3.2 The ABC is also required to ensure tnat the "gathering 
and presentation of news and information is accurate and 
impartial according to the recognised standards of objective 
journalism". This requirement echoes concerns that in 
providing information and analysis the ABC should reflect, 
identify and discuss prevailing community values - so enabling 
the Cor J?Orati on to observe "recognised standards of obj ect1 ve 
journalism". The mandate to provide information and analysis 
and these concerns thus evidence parallel, but f?OSSibly 
conflicting, considerations: the importance for a democracy of 
broadcasting but also the potential (persuasive) dangers of this 
powerful rnedi um. 
3.3 Though satellites and other technologies are 
multi plying the sources of inf orma ti on and analysis available to 
Australians, the ABC remains the sole national source which has 
an unambiguous commitment to serving the community as a whole. 
Moreover, the growth and increasing complexity and pluralism of 
the Australian community, and of its economy and society, 
enhance the importance - as well as the complexity - of these 
traditional ABC activities. The importance of this 
resf?Onsibility has been re-endorsed in the priority the Board 
has recently accorded TV news. 
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3 .4 Similarly, the Board's parallel responsibilities -
those. associated with values and standards in providing 
information and analysis - have also grown. For example, public 
access to a wider: range of news and information has increaseo the 
need for a service whose impartiality and accuracy enjoys 
community respect and can thus provide something of a benchmark 
against which other: sources are assessed. But here, too, 
complexities and uncertainties have grown. The values 
prevailing in the community are now less certain and more 
volatile because of its increasing pluralism and the changing 
nature of its socio-economic activities. The public 
articulation of a philosophy for: the ABC is a recognit1on by the 
Board of the need for greater accountability in these 
dimensions. 
3 .5 Associated with the values and standards obtaining in 
the provision of news, information and analysis are those 
involved in programming more generally. Most entertainment 
programs, including particularly drama, comedy and satire, 
reflect the values and standards of their authors and producers 
and can influence community values. Similar considerations 
apply in the selection and presentation of most cultural 
activities including music. Even the broadcasting of sport can 
be far from value free. The values and standards the ABC 
reflects and the principles it applies in dealing with these 
issues in virtually all its activities are thus of central 
significance. 
4. Values 
4 .l Broadcasting is now one of the most potent of al 1 
influences in developed societies. No substantial broadcast-
ing organisation can escape influencing social values and 
standards, Even the necessity to make pro gr anuning choices 
involves focusing more on some issues and events than others. 
Two dimensions are of particular significance: the role of 
broadcasting in fostering our awareness of values and its role in 
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their formulation (as new issues arise), and their reassessment 
as ideas and attitudes change. 
4 .2 While the ABC has doubtless played a nationally 
important value-awareness role- as is apparent, for example, in 
making rural and isolated community activities and attitudes 
better: known in the cities - it has not specifically acknowledged 
this as one of its major public service functions: it has not 
seen its role, in providing a focus for community discussion, as 
a central part of its philosophy and raison d'etre. Nor has the 
ABC fully pursued the unique contribution it could make to the 
community's value-sharing needs. 
4 .5 In any society there is a need for people to understand 
the reasons for their own views and the reasons other values 
prevail elsewhere. Australia is no exception. Its people 
could benefit significantly from greater understanding of the 
ethnic, social, political and other differences within their 
increasingly pluralistic society. With more understanding and 
sharing of the different values which such pluralism provides, 
the nation would benefit. In the absence of such under standing 
and sharing, cultural and other divisions are likely to 
strengthen and prove divisive, with the nation perhaps suffering 
from its pluralism as happens in so many countries. As the 
national broadcaster the ABC has important responsibilities 
for, and opportunities to, serve Australians in these human 
dimensions. A national broadcaster can reflect the reality 
that Australia has large numbers of migrants and a significant 
minority of Aboriginals whose cultures demand understanding and 
respect. The ABC can strengthen our democratic values of open-
mindedness and tolerance by explaining and protecting diversity 
even as it fosters basic unity. 
4 .6 Interacting with these considerations is the need for an 
effective mechanism by which existing values can be reassessed 
and others developed as new and di ff er ent issues arise. What is 
evolving to replace traditional sources of reassessment and 
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formulation is a process in which values are challenged, changed 
ana developed through public discussion and debate. Community 
values are no longer being determined and endowed with authority 
by ecclesiastical or secular hierarchies or secular 
hierarchies, but instead are increasingly seen as an end in 
themselves. 
4.7 For public discussion and debate to be a reasonably 
effective mechanism, the process needs to be well informed and to 
proceed in forums that inspire confidence and have access to the 
national community. Again the ABC is well placed to provide 
such community services and, to some extent, has traditionally 
played a role in this process. The Corporation recognises, 
however, that there should now be a more specific commitment to 
these responsibilities. No other institution has either the 
opportunities or capacity to fully and fearlessly concern itself 
with such human and national issues. Indeed, it may be argued 
that this role now constitutes one of the ABC's major public 
service functions and that the need for such a function enhances 
the importance of public service broadcasting. 
4 .8 Inevitably, and often perhaps unconsciously, the ABC's 
editorial and programming decisions will reflect the prevailing 
basic ethical and constitutional beliefs on which the nation's 
life is founded. The !'.BC would not feel obliged, for example, to 
appear neutral as between truth and untruth, freedom an<l 
slavery, justice and injustice, or tolerance and intolerance. 
But within these boundaries - which are themselves always open 
for discussion the ABC must strive for accuracy and 
impartiality. 
4 .9 Impartiality is necessarily relative rather than 
absolute and the r ealisa ti on of objectivity more of ten than not a 
matter of subjective judgements that may in themselves not be 
objective. But the ABC, as the national broadcaster, has a 
particular responsibility to strive for the fairest and most 
balanced coverage possible. 
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4 .10 Perhaps more importantly, the ABC must not seek to 
impose its, or any par ti cul ar, values on the community, but 
should allow the public to turn a spotlight on itself, This has 
been recognised by the Board in its corporate goal of 
contributing to the' development of values' in the community and 
in its editorial guidelines and ethics. This can, however, bea 
difficult and lonely task. When subjects that have been 
conventionally taboo, or embarrass powerful interests, are 
canvassed, considerable antipathy to the organisation often 
results. Damage to the ABC could perhaps be reduced if the 
or ganisa ti on' s commitment to helping discussion about community 
values is generally under stood and, hopefully, accepted by the 
community. 
5. Establishing Programming Principles 
5 .1 The editorial guidelines already adopted, and 
published, by the Board recognise the need for the ABC's news and 
information activities to be impartial and independent. They 
also reflect the constraints associated with the intended 
purpose of the organisation, and the values prevailing in the 
community. 
5.2 There is, however, a further responsibility: the ABC 
should openly state the principles it establishes for selecting 
and dealing with all programs and issues involving values or 
controversy. These principles need similarly to be ai:ticulated 
and published to expose them to comment and criticism. This 
will not only influence their character, but facilitate 
subsequent changes in them should they not prove defensible. 
such publi ca ti on will al so enhance the ABC's accountability and, 
hopefully, community support for the activities of national 
broadcasting. In establishing its editorial and programming 
codes the Board has consulted with management, staff and the 
ABC's Advisory Committees. 
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5 .3 While a national broadcaster determines what issues are 
canvassed - and thus makes some value judgements at this level -
it should, as it is required to do for news and information, not 
insinuate its, or any particular, values in the canvassing 
process. For example, while making the decisions necessary in 
'contributing to a sense of national purpose', the ABC should 
make no judgements about the values that should emerge. 
5 .4 This should not mean, however, simply an endorsement of 
status quo concerns. The Corporation is required to be 
innovative and to conform to recognised standards of excellence 
in the provision of information. The ABC must, in short, be a 
pace-setter in community discussion - not attempting to change 
community views and values but ensuring that Aus tr al ians have an 
opportunity to be as well-informed and questioning about 
upcoming issues as about contemporary interests. 
5.5 The ABC also cannot simply report; its legislation 
clearly implies that it should report in the best traditions of 
investigative journal ism. The ABC has made major contributions 
through its investigative journalism; other organisations might 
occasionally undertake difficult and potentially unpopular 
reporting, but none has pursued this function with the skill and 
consistency of the ABC. A free press is essential to a 
democratic society; only the ABC has the independence from 
sectional interests systematically to pursue issues of public 
concern through innovative and reliable journalism. 
6. Standards 
6.1 Considerations applying to values apply also to many 
•standards'. Although this term is often a synonym for values, 
two broad types of standai:ds may be usefully distinguished -
'ethical' standards, those which reflect 'matters of taste' or 
codes of behaviour, and standards which relate almost entirely 
to 'professionalism': areas such as script writing, production 
and presentation. Between the two are standards with both 
17 
professional and ethical elements, such as questions of 
language, pronunciation and syntax. 
6 ,2 The Act provides that the ABC shall provide' services of 
a high standard', whether the concerns are ethical or 
professional. This the ABC endeavours to do, though with the 
necessary qualification that terms such as 'high standard' are 
largely subjective. 
6.3 There is, moreover, an expectation that national 
broadcasters such as the ABC have a community responsibility to 
act as professional standard settees. Because the organisation 
is not subject to market forces, it faces few constraints in 
pursuing high standards. The organisation can, for example, 
set new professional standards in the quality of its news 
coverage and analysis which induce others to follow, thereby 
influencing broadcast news and analysis standards throughout 
the nation. At all times, and through its various functions, 
the ABC must seek to achieve the highest possible standai:ds. 
6 .4 In areas where standards also involve some questions of 
ethics and/or taste-as in what constitutes 'good English' - the 
Board must establish standards for the organisation. There are 
no rules in grammar or pronunciation, engraved in stone like the 
Ten Commandments, only practices more or less accepted socially. 
Given the ABC's responsibility to reflect and aid the 
reassessment of community standards, rather than determine and 
direct them, the ABC's decisions in language questions must 
reflect community ideas and be an on-going process with the 
results open to public scrutiny. 
6 .5 In the case of •ethical' standards another dimension of 
responsibility is evident. Because of its impact and 
significantly pervasiveness, broadcasting, over 
influences the ethical standards of the 
time, 
general 
this process a 
responsibility. 
national broadcaster 
That the standards of 
has 
taste 
community. In 
a particular 
and propriety 
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which. people will accept in broadcasting can alter 
significantly, has been amply evident in recent decades. It is 
also evident that these changes can influence standards and 
values (and attitudes and behaviour) in other areas. 
6 ,6 Here again the ABC should not be the community's 
conscience, But it should accept specific responsibilities 
similar to those associated with other community values - to act 
as a source of information and a forum for discussion. 
Australians would then have more opportunity to recognise and 
influence the direction, nature and extent of changes in its 
'ethical' standards. 
6 .7 The ABC accepts that it has several important roles and 
responsibilities in the formulation and testing of national 
values and standards. On the one hand it is committed to 
fostering awareness and understanding of the various values 
which prevail in Australia and the world. On the other, it must 
act as an effective forum for Australians to question, reassess 
and if necessary change their existing values and standards. It 
must also help in discussions about new values and standards as 
fresh issues impinge on their society. Most importantly, 
however, when acting as such a forum the ABC must aim for 
objectivity, impartiality and balance. 
7. General Principles 
7 .1 Of necessity this paper deals only with the most general 
and central of the philosophic issues facing the ABC. A wide 
range of matters remains to be canvassed, particularly in areas 
with operational policy implications. Examples include the 
extent to which the organisation should, and can, centralise or 
decentralise its activities, allocate its resources between 
radio and television and between the many different types of 
programs necessary to provide services that are consistent with 
its responsibilities to serve the community. The Board also 
acknowledges the need to seek further views and comments - from 
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within and without the organisation - on this paper and that 
periodic reviews will be necessary if its philosophies are to 
remain relevant and appropriate. 
7.2 The present paper indicates, 
underlying parameters and principles 
philosophies of the organisation: 
however, certain 
determining the 
as a publicly funded institution the ABC exists to serve 
the community. As there is no clear definition in the 
ABC Act of how this is to be be st achieved, such 
decisions become the responsibility of the Directors of 
the ABC - hence the need for statements of philosophy. 
decisions about allocation of limited resources require 
the Board to make some significant value judgements 
about the welfare and aspirations of Australians. 
Better to have such judgements explicit and open to 
scrutiny through a published philosophy than have 
administrative and other programming choices made 
unrecognised, undiscussed and unchallenged within the 
organisation; 
the ABC's Charter requires it to operate as part of the 
national broadcasting system and thus avoid needless 
duplication of commercial and other services. It is 
also required to provide innovative programs, establish 
high professional standards and undertake a number of 
specialist services: to be an effective alternative to 
most otner broadcasters. However, the organisation's 
need to serve all Australians in a comprehensive manner 
pr eel ude sit adopting a purely complementary role. Nor 
can the ABC allow its activities to be limited or 
dictated by the interests of other broadcasters; 
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market forces as expressed through conventional ratings 
are not an acceptable guide for the ABC in making 
prograrruuing decisions, allocating resources or 
measuring success. Though ratings can be useful 
indicators of certain aspects of its programming 
activities they are no more than this and must never be 
treated as goals or ends in themselves; 
as a major forum for cultivating awareness, and the 
discussion and development, of community values, the 
ABC must act as a genuinely pluralist organisation. 
Within the boundaries of progi:ams which are as 
impartial, balanceo and objective as possible it should 
provide the inf orma ti on required for inf armed community 
debate. And as the instrument of a secular state it 
must not insinuate its, or any other particular, values 
and standards. People interviewed by the ABC can have 
opinions, but the ABC cannot. Though it must make some 
value judgements in choosing and scheduling programs 
and topics its judgements must not intrude further. It 
must be a disinterested and impartial forum; 
as an information service, the ABC must undertake 
probing, investigative Journalism. Though such 
reporting may sometimes make the Corporation unpopular, 
the ABC cannot avoid the obligation for innovative 
journalism implicit in its Charter. A democracy needs 
an independent and reliable information source such as 
the ABC to ensure that the community has access to 
information that is as far as possible free from tile bias 
of sectional interests, 
ESTABLISHING AN ABC PBILOSOPBY : SUMMARY 
Inti;oduction 
The ABC needs a clear statement of purpose to explain the 
Corporation's worth to the community and to give the ABC coherent 
goals and objectives. 
This paper examines the context, legislation, t.radi t.1ons and 
changing role of the ABC. It explores the unique services 
national broadcasting can provide, and the responsibilities 
inherent in its mandate from Parliament, The difficulties, but 
necessity, of setting values and standards for the organisation 
are canvassed. 
From this analysis, principles are derived which set out the 
purpose and aims of the Corporation. 
Part I : Foundations of a Philosophy 
Parliament created the ABC because it needed an impartial, 
independent and authoritative broadcasting service which coulci 
inform, entertain and contribute to national cohesion. Other 
objectives set for the ABC included servicing isolated 
communities, setting high program standards, assistin9 
education and providing a vehicle for cultural development. 
These continuing responsibilities are reflected in the Charter 
included in the ABC legislation (1.1). 
Legislation requires the organisation to provide an innovative 
and comprehensive multi-media service for all Australians 
(2 .1), Though the ABC must pursue these responsibilities as 
'part of the Australian broadcasting and television service' it 
has to operate with limited resources and outlets. The Board 
must make difficult decisions about which /'13Cserv1ceswill best 
meet the needs and aspirations of the nation (2 .3). •ro help 
guide it in these pursuits the Board has already adopted the 
goals of extending the range of ideas and experiences available 
to Australians, and contributing to the development of values 
within the community and a sense of national purpose and 
identity. 
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Though its prime role, and worth to the comm uni r:y, must lie in 
serving those areas and dimensions of community need which 
others can't or won't, its responsibility is to the total 
community. In discharging these responsibilities it must thus 
produce both popular and specialist programs. It will measure 
its success by the ability of its combined services to interest 
and attract all listeners and viewers at least some of the time 
(2.8). 
Part II : Roles and Principles 
The Corporation has a statutory responsibility to gather and 
broadcast news and analysis. The ABC is the only national and 
truly independent broadcaster, to which Australians can turn for 
information about themselves and the world (3.1). Hence the 
Corporation has a special responsibility to ensure that the 
information it presents is as comprehensive, accurate ana 
impartial as possible according to the recognised standards of 
objective journalism (3 .2). 
Broadcasting - in all its dimensions - is a potent influence on 
community values (4 .1). The ABC thus has an important role in 
helping Australians understand their attitudes and diversity. 
By providing an impartial and independent for um, the ABC helps 
the community evaluate, change and formulate its values. The 
Corporation must also act as a focus for cormnunity discussion 
(4.2). 
While making the decisions necessary to contribute to a sense of 
national purpose, the ABC makes no judgements about the values 
that should emerge. Though editorial or programming decisions 
are inevitably influenced by prevailing ethical and 
constitut:ional beliefs, the ABC must strive for the fairest and 
most balanced coverage possible (4 .9). 
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The legislative requirement that the ABC be 'innovative' 
requires it to be a pace-setter in production standards and in 
raising new issues. The Corporation thus seeks to keep 
Australians as well informed as possible about upcoming issues 
as about contemporary interests (6 .2). 
ABC services are required to be of a high standard (6.2). This 
requires the Board to make some judgements about standards of 
taste ana propriety. Such decisions should be explicit, must 
reflect community views and should be open to continuous public 
scrutiny (6.4). The aim is not to make the ABC the community's 
conscience, but to contribute to the means by which Australians 
have an opportunity to recognise and influence the direction, 
nature and extent of changes in their ethical and other standards 
( 6 .5) • 
General Principles 
From these considerations certain general principles about the 
role of the ABC can be derived. 
As a publicly funded institution the ABC exists to serve 
the community. As there is no clear definition in the 
ABC Act of how this is to be best achieved, such 
decisions become the responsibility of the Directors of 
the ABC - hence the need for statements of philosophy. 
Decisions about allocation of limited resources require 
the Board to make some significant value judgements 
about the welfai:e and aspirations of Australians. 
Better to have such judgements explicit and open to 
scrutiny through a published philosophy than have 
administrative and other programming choices made 
unrecognised, undiscussed and unchallenged within the 
organisation. 
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The ABC's Charter requires it to operate as part of the 
national broadcasting system and thus avoid needless 
duplication of commercial and other services. It is 
also required to provide innovative programs, establish 
high professional standards and undertake a number of 
specialist services: to be an effective alter native to 
most other broadcasters. However, the organisation's 
need to serve all Australians in a comprehensive manner 
precludes it adopting a purely complementary role. Nor 
can the ABC allow its activities to be limited or 
dictated by the interests of other broadcasters. 
Market forces as expressed through conventional ratings 
are not an acceptable guide for the ABC in making 
programming decisions, allocating resources or 
measuring success. 'fhough ratings can be useful 
indicators of certain aspects of its programming 
activities they are no more than this and must never be 
treated as goals or ends in themselves. 
As a major forum for cultivating awareness, and the 
discussion and development, of community values, the 
ABC must act as a genuinely pluralist organisation. 
Within the boundaries of programs which are as 
impartial, balanced and objective as possible it should 
provide the information required for informed community 
debate. And as the instrument of a secular state it 
must not insinuate its, or any other particular, values 
and standards. People interviewed by the ABC can have 
opinions, but the ABC cannot. Though it must make some 
value judgements in choosing and scheduling programs 
and topics its judgements must not intrude further. It 
must be a disinterested and impartial forum. 
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As an information service, the ABC must undertake 
probing, investigative Journal ism. Though such 
reporting may sometimes make the Corporation unpopular, 
the ABC cannot avoid the obligation for innovative 
journalism implicit in its Charter. A democracy needs 
an independent and reliable information source such as 
the ABC to ensure that the community has access to 
inf orrnation that is as far as possible free f rorn the bi as 
of sectional interests. 
These principles, and the !Jhilosophy from which they are 
derived, must continue to evolve as the ABC and the community it 
serves change • Their establishment, however, is essential to 
help the ABC realise its J:;Otential in its critically imµortant 
role of informing and enriching Australian democracy. 
